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ABSTRACT 
This thesis, exploring the rule of law for international rules, offers a human bond 
of common good between determinacy of substance and legitimacy of structure of rules 
in order to evaluate international obligations of States in international law on foreign 
investment. In an in-depth exposition of the theoretical underpinnings and practices 
underlying the normative structure of rules in international law, the thesis critically 
questions the legal reasoning embedded in—and the authority of rules borrowed from—
principles and precedents or  moral and political evaluations by arbitrators in 
interpretation of States‘ contractual, customary, and treaty obligations in investment 
arbitrations. With crucial moral, political, social and economic ramifications for the 
constitutional functions of States and concomitant interests of their human members 
implicated in the concept of expropriation in international law, the thesis provides a 
framework of legitimacy in a common good approach with structural criteria of 
recognition and coherence for the interpretation of States‘ obligations in investment 
arbitration. Coherence brings to the fore conflicting demands of justice requiring fresh 
evaluation divesting a general rule of its authoritative force, and recognition brings to the 
fore the validation of the power to engage in moral and political evaluation. Together, 
these structural criteria offer a common good approach of legitimacy to test the authority 
of States‘ obligations and the power of arbitrators in hard cases. By virtue of these 
criteria, the thesis characterizes the nature of substantive property rights of corporations 
and corresponding obligations of States in foreign investment as contingent and 
consensual in contrast with the absolute and constitutional rights of human beings in 
human rights. Through coherence and recognition, the thesis also portrays a supreme 
status for customary international law for the normative structure and substance of States‘ 
contractual or treaty obligations in the interpretation of hard cases in international law on 
foreign investment. The thesis espouses a new horizon for legal reasoning in foreign 
investment arbitration that eschews the lex lata veneer for lex ferenda propositions 
manufactured from precedents and principles, on the one hand, and the sheen of law for 
the conception of justice of investor-State arbitrators, on the other, in cases of hard 
confrontation between the demands of justice.    
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RÉSUMÉ 
Cette thèse, en explorant l'état de droit pour les règles internationales, présente un lien de 
la déterminabilité de la substance et la légitimité de la structure des règles en vue de bien 
commun des êtres humains afin d‘évaluer les obligations internationales des États en droit 
international concernant les investissements étrangers. Dans un exposé profond des 
fondements théoriques et des pratiques qui sous-tendent la structure normative des règles 
internationales, cette thèse conteste le raisonnement  juridique et l'autorité des règles qui 
sont fondés sur principes et les precedents, ou des évaluations morales et politiques par 
les arbitres, dans l'interprétation des obligations contractuelles, conventionnelles, et 
coutumières des États en arbitrages d'investissement. Étant donné les ramifications 
morales, politiques, sociales et économiques pour les fonctions constitutionnelles des 
Etats et leurs peuples impliquées dans la notion d'expropriation en droit international, 
cette thèse  fournit un cadre de légitimité dans une approche de bien commun avec les 
critères structurels de la reconnaissance et la cohérence pour l'interprétation des 
obligations des États en arbitrages entre les États et d'investissement les  investisseur 
étrangers. La cohérence concerne  des exigences  de la justice pour une évaluation 
nouvelle d‘une règle générale, et la reconnaissance concerne la validation de le pouvoir 
pour exercer une évaluation morale et politique. Ces critères structurels offrent une 
approche de la légitimité en vue de bien commun pour tester l'autorité des obligations des 
États et le pouvoir des arbitres dans les cas difficiles. Avec ces critères la thèse 
caractérise la nature des droits de propriété des entreprises et des obligations 
correspondantes des Etats dans le domaine d'investissement étranger comme contingente 
et consensuelle distingué de droits absolus et constitutionnel des êtres humains dans le 
domaine de droits de l'homme. Grâce à la cohérence et la reconnaissance, la thèse décrit 
aussi un statut suprême du droit international coutumier pour la structure et substance 
normative des obligations des États dans l'interprétation des cas difficiles dans le droit 
international concernant  les investissements étrangers. La thèse adopte un nouvel 
horizon qui rejette la prétention de lex lata pour les propositions de lex ferenda fabriqués 
par des précédents et des principles, d'un côté, et la prétention de loi pour la conception de 
la justice des arbitres en arbitrages d'investissement, de l'autre côté, dans l'interprétation 
des cas difficiles de la  confrontation entre les exigences de la justice. 
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INTRODUCTION      
 
There are structural criteria of legitimacy that frame the determinacy of 
international rules and obligations in their claim of authority for instances of 
fundamental moral and political repercussions for nation-States and their human 
constituents. Recognition and coherence for the common good are a force of 
legitimacy to reckon with in the construction of authoritative international rules. 
This is the theme that this thesis develops in addressing hard questions arising 
from the concept of expropriation in international law on foreign investment.   
Interpretation of obligations of States in investor-State arbitral dispute 
settlement implicates fundamental constitutional powers of States in the interest 
of the public and wellbeing of human beings. Claims against States such as 
expropriation in foreign investment disputes are increasing amid concern about 
undue shrinkage of the powers and funds of States for implementing public 
programs for economic development, environment, safety, or other measures for 
the public and human wellbeing. The situation begs structural criteria sound in 
legal theory to frame the construction and interpretation of international rules in 
this field of international law.  
A thread of legal theory to explain the normative underpinnings of 
international obligations of States in the field of foreign investment is missing in 
literature and the investor-State arbitration. Inconsistent arbitral awards have 
attracted thoughtful criticisms of legitimacy, raising questions about the 
legitimacy of investor-State arbitration itself. Nonetheless, a more fundamental, 
theoretical aspect of legitimacy regarding the determinacy of international rules 
building their authoritative force in areas of indeterminacies is absent. Whereas 
the approach not to interpret a contractual or treaty undertaking of States in a way 
that makes it superfluous is common, the broader concern not to construe such an 
undertaking in a way that renders the normative structure of international law 
incoherent is scarce in the interpretation of States‘ obligations in foreign 
investment disputes. The weight of general international law—not merely its 
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substance but more importantly the structure of international law—in the process 
of interpretation of hard indeterminacies in these disputes has been egregiously 
neglected. The structure and substance of general international law, more 
emphatically customary international law, is fundamental to illuminate the 
interpretation of treaty obligations of States in investment disputes where a hard 
clash of conceptions and demands of justice and constitutional powers of States in 
international law is implicated.  It is not uncommon in foreign investment that the 
responsibility of States under indeterminate obligations is predicated on views of 
distinguished academics or arbitral panels, or principles and precedents advocated 
by them, without any account about the normative structure of international rules 
or the authoritative force of the purported obligations. An account of what the law 
is or how compatible it is with the sources and structure of international law has 
remained out of the picture.   
The thesis will measure consistency or inconsistency, change or flexibility, 
or stability or instability in the normative structure and substance of rules in hard 
indeterminacies by the legitimacy criteria of the rule of recognition and coherence 
for the common good. Legitimacy in this thesis consists in two premises. The first 
premise is that indeterminate obligations of treaty or customary origin entail fresh 
moral and political evaluations in a creative function requiring coherence of their 
substance by appropriate consideration of all justice demands to determine their 
legal content and to obtain authoritative force for the particular indeterminate 
instance. The second premise is that the power to engage in such an evaluative 
process is subject to validation by the rule of recognition. In light of these 
legitimacy criteria, the thesis will lay out a theoretical framework of legitimacy 
for the construction of the authoritative force of international obligations of States 
in building their content for particular indeterminate situations. Approaches and 
practices concerning the property rights of corporations in general and concrete 
settings of hard cases arising in the concept of expropriation in international law 
on foreign investment will be critically weighed in the framework of the 
legitimacy criteria of coherence and recognition. Central questions are, therefore, 
whether investor-State arbitral tribunals when confronted with hard indeterminate 
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situations apply the law or engage in moral and political evaluation and whether 
such a task is recognized.  
 In legal parlance, hard cases may refer to any indeterminacy of rules that 
gives rise to controversy and disagreement among lawyers. The terms hard cases, 
hard penumbra, or hard indeterminacies in this study, however, refer to those 
situations that involve intense conflict between justice demands with all attending 
values, social aims and policies competing in an evaluative and selective process 
in building the content of a rule affecting States‘ political capacity or economic 
prosperity. Given the State sovereignty in international law, there is no set 
definition to preclude the characterization of most issues of international law as a 
hard case. Indeterminacies of legal obligations in international law implicating the 
political and economic sovereignty and self-determination of States are rarely of 
the character of indeterminacy in such rules as ‗no vehicle in the park‘. In 
international law on foreign investment, therefore, hard indeterminacies concern 
situations where the interests of private corporations sharply collide with the 
substantive and structural rights of States in international law with far-reaching 
impact on their political powers or economic funds to perform their constitutional 
functions for development or regulation for the wellbeing of their people and 
human individuals. In this account, the thrust of hard indeterminacies, penumbra 
or cases is initially a legitimacy concern of the validation of the power of the body 
that engages in moral and political evaluations to create the content of 
indeterminate international obligations of States affecting core matters of States‘ 
democratic decision-making and their economic wealth.   
The thesis is structured in five chapters. Chapter One will lay out the 
conceptual framework of legitimacy in general and in its particular relation to 
indeterminacy from the approach of the common good.  This chapter will initially 
observe the multidimensional concept of legitimacy and concentrate on the notion 
that rules must adhere to certain structural criteria for their authority and validity. 
The chapter will raise the question of the determinacy of international rules in 
relation to legitimacy and authority. The chapter will then identify two hard 
situations of indeterminacies surrounding the concept of expropriation in 
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international law on foreign investment for assessment in the final chapters.  
Indeterminacy of international rules on foreign investment arising from customary 
or treaty frameworks and the question of general international law in 
interpretation of treaties will also be raised in this chapter. Finally, the authority 
and legitimacy of international rules as determinate rules will be discussed. The 
thesis will present the rule of recognition and coherence as structural criteria of 
legitimacy for the determinacy of the substance of international rules to test their 
claim of authority. These structural criteria, offering the bases of legitimacy for 
the authority of international rules, will measure more specifically principles and 
customs as authoritative sources of general international law and the question of 
the adjudicative power in the creation of international rules in the following 
chapters.  To this end, an analysis of the rule of recognition followed by its 
standing in international law and the link with coherence and common good will 
be offered. In this regard, the consensual and constitutional schemes of protection 
of rights rooted in consensual and communitarian bases of international rules and 
obligations will be raised.    
Chapter Two will raise the question of coherence and principles in detail. 
This chapter will articulate indeterminacy of rules and obligations in a tension of 
authority and demands of justice arising in their interpretation raising coherence 
for the common good for authoritative determination of their substance. The 
background of general principles in international law will provide a starting point. 
The chapter will depict indeterminacy in a setting depriving general rules of 
authority or binding force and questions the authority of general principles as a 
binding source of law for indeterminate instances. The chapter will explore the 
interface of legal interpretation with morality and demands of justice in the 
identification and determination of the content of the law. Principles of different 
levels and natures will be discussed in this regard to assess their status as 
statements of law. Beneath the upper tier of coherence that connects an existing 
rule horizontally with other rules of the system, the chapter will develop a layer of 
coherence subtle in interpretation of indeterminate rules that links a rule deeply to 
its moral and social roots for the construction of its authoritative force for a 
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particular situation. Indeterminacy and coherence from this perspective concern 
extending legal order into a particular situation for the construction of an 
authoritative prescription in the form of a legal rule following a moral and 
political evaluative and selective process.  Coherence will test the authority of 
rules by their legal determination for a particular indeterminate instance following 
appropriate moral and political evaluations for the common good. As such, the 
terms determination and coherence have their own distinct meanings articulated in 
this study not to be confused with other usages. The thesis will introduce the 
notion of contingent principles in contrast with absolute principles to identify 
situations of indeterminate authority and to distinguish lex ferenda from lex lata.  
The chapter will also underscore a major distinction for rights of human beings in 
human rights and the principles expressing them.   
Chapter Three builds upon the previous chapters to test the adjudicative 
creation of international rules in legal interpretation arising in dispute settlement 
by the general rule of recognition of international law. The chapter will assess the 
assertion of an implied legislative power for international adjudicators. This 
assertion will be measured by reference to practice of States and the practice of 
International Court along with the general rule of recognition in international law. 
The chapter will evaluate the practice of States and the International Court 
surrounding the sources of international law and the particular question of the 
legislative function of international adjudicators. These practices will also 
highlight another structural aspect of customary international law in providing a 
default rule recognizing the absence of limitations on States and rejection of 
claims of obligations of States in foreign investment disputes where hard 
indeterminacies arise as to the obligations of States. The chapter will also present 
customary international law as the authoritative framework for the determination 
of the substance of international obligations of States in hard penumbra 
surrounding property rights of corporations in general and protection against 
expropriation in international law on foreign investment. The chapter will raise 
the supremacy of customary international law with State practice and opinion as a 
consensual framework in constructing international rules and obligations in hard 
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situations of indeterminacy while reconciling States participation with that of non-
State actors at a certain level. For this purpose, constitutive statements of 
customary determination of the content of international obligations will be 
described in conjunction with constitutive elements of customary international 
law. Throughout the study, the thesis will underscore in light of the legitimacy 
criteria of coherence and recognition the essential role of customary international 
law at different levels for the interpretation of substantive obligations of States in 
hard cases of foreign investment. The role of customary international law for the 
interpretation of hard cases in foreign investment notably includes framing and 
recognizing the structure of international law, providing a presumption for the 
absence of international obligations of States and rejection of claims of State 
responsibility by corporations, and functioning as the source for authoritative 
determinations of the substance of States‘ obligations. It should be emphasized 
that the thesis is not espousing a consensualist approach to the obligations of 
States or the freedom of action of States in international law as such but the rule 
of recognition grounded in the common good of human beings that may justify a 
consensual framework or a departure from it. By shifting the focus from the 
consent of States to the common good of human beings, this thesis underscores 
practices and justifications building the international rule of recognition. A 
hallmark of the international rule of recognition is its capacity to assimilate 
absolute principles or to change to accept limitations and obligations on States in 
non-consensual patterns of rule determination by virtue of changing practices and 
common good justifications such as those underlying a constitutional approach to 
rights of human beings in human rights.  
Chapter Four will frame the protection of property in international law on 
foreign investment in hard situations by reference to the legitimacy criteria of rule 
of recognition and coherence for the common good.  In this light, the contingent 
and consensual nature of property protection of foreign corporations in 
international law on foreign investment will be addressed. The international 
minimum standard of treatment, vested or acquired rights, and property rights and 
human rights will come into discussion.  The chapter will weigh the property 
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protection of foreign corporations under assertions of standards and rights in view 
of the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings articulated in earlier chapters as 
well as pertinent practices and tests of common good. Reference will be made to 
State practice bearing upon the nature of rights of corporation in the realm of 
foreign investment in international law. To assess further the practices for the 
property protection of corporations in this field, contrast will be made with some 
practices in a constitutional protection of human beings in the domain of human 
rights. The chapter will also assess the question of the desirability for the scheme 
protection of corporations in foreign investment in light of the tests of the 
common good. In this regard, investor-State arbitral dispute settlement and the 
value of self-determination in international law will be discussed.     
Chapter Five will assess the determinacy and authority of the substance of 
the concept of expropriation in international law on foreign investment by 
reference to the customary framework of building authoritative obligations in hard 
indeterminacies. The chapter will employ the criteria of legitimacy of recognition 
and coherence developed in earlier chapters to customary determinations of 
States‘ obligations in hard situations in this field. Two hard situations in this field 
in the new setting of regulatory measures and the old setting of nationalization in 
natural resources will be examined in light of these criteria. The first section 
discusses the hard penumbra in the concept of expropriation regarding the conduct 
of States arising from investment treaties in relation to regulatory measures of 
States in public protection. The second section discusses the hard penumbra 
regarding future profits in compensation for unilateral termination of State 
contracts under nationalizations for economic reforms in natural resources. The 
chapter will discuss practices and opinions to assess the position of customary 
international law or its change with regard to these two hard instances. The 
chapter will also critically weigh the opinions of arbitral tribunals in terms of the 
legitimacy criteria of recognition and coherence.  
The thesis will expose the process of interpretation of States obligations‘ 
in arbitral adjudication of disputes between investors and States to the test of 
legitimacy criteria of recognition and coherence. It is, however, neither designed 
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nor meant to undermine the institution of investment arbitration itself. Rather, the 
thesis is structured to offer a theoretically sound framework for the interpretation 
of the obligations of States in hard cases in international law on foreign 
investment. At the heart of the legitimacy challenge to investor-State dispute 
settlement in hard situations is the pretense of lex lata rooted in precedents and 
principles and the creative power of arbitrators. Throughout the thesis, a thread of 
theory of legitimacy is maintained to test the authority of indeterminate 
obligations of States and the justice evaluation power of arbitrators in investor-
State arbitration in hard cases.  The common good of human beings constitutes 
the thrust of legitimacy developed in this study with distinct criteria of coherence 
and recognition, which will both mark the preponderance of justice evaluation in 
indeterminate areas of States‘ obligations and demarcate the circumference of 
arbitrators‘ power in investor-State arbitral dispute resolution.  
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CHAPTER I                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
LEGITIMACY AND DETERMINACY IN A COMMON GOOD 
APPROACH   
 
 
The present chapter is devoted to laying out a conceptual framework for 
the legitimacy discourse of international rules in order to evaluate the question of 
expropriation of foreign investors‘ property in that framework. This demands an 
approach to legitimacy in legal theory to evaluate international rules. When 
compared with modern municipal legal systems, international law appears short of 
salient characteristics of law. Conspicuous in international law is the lack of a 
central and organized apparatus for law-making, law-enforcement and sanctions. 
It is not hard to realize that for long States have been engaged in restless 
interactions to address these shortcomings through practices or instruments 
creating obligations and institutions to articulate international obligations or to 
ensure their compliance or enforcement. How far international law as a legal 
system has evolved or how far it must develop is immeasurable here.  Rather the 
focus is on the criteria of legitimacy underpinning general rules of international 
law.   
 
A.  Dimensions of Legitimacy: Process and Substance 
In guiding, regulating and controlling the conduct of States in matters 
falling upon the concern of international community, the boundaries of legitimacy 
surrounding international law need to be recognized. One set of boundaries relates 
to the criteria that raising the right process and content of international rules test 
their authority and validity.   A conceptual framework of legitimacy from this 
perspective would discipline the normative structure and substance of legal 
obligations of States in international law on foreign investment. To this end, a 
theoretical background beckons us. 
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i. Adherence to Legitimacy Criteria of Structure  
The existence of central law machinery in modern States in the form of 
legislative, judicial and executive organs, which is uncharacteristic of 
international law, has not made national legal systems immune from heated 
debate about the nature of law and the validity or legitimacy of the legal rules or 
the system itself. It would be reasonable to imagine that as long as human beings 
have found themselves in a community of social relations, debate about social 
behavior and control has existed in one way or another. Legal theorists have 
interminably been engaged in debates over the validity of national laws. For a 
long time, legal jurisprudence has involved the confrontation of the rival 
traditions from positive and natural law schools of thought. The controversy has 
mainly been over the question of a necessary connection between law and 
morality. It is no settled matter and plausibly will never be a settled matter. Indeed 
law poses much controversy as to the formation, content and operation of a legal 
system and legal rules. These pose multifarious questions beyond the space and 
the scope of this study. To address a framework of legitimacy of international 
rules, however, it is necessary to engage in some discussion about unwritten 
norms of legitimacy that affect  the validity of legal rules and indeed their 
authority.   
The tests of legal validity and limitation on power and authority of rulers 
and the rules have been couched in a number of notions that in one way or another 
reflect an aspect of legitimacy. Parallel ideas have spread across legal theory in 
notions such as the rule of law and the principles of legality, secondary rules, 
integrity, and practical reasonableness carrying connotations of emphasis on 
lawmaking institutions or processes or emphasis on the content and substance of 
the law or legal rules in evaluating the validity of legal rules and their authority. 
We will revisit these notions in more detail insofar as they relate to the 
indeterminacy of international rules and obligations and the criteria of legitimacy 
developed here to address the structure of determinacy. The following section will 
11 
 
sketch legitimacy as a concept that provides certain criteria of structure in 
evaluating legal validity and the authority of rules.   
One familiar concept that provides tests for the validity of a legal system 
and a legal rule is the notion of the rule of law. The rule of law measures the 
legality of and lays conditions on lawmaking powers, processes and institutions 
and the authority they claim as legally binding. In contemporary legal theory, Lon 
Fuller has pointed out certain minimum conditions of the rule of law.  
 Fuller‘s account of the rule of law through the principles of legality points 
to the right process for the existence of a legal system or a legal rule.
1
 Under the 
title ―the morality that makes law possible,‖ Fuller begins to speak of the 
minimum requirements that make the law possible.
2
 According to Fuller, these 
requirements constitute the ―inner morality of law.‖3 To Fuller creating and 
maintaining a system of rules depends on at least eight conditions; non-
observance of any of them is symptomatic of a systematic failure.
4
 Others also 
endorse the existence of certain conditions of legality in variable terms.
5
 These 
types of conditions that Fuller or others enumerate are illustrative and are in part 
germane to national legal systems.  
According to Fuller, the principles of legality represent procedural natural 
law ―entirely terrestrial in origin and application.‖6 The word procedural is 
                                                 
1
 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) at 33-94. [Fuller, 
Morality] 
2
 Ibid. at 33. 
3
 Ibid. at 33-94. According to Lon Fuller, morality resides both inside and outside the law and both 
a legal system and legal rules are bound to these internal and external natural principles of 
morality. He calls the first one the internal morality of law and the other the external morality of 
law. The former sets out the procedural principles of natural law that a legal system or a rule must 
comply with and the latter concerns the substantive principles of natural law. Ibid.  
4
 Ibid. at 38-39. [emphasis added] These eight conditions include: 1) the generality of law in the 
sense that there must be rules; 2) promulgation of law in the sense that rules must be available to 
those expected to observe them; 3)  avoidance of retroactive laws; 4) the clarity of laws; 5) 
avoidance of contradictions in the laws; 6) avoidance of laws requiring the impossible; 7) 
constancy of the law through time in the sense of avoidance of frequent changes in law; and 8) 
congruence between the official action and the declared rule. Ibid. at 46-91.    
5
 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2
nd
 ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 207 [Hart, 
Concept]; John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) at 270-
271; Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979) at 214-216.  
6
 Fuller, Morality, supra note 1, at 96. Note should be taken that, Fuller cautions, the word 
procedural in his account may include certain substantive considerations like a substantive accord 
between official action and the law. Ibid. at 97. 
12 
 
generally appropriate for the principles of legality because they concern ―the ways 
in which a system of rules for governing human conduct must be constructed and 
administered‖ in contrast to substantive ends of rules.7 These principles, therefore, 
concern structure than substance. A total failure in any one of these conditions for 
creating or maintaining a system of rules and an individual rule itself does not 
make the system or the rule a bad one but results in their not being able to be 
called a legal system or a rule at all.
8
 Even a substantial derogation from these 
principles would create difficulty.
9
 This means that these elements of legality, for 
a minimum required, are not simply a sign of perfection of the legal system or the 
rule but establish their existence.  
This clarification was necessary because Fuller also speaks of ‗desiderata‘ 
and the aspiration aspect of legality in addition to the duty aspect of legality.
10
 
Fuller maintains that these principles of the inner morality of law remain in the 
large part a morality of aspiration testing ―excellence in legality‖.11 However, this 
does not negate the necessity of the minimum conditions of legality as a test of the 
existence of the rules. The elements of legality at a minimum function as the 
morality of duty to the extent that their total or substantial failure would lead to 
the non-existence of the legal system or the rule. Fuller discusses ―eight routes‖ to 
failure in creating law, and then states ―[c]orresponding to these are eight kinds 
of legal excellence toward which a legal system may strive.‖12  In other words, the 
principles of legality as duty and those as aspiration are not substitutes of one 
another. The function of the principles of legality as aspiration would not 
prejudice their function as indispensable conditions for the existence of a legal 
system or a legal rule, imposing the duty that the legal system or rules should 
conform to these principles for the minimum required.  
The principles of the inner morality of law are aspiration only beyond the 
minimum they require, which fall within the scope of the morality of duty. It 
                                                 
7
 Ibid. at 97. 
8
 Ibid. at 39. 
9
 Ibid. at 40. 
10
Ibid. at 41-43. The duty and aspiration aspects of legality flow from Fuller‘s distinction between 
the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration, which will be revisited.  
11
 Ibid. at 41-43. 
12
 Ibid. at 41.   
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would also be contradictory to state that these principles form the morality that 
makes law possible without first recognizing that they impose the duty that the 
legal system or rules should display these conditions. This view is evident in the 
Fuller‘s statement that ―[w]hat appear at the lowest level as indispensable 
conditions for the existence of the law at all, become, as we ascend the scale of 
achievement, increasingly demanding challenges to human capacity.‖13 These 
elements of legality not only test the excellence of legality but also and most 
importantly are the test of the existence and the validity of a legal system or a 
legal rule from the point of legitimacy. It is the essence of legitimacy in a broader 
sense to challenge the validity of the legal systems or rules that contravene certain 
conditions of structure. These conditions may vary depending on excluding or 
including in the criteria of legitimacy substantive limitations on rule making in 
tandem with those on institutions and processes in affecting the legal validity.  
According to Fuller, the principles of legality originate in reciprocity 
between the ruler and the ruled. Fuller posits that there is a bond of reciprocity 
between the government and citizens with regard to the observance of rules and 
maintains, ―[w]hen [the] bond of reciprocity is finally and completely ruptured by 
government, nothing is left on which to ground the citizen‘s duty to observe the 
rules.‖14 This constitutes part of Fuller‘s interactional theory of law whereby 
mutual stable expectations between government and the citizens impose certain 
duties upon the government for the legality of the law.
15
 This aspect addresses the 
function of law and interactions that result in emergence of principles of legality. 
Fuller stresses the reciprocal interactions between the government and the 
citizens.
16
 This interaction amounts to the acceptance of law by the citizen.
17
 
Equally remarkable, in a reciprocal manner, the interaction leads to the 
government‘s bond to maintain the legal system and the legal rules in conformity 
                                                 
13
 Ibid. at 41. [emphasis added] See also ibid. at 197. 
14
 Ibid. at 40.  
15
 Law depends on the development of stable interactional expectations between the lawgiver and 
the subject as well. Ibid. at 28-36. There is another dimension to Fuller‘s interaction theory 
whereby interactions conduce to substantive customary rules. That part of the theory for the 
substantive content of rules is not espoused in this study, See Chapter III, Section B.  
16
 Lon L. Fuller, ―Human Interaction And The Law‖ (1969) Am. J. Juris. 1, at 23-27 [Fuller, 
Interaction]      
17
 Ibid. at 28-36.  
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with certain principles.
18
 What follows is that, other than morality, these 
procedural principles of legality derive from stable expectations between the giver 
and recipient of the law. From this angle, these principles find their roots in 
custom as well.  
What is central to legitimacy of rules is ―governance‖ not ―government‖. 19 
The core issue is governance of rules. This has significance in a community of 
union of the subjects of law and the makers of law, particularly in the absence of a 
government, as in customary law or in international law. It follows that in such a 
community the reciprocity exists between the community of persons or States as a 
whole from which legal rules proceed as a collective action of its members, on the 
one hand, and the persons or States as the subjects of law, on the other. 
Legitimacy, therefore, targets the governance of rules not merely the government 
making rules. The rule of law or legitimacy imposes a duty upon the lawmaker, 
the law or its interpreter to meet certain conditions for legal validity and the 
authority of the rules. This represents an aspect of morality, having central weight 
in terms of validity of the rule or the system of law: the moral obligation to obey 
the law depends on the satisfaction of the minimum conditions of legitimacy. This 
applies to persons and States alike. The fidelity to law withers as law‘s validity 
fades because of the violation of the criteria of legitimacy. The subjects have a 
moral obligation to obey the law if the system of law in a reciprocal manner fulfils 
its duty to meet the requirements of legitimacy for the system itself and for the 
rules it generates. The point here is the effect of legitimacy on the moral fidelity to 
law not the moral purpose of law. That a subject loses the moral obligation to 
obey a rule due to infringement of principles that legitimacy prescribes is 
essentially different from the proposition that through principles of legitimacy or 
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 Ibid. at 28-36. 
19
 One may also observe this from the definition of law by Fuller that ―law is the enterprise of 
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.‖ Fuller, Morality, supra note 1, at 106.  
Joseph Raz also enumerates some principles of the rule of law that the law itself must meet in 
contrast to those that law enforcement institutions must meet. Raz, supra note 5, at 214-216.  
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legality, law as a whole necessarily does good morally. It is the latter issue that 
has attracted a great deal of objection to the inner morality of law.
 20
 
H.L.A. Hart acknowledges that rules of law and rulemaking must conform 
to certain principles ―which might well be called ‗natural‘‖ as an aspect of 
―minimum form of justice‖ though without conceding to their moral purpose.21 
The validation test by the principles of legality is only subsidiary in Hart‘s theory 
not sufficient to show the whole picture of legal validity.  In Hart‘s account of 
law, a developed legal system consists in a union of primary and secondary 
rules.
22
 Hart distinguishes such a system from a simple form of social structure 
found in primitive societies that in Hart‘s view consists of primary rules of 
obligation solely.
23
 The secondary rules remedy the defects of the simple form of 
social rules.
24
 Hart‘s concept of law contains much about unwritten rules that 
                                                 
20
 Critics of Fuller‘s inner morality of law do not deny the principles of legality and their 
legitimacy weight on the legal system or the legal rules. They reject their classification as the 
internal morality of law and their moral purpose. They reject a) that a purposive activity would 
necessarily represent morality because it can be used for either good or evil ends; and b) that the 
satisfaction of principles of legality necessarily leads to moral substantive ends of law. See Fuller, 
Morality, supra note 1, at 200-224.   
21
 Hart, Concept, supra note 5, at 207. (―If social control of this sort [by legal rules] is to function, 
the rules must satisfy certain conditions: they must be intelligible and within the capacity of most 
to obey, and in general they must not be retrospective, though exceptionally they may be. Plainly 
these features of control by rule are closely related to the requirements of justice which lawyers 
term principles of legality. Indeed one critic of positivism has seen in these aspects of control by 
rules, something amounting to a necessary connexion between law and morality, and suggested 
that they may be called ‗the internal morality of law.‘ Again, if this is what the necessary 
connexion of law and morality means, we may accept it.‖ Ibid. Hart added that this is still 
―compatible with great iniquity‖ pointing to the formal validity that may arise in a system of the 
formal rule of law that can still produce unjust laws while formally valid and respecting the rule of 
law. Ibid.  
22
 Ibid. at 91-99.  
23
 Ibid. According to Hart a simple social structure carries: a) the defect of uncertainty in the sense 
that there is no reference for the authoritative identification and validation of primary rules and the 
sources of law and the order of the sources; b) the defect of the static character of rules due to the 
lack of a reference, the legislator, to authoritatively eliminate old rules and introduce new ones; 
and c) the defect of diffuse social pressure to enforce the rules due to lack of a reference, the 
judicial and executive organs, for authoritatively deal with the violations of the rules. Ibid. at 92-
93. 
24
Ibid. at 94-97. These secondary rules include: a) the secondary rule of recognition that provides 
authoritative criteria for identifying authoritative sources of law—be it statute, precedent or 
custom and their hierarchical order—to assess and determine the existence and validity of a legal 
rule;  b) the secondary rule of change that identifies and validates the individual or body, the 
legislator, for authoritative introduction of new rules and elimination of the old rules; and c) the 
secondary rule of adjudication that identifies and validates the individuals or bodies, judicial and 
executive organs, and procedures for authoritative determinations as to the violation of primary 
rules.  Ibid. Hart points out that ―there will be a very close connection between the rules of change 
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encompass the legal validity of rules. In a wider sense, secondary rules reflect the 
rule of law and legitimacy by providing certain validation criteria placing the law 
and its author inside the boundaries of the law itself.
25
 Vital in Hart‘s feature of 
law is the notion that substantive primary rules of obligation stand, in their 
formation and application, within the boundaries that unwritten secondary rules 
rooted in convention impose.
26
 A clear affirmation of this is also reflected in an 
earlier statement by Hart that ―nothing which legislators do makes law unless they 
comply with fundamental accepted rules specifying the essential law making 
procedures.‖27  
John Finnis, endorsing the rule of law, also views that the fundamental 
point to the rule of law is ―to secure the dignity of self direction and freedom from 
certain forms of manipulation.‖28 Finnis ties the reciprocity root of the rule of law 
to the common good of the community in that respecting the claims of the 
common good constitutes a condition for respecting the claims of authority.
29
 The 
rule of law is a requirement of justice or fairness and the common good of the 
community.
30
 Justice and common good are in turn requirements of practical 
reasonableness. Thus, legitimacy in this account is even wider by importing the 
                                                                                                                                     
and the rules of recognition: for where the former exists the latter will necessarily incorporate a 
reference to legislation as an identifying feature of the rules, though it need not refer to all the 
details of procedure involved in legislation.‖ Ibid. at 96. 
25
 In a significant way, Hart presents his concept of law as an attempt to mend the positivist theory 
of law rather than opposing the natural law. Hart‘s account of law is more a scathing critique of 
that part of the command theory advocated by his predecessors and generally known as the 
Austinian version of law, which put the law and its author outside the law itself and outside the 
legal limitations of procedural character. See Hart, Concept, supra note 5, Chaps. 1-4. For the 
command theory of Austin, see John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined in 
Lectures on Jurisprudence, (London: 1875) Lec. I, at 11-20. 
26
 See Hart, Concept, supra note 5, at 91-99. 
27
 H. L. A. Hart ―Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals‖ (1957) Harv. L. Rev. 593, at 
603. [Hart, Separation] Embracing such an attitude, Fuller had expected Hart to recognize a 
merger of law and morality in these fundamental procedural rules that are not ―an authoritative 
pronouncement‖ but function to determine ―when a pronouncement is authoritative‖ and accept 
their mixed nature of law and morality because while they are ordinarily treated as law they are 
also rules of morality deriving ―their efficacy from a general acceptance, which in turn rests 
ultimately on a perception that they are right and necessary.‖ Lon. L. Fuller, ―Positivism and 
Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart‖ (1957) 71 Harvard L. Rev. 630, at 639. [Fuller, 
Fidelity]  
28
 Finnis, supra note 5, at 273.   
29
 Ibid. at 272-273. (―[T]he claims of authority are respected on condition that authority respects 
the claims of the common good.‖) Ibid.  
30
 Ibid. at 273-277.  
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requirements of practical reasonableness and common good in measuring the law 
and its content.
31
    
Conditions of the rule of law or legitimacy such as promulgation may find 
positive enunciation in constitutions or other formulations in a legal system.  
Some unwritten structural criteria are part of law entailed by the notion of the rule 
of law or in a broader sense legitimacy grounded in the common good of a 
community that qualify legal rules and condition their validity and authority. No 
positive pronouncement is required to bind legal rules and their creators to certain 
structural norms testing their authority and validity; they are unwritten criteria of 
structure of subjecting authority to law in a system even if in a legal system they 
are enunciated in a constitution or otherwise formulated. The common good 
requires certain structural principles that govern and limit the power of the rule 
makers, the creation of legal institutions and processes, and the validity of legal 
rules produced within legal institutions and processes. This applies to the 
community of States as well as the community of persons. Inherent in the rule of 
law is restriction on the rule of power. The rule of law restricts the use of power 
on the part of those who possess, wield, or manipulate it as well as testing the 
validity and authority of rules in the community of persons and the community of 
States alike. As a concept, legitimacy promotes the concept of the rule of law by 
providing conditions for the claims of the authority of rulers and the rules. 
Inherent in the notion of legitimacy too is restriction on the rule of power. The 
essence of legitimacy is that lawmaking institutions, processes, and legal rules 
themselves are bound by criteria governing their authority and validity. The 
concept of legitimacy captures any unwritten norm that challenges the claims of 
authority by the rulers or the authority of the rules themselves in testing their 
validity or binding force. Legitimacy is the justifying force for the authority of 
law or a rule.
32
 Without that justifying force, the authority of a rule fades. So does 
its validity.  Essential to the claim of authoritative or binding force of a rule or 
obligation is its adherence to the criteria of legitimacy. Before dealing with 
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 See Chapter II, Section C (i) (a). 
32
 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1986) at 191. 
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identification and developing the tests of legitimacy that  provide the criteria for 
their authority or binding force of international rules in their formation and their 
determinacy in their interpretation, a general discussion about legitimacy in 
international law is appropriate. 
 
ii. Legitimacy and International Law    
In international law, the common good requires measurement of the 
authority of international rules and their validity by the test of legitimacy within 
the structure of international law.  Legitimacy with criteria of structure is 
particularly apt for international law whose corpus of general rules is unwritten 
free from a supreme legislature and receptive of morality in a more open manner 
in constructing the substance of international rules for flourishing the community 
of human beings. A legitimate process of lawmaking and rule formation in light 
of common good promotes and ensures the rule of law on the international plane. 
International rules confront the challenges of legitimacy for their validity. 
Thomas Franck has espoused a number of criteria in the treatment of legitimacy 
of international rules.
33
  In Franck‘s view, legitimacy in the relations of States ―is 
a property of a rule or rule-making institution‖ that concerns the right process and 
its compliance power.
34
 Franck, emphasizing the right process, presents 
legitimacy as a principle independent of, and sometimes conflicting with, the 
principle of distributive justice, which interact under the umbrella of fairness in 
international law.
35
 
According to Franck, the prescriptive aspect of legitimacy indicates that 
the primitive status of the system of rules in international law is also due to the 
lack of legitimacy in the processes whereby rules are made, interpreted, and 
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 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990) [Franck, Legitimacy]. Note that Franck‘s treatment of legitimacy also addresses 
institutions in addition to rules.   
34
According to Franck, legitimacy emanates from the perception of the subjects believing that a 
rule or institution has come into being and operates according to the right process. See Ibid. at 24. 
35
 Thomas J. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995)  at 7-8 [Franck, Fairness] ; Also legitimacy, supra note 35, at 208-246, 236-237.   
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applied rather than the sole lack of a hierarchical coercive world sovereign.
36
 His 
focus, however, rests on the descriptive aspect of legitimacy (or law) and the right 
process. Franck highlights the descriptive justification of legitimacy in validating 
international law by its persuasive role in inducing compliance with rules by 
States.
37
 Viewing legitimacy from the descriptive angle as a determinant of the 
compliance pull, Franck notes because the compliance pull varies among rules 
and institutions, legitimacy is a matter of degree as well.
38
 The more legitimate 
the rule is the more likely the chance of obedience. From this standpoint,  
legitimacy is a matter of degree as distinct from legality in that obedience or 
disobedience, while affecting legitimacy, does not affect legality as a rule or text 
is either law or not.
39
 It follows that there can be legitimate rules that are not laws 
or laws that are not legitimate like laws that are not just.
40
 This position appears to 
have arisen from Franck‘s focus on compliance/descriptive aspect of rules. Of 
course, mere degree of disobedience of legal rules does not deprive the rule of its 
binding quality and of course, there might be rules that are not laws. Central to the 
descriptive aspect of legitimacy is the proposition that international rules are 
observed despite the lack of coercive force.  
That there might be laws that are not legitimate still admits significant 
reservation. What follows from the earlier discussion on the concept of legitimacy 
is that rules not satisfying certain criteria lack the quality of legal rules. 
Legitimacy not only functions to measure the extent to which a rule can pull 
compliance, it primarily challenges the validity and the existence of the rule. 
Compliance with a rule presupposes the existence of a rule with authoritative or 
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 Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 33, at 21. 
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 See Ibid. at 21-26. Focusing on this aspect of legitimacy, Franck states, ―legitimacy exerts a pull 
to compliance which is powered by the quality of the rule or the rule-making institution and not by 
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states that in the international system ―many of its rules display authority in themselves which is to 
say that they are obeyed despite the fact that the system has no sovereign and no gendarmes.‖ Ibid. 
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 Ibid. at 26 et seq.   
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at 38.  
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binding force. Hence, legitimacy, in the first place, is a determinant of the validity 
of a rule showing its existence by providing criteria to measure the authority of 
the rule and the authority of its makers. Legitimacy would generate power to 
persuade States to comply with rules when rules initially pass the tests set by the 
criteria of legitimacy for their authority and validity. 
Franck suggests that legitimacy affects the validity of the rule in that the 
lack of legitimacy and thus frequent disobedience may put an end to the rule.
41
 
Nonetheless, in many instances it is not a matter of the termination of the rule but 
its non-formation which is at issue. Franck notes that compliance is one but not 
the only indicator of legitimacy.
42
 Observing that the existence of a rule depends 
on the extent to which those addressed by the rule believe that they are obliged by 
that rule, Franck provides four indicators of legitimacy as objective factors that 
influence that belief.
43
 While noticeably Frank sticks to the descriptive weight of 
legitimacy attracting obedience through voluntary compliance, the elements of 
legitimacy that he enumerates do in fact indicate that their non-satisfaction is an 
indicator of the non-existence of the rule. Those elements affecting the legitimacy 
of a rule or a rule-making process include, in Franck‘s parlance:  determinacy, 
symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence.
44
 These constitute the criteria that 
―[i]n both mature domestic communities and in the emergent international 
community, … determine and legitimate the processes and primary rules by 
which a community regulates itself.‖45  
That legitimacy also validates the international legal order by its 
persuasive role in inducing compliance of rules by States is a significant aspect 
but not the core focus of this study. This study presents the angle of legitimacy 
that relates to the justification of the authority and binding force of international 
rules by certain criteria of legitimacy. In addition to its weight in attracting 
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compliance, legitimacy in international law serves to test the validity of 
international rules and justification of their authoritative force. Even more vital 
than the rule of law in the national systems, where principles of legality may find 
positive formulations in constitutional and statutory texts, legitimacy in 
international law is essential to provide criteria for the identification and 
validation of the rules of international law. The pattern of legitimacy advocated 
here is one that combines process and substance. The right process is a key aspect 
of legitimacy for international rules but not its whole spectrum.  
The rule of law in international law dictates that international rules are 
also bound by certain unwritten criteria of legitimacy of both process and 
substance. Legitimacy imposes a duty on the international law itself, in the 
absence of an international legislator, as well as on international adjudicators to 
demonstrate conformity with certain structural principles of legitimacy to test the 
validity of purported international rules. This is a structural requirement that 
maintains the integrity of the system to govern under the rule of law rather than 
the rule of power. As the justifying force of authority— not solely of the 
lawmaker but of the law itself— legitimacy is vital to the identification and 
validation of international rules, particularly in a horizontal pattern of rule 
formation exhibited by international rules where rules do not emerge from a 
central source. The elements of legitimacy in focus of this study are those that 
concern the determinacy of international rules and obligations in hard cases.  
Legitimacy sets the tests for the authority and the validity of rules. This 
initial function of legitimacy for international rules matters greatly where 
enforcement, sanction, or some kind of pressure of any sort exists. For instance, 
where the responsibility of a State for violation of an international rule is at issue 
before an international court or arbitral tribunal, the tests of legitimacy to measure 
the validity of the rule are of paramount importance. In such a situation, 
legitimacy, by providing criteria for measuring the formation and application of 
the rule, determines whether at all or to what extent the affected State is under a 
commitment. Owing to the special arrangement of arbitration of disputes between 
foreign investors and States, some sort of enforcement of international rules has 
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become available. The challenge of legitimacy for the process and substance of 
rules is irrespective of technical avenues available for the annulment of arbitral 
tribunals‘ decisions in settlement of investment disputes.46 Whatever those 
technical avenues and the flaws in their design, the challenges of legitimacy to the 
authority of international rules survive. In particular, the validation tests of 
legitimacy become vital where customary or treaty obligations of States prove 
indeterminate in disputes before such tribunals. For such disputes, what is far 
more essential than enforcement is the primary task of identification and 
validation of obligations or rules. The criteria of legitimacy, which will be 
identified shortly, are incorporated in the structure of international law framing 
the arbitration of investor-State dispute taking place within the realm of 
international law.  
Legitimacy offering criteria to test the validity of international rules is of 
paramount importance in addressing international law on foreign investment 
including the concept of  expropriation in investor-State arbitration in situations 
where indeterminacy surfaces. No doubt rules of international law in general, 
including those on foreign investment, embodied in treaties or custom are to put 
limitations on States‘ conduct right from the perspective of the rule of law. The 
other side of the issue is the adherence of those rules creating obligations to the 
rule of law. Indeterminacy of rules and obligations itself raises fundamental issues 
of the rule of law and legitimacy affecting the very authority of the rule to claim a 
binding prescription for the States. International law may not be taken to bring the 
rule of law for States in protection of foreign investment without subjecting the 
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issue. The annulment of arbitral decisions are governed by the technical rules of annulment 
provided under respective conventions.  See Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 1958, 330 U.N.T.S.  38, entered into force 7 June 1959 [New 
York Convention] Article V; Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States, 18 March 1965, 575 U.N.T.S.  159, 4 I.L.M. 532, entered into force 
14 October 1966 [ICSID Convention] Articles 53–55.  
The invalidity of a rule by virtue of lack of legitimacy is not to denote that decisions relying on 
such rules should automatically and technically be regarded invalid. On the other hand, the 
challenge of legitimacy to the validity of international rules relied on by the arbitral tribunals 
remains in the face of the technical validity of the decisions under respective conventions.  The 
annulment of arbitral decisions follows its own procedural rules.  Yet, upholding a decision of an 
arbitral tribunal or even absence of such a claim for annulment does not affect the challenge of 
invalidity of the relied rules in view of legitimacy. 
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authority and validity of purported international rules and obligations in this field 
to the tests of legitimacy. If the indeterminacy of rules of expropriation and 
similar provisions in the field of foreign investment in international law is not 
disciplined by the framework criteria of legitimacy in the structure of international 
law, it will be much akin to calling for the rule of law without respecting the rule 
of law. With these premises in mind, we may now turn to the criteria of 
legitimacy that surround the formation and validity of international rules and 
obligations and their indeterminacy in interpretation. To this end, it is first 
appropriate to assess the determinacy of international rules itself as a requirement 
of legitimacy and overview indeterminacy of international rules on foreign 
investment.  
 
B. Determinacy in Legitimacy of Structure   
This section sketches the overview of determinacy for authoritative or 
binding force of rules of international law. It will also frame the question of 
expropriation rules in international law in view of their determinacy within the 
legitimacy framework testing their authority or binding force. The issue will be 
developed in the following sections and chapters of this study.  
 
i. Indeterminacy, Conflict of Rules and Exceptions  
Situated in the context of a system of law, a specific rule or obligation 
operates in relation to other rules of the system. That also raises an aspect of 
coherence that deals with the operation of legal rules in coherence with one 
another in the context of the whole legal system. From a contextual treatment of 
rules follows that rules of a system are interconnected and cannot operate 
regardless of one another. In international law, for instance, the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties in Article 26 stipulates that treaties are binding 
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on the State parties, thus codifies pacta sunt servanda.
47
 Under a series of other 
articles, however, the application of Article 26 may yield to conflicting rules of 
the system that may surface. Thus, the Vienna Convention makes pacta sunt 
servanda coherent by adding articles that make the binding force of treaty 
obligations subject to the absence of nullity provisions under Article 52,
48
 and 
peremptory norms under Article 53,
49
 the impossibility of performance under 
Article 61,
50
 and changed circumstances under Article 62 of the same 
convention.
51
 In this way, the application of an obligation under Article 26, with 
the pacta sunt servanda or good faith principle behind it, is subject to contextual 
coherence in relation to application of other rules of international law in the 
broader context as well as other provisions in the narrow context of the treaty. 
This contextual relation extends to general customary international law creating 
rules that may conflict in practice with other rules of the system. Such conflicts 
may raise the overriding character of certain peremptory or mandatory rules in a 
hierarchical manner or the operation of horizontally conflicting rules such as 
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 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 8 I.L.M. 679. [Vienna Convention]. Article 26: ―Every treaty in force is binding upon the 
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.‖ Ibid. 
48
 Article 52 of the Vienna Convention: ―A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the 
threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the 
United Nations.‖  
49
 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention: ―A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts 
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.‖ 
Peremptory norms will be discussed in some detail when discussing the right content of rules. 
50
 Article 61.1 of the Vienna Convention: ―A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a 
treaty as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the 
permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. 
If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation 
of the treaty.‖  
51
 Article 62 of the Vienna Convention: ―1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has 
occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not 
foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the 
treaty unless: (a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent 
of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform 
the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty. 2. A fundamental change of 
circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if 
the treaty establishes a boundary; or (b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the 
party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation 
owed to any other party to the treaty. 3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a 
fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it 
may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.‖ 
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changed circumstances, force majeure, etc. becoming overriding where 
applicable.    
Conflicting rules may exist in a variety of settings including the conflict 
between obligations of States within different treaties or under a treaty and 
customary law. The conflict of rules with specific content in horizontal or 
hierarchical relationships with one another, posing one aspect of determinacy and 
coherence reflected in legal interpretation and legal reasoning concerning existing 
rules, is not the focus of indeterminacy in this study. Such a conflict may 
increasingly occur in special regimes of treaties creating lex specialis.
52
 In 
particular, lex specialis poses the danger of fragmentation arising from individual 
regimes detached from the system of law.
53
 On the other hand, conflict of rules 
may surface in the form of rules that block the application of another specific rule 
with specific content due to factual issues falling under the rules providing legal 
excuses. Such rules supplying legal excuses to other rules of specific content are 
partly expressed in the Vienna Convention mentioned above as part of the 
coherence in the application of existing rules. Article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention providing for changed circumstances, where established in factual 
analysis, would be a justified excuse overriding Article 26 of the Convention.  
Certain excuses also exist within the framework of general international law 
regarding State responsibility.
54
 Necessity is one example. Thus, a State that has 
accorded national treatment in entry and establishment to a particular industry 
under an investment treaty may later bring a defense of necessity or changed 
circumstances. In fact international instruments often include provisions that raise 
obligations in relation to other rights and obligations. Treaties may also 
                                                 
52
 See International Law Commission (ILC) Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group 
of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.702. (July 18, 2006). The report points 
out the conflict of rules or obligations in relations between general and special law (lex specialis), 
past and subsequent law (lex posterior) and subordinate and hierarchical law (lex superior). Ibid. 
53
 Ibid.   
54
 See Articles 20 to 26 of Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, Adopted by the International Law Commission at its Fifty-Third Session (2001), Report of 
the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third  Session, official Records of the 
General Assembly, Fifty-Sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), Chap. IV.E.1) November 
2001. [Draft Articles on State Responsibility] 
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incorporate a defense of necessity or other general or particular exceptions 
contemplated in the treaty. These are only defenses for non-performance of an 
existing international obligation.  Defenses of necessity, changed circumstances, 
etc. are challenging aspects of adjudication including investment arbitration but 
not the problem of interpretation in view of legitimacy focused in here.  
The conflict of rules in legal interpretation may harbor a kind of 
indeterminacy that the law or the rule itself is indeterminate to a particular 
situation. The issue of lex specialis and conflict of rules or the clash of rule and 
exception should not obscure what may actually be a question whether at all the 
scope of a rule ab initio covers a particular situation. Where the scope of a rule is 
indeterminate in its reach to a particular situation or instance, it is no longer a 
question of rule and exception to require establishment of an exception to defeat 
the rule. The process rather turns on the conflict of demands of justice in creating 
the rule and constructing its authoritative force in the first place for a particular 
situation in the area of indeterminacy.      
 
ii. Determinacy and the Claim of Authority   
Determinacy is a principle of legitimacy of international rules.
55
 
Determinacy in one sense requires clarity of the rule in communicating what is 
expected of the rule.
56
 In order to be legitimate, a rule must communicate what 
acts or omissions it permits and what acts and omissions it forbids.
57
 Determinacy 
of the law thus constitutes a principle of legality.
58
 Clarity may still result in 
absurdity, unfairness, or incoherence rendering the rule an ―idiot rule‖ as opposed 
to a ―sophist rule‖.59 An absolute rule without exception becomes an idiot rule and 
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 Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 33, at 50-66. 
56
 Ibid. Determinacy as a principle of legitimacy not only determines what is expected of the rule 
but also justifies compliance. Ibid. at 57. 
57
 Ibid. at 57. 
58
 Fuller, Morality, supra note 1, at 63-64. (―obscure and incoherent legislation can make legality 
unattainable by anyone, or at least unattainable without an unauthorized revision which itself 
impairs legality.‖) Ibid. at 63. See also Finnis, supra note 5, at 270; Raz, supra note 5, at 214. 
59
 See Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 33, at 77-83. 
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that with exceptions is a sophist rule.
60
 Rebus sic stantibus, for example, 
represents a rule making another rule, i.e. pacta sunt servanda sophist.
61
  
According to Franck, unclear rules may be clarified by the interpretive, 
clarifying processes and (mainly judicial) institutions as the process aspect of 
determinacy.
62
 However, the interpreting body and the process that they employ 
must exhibit legitimacy and be validated as well.
63
 Thus, sophist rules create their 
own problem of legitimacy, namely the legitimacy of the interpretative clarifying 
process and institution.
64
 In discussing this type of the so-called interpretive 
clarification and concomitant legitimacy of the so-called clarifying process and 
institutions, Franck points to the case-by-case factual assessment in a fact-finding 
process implicated in the application of the rule leading to the choice between 
conflicting rules.
65
 The ambiguity as to the application of an existing rule in 
relation to other existing rules that the law has determined (whether in the form of 
an exception to a general rule or another rule of the system) often  involving 
factual analysis for their choice as well as the associated clarifying interpretive 
processes and institutions represents one sort of indeterminacy. This should be 
distinguished from another type of interpretive process entailed by a more 
fundamental form of indeterminacy and concomitant requirements of legitimacy 
for the interpretive process and power of the interpretive institution in relation to 
the creation of rules.  
Determinacy of the law or a rule beyond its clarity or precision, or 
communication of what is expected satisfying certainty and predictability 
concerns its authoritative or binding force for its covered instances and situations, 
posing the position of law in areas where the law or the rule is indeterminate for a 
situation or instance.
 
This is what occurs often under the open texture or 
indeterminacy of the law or a rule.
66
 Determinacy poses the creation of rules that 
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 See ibid. 
61
 Ibid. at 85.     
62
 Ibid. at 64-66, see also 80-81.  
63
 Ibid. at 77-83. 
64
 Ibid. at 64-66, 85. 
65
 See ibid. at 82, 88. 
66
 The theoretical underpinnings of indeterminacy will be developed in Chapter II.  
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may often be obscured or disguised in a fact-finding or rule-application process in 
legal interpretation and legal reasoning.  
There is a far more fundamental challenge of legitimacy than validating a 
clarifying process and institution for a factual analysis or the choice between 
conflicting existing rules of law. Determinacy more basically poses the authority 
of the law as well as the validation of process and power of the interpretive 
institution within the framework of legitimacy in a given system for creating rules 
for particular situations that due to their moral and political underpinnings do not 
fit, and thereby deprive of authority, a general proposition of law.  This is closely 
related to the question of the status of a rule applicable to a settled instance to 
apply as a general principle to an unsettled situation posing the determinacy of the 
rule right in terms of its authority for a particular situation raising conflicting 
justice demands of its own. An indeterminate international rule or obligation of 
customary or treaty origin confronts the challenges of legitimacy.  At the heart of 
indeterminacy is that legitimacy forbids that the authority of a rule established for 
a settled scope be transferred as a matter of law to situations for which the rule is 
indeterminate. If a treaty or customary obligation is indeterminate in its scope to a 
particular situation, it is no more a question of the operation of a specific 
obligation but formation of a new one for a particular instance, raising justice 
demands and policy options, whose legal determination must be disciplined in a 
framework of legitimacy to obtain authority and validity. For an international rule 
to claim authority, its determinacy for a particular situation must adhere to the 
criteria of legitimacy that validates its origin and content.  From this angle, 
determinacy in the framework of legitimacy concerns the authority or binding 
force of a rule in relation to an unsettled particular situation or instance as well as 
criteria for validation of the process of creating and the power of the creating 
body for an authoritative determination of the content of the rule. In this thesis, 
reference to determinacy/indeterminacy is this notion where interpretation 
involves moral and political evaluations and the legitimacy foundations of the law 
for validation of the process and substance.  
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It must be remembered that indeterminacy does not necessarily undermine 
legitimacy but is part of the character of a dynamic, evolutionary system of law 
that reclaims justice as circumstances unfold in a community be it that of human 
beings or of the States, which require legitimate processes for authoritative 
solutions. Moreover, legitimacy structures the determinacy of the law or the rule 
for particular indeterminate cases.  This thesis offers a framework of legitimacy 
for the structure of determinacy. It will present two distinct structural criteria for 
the legitimacy of international rules to discipline the determinacy of rules of 
international law in foreign investment in particular the concept of expropriation. 
These criteria of legitimacy frame the determinacy of international rules 
implicating sources of general international law and in a broader range the 
lawmaking powers in areas of indeterminacy. Before identifying these criteria of 
legitimacy, it is appropriate to overview indeterminacy in the concept of 
expropriation in international law on foreign investment, which arises in both 
treaty and customary frameworks.      
 
iii. Indeterminacy and the Concept of Expropriation: A Network of 
Practices and Provisions under a System of Law 
All treaty or customary rules and obligations may at some point become 
indeterminate. Investment treaty provisions or customary rules of international 
law on foreign investment in their existing ambit of coverage operate in coherence 
with other conflicting treaty or customary obligations on human rights, 
environment and so forth or with other rules or exceptions in treaties or in custom. 
More foundationally, human rights, labor rights, economic development, 
environment, climate change, health, safety, and other matters to protect or 
flourish collective and individual human beings are relevant in a layer of 
coherence involving moral and political evaluations in instances posing 
indeterminacies in the obligations of States in foreign investment. In areas of 
indeterminacies in the obligations of States in foreign investment, public or 
human values and concerns are no longer implicated as a matter of conflict with 
an existing obligation of States but as a matter of demands of justice to be 
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considered in the creation of a rule for the particular indeterminate instance.  Such 
an evaluative process of creation of the content of indeterminate obligations of 
States is subject to criteria of legitimacy that frame the determinacy and authority 
of rules and obligations in foreign investment. The framework of legitimacy is 
above all necessary in hard cases of foreign investment including hard 
indeterminacies that have surfaced surrounding the concept of expropriation.  
 
a) International Law on Expropriation in an Interface of Contract, Treaty, 
Custom and Principle   
The annals of State practice record a range of controversies regarding the 
juridical relationship of the conduct of States and the property of investors in 
international law whether such a relation is anchored in a treaty, contract, custom, 
or principle. The controversies have not so much targeted the authority of 
international law itself but the authority of a purported rule because of its 
indeterminacy. Indeterminacy of law lies at the root of the normative conflict in 
the concept of expropriation of the property of foreign corporations.  
In customary international law, on the one hand, the international 
minimum standard of treatment has suffered greatly for its indeterminate status as 
a legal rule.
67
 On the other hand, the extent of compensation for expropriated 
property and the conditions of legality for it have been the subject of 
indeterminacy. The indeterminacy has become in some ways compounded in the 
wake of investment treaties. Thus, what constitutes expropriation in the first place 
has also become the subject of heated controversy.   
In international instruments including treaties on foreign investment, a 
variety of language has aimed to express States‘ obligation for expropriation and 
compensation. These instruments range from draft codes and articles in 
instruments of some institutions or in failed multilateral attempts to bilateral and 
regional treaty arrangements. Currently bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
constitute the dominant treaty pattern for foreign investment. BITs succeeded 
treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation (FCNs) in relation to investment 
                                                 
67
 See Chapter IV, Section A (i). 
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and coexist with a rising pattern of treaties that addresses foreign investment 
alongside trade. 
On the multilateral level, provisions of foreign investment—as short as 
those in the draft Havana Charter or as extensive as in the draft Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) under the auspices of the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)—failed to materialize.68 A 
number of draft articles or guidelines also address expropriation and 
compensation. These notably include the Harvard Draft,
69
 the United States 
Restatement Third,
70
 and the World Bank Guidelines.
71
  Most of these instruments 
address expropriation and compensation in general terms with variations in 
language. BITs commonly refer to expropriation and nationalization without 
defining or distinguishing them as well as reference to ‗dispossession,‘ 
‗deprivation,‘ ‗tantamount or equivalent to expropriation,‘ etc.72 As to the 
provisions on compensation, many BITs mention the terms prompt, adequate, and 
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 Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana Charter for an 
International Trade Organization, Havana, Cuba, Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4 (1948) 
[Havana Charter]; OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 12 October 
1967, (1968) 7 ILM 117;  The OECD Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, (1998), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng9817e.pdf ;  
69
 Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens (1961) 
drafted by Louis B. Sohn & Richard R. Baxter, (1961) 55 AJIL 545, reprinted in FV García 
Amador, Louis B. Sohn , and Richard R. Baxter, Recent Codification of the Law of State 
Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Dobhs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1974). 
[Harvard Draft] 
70
 Restatement of the Law Third, the Foreign Relations of the United States,‖ American Law 
Institute ,Volume 1, 1987, Section 712.  [Restatement Third] 
71
 The World Bank Guidelines on Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, Article IV, (1992) 31 
ILM 1379, at 1382.  
72
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Bilateral Investment 
Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking, at 44, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5 (2007). [UNCTAD, BITs 95-06] Many particularly recent investment 
treaties refer to ‗direct or indirect measures having effect equivalent or tantamount to 
expropriation.‘ See NAFTA, Article 1110 (1): ―No Party shall directly or indirectly nationalize or 
expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure 
tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment (‗expropriation‘)‖ Ibid. 
Certain instruments do not even mention expropriation or nationalization but rather refer to the 
deprivation of property. See OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property (1967) 
Article 3, referring to ―measures depriving, directly or indirectly, of his property a national of 
another Party….‖ Ibid. The definition of investment within investment treaties may also widen or 
narrow the covered investment. 
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effective or refer to market value, fair market value, or genuine value of the asset 
expropriated.
73
 
Theses semantic provisions, while having significant weight when a 
specific commitment about a specific situation is addressed, do not necessarily 
preclude indeterminacy that may arise with regard to a treaty obligation in the 
course of its application, particularly when a hard indeterminacy arises. 
Expropriation itself is only one term among others. Nationalization, requisition, 
confiscation are other familiar terms having their own connotations. There are 
also categorizations such as direct, indirect, creeping, constructive, regulatory, 
tantamount or equivalent to expropriation in relation to the State conduct or full, 
partial, adequate, just, equitable, or appropriate in relation to the amount of 
compensation. No matter the phraseology or categorization, where the essence of 
the rule or obligation is indeterminate in its scope to a particular situation, the 
authority of the rule itself is subject to the tests of legitimacy. In a framework of 
legitimacy in areas of indeterminacy, beyond and beneath semantics, the 
validation criteria constructing the structure and content of rules come into focus.  
Due to open texture, rules of international law on expropriation may pose 
a broad range of issues. A tax measure, an act affecting intellectual property, a 
forced sale,  removal of control or management over property, a breach of 
contract or its terms, a court decision resulting in the deprivation of property, and 
countless other acts may raise interpretation.
74
 Thus, questions arise whether such 
acts constitute expropriation or whether the remedy is restitution or specific 
performance, or damages or compensation, or whether compensation includes 
future profits, or simple or compound interest and at what rate, from what date, 
and so forth. This study does not discuss all concrete settings of indeterminacy of 
foreign investment rules or all indeterminacy settings of the expropriation rules. It 
will rather introduce a framework of legitimacy for the structure of determinacy 
of the foreign investment rules and applies this framework to hard instances of 
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 See UNCTAD, BITs 95-06, supra note 72, at 48.  
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 Some of these issues may also receive special regimes through separate treaties such as 
international tax treaties or agreements on intellectual property. A court decision to qualify 
expropriation often raises the denial of justice rule and exhaustion of local remedies in customary 
international law.  
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indeterminacy arisen in the legal discourse of the concept of expropriation in 
international law on investment.  
This thesis will address two situations of hard indeterminacies in the 
concept of expropriation that has surfaced in the evolution of this juridical 
institution in international law on foreign investment. The first situation concerns 
economic development reform in natural resources where hard indeterminacy has 
emerged as to whether compensation for nationalization resulting in cancellation 
of economic development agreements includes future profits that the investor 
could have earned from the revenue of the sales of the resource for the term of the 
agreement. This indeterminacy surfaced in customary international law when 
States unilaterally terminated economic development agreements in natural 
resources, primarily in the oil industry, in implementing a measure of 
nationalization. Does international law prescribe future profits for cancellation of 
an economic development agreement with a foreign investor in such a situation?  
The second situation concerns a more recent case of hard indeterminacy whether 
bona fide regulation to protect public health, safety, environment, or other social 
and economic objectives for the public and human wellbeing constitutes 
expropriation compensable in international law. This indeterminacy has arisen 
following investment treaty arbitrations. Does international law characterize such 
conduct of States in their constitutional functions affecting the property of foreign 
corporations as a compensable act of expropriation?  
The authority or binding force of the rule or obligation in such hard 
indeterminacies depends on adherence to the criteria of legitimacy. These 
situations of hard indeterminacies do not merely involve legal questions but rather 
moral and political underpinnings whose engagement must be legitimated 
according to the criteria of legitimacy in international law. These hard instances of 
indeterminacy of States‘ obligations emanating from their contractual, 
conventional, and customary relations are inextricably bound to general 
international law in the process of the interpretation and identification of the 
content of their obligations in these particular hard situations. This figures in not 
simply what the sources of general international law are but the legitimacy 
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framework providing the structure of determinacy by identifying and disciplining 
the sources and the criteria of validity of the system of international law for this 
field. Before dealing with the legitimacy criteria of structure, it is also appropriate 
to discuss the question of general international law for the interpretation of treaty 
obligations.  
 
b) Interpretation in Light of General International Law  
The interpretation of treaties including investment treaties is subject to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In a wider context, treaties belong and 
are subject to the whole system of general international law as the governing legal 
order. Reference to the governing law of the dispute is the stepping-stone of any 
legal interpretation.  
The Vienna Convention embodies the provisions for treaty interpretation 
under Articles 31 to 33. Article 31 provides for the ―general rule of 
interpretation.‖75 Article 32 provides for ―supplementary means of interpretation‖ 
including reference to the preparatory work and circumstances at the time of the 
treaty conclusion to support the interpretation under Article 31 or determine the 
meaning.
76
 Article 33 provides for situations of multiple authentic texts.
77
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 Article 31: ―1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition 
to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was 
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument 
which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into 
account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A 
special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.‖ Ibid. 
76
 Article 32: ―Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the 
meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to 
a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.‖  
77
 Article 33: ―1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is 
equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case 
of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one 
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Paragraph 1 of Article 31 (1) refers to ordinary meaning, context, and purpose of 
the terms of treaty. Paragraph 2 mentions that the context of the treaty extends 
beyond its text and provisions to other agreements and instruments relating to the 
treaty. Paragraph 3 of Article 31 provides for consideration of subsequent 
agreement or practice of the parties or consideration of ―any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.‖ Paragraph 4 also 
takes into account special meaning given to a term by the parties.  
Treaty interpretation is one of the most contentious parts of the law of the 
treaties that generate differences of opinions among international jurists and 
tribunals.
78
 Within the framework of the Vienna Convention, ordinary meaning 
and the context of the treaty are deemed primary elements of treaty 
interpretation.
79
 On the other hand, the ordinary meaning within the context of the 
treaty only begs the question when the provision is indeterminate to a particular 
situation, thus incapable of attaining a solution per se. The ordinary meaning 
within the context of the treaty is itself often part of the question of the 
indeterminacy it seeks to answer.    
Object and purpose are in no better position to illuminate the identification 
of the content of State obligations for expropriation within investment treaties. 
Pro-investor interpretation often relies heavily on the purpose of investment 
promotion or protection. Nevertheless, the purpose of a treaty as with other 
elements of interpretation is not decisive. Even more, the purpose of the treaty 
itself represents an often controversial element because oftentimes a purpose 
comes in competition or conflict with other purposes.
80
 Within the rules of 
interpretation enunciated in the Vienna Convention, object or purpose is 
considered secondary in view of the primary character of ordinary meaning and 
                                                                                                                                     
of those in which the text was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty 
so provides or the parties so agree. 3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same 
meaning in each authentic text. 4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with 
paragraph 1, when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the 
application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, 
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context.
81
 Object or purpose owes this weaker status to the fact that ―most treaties 
have no single, undiluted object and purpose but a variety of differing and 
possibly conflicting objects and purposes.‖82 In this light, resort to the sole 
purpose of investment protection and promotion in interpreting investment treaties 
is not only unhelpful but unfounded as well. Moreover, the guidelines of object 
and purpose under Article 31 suit more appropriately the situations where 
intentions of the parties to the treaties representing the interests of their nations 
collide. Interpretation of investment treaties in investor-State arbitration involves 
the interests of corporations as the beneficiaries of the treaties. The Vienna 
Convention and customary rules of interpretation in international law afford no 
rule to indicate where State parties to an investment treaty concur in 
understanding a vague term of their treaty in a particular way, their common 
intention can be set aside in the name of purpose or object of the treaty in favor of 
the beneficiary investors. Disregarding the intention of the parties is a further risk 
associated with object and purpose of investment treaties.
83
 
Emphasis on investment protection would unduly obscure the whole 
orientation of investment treaties that are to ultimately benefit nations. Being an 
instrument between nations, no treaty is devoid of public purposes. This makes 
the purpose of investment treaties not solely the micro interests of corporations 
but the macro interests of nations. Investment treaty obligations are not to be 
construed in view of a purpose that transforms the treaty either into a means to 
impede States‘ legitimate actions for regulation or development or into a 
reinsurance instrument to convert States‘ legitimate rights to regulation or 
development to a source of revenue for the loss of profits of corporations through 
compensation.   
Just as any other consensual agreement, investment treaties belong and are 
subject to the broader context of general international law. A sort of connection 
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between treaties and general international law is envisaged within the Vienna 
Convention itself under paragraph 3 (c) of Article 31 that provides for taking into 
consideration of ―relevant rules of international law‖. Paragraph 3 (c) of Article 
31 of the Vienna Convention ―may be taken to express what may be called the 
principle of ‗systematic integration‘‖ in the sense that ―international obligations 
are interpreted by reference to their normative environment (‗system‘).‖84 This 
paragraph means, ―[e]very treaty provision must be read not only in its own 
context, but in the wider context of general international law, whether 
conventional or customary.‖85  The provisions of the Vienna Convention under 
Article 31 to 33 on treaty interpretation only ―constitute a general expression of 
the principles of customary international law relating to treaty interpretation.‖86 
These general guidelines for interpretation, for instance, do not exhaust the 
adoption of techniques such as ejusdem generis rule in legal interpretation.
87
  
As far as the connection of specific treaty obligations among each other in 
particular international law and with general international law is concerned, the 
ILC report on fragmentation highlights that while each special regime has its own 
objectives, it is not in isolation.
88
 The ILC study confirms that on the one hand 
treaties are not self-contained and depend on general international law, and on the 
other hand, their connection with general international law is not limited to Article 
31 (3) ( c ) but a  larger process of interpretation including reference to the 
applicable law and other sources including customs, principles and legal 
reasoning.
89
 In this respect, general international law constitutes the normative 
context in the operation of treaty, including gap-filling function of customary 
international law and general principles of law.
90
 The function of custom or 
general principles of law remains to be explored in view of the legitimacy within 
the structure of international law.  
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One important issue regarding reference to general international law is the 
time frame for the assessment of rules of international law under Article 31 (3) (c) 
of the Vienna Convention whether reference should be made to the rules of 
international law existed at the time of treaty making or existing at the time of  
treaty application.  The language and purpose of the treaty may indicate 
evolutionary status of certain terms of the treaty indicating parties‘ intention to 
subject certain obligations to the evolution of the general international law 
governing their relationship.
91
 Such an evolved condition of the rules of 
international law existing at the time of interpretation may be inferred from the 
usage of terms that are evolutionary in character such as a generic term like 
expropriation, or terms that by reference to their purpose point to commitment to 
a future development, or when obligations are described in very general terms.
92
 
Accordingly, the language within context and purpose of the treaty like 
subsequent practice where displaying evolutionary status import the evolution of 
the general law into the treaty as well not bound by the general international law 
as stood or frozen at the time of the conclusion of the treaty.  
The terms expropriation and compensation both in investment treaties and 
customary international law have an evolutionary status whereby their meaning 
are to be assessed in view of the state of the law governing respective treaty 
obligations at the time of their interpretation. That the general international law as 
evolved at the time of interpretation applies to such evolutionary terms, however, 
does not identify the content of the general law itself. The issue still reverts to the 
content of the law at the time of interpretation leaving the question open how such 
an evolution, which has normative consequence for the treaty makers, occurs in 
law and what the content of the evolved law is with regard to an instance that is 
indeterminate.  
The legal rules and obligations formed to protect foreign investment must 
be interpreted on sound legal grounds that could legitimize the process of 
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interpretation and the content of rules and obligations through the validation 
criteria provided by legitimacy. Interpretation by reference to the ordinary 
meaning, context or purpose of the treaty often fails to connect the treaty 
obligations not merely to the general sources of international law but the structure 
within which those sources function. The normative context of a rule in its 
foundational layer consists in the structure that frames the identification and 
validation of the sources and lawmaking powers in the creation of the content of 
the law. As far as interpretation or identification of international rules or 
obligations on expropriation originating in contracts, treaties or customs displays 
or obscures hard indeterminacies in the content of the rule, the structural 
requirements of legitimacy as part of general international law are a must to 
exhaust. In hard indeterminacies, there exist a cluster of relevant purposes, values 
and demands of justice whose authoritative reconciliation or balancing, and 
ultimately the construction of authoritative force for the undetermined area of the 
rule,  is subject to the legitimacy criteria validating the process and power in 
creating rules and their substance.  Investment treaties and their interpretation are 
beyond their own provisions, contexts and purposes subject to the broader context 
of the legal order to which they belong including the structure within which rules 
obtain authority from a legitimate origin with a legitimate substance. What 
identifies and validates sources of obligations in international law as well as the 
utility of principles, academic and adjudicatory opinions in international law is a 
question of legitimacy. The position of general international law and the 
normative relation and function of its sources—customary international law and 
general principles of law— in the system of international law and interpretation of 
its rules is a question that also invites an analysis of the criteria of legitimacy. It 
remains to be seen what components of general international law, custom or 
principle, may in a legitimate manner generate the substance of rules of 
expropriation in foreign investment in the interpretation of the content of the rules 
or obligations governing the parties. We may now turn to identifying the 
structural criteria of legitimacy framing the determinacy of international rules and 
obligations.  
40 
 
C. Authority and Legitimacy of International Rules: Structural Criteria 
of Legitimacy  
 
i. Relevance of Authoritative International Rules 
The existence of general obligations in international law with authoritative 
or binding force on all States presupposes the existence of general rules. If the 
question of expropriation of foreign investors‘ property is supposed to be 
regulated by general international law, then it is necessary to show that there exist 
general rules in international law that address this issue. General obligations may 
not be imposed on States without having general rules.  
The generality of law is one of the basic conditions of legality in national 
legal systems. Fuller points out that ―the basic characteristic of law lies in its 
generality. Law lays down general rules.‖93 By this Fuller means for a system 
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules, there must be rules.
94
 Being 
a basic characteristic of law, this feature of law applies to international law. It 
follows that in order to guide and control the behavior of States, international law 
must provide general rules to meet this basic characteristic of law. Otherwise, 
international law disintegrates into mere individual arrangements between States 
regulating their conduct on ad hoc and borderline basis. Certainly, such 
arrangements can always coexist with general rules in international law the way 
contracts do with legal rules at the domestic level. As seen, however, particular 
obligations arising from treaty arrangements are not dissociated from general 
rules.    
It is obvious that for addressing foreign investment in international law, 
the basic premise is regarding international law as law, i.e. it can produce general 
rules. The question before us is not whether international law is law and can 
potentially lay down general rules but what conditions international law has to 
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meet in order to produce legitimate rules as legally valid rules.
95
 Hence, the basic 
premise is that the lack of a central lawmaker and judicial and executive organs 
with organized sanctions comparable to those of domestic legal systems does not 
prejudice formation of international rules and their application provided that they 
meet the requirements of legitimacy. Some observations support this assumption.  
More than a decade ago, Thomas Franck announced the transit of 
international law to its ―post-ontological era‖ where international lawyers no 
longer debate the existence of international law but engage in assessing its 
content.
96
 If one were to follow Austin‘s version of legal positivism that defined 
law as orders decreed by a sovereign and habitually obeyed by subjects through 
the threat of sanctions, international law would be mythical.
97
 Nonetheless, 
despite continued importance in the positivist account of law, a system of sanction 
does not constitute the core pillar of law without which the notion of law would 
collapse. Thus, as Hart opines ―there seems no good reason for limiting the 
normative idea of obligation to rules supported by organized sanction‖98 
What Hart introduced was softening positivism through the removal of the 
command and sanction from the center of law and its replacement with the union 
of primary and secondary rules.
99
 Hart‘s union of primary rules and secondary 
rules does not repudiate international law. Hart considers legislative, judicial and 
executive organs as necessary for the existence of a developed legal system and 
does not reject the existence of law in their absence.
100
 Without these institutions, 
only a developed legal system is at stake in Hart‘s concept. Accordingly, their 
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absence does not foreclose the existence of the law and valid rules in other legal 
structures. Although Hart regarded international law as a simple form of social 
structure, he explicitly viewed that international law may produce legal rules 
binding on States.
101
 Moreover, Hart‘s rejection of secondary rules in 
international law does not preclude the existence of a rule of recognition for 
identifying and validating international rules where it can be discovered.
102
 
International law may lose its ground if narrowed to a vision of law 
anchored in sanctions solely. Yet, the existence of a rule is one thing and its 
enforcement is another though important. Once the system is capable of diffusion 
of general rules in a way that the members of the community largely follow a 
pattern of conduct accepted in a sense of obligation then instances of violation and 
incapability of the system to address it should not be regarded as the breakdown 
of the system, though it is a shortcoming. It is certainly desirable and necessary as 
well to have an international legal system that can promptly and properly address 
flagrant incidents, such as genocide, in the international community with 
meaningful sanctions and enforcement organs not paralyzed by power-based veto 
of its members. Does this absence mean the rule prohibiting genocide is devoid of 
binding force? Does this lack detract from the normative value of the rule that 
demands the prohibition of genocide though it has difficulty in forcefully 
commanding it?  The defects of the system for the enforcement and application of 
its rules do not derogate from the validity of the rules if legitimately formed.  
International law cannot be deemed incapable of imposing primary 
obligations or be called law.
103
 The appreciation that international law exists 
despite the lack of a vertical lawmaker confirms that a vertical structure of 
lawmaking is not a necessary condition for the existence of law. By contrast, law 
may emerge horizontally. The recognition of a horizontal lawmaking is hardly 
discreet in Hart‘s vision of simple form of social structure rooted in customary 
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law in primitive societies that he extended to international law at the time.
104
 
Indeed a horizontal structure of lawmaking is a very familiar phenomenon long-
lived in the international community and not always or universally seen as a 
primitive or simple form of structure. Against the primitive background that some 
scholars once sketched for international law, international customary law has 
received such a laudable recognition in legal theory in an attempt to justify that 
national formal laws are also founded on horizontal lawmaking processes in the 
society of individuals. Lon Fuller recognizes with praise that much of the law 
among States is customary law.
105
  
Fuller illustrates international law to justify his interactional theory. 
According to this theory, law arises from interactional processes among the 
members of the society.
106
  By the interactional theory, Fuller challenges the 
approach that law serves as an instrument of social control and comes into 
existence by an exercise of authority.
107
 Instead, Fuller posits that law develops 
from human interaction, normally called customary law and this human 
interaction in his view consists of reciprocal stable expectations (the practices and 
conduct mutually expected).
108
 This reflects a substantive part of interactional 
theory as well.
109
 Seeking to highlight the role of customary along with enacted 
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law, in particular, Fuller finds customary law, unlike enacted law, effective for 
ordering complex relations.
110
 
The social context plays an important role in the realm of international 
law. In view of cultural variety and power variation in the community of States, 
not only is international law not suffering from the lack of central and organized 
machinery for law making but also enacted law could hardly be effective for the 
complex and dynamic relations of States. Thus, to address the complex and 
dynamic relations of States in a general pattern of law in contrast to particular 
treaty arrangements, customary international law is appropriate. In reality, the 
existence of a world government exercising supreme authority would defy 
international law because a world government would function as ―the antithesis of 
international law for a world of many separate and independent political 
entities.‖111 The fabric of international law is inherently incongruous to such a 
vertical pattern of law.  
It must be noted that while this study regards customary international law 
as capable of producing authoritative rules, for the formation of the substance and 
content of customary rules it does not adopt Fuller‘s view of formation of the 
substance of custom through reciprocal expectations. The significance for 
customary international law and international law in general is that dimension of 
Fuller‘s theory that appreciates the law with authoritative and binding force 
without being rooted in an authority. It reinforces the position of customary 
international law that it can horizontally generate general rules in a dynamic and 
complex structure not merely a simple and primitive one. The generality of 
international rules also imports the notion of the authority of the law or the rule 
itself formed in a horizontal way rather than the authority of the lawmaker in a 
vertical one. The authority of international rules may still be explained in a more 
theoretically fundamental way.  
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The authority of rules is distinct from the authority of rulers. Justification 
for authority is by reference to the common good.
112
 Bound by the common good, 
authority mends the limits of unanimity as the other model for solving 
coordination problems.
113
 In a political community, unanimity is not practically 
possible.
114
 If unanimity is required, most coordination problems are left without 
solution.
115
 This will repudiate any claim for requiring the unanimous consent of 
all States for the formation of authoritative general rules of international law and 
justifies the generality of consent in customary international law rather than 
specific consent. States are so diverse in their cultural, political, economic and 
social fibers that it is almost impossible to reach unanimity about a solution to a 
particular coordination problem. Indeed the generality of international law is 
grounded in the authoritative rules it provides. Therefore, existing rules of general 
international law have authoritative force binding all States irrespective of their 
individual consent. An international rule legitimately formed displays authority 
for its determinate scope. A duly established customary rule has authority.
116
 
Authority is not incompatible with horizontal structure of customary international 
rules. This authoritative generality of international law explains the binding force 
of existing international rules for new or emerging States. It also renders the 
persistent objection theory of general customary international law theoretically 
fallacious not to mention its vices in practice for generating double standards.
117
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What is objectionable is the command theory that links the creation of law 
exclusively to the authority of a sovereign not the authority of the rule itself. To 
think otherwise, there would be no justification to attempt to stop a government 
from genocide, to hold a government accountable for its action, or to seek 
remedies for violation under international law. Asserting that governments have 
responsibility to reduce gas emissions is no less than asserting that an 
international rule exists that has the authority to demand the reduction of gas 
emissions. Whether such rules have formed is another matter but once their 
existence is established in a determinate way their authority accords binding force 
to them.  
International law is not reduced to a voluntary system of unanimity to the 
degree to entirely depend on specific consent of individual States for creating 
binding rules, which is incongruous to the requirement of generality lending it the 
character of ‗law‘. At the same time, authority and consent are not rivals but may 
interact. The general consent of States in a consensual basis for international rules 
plays a vital role in legitimizing the authority of rules constructed in general 
international law.
118
 That international law can produce general, authoritative 
rules for the community of States does not obviate but necessitates legitimacy for 
justifying and validating the authoritative force of international rules. As the 
justifying force of authority, legitimacy appraises the claim of authoritative or 
binding force of an international rule. We may now turn to identifying those 
validating criteria of legitimacy in international law that frame the determinacy of 
primary rules of obligations.                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                     
to a rule once it becomes a matter of their interest.  As a matter of practice, power would reign. 
The view allows powerful States‘ leeway to evade responsibility that would arise from the practice 
of other States. It wrongly presupposes that all States have the means to know and protest the 
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constructs but a scheme that the rule of power designs.   
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ii. The Right Source and Content of the Law:  Consent and Common 
good in Recognition and Coherence of International Rules  
 
The source of law matters significantly in any system of law. It is 
important because  ―the concept of ― a ‗source‘ of a rule of law … enables rules of 
law to be identified and distinguished from other rules (in particular from rules de 
lege ferenda) and concerns the way in which the legal force of new rules of 
conduct is established and in which the existing rules are changed.‖119 It has 
perhaps more significance in international law because of the lack of a central 
law-making machinery and thereby the need for a legitimate source to validate 
and delineate formal sources such as custom or principles to identify valid 
primary international rules. Primary rules of international law raise their relation 
with secondary rules.  
Franck observed the existence of secondary rules in international 
law.
120
The legitimacy of international primary rules depends on compliance with 
secondary rules of legitimacy.
121
 However, Franck focused on the secondary rules 
that account for the binding force of treaties and customs and thereby adherence 
of States to a binding treaty or custom. The utility that Franck attaches to rule 
adherence is explaining the binding force of the Vienna Convention and 
customary rules as a secondary rule of international law arising from membership 
in the community creating the obligation to obey the law.
122
 To explain the 
binding force of the consent of States itself, Franck employs a status-based 
secondary rule—ultimate rule of recognition—of international law to justify the 
binding force of obligations.
123
 This ―rulehierarchy‖ provides the source that 
confers binding force on treaties and customs.
124
 In Franck‘s opinion, the ultimate 
rule of recognition conferring binding force on treaties and customs arises from 
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the membership status of States in the international community.
125
 According to 
Franck, the ultimate rule of recognition of international law provides that the 
enjoyment of the right to statehood conferred by the community is in 
consideration of compliance with international obligations.
126
  What concerns this 
version of adherence of States is a secondary rule recognizing treaties and 
customs as binding sources of international law, raising the obligation to obey the 
law.   
The issue is different where the formation of authoritative or binding force 
of treaty or customary obligations is itself in question raising adherence to 
legitimacy criteria of structure. As discussed, in a reciprocal manner rooted in the 
common good of the community, adherence to rules is geared to the adherence of 
rules to the legitimacy criteria of the system as to the process and content of the 
rules. Adherence of States to international rules requires adherence of primary 
rules to the higher rules that shape the legitimacy framework of rules. These rules 
about rules test the validity of primary rules by means of criteria for identification 
and validation of international rules in the process of their formation and the 
substance of their content as well as validation of the lawmaker of the system. 
Whether a treaty or customary obligation, it must adhere to legitimacy criteria to 
obtain authority or binding force. This is not to indicate that the secondary rules of 
international law or criteria of legitimacy functioning as such are finite or limited 
to those presented here. Nevertheless, the rule of recognition and coherence for 
the common good will be advanced in this thesis as the structural criteria of 
legitimacy, secondary rules, in international law that govern the process and 
content of primary rules of international law structuring their authoritative 
determinacy for particular situations.   
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a) The Rule of Recognition 
The first step in identification and validation of international rules is 
evaluating the right source of rules as a principle of legitimacy in terms of the rule 
of recognition of the system.  The question of the right source as a condition of 
legitimacy and the validity of international rules basically concerns the rule of 
recognition in international law. The first legitimacy criterion advanced here for 
the process of formation of primary rules or their change is the rule of recognition 
as a secondary structural rule identifying and validating the origin and the sources 
of primary international rules. This structural rule raises the question of 
recognition and relation of sources of international law, the consent of States, and 
the lawmaking power in international law. The question of sources and their 
relation to authority and validity of rules have received a fundamental legal basis 
by Hart‘s introduction of the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition is a 
secondary rule of the system in contrast to a primary rule of obligation.
127
 What 
Hart has introduced as the rule of recognition of a system addresses one stage 
earlier in the process of the identification of primary rules of the system. The 
concept of the rule of recognition offers a necessary though not sufficient key 
element of legitimacy in the determinacy of rules of international law and thereby 
merits the review of some relevant aspects of the rule of recognition.  Hart‘s 
discussion of the rule of recognition alluded to a number of aspects of the rule of 
recognition that are important to examine in order to develop the rule of 
recognition in international law.    
 
1. Concept and Function  
The rule of recognition provides authoritative criteria of validity including 
sources of law and their hierarchical relations for the identification and validation 
of primary rules in a given legal system.
128
 The rule of recognition thus provides 
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―the criteria by which the validity of other rules of the system is assessed.‖129 It 
functions to remedy the uncertainty attributed to the simple social structure about 
the validity or existence of a rule ―if doubts arise what the rules are or as to the 
precise scope of some given rule.‖130 With the acceptance of a rule of recognition, 
―both private persons and officials are provided with authoritative criteria for 
identifying primary rules of obligation.‖131 A source of law such as legislation, 
custom, precedent in view of the rule of recognition constitutes an authoritative 
criterion of validity of primary rules.
132
 The criteria of validity also include 
procedures within each criterion (source) for the creation of rules.
133
 Accordingly, 
the rule of recognition supplies the tests to be met for a source to count as a source 
of law, thereby a valid rule of law can be identified by specifying which source 
and whether alone or in tandem with other sources is the identifying criterion of 
validity of the rules.
134
 The concept of the rule of recognition is part of the general 
theory of law in that ―it is not tied to any particular legal system or legal 
culture.‖135  
The rule of recognition also concerns the power and authority of 
lawmaking. In addition to validating the authority of rules, the rule of recognition 
validates the authority of the lawmaker in a given system.
136
 It should not be 
deemed that in a system in which a hierarchical authority is absent, this basic 
aspect of the rule of recognition is immaterial. In a horizontal system of law like 
that of international law the issue is of paramount importance in cases of 
indeterminacy of international rules whether the rule of the recognition identifies 
and validates the power of international adjudicators to make law.
137
 The rule of 
recognition in the first place is a rule that identifies and validates the authority of 
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the lawmakers in a given system to legitimize the authority of rules by 
recognizing and validating its origin.  
 
2. Form and Content   
The rule of recognition varies in form.
138
  It may be in a simple form 
providing a single criterion of validity like ―authoritative text or list of rules‖ in 
―early law of many societies.‖139 A simple rule of recognition with a single 
criterion of validity may, in the evaluation of an imaginary King Rex I, be 
―whatever Rex I enacts is law‘ as the ―sole criteria for identifying the law‖ 
without any legal restrictions on the legislative power of Rex I.
140
 That is to 
regard Rex‘s declarations as the exclusive source of authoritative law. In modern 
developed legal systems, the rule of recognition exists in a complex form 
providing several criteria of validity, i.e. sources to identify authoritative rules.
141
  
These several sources include ―enactment by a legislature,‖ ―customary practice,‖  
―written constitution,‖ or ―judicial precedent.‖142 In this way, the rule of 
recognition in a legal system may recognize a statute, or custom, or precedent, or 
constitution as sources, i.e. authoritative criteria, to identify and validate primary 
rules of obligation in settling doubt as to what the rules are or what the scope of a 
given rule is. The existence or validity of a primary rule in such a system is 
established by its formation according to these identifying criteria, sources 
recognized in that system. In the complex form where there are more than one 
source or identifying criteria, the rule of recognition in a system may also include 
criteria for settling the conflict between the sources ―by their arrangement in an 
order of superiority‖, i.e. providing for the hierarchy of sources where there are 
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more than one source or identifying criteria.
143
 In the complex form of rule of 
recognition that has several criteria, one of its criteria is supreme or superior.
144
  
The content of the rule of recognition is system-based. The rule of 
recognition is systematic in that each system of law provides for its own rule of 
recognition. This lends the rule of recognition, while a universal concept across 
legal systems, different contents depending on a given legal system. Hart was not 
claiming same rules of recognition for all legal systems. Throughout his debate, 
Hart distinguished between the rules of recognition in the United Kingdom and 
the United States. This is also clear in his statement that ―[i]n our own system, 
custom and precedent are subordinate to legislation since customary and common 
law rules may be deprived of their status as law by statute.‖145 Hart also indicated 
that this supreme criterion of validity provided by the rule of recognition in the 
English legal system is different from that in the United States. Unlike providing 
for the supremacy of legislation in the English legal system, the rule of 
recognition in the United States, which specifies a constitution among its criteria 
of validity, provides for no unlimited legislature but ―the clauses of its 
constitution as the supreme criterion of validity.‖146 Therefore, not only the 
content of the rule of recognition about which criteria (sources) count as tests for 
the identification of a valid rule may vary from one system to another but also 
variation may exist from one system to another in terms of superiority and 
inferiority in relations among the criteria of validity that the rule of recognition 
provides.  
A central question as to the content of the rule of recognition is whether 
and how it admits principles. Hart acknowledged that the rule of recognition of a 
given system might contain principles among the criteria of validity.
147
 In 
describing his doctrine as ‗soft positivism‘, Hart stated that ―the rule of 
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recognition may incorporate as criteria of legal validity conformity with moral 
principles or substantive values.‖148 Even more significant than counting as the 
criteria of validity, moral principles and values may count as the supreme criteria 
of validity in a given system.
149
 According to Hart many principles are ―identified 
by pedigree criteria,‖ i.e. ―the manner of their creation or adoption by a 
recognized authoritative source,‖ and not by their content.150   
With regard to principles as part of the criteria of the legal validity, two 
issues are important. The first one is the question of moral principles and values. 
On this point a basic aspect of the rule of recognition, which is validating the 
power of the rule maker for the validation of the rule, is at issue. According to 
Hart, the incorporation of a controversial moral test lacking ―an objective 
standing‖ in the criteria provided by the rule of recognition is not inconsistent 
with the rule of recognition. On this matter, Hart points to the issue of 
indeterminacy and the rule of recognition for the discretion of judges. For Hart, 
―if there are no such [objective moral] facts, a judge, told to apply a moral test, 
can only treat this as a call for the exercise by him of a law-making discretion.‖151 
Thus, addressing national legal systems, Hart maintains that the criteria of a rule 
recognition by incorporating a moral test for legal validity, recognizes and 
validates in the first place the power of judges to make the law where such a test 
is at issue. This is part of the broader aspect of the rule of recognition in Hart‘s 
theory of law, which relates to the indeterminacy of primary obligations and the 
issue of the judicial discretion. Hart has addressed the question of indeterminacy 
and open texture of rules for national legal systems and has posited that in such 
cases judges perform a creative role.
152
 The rule of recognition in a broader aspect 
recognizes and validates the authority of the rule maker. Part of the function of the 
rule of recognition in national systems, in Hart‘s theory, is the validation of the 
power of judges to create rules, though within limits, in cases where the law is 
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indeterminate.
153
 Validating the authority of the rule maker in given system is a 
basic aspect of the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition in this basic 
function identifies who has the power recognized and validated in the system to 
create rules, which is of paramount importance in cases of indeterminacies, 
raising the question whether an adjudicator has such a power according to the rule 
of recognition of the system. The second question concerns the possibility of 
inclusion of certain principles by virtue of their content among the criteria of 
validity provided by the rule of recognition. This issue draws on the origin of the 
rule of recognition and its criteria.  
 
3. Status and Origin      
The rule of recognition constitutes the ―foundations of a legal system.‖154  
Hart did not assert that a rule of recognition is a necessary feature of law because 
in certain societies, namely those of simple form of primary rules, a social rule 
can be binding by acceptance. In the simple social structure of rules, Hart 
maintains, legal rules may come into existence by acceptance not requiring 
validation by a rule of recognition.
155
 In this simple social structure consisting of 
primary rules formed in a customary manner, once the existence of a primary rule 
(by general practice) is established, there is no question of validity.
156
 In this 
structure of primary rules of a customary form, the existence and binding force of 
rules depends on wide acceptance.
157
 Thus, in its concept the rule of recognition is 
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compatible with the existence of other rules whose binding force comes from 
acceptance not requiring conformity with certain criteria of validity where such 
rules are established. Regarding international law as a simple structure, Hart 
rejected a rule of recognition for international law.
158
 In so doing, Hart in view of 
the absence of legislature, judiciary and enforcement institutions comparable to 
those in national systems regarded international law as similar to a simple social 
structure of primary rules in form.
159
 Yet, Hart focused on the question of the 
legal character of international law supporting that international law is law 
notwithstanding the absence of institutions similar to national systems.
160
 On the 
question at issue, Hart viewed that international law need not have a Kelsenian 
basic norm or a rule of recognition for its legal character and binding force of its 
rules because in a simple social structure the authority or the binding force of 
primary rules forms when they come into existence by acceptance not by 
validation criteria. 
161
 This observation by Hart about the rule of recognition in 
international law should not be taken as the absence of the rule of recognition in 
international law. This matter will be discussed shortly.  
In Hart‘s theory, the rule of recognition, while mostly unstated, is the 
ultimate rule of the system.
162
 Hart also views that the practice of accepting a rule 
of recognition to refer to certain sources as authoritative criteria for the 
identification of the law takes place from an internal point of view but that a rule 
of recognition exists is expressed from an external point of view.
163
 According to 
Hart, the distinction between internal and external statements assists to remove 
obscurities as to the notion of legal validity.
164
 In Hart‘s view, legal validity 
concerns the particular rules of the system that are identified and validated by the 
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rule of recognition.
165
 Yet, for the existence of the rule of recognition,  it is 
required that the rule of recognition used by a person in identifying the law and 
asserting the validity of a particular rule, ―is not only accepted by him but is the 
rule of recognition actually accepted and employed in the general operation of the 
system.‖166 The legal status of the rule of recognition as the ultimate rule of the 
system is not a question of validity provided by another rule in an internal 
assertion nor by showing that its validity ―is ‗assumed‘ or ‗postulated‘ or is a 
‗hypothesis‘.‖167 Thus, Hart maintains that ―[t]he assertion that it [a rule of 
recognition] exists can only be an external Statement of the fact. For whereas a 
subordinate rule of system may be valid and in that sense ‗exist‘ even if it is 
generally disregarded, the rule of recognition exists only as a complex, but 
normally concordant practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in 
identifying the law by reference to certain criteria. Its existence is a matter of 
fact.‖168  
Although Hart included private persons among those whose concordant 
practice may bring a rule of recognition into existence, he grounds the rule of 
recognition in the practice of officials of the system and particularly the practice 
of the courts.
169
 Hart did not assert that the consensus arising from the practice of 
courts in any system of law would constitute the rule of recognition.
170
 Thus, like 
its content being variable among legal systems, that in a given system whose 
practice counts for the formation of the rule of recognition also depends on the 
system of law concerned. What is material is the requirement of general practice 
                                                 
165
 Ibid.  
166
 Ibid. at 108. [emphasis added]  
167
 Ibid. at 108-110. Its existence is a matter of fact not a question of validity since ―it can be 
neither valid nor invalid but is simply accepted as appropriate for use in this way.‖ Ibid at 109. 
168
 Ibid. at 110. In this way, the rule of recognition reflects both internal and external points of 
view.  (―[W]e need to remember that the ultimate rule of recognition may be regarded from two 
points of view: one is expressed in the external statement of fact that the rule exists in the actual 
practice of the system; the other is expressed in the internal statements of validity made by those 
who use it in identifying the law.‖ Ibid. at 112. 
169
 (―[T]he rule of recognition is treated in my book as resting on a conventional form of judicial 
consensus.‖ Ibid. at 266-267.   Hart also stated that in a complex legal system the acceptance of 
the rule of recognition comes from the practice of officials and ordinary individuals acquiesce the 
rule by obeying it. Ibid. at 117. 
170
See ibid at 267 where Hart observes that the rule of recognition rests ―on a conventional form of 
judicial consensus  … seems quite clear at least in English and American law …‖ Ibid. at 266-267.     
57 
 
for the formation of a rule of recognition within the structure of the legal system 
concerned. The formation of the rule of recognition, whether simple or complex, 
―is manifested in the general practice of identifying the rules by such criteria.‖171 
Therefore, it requires a general practice in a given system according to its own 
structure for the rule of recognition or a particular form of criterion, a particular 
source, under that to come into existence. Its formation through actual practice 
still does not deprive the rule of recognition of being called ‗law‘.172  
The legal status of the rule of recognition rooted in convention, however, 
should not be treated to reject altogether any test for the origin of the rule of 
recognition lying at the base of a system of law or in the criteria it contains. If 
there is conventional recognition for recognizing principles by way of their 
content, no doubt it is compatible with Hartian conception of the rule of 
recognition. Yet, the question of content raised earlier concerns the possibility of 
inclusion of certain principles by virtue of their content as part of the criteria of 
validity provided by the rule of recognition not rooted in the convention. Hart 
does not seem to reject this possibility although he believed that a legal system 
with such a criterion of validity might not actually be found without a 
conventional rule of recognition.
173
 In his discussion of the objective standing of 
principles too, Hart also suggests where certain principles do have objective 
standing they do not require a conventional, general practice for their inclusion as 
part of the criteria supplied by the rule of recognition.
174
 Similarly, Hart indicated 
that the superiority of a source like statute is a relative notion without connoting a 
―legally unlimited legislative power.‖175 This also indicates that the rule of 
recognition imports limitations on the power or authority of those creating the law 
through other criteria of legitimacy. The rule of law limitations represent a 
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structural aspect of restrictions on authority. Hart himself has indicated that 
certain principles may exist to secure the functioning of the social control as an 
aspect of the ―minimum form of justice which may be called ‗natural‘‖ including 
the principles of legality and the rule of law.
176
 The rule of recognition as a 
secondary rule of the system itself constitutes part of structural limitations on 
authority to adhere to criteria of validity.
177
 In creation, application or 
interpretation of the law, the rule of recognition demands conformity with its 
criteria and basic tests for the identification and validation of the source of law 
and the power of the lawmakers alike. These suggest admissibility of the rule of 
recognition for the inclusion of certain absolute principles of structural, 
procedural and substantive nature that may show objective standing by virtue of 
their content. The concept of the rule of recognition is compatible with having 
certain principles by virtue of their absolute character not merely their 
conventional acceptance among its criteria of validity.     
Hart also alluded to the possibility of the evaluation of the rule of 
recognition in his discussion of the open texture of the rule of recognition and the 
pathology of the rule of recognition.
178
 Both these phenomena point to doubts 
about the content and origin of the rule of recognition. This situation may suggest 
occasional indeterminacy about the rule of the recognition whose response falls 
within Hart‘s theory that the courts may exercise discretionary power to remove 
uncertainty.
179
 Yet there may be another kind of doubt about the power and 
authority of the lawmakers that targets the very power and practice of the courts 
and officials as the participants whose practice creates the rule of recognition. 
This kind of doubt arises because of the detachment of the official world from the 
bulk of the society, which may lead to the breakdown of the system and its rule of 
recognition as a phenomenon of the ―pathology of the legal systems.‖180 The 
breakdown of the rule of recognition thus may be due to limiting its content (for 
instance not recognizing certain procedural and substantive principles imposing 
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limitations on lawmakers) to the consensus of officials and courts rather than the 
bulk of the society. From another perspective, this situation raises the point and 
reform of the rule of recognition in view of the common good for which an 
assessment of the international rule of recognition must also heed.   
 
b) The Rule of Recognition in International Law  
A number of observations may now be drawn from the previous section 
that guide the assessment of the international rule of recognition. First, the 
essence of the rule of recognition consists in its concept not its content or origin 
that may both vary across legal orders and have controversial status in each 
system. The rule of recognition constitutes a framework rule of legitimacy not 
only providing the criteria that identify and validate primary rules of obligations 
but also the criteria  identifying and validating the power of those creating the law 
in a given system. International law has now a rule of recognition of its own 
providing both of these criteria for the international primary rules of obligation 
and the power of those creating them.  
Hart‘s rejection of a rule of recognition in international law should not be 
taken as the absence of the rule of recognition in international law. That in 
international law most of its primary rules must be widely accepted (by States in a 
customary framework) does not necessarily earn it the characterization of a 
‗primitive‘ society. International law is in some sense ‗decentralized‘, but it is not 
reduced to what Hart describes a ―pre-legal form of social structure which 
consists only of primary rules.‖181 The international legal system, while certainly 
different from those of national systems, cannot be a system of law devoid of a 
rule of recognition with multiple criteria of validity. There are, for instance, 
complex criteria of validity developed and accepted in international law for the 
formation of customary international law.
182
 Still what is more important is the 
international rule of recognition for the indeterminacy of international rules 
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whether of treaty or customary origin. Hart did not address this aspect of the rule 
of recognition for international law, which he had addressed for national systems 
for which he viewed judges perform a creative, legislative role in situations of 
indeterminacy.
183
 Hart rejected the need for a rule of recognition for international 
law because once a rule (in a simple social structure) comes into existence by 
acceptance, it needs no basic norm to validate its binding force or authority.
184
 
Whereas international rules may also become indeterminate where the very 
existence of a rule for particular a situation becomes the question, thus the need 
for a rule of recognition to validate the creation of the rule no longer attributed to 
its acceptance but to its validity. Hart did not address for international law that 
broader aspect of the rule of recognition concerning the power of the creators of 
the rule in situations of indeterminacy of rules that needs validation by the rule of 
recognition of the system. Hart did not raise the situation of indeterminate rules in 
their interpretation for international law where the question is no longer the 
existence of the rules by way of acceptance of the rule for the instance in question 
but the validity of the legislative power of adjudicators and thereby the validity of 
the rule so created.  
Where international rules become indeterminate in the process of 
interpretation, the rule of recognition is pivotal whether international law 
recognizes an adjudicative creation of international rules in cases of 
indeterminacies. It is this aspect of the rule of recognition that challenges the 
validity of international rules and thereby the legitimacy of the process. This is a 
key issue in international law on foreign investment and the assessment of the 
substance of its rules in indeterminate instances. It is this broader aspect of the 
rule of recognition relating to the power of the creators of law that raises the 
question of legitimacy in international rule-making in indeterminate cases where 
the very existence of the rule for a particular instance is in question. For being a 
legitimate authoritative primary rule of international law, such a rule must satisfy 
the rule of recognition of the international system by being created through 
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validating sources and criteria recognized in the system of international law and 
by the lawmaker recognized in that system. In other words, it requires a rule of 
recognition to validate an adjudicative creative power in indeterminate cases. The 
adjudicative creation of rules and obligations in international law is a matter 
requiring validation by the international rule of recognition. It remains to be seen 
whether the international rule of recognition actually has such a validation in its 
content.   
Second, in content, the criteria for the identification and validation (the 
sources of law) of the primary rules may vary from one system to another. 
Significantly, the contents of the rule of recognition as a basic rule to identify and 
validate the power of lawmakers including the lawmaking power of adjudicators 
in cases of indeterminacy may also differ between legal orders and particularly 
between national systems and international law. The basic rule of recognition in a 
given system concerns the validation of the authority of the rule-makers along the 
criteria of validity it provides for validating the authority of the particular rules.  
The rule of recognition in its basic aspect identifies and validates the lawmaker of 
the system.  In indeterminate cases, this basic aspect rule of recognition raises the 
question whether the rule of recognition of a given system identifies and validates 
the power or authority of adjudicators to create the law.  The identification and 
validation of the creative power of international adjudicators in the international 
legal order is a question that must be established by reference to the rule of 
recognition within its own structure.  
Third, in origin, generally the rule of recognition consists in a 
conventional acceptance by those whose general practice in a given system is 
recognized as competent to bring such a rule into existence, which may also vary 
among legal systems. Whose practice may create or change a rule of recognition 
or its criteria may vary from one legal system to another. In international law, 
therefore, the origin of the rule of recognition and those creating or changing it 
follows the structure of international law itself.  
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The rule of recognition loses legitimacy if the practice of the officials and 
the courts creating that rule separates from the bulk of the society. The same risk 
exists in international law if the creator of the rule of recognition is exclusively 
narrowed to States or its criteria of validity for the primary rules and rule makers 
solely refer to the consent of States. Yet, there must be a basic yardstick of 
legitimacy to distinguish where States‘ consent is recognized from where it is 
deplored in international law, which may lead to welcoming it in a field of 
international law but eschewing it in another. The yardstick advocated in this 
thesis is the common good of the community in the interest of human beings, 
which may challenge the origin of the international rule of recognition and the 
criteria it supplies. This mixture of consent and common good will situate the rule 
of recognition of international law in the consensual and communitarian bases of 
rules.  
 
1. Consensual Basis 
The international rule of recognition provides the criteria of validity of 
primary rules of obligations and the validity of international lawmaking power 
emerging from an origin and with content germane to its own structure without 
being impervious to moral influences for reform in its origin and content. This is a 
structural rule of the system of international law that cannot be transferred from 
national systems to international law. International law has developed a rule of 
recognition recognizing and validating that in general authoritative primary rules 
and obligations come into existence by the specific or general consent of States. 
Both the origin and the content of the international rule of recognition have roots 
in the consent of States earning it a consensual basis.   
State practice heavily weighs in the formation (origin) of the international 
rule of recognition. Absent central lawmaking and enforcement machinery and 
officials in international law, in the words of the editors of Oppenheim‘s 
International Law ―[i]t is the practice of States which demonstrates which sources 
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are acknowledged as giving rise to rules having the source of law.‖185 Hence, the 
international rule of recognition as to which source has the authority of law in 
international law in the first place emanates from the practice of States. The 
international rule of recognition in its content also defers to the consensual basis 
of international law by identifying and validating specific or general consent of 
States for the creation of most authoritative primary rules and obligations.  As the 
editors of the of Oppenheim‘s International Law state, ―as the international 
community at present organize, the will of States normally predominates in the 
creation of rules of international law.‖186 Accordingly, custom and treaties 
constitute ―the principal and regular sources of international law‖187 The 
international rule of recognition thus more basically identifies and validates that in 
international law States are the author of laws. 
The international rule of recognition recognizing and validating the 
consent of States as the source of the creation of primary international rules is the 
stepping-stone of the legitimacy of the right process in the structure of 
international law. Franck presumed this fundamental principle of legitimacy under 
the contractarian foundation of international rules without examining it.
188
 Franck 
restates the classical view in international law rooted in the contractarian theory 
that ―States, like persons in the state of nature, are equal in their ‗statehood‘, 
which is restrained only to the extent that they have agreed voluntarily to be 
associated in a common enterprise and have defined the limits on their rights and 
autonomy in reciprocal fashion.‖189 Under international law, States enjoy 
freedom, equality, sovereignty, autonomy, self-determination, and self-
preservation that have fundamentally brought their consent in the forefront of the 
lawmaking mechanism in international law.  
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The modern era of international law was marked by the emergence of the 
nation States in Europe from late 15
th
 century when a series of treaties ushered in 
the emergence of independent nations.
190
 Sovereignty merged into international 
law in 1648 when the Europeans materialized a multilateral charter under the 
Peace of Westphalia treaty to extinguish the flames of a thirty-year war.
191
 The 
Peace of Westphalia culminated a long process of the erosion of the imperial 
authority.
192
 The Peace of Westphalia stands out in history as the inauguration of 
the law of nations under a system grounded in independence and equality of 
nations. Balance of power fell at the core of the agenda for the realization of 
peace.
193
  From sovereign equality it followed that independent nations admitted 
no supreme authority and no interstate obligations without their consent. This new 
system recognized ―a law operating between rather than above States and a power 
operating between rather than above States.‖194 The principles of equal 
sovereignty and self- determination revived in a universal format in the Charter of 
the United Nations.
195
 What this survey narrates is that, in hindsight, equality, 
                                                 
190
 See Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1954) at 61-66. It began with the Peace of Basel of 1499 whereby Switzerland voiced 
its independency from the Western Empire. Switzerland, however, gained complete independency 
only in 1648. Ibid. at 6162. Before this era, resort to consent for creating obligations was reflected 
in practice among ancient oriental and occidental communities to address their affairs in relation to 
one another within treaties though without having the modern concept of nation-State. See ibid. at 
1-16. In those times, treaties carried a religious attribute. Ibid. The peace convention of 562 
between Byzantium and Persia that provided for the protection of religious minorities is 
considered to be one of the important conventions in that era. Ibid. at 48. The protection of 
religious minorities under that treaty later inspired treaties among Europeans with similar 
protections in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries. Ibid. at 126.  Among the features of the treaties in the 
18
th
 century was differentiation between political and commercial treaties. Of particular 
importance was the Jay Treaty of 1794 between the United States and England that embodied 
arbitration provisions. Ibid. at 128-129.  
191
 Bederman, supra note 104, at 3.  
192
 Leo Gross, ―The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948‖ in Ku, Charlotte, Diehl, Paul F. & Boulder, 
Colo., eds., International Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings (London: L. Rienner 
Publishers, 2003)  57, at 63. 
193
 See Nussbaum, supra note 190, at 115-118. The family of nations was not expanding over the 
globe on the basis of equality. One example is the agreements of the capitulation nature that 
Europeans entered into with Far East obtaining unilateral concessions from China and Japan. Ibid. 
at 194-196. Outside Europe, colonialism and imperialism replaced sovereign equality of nations, 
promoting ―western international law.‖ Bederman, supra note 104, at 7-8.  
194
 Gross, supra note 192, at 62.  
195
 See Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 
993, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945; See also the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States, (1970). G.A. Res. 2625,25 
65 
 
sovereignty and self-determination and concomitant consensual basis of 
international rules have not been mere rhetoric. They have played a major role in 
constructing a horizontal structure of legal order for international law, in building 
international institutions, and in creating international obligations whereby the 
peaceful coexistence of States and their orderly intercourse could materialize. 
International law has grown in the foreground of independence and the 
background of interdependence out of respect for these enduring values.  
The consent theory constitutes the backbone of modern democracies. The 
legitimacy of today‘s legal systems is anchored in their democratic dimension. At 
least theoretically, though not always practically, this dimension is rooted in the 
acceptance of the members of the community of its underlying shared principles 
through a referendum of a written constitution or customary deference to an 
unwritten one, as well as expressing their voice in ordinary laws through elections 
and delegation of lawmaking authority. In international law, the absence of an 
identical centralized apparatus dealing with law has brought this fundamental 
aspect of legitimacy to the fore. The consent of States in international law 
functions, at high profile, as a fundamental principle legitimating the legal order 
and the rules flowing from it. Just as acceptance of the members of the 
community legitimate rules and their authority at the domestic level, the consent 
of States confers legitimacy on international rules for their claim of authority 
laying burdens on States. The voice of the members of the community underpins 
the validity of its rules. Due to the cultural complexity in the fabric of the 
international community, international law needs to reflect this element far greater 
than domestic legal systems. A vertical delivery of authority in the name of 
international law irrespective of the share that each diverse culture enjoys in 
shaping international rules through the collective practice and opinion of States is 
the very sign of the demolition of legitimacy of rules and the destruction of their 
authority.  
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The consent of States, therefore, constitutes one essential element for 
legitimating the primary rules of international law. This is couched in the terms 
that the consent of States forms ―the condition historically deemed necessary, but 
not necessarily sufficient, for any demonstration of rule legitimacy.‖196 The 
consent of States constitutes the foundation of the legitimacy of international rules 
according to the rule of recognition in the system of international law. Not only 
does international law have a rule of recognition but also it has a complex one 
though it has its own complexity as to the supremacy of one criterion over 
another. The international rule of recognition provides the consent of States as the 
criterion of validity of primary obligations thus rendering custom and treaty as 
primary sources of validation in international law. The rule of recognition further 
provides for procedural conditions for the formation of custom or conclusion of 
treaties. The existence of its primary rules in general international law within the 
customary framework and particular international law within the treaty framework 
must satisfy the demonstration of meeting certain procedures developed in 
international law for the formation of custom and treaty. More basically, the 
international rule of recognition provides the criteria for the lawmaking power in 
international law by designating States as the author of primary rules of 
obligations in a consensual basis. No doubt, determinate treaty and customary 
obligations conform to the rule of recognition of the system in regard to the 
authority lent by States to their settled scope. What departs from this general rule 
of recognition of international law is an adjudicative creation of rules and 
obligations in the interpretation of indeterminate treaty or customary obligations. 
What further departs from this rule of recognition is an interpretative tool such as 
general principles where they lead to an adjudicative creation of rules and 
obligations. These important issues will be dealt with in detail in the next 
chapters. 
The power to create rules in international law, which validates the 
rulemaking authority of the rule-maker and thus the validity of the rule, is a 
requirement of legitimacy that needs to be satisfied by demonstrating the 
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existence of a rule of recognition to this effect. This is a framework rule of the 
system whose existence cannot be taken for granted, presupposed or transformed 
from national systems to international law. The rule of recognition is a structural 
rule of legitimacy in international law, which in general requires the consent of 
States for the creation of international obligations lending their authoritative force 
including in areas of indeterminacies where the authority of the rule for a 
particular situation is in question. Any departure from the consensual basis of 
international rules, therefore, needs to be established by showing the modification 
of the rule of recognition. Indeed, in a number of ways the international rule of 
recognition has embraced a communitarian basis both in its origin and content but 
leaving intact the consent of States for the large part of international primary 
rules.  
 
2. Communitarian Basis  
By virtue of the rule of recognition of international law, the structural 
criterion of legitimacy for the right source and process of rule formation in 
international law provides that the primary rules of international law flow from 
the consent of States. Primary obligations of States rest on the consensual basis in 
large part.  By the consensual basis of international rules, however, is not meant to 
accord sovereignty a status above international law. There is another dimension to 
international lawmaking stemming from a communitarian basis that while 
supporting the rule of recognition in many aspects may challenge its origin or 
content as well as requiring another criterion of legitimacy.  
Human community is a form of unifying relationship and interaction 
between the members of the society, which involves relationships in four types of 
order.
197
 These orders or sets of unifying relationships form the unity of human 
beings in the community in different aspects. One part of the unity of members of 
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human community is ―the unity of common action.‖198 This order or unity 
represents interactions and mutual commitments among the members of human 
community in order to solve their co-ordination problems.
199
 The sole interaction 
is not sufficient. Community exists wherever interaction blends with a shared 
purpose.
200
 The existence of social rules and authority go together with the 
existence of community in finding meaning wherever ―some shared conception of 
the point of continuing co-operation, namely ―the common good‖ is present.201 
The shared purpose and common good are rooted in basic values. 
202
 
The unity of common action resting on common good can justify the 
existence of the international community. The common good of the members of 
the international community, as with the members of individual nation States, in 
some respects is realized in the international community not the national systems 
alone. Similar to the function of a federal system that supervises its constituent 
societies on fundamental issues that matter for the whole national community, the 
international community exists alongside national States to urge matters 
fundamental to the international community that have earned the quality of 
common action and common good. In this sense, the emergence of an 
international community is barely refutable.
203
   
As indicated earlier, the existence of international community further 
bolsters the existence of certain secondary or framework rules.
204
 The rule of 
recognition in Hartian conception is rooted in the convention, namely the practice 
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of officials and courts though not rejecting other possibilities.
205
 In Franck‘s 
opinion, the ultimate rule of recognition conferring binding force on treaties and 
customs in international law arises from the membership status of States in the 
international community.
206
  
The common good is advocated here, which also alleviates the 
shortcomings of membership or convention accounts for the origin or content of 
the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition of international law can justifiably 
be grounded in the common good of the community than convention or the 
membership status in the community. For instance, treaties and customs owe their 
binding status to the common good since the recognition of the binding status of 
treaties or customs would enable States to solve coordination problems.
207
 The 
common good of States outweighs the conventional origin or membership status 
in accounting for the origin and content of the international rule of recognition, its 
change, or coexistence of the rule of recognition with another criterion of 
legitimacy, i.e. coherence for consideration of justice demands in the construction 
of rules.   
The membership argument tends to mirror a quasi club picture of 
international community. Clubs run mostly on power than law. The club extends 
privileges to its members in proportion to the power and wealth of the members. 
The rich and powerful members gain more privileges. The legal scheme of 
international law cannot subscribe to a pattern of power. Beyond doubt, power is a 
major factor in the national legal systems and the international system alike. The 
point, however, is to highlight that the rule of law, legitimacy, and the law also 
function to place legal limitations on those wielding power and to correct 
imbalances, inequalities, and other vices flowing from power. In theory, the legal 
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scheme of international law cannot be anchored in something that it seeks or 
should seek to contain. The conventional origin of the rule of recognition may 
also end up in a narrow club of the practice of officials or courts or States 
segregating the criteria of validity from the human constituents of the society.  
The conventional acceptance of the rule is an important part of the rule of 
recognition. Nevertheless, the rule of recognition drastically diminishes in 
legitimacy—and sometimes to the point of extinction— if its conventional origin 
is always narrowed to the practice of officials without considering the perception 
of the bulk of the society and human values and interests in the criteria provided 
for the validation of primary rules or the power of the rule makers. The laws of a 
ruling body representing a majority suppressing the minority may be formally 
validated by the officials of the system and ultimately by the 
acceptance/acquiescence of the community as a whole. Even worse, officials of a 
system including its courts may accept, recognize, and validate the authority of a 
despot or despotic ruling party or a regime or ruling body representing a minority 
and a concomitant supreme criterion of validity producing unjust laws and 
suppressing the people or the majority. Legitimacy challenges the validity of such 
rulings even if compatible with a conventional rule of recognition because of 
failure to advance the common good. The absence of officials in international law 
leaves a more dynamic space for participation in the lawmaking process by States, 
which are usually burdened by rules and obligations imposed by the system. This 
space is more apt to avert extreme scenarios of national legal systems in which 
officials become the sole narrators of the internal point of view in accepting and 
using the criteria of validity of the system indicative of a ―deplorably sheeplike‖ 
society or legal system.
208
 On the other hand, international law itself may turn out 
to be vulnerable to the same situation if individual human beings are neglected in 
its lawmaking process. States as subjects of international law should not be treated 
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in a way to end up in a ‗sheeplike‘ scenario, substituting officials in treatment of 
individual human beings, by becoming the sole participant in authoring primary 
rules of obligation or shaping the rule of recognition.  
A number of restrictions on the will of individual States are already 
observable in international law. A general consent not a universal one among 
States is sufficient to have the force of customary law, treaties or customs 
representing consent may not derogate from jus cogens norms, and treaties and 
customs are not the sole sources of international law, which embrace certain 
principles as a source of international law.
209
 These restrictions on the consent of 
individual Stats represent partial changes materialized in the content of the 
international rule of recognition and its criteria of validity. The general rule of 
recognition in international law recognizes the creation of rules of international 
law under customary rules by the general consent of States not requiring specific 
consent of every individual State. Equally important, the international rule of 
recognition counts certain principles as a source of law. The international rule of 
recognition embodies among its criteria of validity or legitimacy certain principles 
that by their absolute content apply as law without the need of conventional 
sanction or in the face of adverse convention. Through their practice, States have 
sanctioned a category of norms, peremptory norms, with a supreme status in 
international law. To ascribe the recognition of the force of law of certain absolute 
principles of structure or substance to mere State practice, however, is a capital 
mistake. Principles with an absolute character in international law need no 
pedigree or conventional reception to count as the criteria of the rule of 
recognition of a legal system identifying and validating a binding or authoritative 
primary rule by virtue of its content. The legal position of absolute principles 
resides in the common good of the community and the requirements of 
reasonableness.
210
  
As discussed as a framework rule of legitimacy of the system, the 
international rule of recognition requires the general consent of States in creation 
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of primary rules and identifying and validating States as the lawmakers in the 
international system where absolute rights and principles are not at issue. The rule 
of recognition itself originates in State practice to determine what counts as a 
criterion of validity or a valid lawmaker. This is compatible with the common 
good while the common good may require a reform of the criterion of the rule of 
recognition in a field of international law. Just as authority is justified because it 
advances the common good, the rule of recognition of international law in the 
ultimate measure is justified because it advances the common good. More 
fundamentally, the common good necessitates the rule of recognition to identify 
and validate the lawmaking agent in the international system with legitimate 
power to command authoritative prescriptions of the members of the international 
community and demand compliance. On the other hand, just as the common good 
may place limitations on authority, it may place limitations on the rule of 
recognition including widening the circle of participants whose practice counts in 
the formation or change of the rule of recognition or its criterion.  
There is no dogmatic preference for the stability of a criterion of validity 
and a source of law that the rule of recognition of a system provides or the sort of 
participants whose practice count to bring it into existence. The international rule 
of recognition may change. However, the desirability for a change in the content 
of the rule of recognition and more foundationally in the origin of the rule of 
recognition of a given system at least must advance the common good of the 
community.  
The rule of recognition of international law may undergo reform in 
keeping abreast of developments in human societies. International law has already 
experienced reform in a number of ways including embracing certain principles as 
its criteria of validity. What is of particular relevance for the purpose of this study 
is whether the international rule of recognition has changed to  recognize and 
validate a constitutional construction of rights and obligations whereby the 
consent of sates is no longer the determinant element in their authorship. Such 
reform in departing from the consent of States is mostly apt for the field of human 
rights in a constitutional than consensual construction of rights of human beings 
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in international law. Whether such a departure from the consent of States for a 
constitutional construction of rights and obligations is also justifiable in the 
construction of the rights of corporations in international law on foreign 
investment is a question to explore. The test for the desirability or justification of 
such a change is the common good of the community. Common good is the 
measure of desirability or justification for a challenge to the consensual basis of 
international rules and obligations in a particular field in international law.  
In the  majority of situations of indeterminacy of international law arising 
in legal interpretation, the rule of recognition concerns not counting absolute 
principles as criteria of validity but whether the international rule of recognition 
counts the creation of rules by adjudicators. It is perfectly compatible with the 
general rule of recognition for the creation of international rules by States that 
there may be a particular authorization or recognition in a particular field of 
international law to depart from the consent of States in the creation of their 
international obligations delegating a creative task to international adjudicators. It 
still needs the establishment of such a particular authorization or recognition to 
depart from the general of rule recognition requiring the creation of the 
international rules and obligations by the States. A particular authorization or 
recognition in a particular field such as human rights is not a sign or authority for 
the departure from the rule of the recognition in the other fields of international 
law such as foreign investment.   
The basic international rule of recognition provides that in international 
law States are the author of international rules. State practice with a view to the 
common good is required to justify and show a change in this basic lawmaking 
power validation in international law. For a change of the rule of recognition in 
any system and so in international law, it requires much beyond implication or 
assumption. There is no prejudice or sympathy for sovereignty when it is reduced 
to the benefits of governments or rulers detached from nations and human 
individuals. Sovereignty is not above international law. Nonetheless, sovereignty 
and self-determination are part of the values of the international community as 
long as advancing the common good of the community in the interest of human 
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beings. The consensual basis of the international rule of recognition and the 
primary rules of international law is justified because it generally advances and 
has historically advanced the common good of human beings. This consensual 
basis lies beneath the structure of international law in order to give every culture 
and community formed as a nation-State a share of participation in the 
construction of rules and obligations burdened upon them by international law.  
The international community and national communities coexist with their 
own coordination in terms of competencies of authoritative lawmaking rendering 
States both independent and interdependent. The international community has a 
limited ambit that, in Franck‘s view, only signifies ―a high level of sophistication 
in the rule structure within which a group of actors habitually interact.‖211 The 
international general legal agenda is much narrower than national communities 
that are assumed to provide a solution to every coordination problem. A  
structural part of international law similar to but far more profound than the 
federal institutions in national systems concerns the allocation and distribution of 
lawmaking competencies between national and international systems and the 
recognition of national communities‘ sovereignty and self-determination for 
policy and law making. The existence of common good does not mean that 
members of a community ―must all have the same values or objectives (or a set of 
values or objectives); it implies only that there must be some set (or set of sets) of 
conditions which needs to obtain if each of the members is to attain his own 
objectives.‖212 The implication for the international community is much greater. 
The diverse cultures, values and purposes give little space for a broad 
international common action, shared purpose or value. The central point of the 
common good of the international community, advocated here, is human beings.  
The centrality of human beings may embrace sovereignty, independence, and the 
consent of States where functioning to benefit human beings and nations just as 
equally eschewing sovereignty, independence, and the consent of States where 
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diminishing human beings. The centrality of human beings in the common good 
of the community may also explain why the structure of international law may in 
the particular field of protection of human rights depart from its basic values of 
sovereignty and independence for the basic values of human beings while 
standing by those basic values in the protection of corporations. Equally, the 
common good of human beings may justify respect for sovereignty and self-
determination, respect for the concomitant consensual basis of international rules, 
and the maintenance of the general rule of recognition requiring the consent of 
States for the validation of international rules in a field such as foreign investment 
but not in another such as human rights.  These issues will be elaborated in detail 
in the next chapters. For now, it is observed that in international law the general 
rule of recognition as a structural rule of legitimacy recognizes the creation of 
international rules by the States as the normal and regular source of international 
law and lawmaking power. The appreciation of a communitarian basis for the 
rules of international law does not undermine their consensual basis. They coexist 
to confer authority and legitimacy on international rules. The rule of recognition 
of international law admits the general consent and practice of States in building 
the international primary rules of obligation.    
The common good is not a rhetorical notion. There are sound theoretical 
foundations with justifiable practical guidance for the assessment of sources of 
international law and settlement of disputes governed by international law that 
will be developed in the next chapters for the recognition of lawmaking power 
and coherence of the content of rules of international law. Besides justifying and 
disciplining the rule of recognition, the common good underscores coherence as 
another criterion of legitimacy for the substance of international rules along the 
rule of recognition. On the one hand, coherence of the content of international 
rules for the common good as another criterion of legitimacy requires in the first 
place reference to the rule of recognition of international law for identifying and 
validating the power for engagement in moral and political evaluations. On the 
other hand, the rule of recognition is not a sufficient criterion of legitimacy; 
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coherence for the common good is also required for the substance of international 
rules.  
Thomas Franck adopts Dworkin‘s account of coherence.213 That account 
of coherence refers to the integrity of rules by their relation to other rules in a 
principled way, requiring consistency in the application of rules in order to treat 
like cases alike rejecting checkerboard solutions or compromises or their 
application inconsistently by reference to principles and the purpose of the rules 
justifying exceptions.
214
 This account of coherence relies on principles. However, 
legitimacy turns on coherence for the common good and the recognition of power 
of lawmaking body if principles themselves are part of an evaluative process. If 
justice is deemed a component of the common good of the community, as 
advocated in this study, its evaluation for every particular situation of hard 
indeterminacy of rules is an integral part of legitimacy for constructing the 
content of rules of international law proved indeterminate. This implicates in the 
first place the power of the body engaging in justice evaluation in international 
law for creating rules. Coherence as a criterion of legitimacy requires 
consideration of justice concerns extending legal order into a particular situation 
of indeterminacy having a, sometimes hard, collision of demands and conceptions 
of justice all required by the common good to be considered in constructing the 
substance of an authoritative rule with an engagement in  moral and political 
evaluation. It also entails the rule of recognition to identify and validate the power 
of the rule maker engaging in such an evaluation or its delegation to adjudicators 
for particular cases of hard collision of justice demands. The rule of recognition 
and coherence for the common good constitute structural criteria of legitimacy for 
validating the process and content of primary rules of international law that guide 
general sources of international law and participants in its rule formation 
processes.  
As a structural criterion of legitimacy, the rule of recognition constitutes 
one indispensable element in identifying and validating the origin of authority for 
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the formation or change of primary rules of obligation in international law. On the 
other hand, coherence including consideration of justice, equity and fairness 
constitutes another structural criterion of legitimacy for the formation or change 
of the content of primary international rules prescribing obligations for States. 
Both are justified and bound by the common good of the community. This leads 
the study to explore these structural criteria of legitimacy in view of situations of 
indeterminacies of the international rules and ultimately rules of international law 
on foreign investment. The examination of sources of general international law—
general principles of law and customary international law— in terms of the 
underlying lawmaking power in international law in constructing the content of 
international rules will be developed in the course of this exploration.     
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CHAPTER II                                                                                                            
COHERENCE AND PRINCIPLES                                                                      
 
 
The previous chapter articulated the conceptual approach to legitimacy in 
view of the common good of the community for the structure of the determinacy 
of the substance of international rules by distinct criteria of the rule of recognition 
and coherence. Coherence is a criterion of legitimacy. This criterion is linked to 
the common good requiring consideration of all appropriate justice demands in 
the creation of the substance of the law. Being a creative task involving moral and 
political evaluation requiring recognition, the criterion of coherence is also linked 
to the legitimacy criterion of the rule of recognition. To explore the concept of 
coherence and these links, this chapter will address the matter in light of the 
nature and function of principles and rule determination. This can begin with a 
background of general principles of law in international law.  
 
A. Background of Principles in International Law  
A basic category of principles relate to principles of structure in 
international law, including the criteria of legitimacy discussed in the previous 
chapter, which measure the claim of authority of an international rule. The 
function of substantive principles, therefore, must be compatible with these 
structural criteria of legitimacy.  
No state of disarray is probably greater in the lawmaking aspect of 
international law than what the term ‗principle‘ poses in substance. A discussion 
of general principles of law in international law usually revolves around sub-
paragraph C of Paragraph 1 of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice that refers to  ―the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations‖ among other sources that the ICJ may refer to in deciding disputes 
brought before it. This provision is a source of debate and leaves important 
questions about the generality, nature and function of principles.  
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There is opposition to the association of general principles with ‗civilized 
nations‘.215 The generality is no longer supposed to arise by common approaches 
adopted in ‗civilized nations‘ with European or Western characterization.  To 
argue for a general principle in international law it is necessary to reflect the 
approaches by nations of different cultural and legal backgrounds.
216
 This makes 
the generality test far more formidable to fulfill. Including other nations in the 
generality test is a positive starting point but not adequate. From the practical 
point of view, the identification of a general principle of law and its elevation and 
incorporation in the international law meets a fundamental challenge. As one 
scholar notes ―[t]he more abstract the principle, the greater consensus of legal 
systems but also the less useful the rule….The less abstract (and more concrete) 
the principle, the greater meaning it has but also the more difficult it is to find a 
consensus among domestic legal systems.‖217 The task of establishing the 
generality of the principle is extremely formidable. This is not to indicate that 
once the generality test is met, i.e. it is established that a principle is used in most 
developed systems, the principle may be applied as an authority deciding the case. 
While a purported general principle of law may collapse simply by not being 
shown as a principle recognized by most developed legal systems, meeting this 
test alone does not justify the application of the principle. From the legitimacy 
                                                 
215
  The practical effect of this phrase is doubtful. Was the United States uncivilized at the time 
when it systematically and formally practiced racism against the black people?  No tangible 
demarcation existed or exists today to determine a civilized from uncivilized nation because while 
certain acts may be found in gross conflict with moral conviction or conscience, to label the whole 
society or nation as uncivilized is unwarranted. 
216
 David J. Bederman, The Spirit of International Law (London: University of Georgia Press, 
2002) at 30. Bederman, finding a gap-filling function of general principles of domestic law for the 
rules of international law, notes that ‗civilized nations‘ referred to in Article 38 (1) (c) ―should be 
eclectically be taken as referring to jurisdictions embracing the common law tradition, the civil 
law, significant religious legal cultures (including Islamic law), and ideological legal systems 
(including socialist law as practiced in China and elsewhere).‖ Ibid.       
217
 Ibid. at 31. (―The irony of general principles is that the truly useful rules rarely pass the test of 
generality. As a consequence, international lawyers have tended to err on the side of the lowest-
common-denominator kind of logic in which abstract principles are derived from national legal 
systems and then shoehorned into appropriate legal submissions. Interestingly, this has most often 
been seen in ―mixed‖ international arbitrations (involving commercial disputes between States and 
private parties) where a ‗new‘ lex mercatoria has been derived from general rules of domestic 
practice.‖) Ibid. at 97-98.   
80 
 
point of view, the core of the matter is not reaching the generality of principles 
but their compatibility with the criteria of legitimacy.
218
 
The meaning of principles in international law is controversial. Reference 
has been made to the principles of international law, the principles of domestic 
law, the principles of domestic private law, or the principles of natural law.
219
 
Thus, in the treatment of principles literature refers to principles of different types 
and levels.
220
 Disagreement also exists about the function of general principles of 
law whether they can go beyond assisting the interpretation of customary or treaty 
obligations to an independent source.
221
 One view while acknowledging a 
supplementary role of general principles of law does not rule out the possibility of 
principles as an independent source.
222
 Some also view that general principles of 
law are not part of international law but part of law that only the international 
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court could apply in the absence of treaty or custom by virtue of sub-paragraph C 
of Article 38 (1).
223
  
Even as a guiding tool for treaty interpretation, there is no consensus as to 
how principles may play that role. The issue turns on the question of the 
normative weight of principles and their binding force, which also relates to the 
question of their status as a source of law. The sources doctrine in international 
law is confusing.
224
 Accordingly, the use of the source of law for principles as 
appearing in literature and indicated by Article 38 (1) (c) may accommodate 
theories that both attribute and do not attribute a binding force to principles.
225
 
These theories from one perspective represent normative and descriptive theories 
of principles in international law.
226
 The normative theory attaches a binding force 
to principles and the binding force of norms usually means that norms or 
principles ―govern the solution of normative problems‖, that is they are applied to 
provide solutions to the exclusion of other solutions in controlling decisions and 
provide explanation for decisions.
227
 The descriptive theory regards principles as 
non-binding because ―rules of international law are the only legally binding norms 
of international conduct.‖228 A gap-filling function to general principles in judicial 
practice is regarded as a branch of the normative theory.
 229
 The gap-filling 
function is an aspect that may arise in the interpretive aspect of adjudication. 
Accordingly, to use principles such as principles of equity, estoppel, etc. as 
interpretative standards when seen carrying a binding force would be an 
interpretive exercise representing the normative theory.
230
   
The gap filling function of general principles has also been raised in the 
discussion of non-liquet in adjudication, particularly for novel cases in the 
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absence of specific rules. On analogies with national systems, Hersch Lauterpacht 
treated the completeness of the legal system and the prohibition of non-liquet 
itself as a general principle and transposed it to international law on the ground 
that the process of judicial settlement does not permit non-liquet.
231
 This 
transposition also accompanied the assumption that ―[t]he rejection of the 
admissibility of non-liquet implies the necessity for creative activity on the part of 
international judges.‖232 Lauterpacht assumed the judicial activity for what he 
termed ―real gaps‖, i.e. ―gaps due to discrepancies of practice‖ unlike ―unreal 
gaps‖ attributed to situations where the legal situation is unsatisfactory in view of 
the purpose of law for which a gap filling function by the tribunal is much limited 
in international law because is seen as overriding the existing law. 
233
 This view 
runs along the lines of the distinction between the notions of equity.
234
  
The material completeness approach regarded the prohibition of non-liquet 
in international adjudication as requiring beyond the method whereby claims are 
rejected because of the absence of a rule, notably the absence of a rule in 
international law to restrict the freedom of State action.
235
 Lauterpacht 
acknowledged, ―[v]ery frequently this method of dealing with claims will be in 
accordance with the judicial function of international judges as distinguished from 
that of legislators or mediators.‖236 Yet, Lauterpacht advocated extending to 
international law a material completeness of law deemed to be ―the necessary aim 
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of any legal system‖ for its achievement ―the judge must consider not only the 
letter of the law, but also its spirit and purpose.‖237 
Opinions on gaps and non-liquet diverge diametrically. Views divide on 
whether non-liquet should be rejected in international law with some rejecting the 
declaration of non-liquet by an international tribunal and others believing that in 
the absence of sufficient State practice non-liquet must be declared as an inherent 
aspect of customary international law as an incomplete system.
238
 The view 
expressing non-permissibility of non-liquet in international law has received sharp 
criticism.
239
 Declaration of non-liquet could be justified in certain cases, which 
albeit important no ―wise solution‖ is available for them for the present and non-
liquet in some cases is even required.
240
 Furthermore, a customary or general 
principle basis of the prohibition of non-liquet in international law is rejected.
241
 
One main concern for the issue of non-liquet is the law-creating exercise of 
international courts as opposed to their function for the application of law.
242
  
It is acknowledged that non-liquet prohibits the refusal by the adjudicator 
to give a decision on the ground of the absence of an applicable rule.
243
 Thus, the 
notion of non-liquet does not necessarily mean the decision has to be positive by 
creating a rule on a material completeness approach instead of rejecting the claim. 
Yet, the more fundamental issue is the non-liquet associated with the material 
completeness of the law that begs the question whether the international rule of 
recognition recognizes and validates any moral and political evaluation task, 
arising from whatever sort of gap, creating obligations and limitations on the 
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conduct of States. This question as indicated has links to the function of principles 
and the process of rule determination.   
The boundaries of principles in international law are not marked. 
Principles of different orders interplay. Article 38 leaves unanswered significant 
questions about general principles of law in international law in terms of their 
compatibility with the criteria of legitimacy regarding the identification of the 
origin and content of law. The above account raises important questions of 
legitimacy regarding the application of principles and the creative function of 
international adjudicators in the interpretation of indeterminate obligations of 
states in international law. In relation to principles, the question concerns the 
compatibility of the binding force of substantive principles in view of the criterion 
of coherence. In relation to the creative function of international adjudicators, the 
question concerns the conformity of the adjudicators‘ power with the criterion of 
the rule of recognition in international law. To address these questions a 
distinction between the types and the nature of principles is important to evaluate 
the function of principles and its implication for the function of adjudicators in 
view of legitimacy.  
The capacity to provide a solution in a legitimate manner is a fundamental 
issue surrounding the question of principles in areas of indeterminacies in 
international law. Indiscriminate reference to principles of different levels and 
functions to either appreciate or repudiate the binding force of principles obscures 
their true juridical character in international law that the criteria of legitimacy 
depict. All these questions invite exploration of the pertinent aspects of legal 
theory, in order to build a justified account of general principles of law in 
international law and the issue of the creative function of adjudicators in terms of 
legitimacy. This may begin with a discussion of indeterminacy and the issue of 
gap arising in interpretation in identification of the content of law.  
 
B. The Identification of the Content of Law    
Legitimacy of process heavily affects the legitmacy of conent in 
substance. The concern of the content of law arises both at the legislative and 
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interpretative  levels, which is bound by the creteria of legitimacy. Determining 
the content of law at the legislative level may very often implicate challenges at 
the intepretation level for the identification of the content of law in terms of unjust 
laws or the the gap of law.  
Conventional approach in legal theory deems natural law‘s primary or 
extreme claim to be attaching a moral test for the legal validity of laws.
244
 In 
Hart‘s view, the most hotly contested theory of natural law regards bad (morally 
wrong or unjust) laws not laws or invalid laws, whereas positivists regard them as 
valid or to be still laws but ―too iniquitous to be applied or obeyed.‖245 This form 
of relation of morality and law ascribed to natural law is, according to John 
Finnis, not the primary concern of natural law.
246
 Finnis shows that the thrust of 
natural law theory is the rational foundations for moral judgment and the legal 
rules embodying the moral judgment.
247
  Natural law in this account concerns the 
principles of ‗reasonableness‘ that lay the foundations for the construction of 
rules. The primary concern of natural law is not to challenge the positive law and 
the validity of its rules through moral tests but to equip positive law with 
principles of practical reasonableness in order to solve coordination problems and 
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promote the common good in the community.
248
 What primarily natural law 
eschews about positive law is when legal rules are defective in practical 
reasonableness including legality (in the sense of the rule of law), i.e. 
legitimacy.
249
  The question of unjust laws in national legal systems is open to an 
interminable debate in legal theory, which may not correspondingly reflect in 
international law. What may create a great deal of confusion regarding 
international rules—still mingled with moral and justice foundations of rules—is 
the gap of law, which deserves a closer look.  
 Although the question of gap surfaces in interpretation of the content of a 
rule, it actually concerns the content of the law. It turns on what the position of 
the law of a given system is in attaching an instance to the scope of a rule whose 
extent to the instance at issue is controversial. If the rule does not cover the 
instance in its content, there is, therefore, a gap in the law. This is what Hart 
describes as the open texture of law or indeterminacy resulting from disputable 
rules. Hart points out that law has open texure, namely indeterminacy about the 
application of words and rules, and posits that judges in such cases exercise 
discretion in making a choice between different interests and alternatives.
250
 The 
legislator‘s inability to predict all circumstances, namely ―ignorance of fact‖, will 
lead to ―a relative indeterminacy of aim.‖251 
Hart‘s open texture of law builds upon his earlier account of the gap of 
law resulting from disputable rules. Hart distinguished between standard and 
penumbral cases with respect to the application of existing rules to facts. 
Therefore, a legal rule forbidding taking vehicles into parks, according to Hart, 
has uncontroversial core meaning in contrast to penumbral issues whose scope is 
disputable.
252
 A ―penumbra of uncertainty‖ surrounds all rules where judges make 
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a choice between alternatives.
253
 The issue of penumbra of uncertainty is 
fundamental for interpreting an issue like expropriation of foreign investors‘ 
property in international law because the interpretation of the ‗expropriation‘ or 
‗compensation‘ involves disputable instances whose arbitral assessment must 
conform to the criteria of legitimacy.    
 In response to what makes a decision in interpretation of penumbral cases 
sound or better than alternatives, Hart emphasizes the separation of law and 
morality in that ―the criterion which makes a decision sound in such cases is some 
concept of what the law ought to be.‖254 This in fact concerns the existence or 
non-existence of a rule for a particular situation due to the penumbra of 
uncertainty surrounding a rule. That a decision in the interpretation of penumbral 
cases reflects what the law should be does not preclude moral judgments to 
determine what the law should be.
255
  Acknowledging this relation between law 
and morality, Hart recognizes ―a point of necessary intersection‖ instead of 
―connection‖ between law and morality.256  Behind this account of interpretation 
of legal rules is that in penumbral cases judges engage in the lawmaking process 
because they confront alternatives to choose.
257
 Thus, the interpretation of the 
content of law in the adjudication of indeterminate rules turns on competing 
alternatives.     
 Lon Fuller finds Hart‘s account of interpretation defective because it 
assumes that interpretative problems arise from the meaning of individual 
words.
258
 In response to Hart‘s seemingly semantic account of interpretation, 
Fuller offers the purposive interpretation of law that takes the aim or purpose of a 
statute or a precedent into account in the interpretation of its content.
 259
 This 
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purposive interpretation assesses the purpose of a rule itself rather than the 
intention of its framers. Fuller suggests that the purposive interpretation has a 
place not only in penumbral but ordinary cases as well.
260
  A mere semantic 
character is not, however, attributable to Hart‘s analysis of legal interpretation as 
Hart has rejected mechanical interpretation and acknowledged interpretation in 
light of social aims.
261
 There is no reason that the distinction between core and 
penumbra solely and necessarily applies to the meaning of words rather than the 
meaning or the content of rules. Certainly, there are rules that have core or 
standard instances as well as penumbra instances.  At the core of this distinction is 
that in interpreting the content of a rule there are instances whose coverage by the 
rule is indeterminate. 
Hart‘s account of interpretation still indicates that in penumbral cases 
where the meaning of rules is disputable judges engage in a gap filling exercise. 
Fuller‘s purposive account of interpretation implies that by deciding the meaning 
of a rule through the purpose of the rule, judges discover its scope rather than 
creating a new rule for a new instance.  Nonetheless, as long as the purposes of 
rules are themselves to be weighed in light of social aims, purposes, and policies 
or moral judgments and be chosen among alternatives, then an instance, which is 
not at the core and undisputable meaning of the rule, is legally undetermined. 
Fuller‘s acknowledgement that when purposive interpretation is made within the 
limits of ―structural integrity‖ of rules, the fidelity to law permits and requires 
judges‘ creative role, points to the gap-filling function of judges in a law-making 
manner even though they are deciding the purpose of rules.
262
  
 Fuller concedes that purposive interpretation of law is significantly 
susceptible to abuse to an extent that may jeopardize human dignity and liberty.
263
  
To reduce the vice of purposive interpretation, Fuller emphasizes, that judges are 
                                                 
260
 Ibid. at 661-669.   
261
 See Hart, Separation, supra note 27, at 611-614. Hart observes that a mechanical interpretation 
of general terms contained in rules without considering social aims, policies and consequences 
would amount to an absurd result such as including a toy motion car and excluding a bicycle as a 
vehicle in the coverage of the rule prohibiting taking vehicles into parks. Ibid. at 611. According to 
Hart, the aim or purpose of law is not necessarily moral. See ibid.  
262
 See Fuller, Fidelity, supra note 27, at 670. 
263
 Ibid. at 670-671. 
89 
 
bound by the ―structural integrity‖ of the rules.264 Fuller only hints at the 
structural integrity by stating, ―[a] statute or a rule of common law has, either 
explicitly, or by virtue of its relation with other rules, something that may be 
called a structural integrity.‖265 The question of the gap of the law and the 
judicial funtion to address it also finds expression in Ronald Dworkin‘s vision of 
law. Dworkin argues that in hard cases judges‘ disagreemnt about the truth of 
propositions of law, namely ―all the various statements and claims people make 
about what the law allows or prohibits or entitles them to have‖ is theoretical as 
opposed to philosphical or empirical disagreement that focuses on the issues of 
the fidelity or gap.
266
 The theoretical disagreemnt, in Dworkin‘s view, concerns 
the grounds of law as ―more familiar propositions of law,‖ which ―makes a 
particular proposition true or false.‖ 267 Dworkin asserts that in deciding important 
cases judges in the Anglo-American system ―generally offer … ‗new‘ statements 
of law as improved reports of what the law, properly understood, already is‖ and 
claim that their ―new statement is required by a correct perception of the true 
grounds of law even though this has not been recognized previously, or has even 
been denied. So the public debate about whether judges ‗discover‘ or ‗invent‘ law 
is really about whether and when that ambitious claim is true.‖268 
 What, in relation to principles, Dworkin builds on these assumptions is his 
account of integrity advocating coherence of rules with background principles 
constituting part of the law as a whole.
269
 Dworkin divides integrity between 
―integrity in legislation‖ and ―integrity in adjudication‖.270 Whereas legislative 
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integrity requires lawmakers to make law coherent with principles of justice and 
fairness, the adjudicative integrity demands judges to treat law ―as expressing and 
respecting a coherent set of principles, and to that end, to interpret these standards 
to find implicit standards between and beneath the explicit ones.‖271 Thus, 
according to Dworkin, law as integrity, the adjudicative integrity, means 
―propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of 
justice, fairness or procedural due process that provide the best constructive 
interpretation of the community‘s legal practice.‖272  
 Reliance on the principles of justice or fairness in Dworkin‘s adjudicative 
integrity is accompanied with some assumptions. First, Dworkin supports that a 
―principle model‖ of community is preferred to a ―rule-book model.‖273 Second, 
by projecting a gapless vision of law in the name of integrity, Dworkin argues that 
principles provide one right or best solution or answer to controversial legal 
questions in the legal interpretation of hard cases.
274
 It follows that the gap is 
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that ―[w]e might treat legal principles the way we treat legal rules and say that some principles are 
binding as law and must be taken into account by judges and lawyers who make decisions of legal 
obligation …, we should say that in the United States, at least, the ‗law‘ includes principles as well 
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attributed to rule books (statutes or precedents) not the law as a whole because 
principles of justice or fairness as integral part of the law provide one right 
solution in a hard case where the scope of a statute or precedent is in question.  
 This conception of integrity situates principles at the core of law and legal 
interpretation of a rule and the law as a whole. On this ground, Dworkin presents 
a constructive interpretation consisting of elements of fit and justification 
whereby judges test different interpretations and principles expressing them in 
hard cases in view of principles of justice or fairness.
275
 Through this constructive 
interpretation, judges interpret the law in a way to make it the best it can be 
construed as the work of a single legislator.
276
 They first decide which 
interpretations fit past decisions (precedents, statutes) as a whole and then, 
confronting several contradictory or conflicting interpretations and the principles 
expressing them that fit the law as a whole, judges make the law and the legal 
practice the best it can through the interpretation that best justifies it in light of 
principles of fairness or justice.
277
 For instance, among different interpretations 
and principles expressing them about the compensation for emotional injury 
suffered in automobile accidents in England, six interpretations may be short-
listed by the judge.
278
 An interpretation that allows only compensation for 
physical injury or allowing compensation for unforeseeable damages is rejected 
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because it does not fit past decisions (precedents) in that system.
279
 An 
interpretation that allows compensation for emotional injury at the scene but not 
away from the scene fits past decisions but fails the justification dimension as ―it 
does not state a principle of justice at all.‖280 An interpretation and the principle 
expressing it that allows compensation if seemingly on a utilitarian basis that 
practice would reduce the cost of accidents or make the community wealthier also 
fits past decisions but does not meet well the justification test because it states 
policies rather than principles of justice or fairness.
281
 The battle comes to the 
conflicting interpretations and principles expressing them that both fit past 
decisions but one (conforming to popular opinion) requiring unlimited 
compensation and the other limited compensation due to grave financial impact 
on the party at fault.
282
  
 A key point in this constructive interpretation is conceiving integrity in the 
sense of ―treat like cases alike.‖283 Hence, in deciding the similarity of cases and 
therefore the principles behind them, Dworkin suggests that a judge modeling 
after his imaginary ‗Judge Hercules‘ ―expands the range‖ to ―see whether it [the 
interpretation or principle] is compatible with the bulk of legal practice more 
generally.‖284 By expanding the range, he means testing each interpretation and 
the underlying principle (legal principle) against past decisions (and their 
principles) beyond those of immediate cases of likeness in that legal field to other 
cases in the field or even beyond its field.
285
 For instance, in the case of accidental 
emotional injury in tort law, justice requires to treat it like a case not same as 
physical or emotional injury that may result in unlimited liability but similar to 
cases in which damages are potentially great such as injury caused by accountants 
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or surveyors where liability is limited.
286
 In this account, the judge considers 
which interpretation or principle expressing it better ―fits the extended legal 
record.‖287 Ultimately, the judge would confront a question of political morality 
where in order to show the legal record the best it can be, principles of fairness 
and justice diverge, the former demanding unlimited liability and the latter 
requiring limited liability.
288
 The answer will depend on the judge‘s conviction 
about justice and fairness constituting political morality.
289
  Whether principles 
can offer solutions so as to characterize judges‘ decisions in a constructive 
interpretation or any other interpretation based on principles as legal rather than 
moral or political remains a question. Before addressing the question of principles 
in detail, some points may be highlighted. Firstly, Dworkin‘s reliance on 
principles for the adjudicative integrity is primarily on principles of justice and 
fairness not general principles of law. In fact, his assessment in the question of 
emotional injury shows how these general principles emanating from rules as 
settled law are tested against what the principles of justice or fairness require for a 
particular hard case. Secondly, Dworkin‘s theory of adjudicative integrity and a 
community of principles tend to protect rights of individual human beings by 
preventing an affront to what principles of fairness and justice demand in such 
protection. No safeguard, however, is provided in that theory to secure that such 
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affront does not follow at the adjudication level from judges‘ opinions about 
fairness or justice in the name of those principles.
290
  
Thirdly, Dworkin acknowledges that judges and lawyers disagree about 
the grounds of law and have different opinions as to what fairness or justice 
requires or how conflict between them should be resolved. Yet, he insists on a 
right or real solution as a matter of law. There is an understatement of rules and 
overstatement of principles in the adjudicative integrity and similar calls for 
principles in their role to solve coordination problems.  
Fourthly, as with other accounts relying on principles Dworkin also relies 
on principles indiscriminately in their function as a requirement of law, whereas 
some principles have this effect and many do not. Dworkin‘s theory is compatible 
with certain principles of absolute character. It will also promote a constitutional 
approach to the construction of rights of human beings. Neither of these can be 
taken for granted for corporations. Part of the confusion surrounding binding 
force of principles is the attempts to create a universal theory for principles 
regardless of their character and function.   
Fifthly, Dworkin‘s interpretive theory is ―addressed to a particular legal 
culture‖, which is the Anglo-American system.291 Thus, it cannot be applied to 
international law irrespective of the structure of international law. There is no 
reason to suppose that the question of gap in international law is commensurable 
to domestic systems or uniformly applicable for all relations of States in all fields 
of international law. Dworkin‘s argument cannot be generalized as a necessarily 
correct picture of all fields of international law.   
Sixthly, coherence as a key element of legitimacy is not tied to the notion 
of interpretive integrity in adjudication. Dworkin‘s own reference to integrity in 
legislation affirms this point. Therefore, objections to Dworkin‘s conception of 
integrity in adjudication or to one right solution in all hard cases should not be 
regarded as objections to coherence in law. Moreover, Dworkin‘s conception of 
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integrity and coherence is about consistency in law through the principles of 
fairness or justice, making one part of the law consistent with another part. 
Coherence, however, at the same time, supports inconsistency in law in the sense 
that, for example, in Dworkin‘s analysis of emotional injury justice demands a 
solution not consistent with the general principle of unlimited liability. 
Coherence, therefore, involves inconsistency with a general principle.
292
   
 Theorists such as above, in one way or another, raise the content of the 
law in legal interpretation in controversial cases with varying reliance on rules, 
purposes and principles. In all these variations, the identification of the content of 
the law in indeterminate cases implicates evaluation of different values and 
making choices by a legitimate body to determine the content of the law to give 
specificity to the scope of a new or existing rule for a particular situation. A 
substantial issue for the application of principles in interpretation is compatibility 
with the criteria of legitimacy. The question of the utility of principles in 
interpretation and identification of the content of the law is subject to legitimacy 
criteria. The interpretation of rules— be it semantic, purposive, or constructive— 
is disciplined by the criteria of legitimacy. This raises the question whether the 
application of principles in a biding manner conforms to the legitimacy criteria of 
coherence and the rule of recognition of the system. This question receives deeper 
treatment in a discussion of the determination of the content of the law.    
 
C. The Determination of the Content of Law   
The previous section showed that the identification of the content of law in 
legal interpretation of indeterminate law or rules raises the question of the utility 
of principles. The application of principles in a binding manner needs to be 
assessed in terms of their conformity with the criteria of legitimacy. To this end, 
this section will focus on certain different levels and types of principles and the 
manner they implicate the requirements of coherence and the rule of recognition. 
By the types of principles discussed in this section, it is not meant to indicate that 
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they exhaust the range of principles that may come into focus in relation to law. 
The principles discussed in this section will rather assist to identify their character 
and their capacity to apply in a binding manner. This assessment will then assist 
to revisit the question of the application of principles in international law.  
 
i. Variety and Variability of Principles  
In addition to structural principles of legitimacy that provide the 
framework criteria for the formation and identification of primary rules, a variety 
of principles may interact in the determination of the content of rules or law. 
These include principles expressing basic values to general principles of law and 
in between principles of justice, fairness, and equity.  The following will address 
these principles to assess their character and function and their weight in the 
process of determination of specific rules.  
 
a) Practical Principles: Diversity of Participation in Values 
 
An intimate bond firmly ties natural law and positive law in the process of 
rational determination of rules. The primary dependency of natural law on 
positive law is to secure basic human values.
293
  The community of human beings 
has basic values that both orient and justify the necessity for law and specific 
rules, justice, authority and the rule of law (legitimacy) in an orderly manner 
where these virtues of human association merge to produce rational determination 
of rules in order to solve coordination problems of a society for the common 
good.
 294
    
Legal theorists have treated human goods differently. For instance, Hart, 
as ―an attenuated version of Natural Law‖, reduces natural human end or good, 
which in his view emanates from teleological view of nature, to human 
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survival.
295
 Hart finds this modest human aim or value of survival as the core 
indisputable element of natural law.
296
 Thus, in Hart‘s approach, survival is an 
irreducible human good, value or aim.
297
 To Fuller, human end is not limited to 
survival but imports communication as well.
298
 Fuller does not contest that a 
necessary condition for human achievement is survival, but objects to survival as 
being ―the core and central element of all human striving.‖299  What Fuller adds is 
the objective of maintaining communication for supporting and infusing all 
human aspirations since it is because of communication with other fellows that 
man has been able to survive.
300
  
In Finnis‘s account of natural law, neither survival nor the combination of 
survival and communication, nor Finnis‘s own enumeration exhausts human 
values. Finnis counts, in a non-exhaustive manner, seven forms of good or basic 
values, which comprise life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, 
practical reasonableness, and religion.
301
 The basic values are not only ‗self-
evident‘, ‗underived‘, and ‗incommensurable‘ but also ―equally fundamental‖ 
without hierarchy among them.
302
 Only may one‘s focus shift from one value to 
another based on the circumstances and the value focused in those circumstances. 
In this way, no value is more fundamental than the others because each value ―can 
reasonably be focused upon, and each, when focused upon, claims a priority of 
value.‖303  That basic values are equally fundamental, of course, does not prevent 
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a person from the choice of treating one or some values as more important in his 
life so that they can elect to participate in one or some values and not in others.
304
  
The values of life, sociability, and practical reasonableness are significant 
in this discussion. Life is a basic value corresponding to the drive for self-
preservation, and ―signifies every aspect of the vitality (vita, life) which puts a 
human being in good shape for self-determination.‖305 There is also the value of 
sociability, which ranges from peace and harmony among persons to forms of 
human communities.
306
 There is further the basic value of practical 
reasonableness that provides criteria for effectively solving problems of choosing 
actions and decisions by individuals as well as lawmakers and adjudicators.
307
 
The basic principle of practical reasonableness is pivotal among the basic values 
in that not only is it itself a basic value but also it disciplines participation in all 
other aspects of human values or goods.
308
 Participation in values creates 
coordination problems in relation to other members in the community that need to 
be solved. To this end, the basic value of practical reasonableness provides certain 
requirements for the lawmaking process.
309
  
These three basic values find immediate focus in dealing with the rule 
formation and interpretation in international law in shaping and determination of 
the origin and content of rules in boundaries of legitimacy. A number of values 
may be put forward as basic values in the international community corresponding 
to life and community. Self-determination, self-preservation, equality of States, 
peace and peaceful co-existence are familiar terms.
310
  Parallel to the basic value 
of life in the human community, which concerns the self-preservation and self-
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determination of human beings, there is a basic value of life of States for their 
self-preservation and self-determination. The parallel to the value of community 
at the domestic level, in international law is the sociability of States and the 
community of States.
311
 The association of States in peace and peaceful 
coexistence is a basic value of international law.   
These values in the international community have a dual aspect by being 
bound to basic values of human beings. The collective life of communities of 
human beings is manifested in the notion of nations underlying the values of self-
preservation and self-determination of States. On one side then, the corresponding 
value at the international level is the life of nations in the form of States, which 
includes every aspect of viability of nation-States that put their communities in a 
good shape for self-preservation and self-determination. The other aspect is the 
co-existence of the value of life and the dignity of human beings as individuals in 
the international community. The international community is ultimately a 
community by and for the communities of human beings. Not only are basic 
values of human beings part of the basic values of the international community, 
but also it may turn out that ―the good of individuals can only be fully secured and 
realized in the context of international community.‖312     
As a basic value that disciplines participation in other values to solve 
coordination problems, the basic value of practical reasonableness also applies to 
international lawmaking. With so many complex coordination problems in the 
international community, this basic value and its requirements function as 
principles of legitimacy to be met in international rulemaking to justify the 
authority of rules.
313
  The rule formation in international law must display respect 
for this basic value and its requirements as part of the criterion of coherence.  
What express basic values are basic value judgments or basic practical 
principles.  An important issue is then what a practical principle is and how to 
participate in a value. A principle of practical reasonableness is any expression of 
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our understanding of a value (such as ‗knowledge is something good to have,‘ or 
‗ignorance is to be avoided) that provides ―a starting point for reasoning about 
what to do.‖314  By the proposition that knowledge is good is not meant that it is a 
moral value and follows a moral recommendation, prescription, requirement or 
obligation.
315
 Practical principles express values in basic and particular forms.
316
  
A basic practical principle such as ‗knowledge is good‘ orients the reasoning.317 A 
particular practical premise such as ‗it is desirable to find out about …‘ formulates 
a desire but makes the desire more specific by ―refereeing its object to the 
intelligible and general form of good which that object is one possible way of 
participating in or instantiating.‖318 Another particular practical principle such as 
‗reading this particular book serves the end to find out about …‘ adds a 
―straightforward factual judgment about relevance, coherence, etc., of a particular 
book‖ to the particular practical principle, which together ―expresses a reason for 
acting in the manner signified in the conclusion that ‗therefore, I will read this 
particular book‘.319 An important issue is that in many cases beyond the basic 
form of good just as with knowledge and the principle expressing it, rule 
formation, creation, and interpretation is a matter of evaluation, assessment, all-
considered, and selection of choices and specification of particulars. Basic 
practical principles ―can be instantiated (rather than ‗applied‘) in indefinitely 
many, more specific, practical principles and premises.‖320  
To translate the basic practical principles and the function of the basic 
requirements of reasoning in relation to a rule making process, reference may be 
made to the example of determination of a rule for the ownership of natural 
resources in the High Seas. The first practical principle is that it is desirable or 
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good to have a rule in this particular field of law as it would solve the 
coordination problems that arise from the relations between States in extracting 
these resources. But, that ‗this particular rule of common ownership rooted in the 
notion of common heritage of mankind is good for this field‘ is a particular 
practical principle. Such a particular practical principle may be formulated 
subsequent to the evaluation of conceptions of justice and concerns of the 
international community whether through customary or conventional international 
law specification of the legal order of the ownership of natural resources in the 
High Seas. The necessity for the determination of the content of law through 
specific rules in part relates to the range of possibilities open to evaluation and 
selection in formulating this second particular practical principle.   
That knowledge is good as a self evident and universal practical principle 
cannot be extended to the premise that knowledge about a particular object is 
universally good. As Finnis observes ―[t]he universality of a desire is not a 
sufficient basis for inferring that the object of that desire is really desirable, 
objectively good.‖321 The universality, irreducibility, self-evidentness of 
principles is attributable to basic goods, basic practical principles and the 
requirements of practical reasonableness or structural principles. Such attribution 
does not fit substantive moral principles or particular practical judgments or 
general principles of law that are subject to evaluation and choice in infinite 
instances.  
The necessity for specificity in rule making at the deepest root stems from 
the indefinite and inexhaustible diversity existing for the realization of or 
participation in basic values. The basic values and the basic value judgments 
(basic practical principles) built on them such as ‗the human life is a value‘ are 
universal. There is a concern for the value of human life, for the value of 
cooperation, for the value of common good, for the value of justice, etc. in all 
societies, and all have conceptions of property, title, and reciprocity.
322
  The basic 
value judgments form the rational infrastructure of moral judgments as well as 
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human law. Thus, they are manifested not only in moral requirements but in 
human cultures and institutions as well.
323
 Yet, the basic values and basic value 
judgments do not entail universal methods and forms in particular realization of or 
participation in basic values (principles) or universal moral attitude. They provide 
horizons and opportunities for which human beings and communities are free to 
select in shaping life.
324
 There is infinite diversity in particular realization of or 
participation in basic values and instantiation of basic practical principles, in free 
and selective pursuit of opportunities open to human beings and communities.
325
  
There is also diversity in the level of priority given in the pursuit of a given value. 
Human beings, cultures, and communities differ in their realization of values and 
in their response to any value.
326
 Law and law-making enterprise respect 
diversities in participation in and response to basic values by human beings, 
cultures, and communities. International law in particular is built upon respect for 
these diversities through its basic values and structural principles and criteria of 
legitimacy.  
Law, justice, and authority are also values of the community because 
without them the basic values could not be secured or at least advanced.
327
 They 
are needed because basic values may be participated in a variety of ways and the 
communal life pose coordination problems that need to be solved and the solution 
could only be provided through institutions of human law.
328
 The variation in 
realization of and response to basic values and practical principles is, therefore, 
conducive to coordination problems that require specific rules determined through 
rational evaluations and selection of choices in a given community.  
In addition to justifying the need for law, justice and authority to 
determine solutions to coordination problems through specific rules, the basic 
good of practical reasonableness provides criteria for such determination and 
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indeed for actions and decisions by individuals, judges, and lawmakers.
329
 These 
are the methodological principles that are among others required in lawmaking 
and law applying decisions. Amongst the basic requirements of practical 
reasonableness that discipline the decision and making the determination of the 
content of rules are ―no arbitrary preferences‖ among values or persons, ―respect 
for every basic value in every act‖, and the advancement of the common good.330 
Morality is the product of the basic requirements of practical reasonableness.
331
 
Finnis observes ―[v]ery many, perhaps, even most of our concrete moral 
responsibilities, obligations, and duties have their basis in … the requirement of 
favouring and fostering the common good of one‘s communities.‖332 The content 
of the common good of the political community or the international community is 
the subject matter of justice, law including the rule of law, and authority.
333
 These 
methodological requirements of practical reasonableness, notably the 
advancement of common good, are tied to the legitimacy criterion of coherence in 
determining the content of law.  
Basic values and their concomitant basic principles together with the 
requirements of practical reasonableness furnish foundations for moral 
evaluations and legal formulations in the construction of order in relations 
between the members of the community and the determination of solutions to 
their coordination problems. The basic values, the basic practical principle 
expressing the values of the community, and the basic requirements of practical 
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reasonableness underlying the necessity for specific rules have also significant 
implications for moral principles and general principles of law. These 
implications are reflected in the following sections.  
 
b) Moral Principles: Variability of Moral Attitude 
The capacity of morals to be binding as a matter of law may also evaluated 
in view of variability of moral judgments. Two aspects of morality in this regard 
are general and specific morality. On the issue of general morality, the distinction 
between duty and aspiration comes to point. On the question of specific morality, 
the shifting aspect of principles of justice, fairness, or equity comes into focus. 
These issues will be assessed from the legitimacy point of view in relation to the 
determination of the content of rules.  
 
1. Duty and Aspiration on the Scale of Morality  
The portrait of morality as a scale of human achievement between duty 
and aspiration has been depicted by Lon Fuller. This scale of human achievement 
starts with the morality of duty at the bottom and switches to the morality of 
aspiration towards the top with an imaginary pointer to mark the line where the 
duty stops and excellence begins.
334
 The morality of duty is akin to law, whereas 
the morality of aspiration finds its relation to aesthetics.
335
 The morality of duty 
concerns the minimum requirements or conditions of social living ―without which 
an ordered society is impossible, or without which an ordered society directed 
toward specific goals must fail of its mark‖ similar to rules of grammar in 
language in preserving language as a means of communication.
336
 Morality of 
aspiration reaches towards the excellence of good life and realization of human 
capacity and powers, similar to rules of good writing.
337
 Below the imaginary 
pointer, failure is condemned as a violation of duty and success is not praised as a 
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fulfillment of duty, whereas above the pointer, failure results in expression of pity 
and success is admired.
338
 This distinction explains lawmakers‘ treatment of a 
question such as gambling.
339
 If the lawmaker regards gambling as a morality of 
aspiration and not duty, then it has no (direct) bearing on law because law cannot, 
as Fuller submits, or should not seek to, ―compel a man to live up to the 
excellences of which he is capable.‖340  
A similar analysis is traceable to Hart‘s distinction between moral ideals 
and moral obligations.
341
 Hart pointing to the evaluation of competing moral 
values, states that  
[D]ifferences of weight or emphasis placed on different moral 
values may prove irreconcilable. They may amount to radically 
different ideal conceptions of society and form the moral basis of 
opposed political parties. One of the great justifications of 
democracy is that it permits experimentation and a revisable choice 
between such alternatives.
342
   
 
This account of duty and aspiration or obligation and ideal carry significant 
implications for rule determination.  
First, it indicates that not all moral propositions impose duty. There could 
be morals that are not located in law. Second, the fact that many moral 
propositions may not impose duties necessitates a legitimate process to determine 
rules that specify rights and obligations in order to provide a conclusive line 
between duties and aspiration in the communal life to rescue the members of the 
community from arbitrary or idiosyncratic solutions as to what morals impose 
legal obligations. This is part of the coherence required as a criterion of 
legitimacy. The distinction between duty and aspiration is another aspect of 
diversity in participation in basic values, which further affirms that the law-
making processes involve decisions as to the choice between moral conceptions. 
Therefore, moral principles are not universal or absolute but contingent upon 
                                                 
338
 Ibid. at 10, 30-31.  
339
 Ibid. at 7-9.  
340
 Ibid. at 6-9. 
341
 Hart, Concept, supra note 5, at 182. 
342
 Ibid. at 184. 
106 
 
determination of specific rules to show the choice of the community where duties 
are imposed and where morals remain aspirations.  
In international law, the distinction between duty and aspiration is even 
more significant in separating the duties of States from what are aspirations. 
International law, by virtue of its basic values and fundamental principles 
expressing them such as self-determination and self-preservation, leaves a great 
deal of autonomy to States particularly in their economic affairs. This makes the 
tension between international duties and aspirations even higher because many 
activities with cross-boundary effect may in the international agenda remain 
aspirations beyond the sphere of morality of duty in international law. 
International law determines its own sphere of morality of duty and aspiration.  
Just as international law may require a minimum treatment for the 
treatment of aliens regardless of whether the national law of a State may have 
determined that minimum as aspiration, international law may treat many issues 
as aspirations even though in a national system they may have been determined as 
a duty. By way of illustration, international law may treat equal treatment between 
a foreign investor and a national investor for establishing investment not as an 
obligation of States but an aspiration that if desired States may within their 
consensual scheme through treaties formulate as a duty in their particular 
relations.  The fundamental point is that locating the line between the morality of 
duty and morality of aspiration in international law requires determination under a 
legitimate process according to criteria of legitimacy in international law. It 
requires making rules coherent with what are determined as morality of duty 
according to the criteria of practical reasonableness under the rule of recognition 
not undue extension of aspiration into morality or ideal into obligation through 
transposition of national duties into international duties.  
As a requirement of legitimacy, determination is essential to ascertain the 
duty of States. Fuller reminds that ―[i]f the morality of duty reaches upward 
beyond its proper sphere the iron hand of imposed obligation may stifle 
experiment, inspiration, and spontaneity. If the morality of aspiration invades the 
province of duty, men may begin to weigh and qualify their obligations by 
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standards of their own …‖343 The stake for international law is much greater. If 
the morality of aspiration intrudes upon the morality of duty in international law 
through ambitious agenda to extend aspirations into States‘ obligations without 
determination and specification of those obligations in the context of international 
law, this would create a legitimacy shortfall causing States to employ their own 
yardsticks to assess international duties. The more resort to abstract standards or 
principles to attach duties to States, the more likelihood of erosion of international 
law and retard of genuine international rules.  Determination of duties in specific 
rules, in contrast, restores the yardstick of legitimacy and efficiency of genuine 
rules. Determination of the content of rules is an essential element in international 
law to test and demonstrate through the criteria of legitimacy what has reached the 
level of duty and what has not. The distinction between morality of aspiration and 
duty is also linked to the status of moral principles of justice, fairness or equity in 
relation to rules.  
 
2. Concept and Conception of Justice 
Closely related to the distinction between aspiration and duty is that 
justice, fairness, equity and similar hallowed concepts do not automatically 
impose a duty. A process of determination in most cases is required to legitimate 
the obligation demanded by these fundamental principles of all communities. 
Otherwise, aspiration would intrude upon duty and more importantly violate 
legitimacy. Justice as a significant segment and more specific form of morality 
does not necessarily guarantee the existence of excellences in laws or 
administration of laws.
344
 
Justice, fairness, equity or similar cherished principles truly constitute the 
moral foundations of all legitimate lawmaking processes in human communities. 
These concepts may indeed differ in meaning or character, or their interaction. 
For instance, Dworkin‘s reference to fairness includes both procedural and 
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substantive aspects that may even compete with the principle of justice.
345
 Franck 
also treats fairness as an umbrella notion with equity or justice as its substantive 
portion.
346
 Equity in turn has been conceived in three notions of equity under the 
law (infra legem), equity additional to the law (praeter legem), and equity 
contrary to the law (contra legem).
347
 However, the discussion here concerns not 
the differences in meaning but mainly the function of these principles. Reference 
to justice in this perspective also includes equity or fairness in the way they 
function in rule construction. What is material here is the relation of the principle 
of justice to the criteria of legitimacy and determination of rules.  
On the one hand, legitimacy is linked to procedural justice or fairness. In 
this respect, the legitimacy of structure and adherence to the criteria of legitimacy 
for rule construction is a reflection of procedural justice.
348
 Franck has treated this 
procedural aspect of justice in the notion of fairness. Franck articulates legitimacy 
as a requirement of fairness in that for a legal system to be seen as fair, the 
subjects  
[E]xpect that decisions about distributive and other entitlements 
will be made by those duly authorized in accordance with 
procedures which protect against corrupt, arbitrary, or idiosyncratic 
decision-making or decision-executing. The fairness of 
international law, as of any other legal system, will be judged, first 
by the degree to which the rules satisfy the participants‘ 
expectations of justifiable distribution of costs and benefits, and 
secondly by the extent to which the rules are made and applied in 
accordance with what the participants perceive as right process.
349
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The other side of the equation is that in relation to law substantive principles of 
justice depend on the criteria of legitimacy including principles of practical 
reasonableness for the determination of the content. Accordingly, legitimacy that 
may find its origin in procedural justice requiring it for a legitimate structure itself 
disciplines the content of substantive justice. Similar to the relation of law and 
criteria of legitimacy where law acts and functions by reference to criteria of 
legitimacy, substantive justice acts and functions by reference to criteria of 
legitimacy. The phrase ‗justice under law‘ is self-explanatory in this regard. 
Criteria of legitimacy measure the conceptions of justice and selection of a 
reasonable solution in formulation of a rule for a particular problem in the 
community in the context of that community and with consideration of values and 
concerns appropriate to that community. For international law to pay respect to 
justice, it must above all show that the conception of justice reflected in the 
content of its rules is disciplined by the criteria of legitimacy of its own 
community.   
The significance of criteria of legitimacy to determine the demand of 
justice in the content of a specific rule in each situation is in turn due to the fact 
that, just as with other abstract ideas, justice reflects a concept and conception. 
The concept of justice is abstract and global. Its conceptions are particular and 
local. The concept of justice endures across times and places in guiding human or 
communal relations or interactions. The conceptions of justice may vary from 
time to time, place to place, situation to situation, and context to context. The 
maxim ‗treat like cases alike‘ is pivotal in this respect.   
Hart finds the maxim ‗treat like cases alike‘ in the core of the concept of 
justice to maintain a balance or proportion in the distribution of burdens and 
benefits in relationships in the social life or restore that balance or proportion 
when disturbed.
350
 Dworkin renames this maxim as ―the virtue of political 
integrity‖, which ―requires government … to extend to every one the substantive 
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standards of justice or fairness it uses for some.‖351 On the basis of this maxim, 
Dworkin eschews ‗checkerboard laws‘ in a system that, for instance, impose strict 
liability for manufactures of automobiles and not washing machines.
352
 Dworkin 
acknowledges that different solutions may not necessarily be checkerboard 
solutions.
353
 The maxim ‗treat like cases alike‘ even demands that where in a case 
of liability for injury by accountants law has accepted limited liability because of 
great financial burden, the same principle of justice applies to cases of emotional 
injury.
354
  
From the maxim ‗treat like cases alike‘ may follow that enslaving one 
black person would justify enslaving another black person, etc. Finnis objects to 
the restriction of the concept of justice to that maxim that deems equality rather 
than the common good as the object of justice. Equality is among the elements of 
the concept of justice but not its object.
355
 Finnis offers criteria of practical 
reasonableness among them the requirement of the common good of the 
community for the assessment of justice.
356
 Finnis defines justice in the general 
and particular senses. In its general sense, justice is ―always a practical 
willingness to favour and foster the common good of one‘s communities.‖357 This 
general disposition or concept of justice, however, is not sufficient to meet the 
requirements of practical reasonableness and thus to satisfy the common good of 
the community.
358
 To meet the requirements of practical reasonableness, the 
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concrete meaning of justice, justice in particular sense, must be considered.
359
 The 
concrete meaning of justice in turn draws on the concrete meaning of the common 
good, namely ―effective collaboration of persons, and co-ordination of resources 
and of enterprises‖ for the well-being of the members of the community.360 
Therefore, there are also two classes of particular justice—distributive and 
commutative justice—which pose coordination problems in the society requiring 
effective collaboration and coordination and appropriate solutions.
361
 Distributive 
justice concerns the reasonable allocation of an essentially common subject matter 
that needs to be appropriated to individuals for the sake of the common good.
362
 
The problem that the distributive justice poses is ―to whom and on what 
conditions to make the necessary appropriation.‖363 The coordination problems 
arising from particular justice necessitates determination of the content of the 
common good, justice and rules that must reflect them disciplined by the criteria 
of legitimacy including coherence and the concomitant requirements of practical 
reasonableness. The process implicates evaluation of values and assessment of 
different but appropriate solutions and selection among alternatives.
364
 
Application of the principle of justice in the abstract without consideration of the 
background competing values and demands of justice in the context of a particular 
case would violate the very requirement of practical reasonableness including the 
common good as part of the legitimacy criterion of coherence.  
There are some criteria for distributive justice. Equality is a fundamental 
one. According to this criterion, ―all members of a community equally have the 
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right to respectful consideration when the problem of distribution arises.‖365 
Equality is an element that more than others accords an analogical sense to the 
concept of justice, and introduces a notion of proportionality, in that ‗equity‘ 
depends on ―the terms of the comparison in any assessment of proportions.‖366 
Because of this analogical nature of justice and its elements, ―either sort of 
comparison suffices to supply the equality/inequality or proportion/disproportion 
that must enter, at least implicitly, into any assessment in terms of 
justice/injustice.‖367 
 Whether deemed solely as equality associated with the maxim treat like 
cases alike or as a concept to foster the common good of the community with 
equality as one criterion among others, therefore, what the principle of justice 
requires depends in each particular situation on concrete solutions determined to 
respond to collaboration and coordination problems that particular justice poses. 
The core matter is the need for law and specific rules to determine a conception of 
justice appropriate to the context of a particular situation for the common good of 
the community. From another angle, the process involves appreciation of different 
solutions for seemingly similar cases. Hart recognizes that justice cannot be 
conceived solely as treat like cases alike. That element of justice while important 
and constant, ―cannot afford any determinate guide to conduct‖ unless 
supplemented by another significant element, namely ―a shifting or varying 
criterion used in determining when, for any given purpose, cases are alike or 
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different.‖368 This is a fundamental issue in justifying the necessity for specific 
rules to capture the conception of justice for a particular instance.  The criterion of 
legitimacy of coherence and concomitant requirements of practical reasonableness 
become necessary precisely because of this varying element of justice to see 
where and in which context the cases are different and where similar and for 
evaluation of justice demands subject to the legitimacy criterion of recognition 
that validates the power to engage in such a task. The assessment of analogy, 
therefore, precedes an assessment of the application of principles. Determination 
of the content of rules is necessary to assess the similarities and differences 
between the cases and to determine the appropriate principle for a particular 
situation according to its own context in order to provide solutions to coordination 
problems in a legitimate structure. Human communities confront vast diversity in 
participation in values, coordination problems, justice perceptions, and conflict of 
principles. Coordination problems arising from particular justice necessitates the 
determination of the content of the common good through concrete content of 
specific rules disciplined by the criteria of legitimacy. Equally important, the 
requirements of the practical reasonableness including the criterion of common 
good as part of legitimacy appreciate the existence of certain absolute principles 
of justice or constitutional approach to rights of human beings, which avoids the 
vice that may attend the maxim treat like cases.
369
 
Moral principles in most cases are devoid of legal determinacy and 
coherence.  Moral principles including justice, equity and fairness depend on 
determination through specific rules to respond to coordination problems and 
conceptions of justice and its elements for the common good. Another category of 
principles, though in less abstraction, joins practical and moral principles in their 
lack of determinacy and coherence and dependency on determination. 
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c) General Principles of Law: An Inconclusive Character  
General principles of law also pose dependency on determination as they 
may often collide and yield to one another or principles of higher-order. 
Reference to general principles of law may be made for different aspects of law. 
They may be used for substantive or procedural aspects of law.
370
 The focus here 
is on substantive general principles of law. Unlike principles of morality and 
justice, general principles of law have a positive pedigree. General principles of 
law stem from positive laws in the form of statutes, precedents or customs. In fact, 
the status of a general principle of law is supposed to derive from past and wide 
repeated usage in positive law. As Hart notes ―many legal principles owe their 
status not to their content serving as interpretation of settled law, but to … their 
‗pedigree‘; that is the manner of their creation by a recognized authoritative 
source.‖371 Inherent in the pedigree status of general principles of law is the 
analogical assumptions for transferring the authority of a settled law to a new 
penumbral instance by using a general principle. What can fundamentally render 
this utilization specious is precisely the analogy involved.
 372
   
In international law, the pedigree of general principles of law is often tied 
to national systems, but it may originate in the international system as well. 
Certain general principles are further conceived to assist the evaluation of the 
principle of justice or equity.
373
 This approach displays more an affirmation of the 
lack of substance of principles of justice, fairness and equity and their 
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contingency on determination in majority of cases than a demonstration of the 
substance of general principles of law. Having pedigree does not entail having 
universally applicable content or coherence.  
Contrary to the impression that general principles of law can afford what 
justice, fairness or equity demands, the conflict among principles shows that a 
general principle may yield to another less frequent or novel principle. Justice or 
fairness may demand determining the legal order for a particular situation other 
than what has frequently been used.  Justice may, after evaluation of competing 
values and justice conceptions, result in a different solution both in a national 
system and even more in international law. The example of unlimited 
compensation for emotional injury as a frequent principle and its conflict with the 
principle of limited liability for the particular situation of emotional injury 
illustrates the point.
374
 The coherence of a rule for a particular situation with its 
context and conception of justice for that context not of course necessarily as a 
one single answer or solution but through appropriate consideration of all justice 
demands, therefore, may quite legitimately lead to the collapse of a supposedly 
general principle.  
The pedigree of general principles of law cannot release them from 
dependency on determination. Just as with moral principles, general principles of 
law are in most cases contingent on determination and instantiation in specific 
rules. Principles have a ―dimension of weight‖ or are non-conclusive in that they 
may be overridden or defeated.
375
 As opposed to rules that are ―near conclusive‖, 
principles are ―generally non-conclusive‖ in that they ―merely point towards a 
decision but may very frequently fail to determine it.‖376 General principles of law 
―justify, rather than require, particular rules and determinations, and are qualified 
in their application to particular circumstances by other like principles.‖377 
General principles may ―be outweighed and overridden (which is not the same as 
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violated, demanded, or repealed) by other important components of the common 
good, other principles of justice.‖378  
Indeed general principles may not only often yield to competing principles 
or rules but also to different and competing moral and justice demands and the 
demand of the common good that may surround a particular case. In determining 
the content of rules, the consideration of competing but appropriate demands of 
justice and moral values is a requirement of practical reasonableness and 
legitimacy. This makes the coherence of rules with their context through a 
legitimate determination a prerequisite to meet the requirement of the common 
good of the community. The inconclusiveness of general principles of law is in 
fact rooted in their lack of coherence with what the background common good of 
a community as a requirement of legitimacy may require in the context of a 
particular situation. A general principle of law in the sense of a binding 
requirement of law is incongruous with what this criterion of legitimacy requires 
because its automatic application would give supremacy to one conception of 
justice without considering other demands of justice that the common good of the 
community may demand for the context of the case. Respect for the common 
good requires a genuine consideration of conflicting demands of justice, which is 
not met by mere acknowledging their being a matter of weight but genuinely 
treating substantive general principles only as an expression of one demand of 
justice and not the statement of the law as their appellation misleadingly suggests. 
General principles of law, despite their legal attribution and pedigree 
status, share the very shifting character of moral and justice principles tied to the 
diversity of participation in basic values and infinite instantiation possibility of 
particular practical principles. Similar to particular practical principles and moral 
principles, general principles of law depend on the determination of the content of 
rules. The next section will depict the requirement of coherence and determination 
in more detail. 
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ii. Coherence and Determination Requirement  
a) Contingent Principles 
1. Principles and Rule Specification  
A cardinal feature of law is that ―law brings definition, specificity, clarity 
and thus predictability into human interactions, by way of a system of rules …‖379 
Thus specificity, determinacy and coherence are also a dimension of the formal 
feature of predictability associated with law. Law‘s demand for determination is 
indeed rooted in the need for specification of rights and obligations. Most rights 
find their protection not by way of emanation from nature but formulation in law. 
The specification of rights and obligations and concomitant consideration of 
competing conceptions of justice involve evaluation and choices. Finnis states, 
―most assertions of right made in political discourse need to be subjected to a 
rational process of specification, assessment and qualification.‖380  
Specification of rights is geared to determination of rules and the 
determination of rules involves selecting among competing and appropriate 
perceptions of justice or moral values with all associated social aims and policy 
considerations for the common good in a given community. Rule determination 
based on the demands of justice and the common good is a requirement of 
practical reasoning whose absence makes not only the content of the rule but the 
process of its formation devoid of legitimacy. That the law may not sometimes 
secure predictability and specificity for a particular situation does not undermine 
but underscores the necessity for determination. Legitimacy or the rule of law 
links these formal features of law to the requirements of practical reasonableness 
including the common good.
381
 
Determination is a requirement of legitimacy not because of structural 
coherence but its concomitant infrastructural requirements furnished by practical 
reasonableness to take into appropriate account the common good of the 
community and its components. This is not solely a process requirement of 
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legitimacy but a merger of process and substance. Common good together with 
other requirements of practical reasonableness provide process criteria to ensure a 
substantively justified content that has been rationally weighed and chosen with 
due consideration to and evaluation of the ingredients of common good including 
competing, appropriate moral values and justice demands behind policies and 
decisions in the lawmaking process.   
Determination of the content of rules is necessitated in order to meet 
coherence and the concomitant methodological requirements of practical 
reasonableness. Along with the advancement of the common good of the 
community, the content of rules must show respect for other requirements of 
practical reasonableness. Among others, these requirements include ―no arbitrary 
preferences‖ among values or persons and ―respect for every basic value in every 
act.‖ 382  
Preferences reflected in the content of rules must first show that they are 
not arbitrary. Bias and arbitrariness in action or decision for choosing principles 
and values violates this requirement of legitimacy in the determination of the 
content of rules. Pre-supposition of a conception of justice for a particular case, 
which the application of a general principle as a statement of the law instead of 
treating it only as a demand of justice entails, without an appropriate evaluation of 
competing demands of justice for the  common good equals to a biased and 
arbitrary preference violating the legitimacy criterion of coherence. A genuine 
respect for the common good begins with acknowledgment by the tribunal of a 
determination, i.e. moral and political evaluation, task without obscuring the 
process behind the veil of principles or precedents as well as demonstrating 
authorization for this task.  
Preferences mirrored in the content of rules must also show ‗respect for 
every basic value in every act.‘383  In negative terms, the formulation of this 
requirements reads as ―one should not choose to do any act which of itself does 
nothing but damage or impede a realization or participation of any one or more of 
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the basic forms of human good.‖384 This requirement provides a foundation for a 
category of absolute principles related to human life and dignity having 
paramount importance for international law.
385
 These requirements of practical 
reasonableness have significant implications in rule formation and interpretation 
in international law.  
These criteria do not necessarily guarantee a legal solution that suits 
everybody‘s conception of morality or justice. They accompany the legitimacy 
criterion of coherence that along with the rule of recognition lays out a legitimate 
structure for a legitimate process to ensure that the selection of that solution has 
been made by due consideration of all competing justice and moral demands and 
by the authorized body of the system. These requirements of reasoning provide 
criteria as to how in process the conceptions of justice and morality are to be 
assessed and how the selection of choices is to be made to reach a rule that can be 
legitimate in content. They provide yardsticks for a justifiable determination in 
specifying rights and obligations under coherent specific rules determining the 
conduct and consequences required by law. The lawmaking process is bound to 
the criteria of legitimacy including coherence with its component of requirements 
of practical reasonableness.
386
  
The principles of practical reasonableness including the requirement of the 
common good not only discipline but also require determination. In most cases, 
they may not be met without the determination of specific rights and obligations 
through specific rules.  Participation in basic values is diverse, justice has a 
particular aspect leading to coordination problems as well as shifting character 
varying from one particular situation to another, and general principles of law are 
inconclusive. This state of principles makes determination necessary in order to 
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make the substance of a rule coherent with what the common good of a 
community requires in a particular context upon consideration of all justice 
demands. Such coherence and determination extends legal order into a field. 
Extending legal order into a field such as contract law, property law etc. ―is 
justified not only by the desirability of minimizing tangible forms of harm and 
economic loss but also by the value of securing, for its own sake, a quality of 
clarity, certainty, predictability, trustworthiness, in the human interactions.‖387 
Determination required by the legitimacy of process and principles of practical 
reasonableness functions to extend coherence and legal order into a particular 
field. Principles whether substantive moral principles of justice, fairness, and 
equity or general principles of law, per se, fail to extend legal order into a 
particular field.  
The inadequacy of principles and the necessity for determination can 
further be demonstrated through assessment of the relationship between positive 
rules and natural principles. The tradition of natural law has exposed positive 
rules to two modes of derivation from basic principles of practical reasonableness 
(which are themselves connected to the basic human values), which include the 
ratification and determination of these basic principles of natural law by positive 
law.
388
 The mode of ratification of basic principles of natural law concerns the 
focal principle of law of a subject-matter such as murder, theft, contract, property, 
etc.
389
 Reflecting this aspect of relationship, positive law is connected to the basic 
principles of practical reasonableness expressing human values and the basic 
requirements of practical reasonableness through a process of ratification. Thus, 
the positive rule in a legal system that holds that ―one is not to deliberately kill the 
innocent … unless in self defence … is derived from the basic principle that 
human life is good‖ and the basic requirement of practical reasonableness that 
every basic value must be respected in every act.
390
 This sort of rule is derived 
from natural law like ―deduction of demonstrative conclusions from general 
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principles.‖391 Thus, positive laws whose relation to natural law is in this sense of 
derivation have part of their force in these basic principles of practical 
reasonableness.
392
 Nevertheless, it does not follow that the substantive basic 
principles like the one expressing the prohibition of killing is exempted from 
determination. As will be seen shortly, such derivation from natural law also 
involves determination of rights and obligations of conduct and consequences for 
each legal subject matter like murder, property, contract, and so forth to satisfy 
the requirement of coherence and to extend legal order into a particular instance.  
Another closely related mode of derivation of positive law from natural 
law is determination. This mode of link between positive law and the natural 
principles of reasoning is derivation ―like implementations (determinations) of 
general directives.‖393 Determination involves choices.394 As opposed to rules 
related to natural principles by ratification that are regarded as partly natural, rules 
that are mere determinations are pure human law having their whole force from 
human law.
395
 The creation of a private property regime illustrates this sort of 
relationship. It starts with a general requirement that a regime of private property 
is as a requirement of distributive justice necessary if ―material goods are to be 
used efficiently for human well-being‖ as a requirement of practical 
reasonableness.
396
 However, this requirement of justice does not determine 
―precisely what rules should be laid down in order to constitute such a regime.‖397 
Therefore, the rules that are adopted for this regime will ―for the most part be 
determinations of the general requirement—derived from it but not entailed by it 
even in conjunction with a description of those particular circumstances.
398
  
The first mode of derivation involves determination process as well. The 
relationship set by the first mode of derivation does not obviate the necessity for 
the determination of the content and scope of those principles through specific 
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rules. That there are certain basic principles of reasonableness as the focal 
principles of the law of a particular subject matter like murder does not mean that 
they can apply without determination of their scope through determinate and 
coherent rules that make the content of the legal requirement coherent in such and 
such instances and such and such consequences. Whereas the general core point 
of the law of the subject matter is not a matter of choice, its specific scope 
requires determination that may also involve choices. What human law does to the 
preexisting basic natural principles of reasoning is not mere application of 
substantive basic principles. If it were so, there was no need of positive law 
because such principles could be applied directly. Yet, not only basic principles 
and values but also constitutional principles cannot dispense with rules.  
 The proposition that rules that ratify basic principles of reasonableness 
derive from natural law like deduction of conclusions from general principles 
receives a significant clarification. Coherence of rules and satisfaction of 
requirements of practical reasonableness emerge from a determination of such and 
such conduct and consequences in each particular case according to its context for 
the common good. This clarification is best inferred from the process of reception 
of basic principles of reasonableness into the law that ratifies them. The issue 
raises the interface between the reception of moral principles into the law of 
subject matters such as marriage, murder, contract, property and so forth and 
extending legal order into these fields.
399
 Thus, Finnis points out that ―the effort to 
integrate these subject-matters into the Rule of Law will require of judge and 
legislator countless elaborations which in most instances partake of the second 
mode of derivation [determination].‖400 It is the role of law to specify in which 
―relationships an act of killing-under-such-and-such circumstances fit.‖401 This 
requirement of specification of such and such conducts and consequences as 
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requirements of law explains why ―‗No one may kill …‘ is legally so defective a 
formulation.‖402 This analysis shows that a general principle as hallowed and 
undisputable as that expressing the prohibition of killing may not operate without 
determination in specific rules for particular situations if it is to serve social order, 
to meet the common good, and to solve co-ordination problems. Principles such 
as those expressing the sanctity of contract or property that fall far below the 
inviolability of person are no exception and are a fortiori contingent on 
determination through specific rules for instantiation.   
 The necessity for determination also shows that in many cases ‗the best 
answer‘ may not be identifiable.403 The significance of determination in relation 
to natural law is, that natural law ―‗already somehow in existence‘ does not itself 
provide all or even most of the solutions to the co-ordination problems of 
communal life.‖404 The requirement of the determination of the content of law in 
specific rules is, therefore, not solely a requirement of positive law but also a 
requirement of natural law. The requirement of determination is essential to 
secure basic values of the community and solve coordination problems arising 
from participation in them including problems of distributive justice.  
Determination is a moral and political evaluation task entailed by the common 
good that requires consideration of all justice demands in making legal 
determination.  
 Coherence is a criterion of legitimacy to extend legal order into a field 
through a legal determination task with genuine moral and political evaluation 
taking into appropriate consideration all justice demands posed in the context of a 
particular indeterminate situation to meet the common good of human beings in a 
community. This account of the legitimacy requirement of coherence, which 
includes the requirements of practical reasonableness, for the determination of 
conduct and its consequences in such and such cases and rights and obligations in 
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specific rules would test the legitimacy of a rule claiming authority to demand and 
command actions and consequences. General principles of law or moral principles 
including justice or fairness fail to meet this test of legitimacy per se to justify the 
claim of legal authority (binding force) over the members of the community. They 
lack the capacity to extend legal order into a particular field due to their lack of 
coherence with what the common good of a community may demand in the 
context of a particular indeterminate situation. Most substantive principles, 
therefore, do not qualify qua law per se. They are contingent upon legal 
determination to meet the legitimacy criterion of coherence.  The vice in the 
application of principles in a biding manner to penumbral cases in legal 
interpretation is not merely their impotence to account for such-and-such conduct 
or such and such consequences. Such application is rather an affront to justice and 
common good. This account of determination will further explain the fallacy of 
any attempt to derive a legal requirement from a general principle as major 
premise of a deductive analysis in interpretation of rules where those principles 
are not absolute principles. 
 
2. Principles and Deduction  
That determination in such and such circumstances through specific rules 
is necessary to provide solutions to coordination problems of the community also 
transpires in a deductive analysis of general principles. If a rule does not 
unambiguously fit a particular instance in a penumbral case, what is latent in the 
process is determination not application of a rule to its covered instance in which 
deduction is not operable. In the penumbral area, i.e. where the coverage of an 
instance is in dispute or doubtful, the application of legal rules ―cannot be a matter 
of logical deduction.‖405 In fact, what makes deduction inoperable in such 
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situations is the very existence of competing values, demands of justice, social 
purposes, and policies open to evaluation. 
General principles cannot apply in a deductive manner to a specific 
instance for which a rule is absent or silent. Where a general principle is treated as 
the major premise of a deduction, it will result in a doubtful and inconclusive 
conclusion. Most principles as discussed are subject to determination in the mould 
of rules according to the criteria of legitimacy and the concomitant requirements 
of practical reasonableness.  Deduction from inconclusive principles violates 
these criteria.  
Supposedly universal propositions such as ‗killing is forbidden‘ or 
‗promises must be kept‘ find expressions in other premises. The instantiation of 
instances for these universal propositions is not a matter of application of the 
principle but determination of a rule. The determination alters an abstract 
principle into a coherent set of rules for such-and-such specific circumstances and 
such-and-such specific consequences.  If there is a defect in the substance of 
either of the major or minor premise of a deductive analysis, the conclusion is 
fallacious. The defect that the application of principles carries in a deductive 
analysis is the disregard to determination required by the criteria of legitimacy 
and an affront to the justice and the common good.  
To illustrate the issue in the example of killing, which as discussed 
requires such and such determination,  if one follows the major premise of a 
deductive reasoning that reads ‗no one may kill‘ from the minor premise that ‗―A‖ 
has killed ―B‖ in self defense‘ proceeds the conclusion that ―A‖ is legally 
responsible. Then in the analysis of the premises expressing the consequences of 
the conduct from a principle that ―all killers must be killed‖ follows that ―A‖ must 
be killed.
406
  Likewise, based on the major premise that  ‗promises must be kept‘ 
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from the factual minor premise that ‗―A‖ has entered into a treaty with State ―B‖ 
that allows or condones human trafficking between their borders‘ follows the 
conclusion that they must keep their promise.  
Principles cannot work in deduction because as shown earlier they are 
open to evaluation and may often yield not only to another rule in the system but 
also to a different solution that the common good may require. The absurd result 
in these deductive analyses lies in the defect of the substance of the major 
premises projecting principles or precedents as conclusive propositions. An 
undetermined proposition whose truth for the specific instance of the case has not 
been determined in a coherent way would result in a defect of substance in 
deduction not capable of justifying the conclusion. The link of legitimacy and the 
common good is missing in drawing a conclusion from a principle that is 
inconclusive and open to evaluation. A general principle as the major premise of a 
deductive analysis taints the analysis with untruth.   It distorts the minor premise 
by misleadingly projecting a case to be an instance of what the law requires 
whereas the law is either yet undetermined as to that specific situation or 
determined in another specific rule that requires a solution consistent with the 
particular context of the case.  
Principles applying in a deductive manner are incoherent with established 
rules of the system or the context of particular situations requiring consideration 
of different demands of justice and determination according to the requirements of 
the common good of the community. Such an application of principles violates 
the criteria of legitimacy. Principles are subject to refinery through specific rules. 
In each particular situation of a penumbral case, it requires fresh evaluation and 
consideration of competing demands of justice to meet the requirements of 
legitimacy.  
Just as the inconclusiveness of general principles of law makes them 
inappropriate for deductive analysis in law, their inconclusive character precludes 
their application through analogy. The implication of analogy was pointed out in 
relation to principles of justice or fairness.
407
 General principles of law are prone 
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to the same flaw. Inherent in applying general principles of law is the assumption 
of similarity between a case or an instance that has found pedigree in law and a 
case or instance that is in dispute.  
 
3. Principles and Analogy  
Two aspects of analogy have significant implications for the construction 
of the substantive content of international rules and the criteria of legitimacy. The 
first aspect concerns the analogy with substantive law of national systems. 
General principles are determinations of justice and common good in a system 
and as such they are also tied to the context of their system including parallel 
principles and rules and their background competing values and conceptions of 
justice in that system.
408
 The transfer of a purportedly general principle extracted 
from national systems to apply as a binding rule in international law in a hard case 
firstly violates the legitimacy requirement of coherence by disregarding what the 
common good in the context of international law may require for the 
determination of the content of the rule for a particular situation. Such transfer 
would accord a floating character to principles extracted from seemingly similar 
rules in national systems detaching them from their own context that makes them 
coherent with other competing or counter rules and principles behind them in each 
system. This aspect of coherence in fact challenges the analogy of national 
systems in extracting general principles solely based on their similarities in 
national systems but ignoring the differences that each system develops in 
competing or counter rules.  On the point of differences among national systems, 
a scholarly view affirms that   
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[C]onsidering the fact that law gives effect to key cultural values of 
different civilizations and that there are striking variations in legal 
arrangements in, let us say, contract law between countries as close 
as France and Germany or either of those countries and the United 
States, the proposition that there are specific common norms in 
international business remains to be established. Systematic 
comparative inquiry usually establishes remarkable differences 
between apparently similar legal approaches, even in systems that 
have common origins.
409
      
 
In international law, the binding force of a general principle of law with a 
pedigree in national systems becomes further objectionable by obscuring the very 
context and differences in values, cultures, and conceptions of justice in the 
background of each principle in its own system that give rise to formation of 
competing or counter rules or principles in each system. This aspect of 
disregarding coherence by analogy of national systems between themselves with 
their similarities not their differences in extracting general principles is an 
additional objection to the application of general principles of law in a binding 
manner in international law.  
More objectionable in view of the criteria of legitimacy is the analogy of 
international coordination problems/solutions with those of national systems 
disregarding what the common good in the international community and criteria 
of legitimacy including requirements of practical reasonableness in the context of 
international law requires for a particular situation. The inconclusive character of 
general principles entails the necessity for determination of the content of rules 
and the determination of the content of international rules follows evaluation of 
the common good and justice in its own context according to its criteria of 
legitimacy. The analogy syndrome of general principles of law in a binding 
manner in international law becomes more acute by presupposing the likeness of 
paradigms and parameters of national systems with those in international law or 
presupposing paradigms and parameters of private relations in national legal 
systems with those of relations involving nations in international law.  Rooted in 
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the application of general principles of law in international law is the analogy of 
international coordination problems/solutions with coordination 
problems/solutions at the national level. Because of contextual differrneces 
beween international law and national systems, parameters and paradigms of 
justice and common good in the internaitonal law may oftentimes be 
incommensurate to national systems. Justice and common good concerns in the 
context of the international community may justify different approaches to issues 
such as repayment of loans, concept of ownership of natural resources, etc. in 
determination of the content of respective rules. Rules of international law require 
determination according to conceptions of justice and common good germane to 
the community of nations according to the criteria of legitimacy that are not 
achieved by mechanical comparison of its problems and solutions to those that 
resemble in the national systems. The application of principles as an authority 
extracted from national systems and transposed in international law in such an 
analogical way would distort what the common good and justice in the context of 
international law may require in each particular case.  
The second, more fundamental aspect of analogy concerns not analogy 
with domestic systems but analogy itself.  That the general principles and 
precedents are not workable in deduction has close relation to the question of 
analogy as well. Resort to analogy is made to use what has found pedigree in the 
settled law to justify a new law.
410
 What is sought by analogical reasoning is in 
effect to rely on an established rule and to borrow its recognized authority for the 
case that is in dispute. Using a general principle or precedent in essence is 
predicated on an analogical assumption. This is rooted in the justice maxim ‗treat 
like cases alike‘. Thus, an automatic application of a general principle or 
precedent to a penumbral case, say liability for emotional injuries, would assume 
similarity with cases to which the principle of unlimited liability has generally 
been applied.  Yet, the other side of the justice precept is ‗treat different cases 
differently‘.411 The whole process turns on the elements of similarity and 
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difference by the legitimate body in a given legal system to ascertain and evaluate 
those elements in the context of a particular situation to make the content of the 
rule coherent with what the common good considering all demands of justice 
requires in that context. Application of a general principle in a binding manner to 
penumbral instances ignores and violates this coherence requirement. Cases may 
be similar in one element and different in another. Thus the emotional injury case 
may be similar to physical injury cases in being foreseeable but not in having the 
same the financial burden, and, therefore, similar to cases that consider great 
financial burden in treating liability. A determination is necessary to weigh the 
justice demands in each particular case that general principles of law fail to 
provide just because the common good and justice may require a solution 
different from that adopted in apparently similar cases.   
In the ordinary assessment of such cases, the conventional wisdom tends 
to perceive this as exceptions but neglects the requirement of determination as a 
condition precedent to make such exceptions. That is, the criterion of legitimacy 
of coherence requires initially the appraisal of common good for a particular 
situation in order to determine the case as an exception or not.  Exceptions are 
themselves rules for their sphere of application for a specific case. The 
construction of exceptions, i.e. rules for specific situations, is itself part of 
evaluation and selection among principles, about locating the pointer on the scale 
of moral aspiration or duty, and about selecting the conception of justice for the 
common good for a particular case. 
Coherence for the common good of a community as a yardstick of 
legitimacy requires consideration of competing elements such as social purposes, 
public polices, moral values, and justice demands and selection of choices 
according to the criteria of legitimacy and the accompanying requirements of 
practical reasonableness in determining the content of rules. Meeting this 
requirement of legitimacy is what the application of a general principle 
proceeding from a superficial analogy misses.  
In the analogical process what the common good as the requirement of 
legitimacy in the determination of the content of rules requires is not a mere 
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similarity of facts but similarity in the background moral values, justice 
foundations, social aims, and policy drives. Legitimacy dictates the coherence of 
the content of a rule with its own context that may not be same as a seemingly 
similar case. General principles of law per se lack the capacity to exhibit this 
requirement of legitimacy in the interpretation of the content of rules. In 
penumbral cases each instance pose circumstances of justice and common good of 
the community peculiar to its own context that may also be in part linked to the 
cultural and social background of each community. What makes general 
principles of law inconclusive and contingent upon determination in penumbra 
areas is precisely the fact that in penumbra cases moral weights, justice demands, 
policy needs, and social purposes together with competing rules and principles 
constituting the context of a particular issue at the background of the case are not 
similar.  
The criterion of coherence for the common good requires evaluation of 
justice appropriate to the context of international law and the particular instance at 
issue. Thus, in the penumbral area of international law that requires determination 
for the common good in its own context, using analogy to import, as a matter of 
principle, the authority of a settled rule whether of national or international 
pedigree departs from the legitimacy criterion of coherence. The transplant of the 
authority of a settled rule into penumbral cases, particularly hard penumbra, 
without coherence for the common good— such as analogies in the legal 
discourse of foreign investment that enrich corporations and impoverish human 
beings— beyond a defect of substance is a sign of decay of structure. Such a 
transfer of authority fails to consider the common good of the international 
community that include the flourishing of human beings and nations.  
 That the participation in basic values is diverse, the possibility of 
instantiation of particular practical principles is infinite, moral principles fluctuate 
on a scale of morality between duty and aspiration, justice conceptions shift 
across places and times, and general principles of law are inconclusive involving 
evaluation of justice for the common good can justifiably characterize most 
principles as contingent. They are contingent in the sense that they depend on 
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legal determination and coherence for the common good as a requirement of 
legitimacy that turns on the evaluation of justice and selection of choices among 
different conceptions of justice.  In order to meet the requirements of legitimacy, 
it requires determination to extend legal order into a particular field and making 
its scope coherent for the common good and thus constructing its authority. 
Reasons are not enough for the statement of law; it requires legal determination 
according to the criteria of legitimacy. It is not enough that tribunals should 
provide reasons. Where competing but appropriate demands of justice and options 
of policy are involved, the competing reasons expressing or advocating them are 
all appropriate as well, requiring evaluation and selection for the common good in 
a legal determination according to criteria of legitimacy. This account of 
principles justifiably warrants the proposition that principles mostly guide the 
formation of the content of rules but are not binding in relation to law in the sense 
of requiring conduct or consequences of conduct creating obligations. The 
relevance of contingent principles expressing values, morals and laws is by way 
of orientation not application.  
 In light of these observations, in penumbral areas lex lata is illusive.
412
 
The statements represented by contingent principles to show lex lata, what the law 
is, are only part of lex ferenda, what the law should be. In penumbral areas, the 
application of a general principle in a binding manner would be in fact a disguise 
determination without meeting the criteria of legitimacy. A contingent general 
principle having its pedigree in national systems or the international law itself 
expresses no more than one demand of justice itself subject to fresh determination 
of the content of rules in penumbral areas for coherence.
 
The most subtle form of 
violation of coherence takes place when in a penumbral case, particularly a hard 
case, the justice demand represented by a contingent principle is taken for granted 
as the statement of the law and other justice demands are deemed calls for 
revising the law in a determination disguised by resort to a general principle of 
law. In penumbral areas, the rule receives authority, a binding character, through 
coherence for the common good according to the criteria of legitimacy.  Where 
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the tension between moral values, demands of justice, social purposes, and policy 
options is tense with significant implications for those affected by the rule, a hard 
penumbra is at issue for which the power to engage in the task of coherence and 
determination cannot be substantiated without the legitimacy criterion of 
recognition.  
The above account of principles and requirements of legitimacy of process 
for the specification of rights in specific rules should not be regarded as 
undermining human rights.
413
 First, it should not be taken as to detracting from 
the constitutional rights of human beings and their construction and interpretation 
in a constitutional manner in favor of human beings.
414
 Second, releasing rights 
from a legitimate specification requirement would not necessarily bolster human 
rights. As Finnis observes ―[h]uman rights (not to mention public order and 
morality which constitute a necessary framework for their enjoyment) can 
certainly be threatened by use of rights-talk which, in bad faith or good, 
prematurely ascribe a conclusory or absolute status to this or that human right.‖415 
Specification of rights and obligations in specific rules by employing the 
requirements of practical reasonableness for legitimate assessment of demands of 
justice may further bolster human and people rights by requiring their 
consideration in the formation and interpretation of rules in areas such as foreign 
investment.  Various aspects of human rights from labor rights to aboriginal rights 
may be at stake in investment matters in international law. Without specification 
of states‘ obligations and determination of the content of rules in foreign 
investment according to the criteria of legitimacy, many concerns of human 
beings such as human life and dignity, environment, climate, work conditions and 
so forth would be left out of the legal discourse that the common good of the 
international community requires for rule formation. In fact, the requirements of 
legitimacy, by demanding coherence with what the common good in the context 
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of international law requires, would insulate rule formation in foreign investment 
in international law from fragmentation.  Without this insulation, many individual 
or group human rights that national and international law protect are vulnerable to 
an illegitimate subordination. More profoundly than linkage with other fields of 
international law for the application of existing rules, coherence for the common 
good figures in genuine consideration of human rights, labor rights, environment, 
and other public protection demands of justice right in the determination of the 
content of treaty or customary rules on investment that surface in the penumbral 
areas.  The criteria of legitimacy are, therefore, essential to maintain coherence for 
appropriate consideration and evaluation of all demands of justice in the 
formation of international rules. The criteria of legitimacy are further essential to 
maintain coherence with absolute principles.  
 
b) Absolute Principles 
 Not all principles can be characterized as contingent. There exists a 
category of principles of absolute character, whose significance for international 
law is paramount. There is a category of human rights that is absolute giving rise 
to absolute substantive principles.
416
 Corresponding to absolute rights of human 
beings, there are principles of justice that can never be outweighed or 
overridden.
417
 This class of absolute rights flows from the requirement of practical 
reasonableness that ―it is always unreasonable to choose directly against any basic 
value, whether in oneself or in one‘s fellow human beings.‖418  This basic 
requirement underscores ―the strict inviolability of basic human rights.‖419 At the 
core of this requirement is then the distinction between where a choice in 
                                                 
416
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participating in a basic value is right, that is moral and rational and where it is not 
right, which provides a yardstick for treating basic human rights.
420
    
   By absolute principles, it is meant principles that are exceptionless 
expressing exceptionless duties and their correlative exceptionless human rights, 
which are entailed by that requirement of practical reasoning.
421
 The most obvious 
of absolute rights that arise directly from the natural law requirement of practical 
reasonableness are, for instance, ―the right not to have one‘s life taken directly as 
a means to any further end; … and the right to be taken into respectful 
consideration in any assessment of what the common good requires.‖422  
 The application of substantive absolute principles is not incompatible with 
the rule of recognition.
423
 International law provides for a category of principles 
under the notions of jus cogens or peremptory norms although their basis and 
content are controversial.
424
 The Vienna Convention has recognized this category 
of principles in international law focusing on their overriding character.
425
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 (―The choice would be immoral and irrational where ―directly and immediately damaging a 
basic good in some aspect or participation by choosing an act which in and of itself simply (or, we 
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(A/56/10), Chap. IV.E.2), Commentary on Article 40, paras. 4-6, at  283-284. [Commentaries to 
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility] See also Brownlie, Principles, supra note 424, at 515 
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Another aspect of peremptory norms is whether they also constitute obligations 
erga omnes in that they are owed to the international community and thereby any 
State can invoke their breach, i.e. the right to action.
426
 What is in focus here is 
not the supremacy of peremptory norms in that they cannot be derogated by treaty 
or their capacity as obligations to the international community. Rather the 
absolute character of certain principles by virtue of the requirements of practical 
reasonableness is at issue.
427
 The international community as part of domestic 
human communities cannot be indifferent to human catastrophes and miseries. 
Slavery, torture, genocide, human trafficking and many atrocities inflicted in wars 
or conflicts are all examples of using human life as a means to an end. Principles 
prohibiting them in the law of human rights or humanitarian law in international 
law, therefore, carry absolute characterization no matter their customary 
recognition. They are absolute because such acts violate absolute basic human 
rights by treating human life as a means to an end. When concerning human 
beings in many respects absolute principles of treatment come into play for the 
value of human life and dignity and their personal security  
 The challenge in international law with respect to absolute rights and 
obligations is not much about the prohibition of conduct violating them but as to 
how to deal with their violation. The challenge, for instance, is not that ‗genocide 
                                                                                                                                     
for a controversial list: prohibition of the use of force, the law of genocide, the principle of racial 
non-discrimination, crimes against humanity, and the rules prohibiting trade in slaves and piracy. 
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is forbidden‘ is exceptionless but how to stop it and what consequences should 
follow for the perpetrators of genocide. When confronting an absolute principle 
like this, States usually attempt to cover or justify their actions rather than 
denying the obligation. Although the category of absolute principles is recognized 
by the rule of recognition in international law, the binding force of an absolute 
principle like prohibition of genocide is not anchored in customary practice of 
States. Genocide is prohibited however widespread and frequent the practice may 
be. For the absolute substantive principles of international law geared to human 
dignity, in contrast to contingent principles, adverse practice of States is not a sign 
of the non-formation of the rule but the violation of the rule. There is, therefore, 
no contradiction between an absolute principle requiring the prohibition of 
genocide and a customary practice to the contrary because there is no customary 
law requiring the contrary. That the life of human beings cannot be taken as a 
means to an end is an absolute human right generating concomitant absolute 
principles from which no derogation is possible, which provides a yardstick of 
legitimacy for the identification of some substantive absolute rights and principles 
within the category of peremptory norms of international law.    
 Although the line between contingent and absolute principles is not always 
clear,   there is a general yardstick to assist the avoidance of adulteration of some 
domains. That yardstick is the sanctity of human person and dignity. It may 
sometimes be difficult to distinguish absolute from contingent when addressing 
the rights of persons. Yet, the human characteristic of substantive absolute rights 
and principles provides a clear line for non-human subjects that do not have the 
sanctity of human being. Substantive absolute rights and principles belong to 
human beings. This is in part because the value of human person is 
immeasurable.
428
  
An important corollary of human centrality of absolute rights is that the 
scope of these rights and their concomitant principles is limited to natural persons, 
human beings. In international law on foreign investment, substantive rights and 
privileges of corporations are subject to contingent principles and always need to 
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be specified under specific rules in order to meet the requirements of legitimacy 
and practical reasoning including the common good.
429
 The integrity of natural 
persons consists in human life and dignity. The entity of corporations consists in 
the notion of property. Human life or dignity in which absolute rights and 
principles are grounded is a basic good. Property is an ―instrumental good‖.430 
Any attempt to extend absolute principles or other status exclusive to human 
beings to corporations under international law would stem from a false analogy in 
a flagrant equation of property of corporations with human life and dignity. Any 
attempt to elevate non-absolute rights and their concomitant principles to the 
status of absolute ones may not elevate contingent principles but degrade the 
absolute ones. Putting the principle forbidding termination of a contract on par 
with a principle forbidding genocide may sometimes not solely mask the 
contingency of the former but distort the absoluteness of the latter. The treatment 
of corporations in international law on foreign investment is subject to principles 
contingent on legal determination. Treatment of corporations in the field of 
foreign investment in international law is a domain where rules must be 
determined and specified in accordance with the criteria of legitimacy of 
recognition and coherence for the common good.  
Legitimacy dictates the treatment of principles in international law in a 
manner neither to underrate absolute principles nor to overrate contingent 
principles. The excesses of a blanket treatment of principles with binding force or 
blanket treatment of principles without binding force is unjustified in view of 
legitimacy. There are absolute principles of structure and procedure as well as 
certain substantive principles germane to human life and dignity that are binding.   
Principles by the inconclusive character of general principles of law tied to 
the shifting character of moral principles and conceptions of justice joined with 
infinite instantiation possibility of particular practical principles and all of these 
originating in diversity of participation in basic values posing coordination 
problems to communities are contingent on legal determination. To meet the 
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requirements of legitimacy, most substantive principles of varying degree of 
abstraction and specificity still are contingent on determination through specific 
rules to make the content of rules and obligations on conduct or consequence in a 
specific situation coherent with the demands of the common good and its 
competing elements of morality, justice, social aims, and public policy. Legal 
determination is essentially a moral or political task, a legislative or creative 
function, requiring validation of the power to engage in determination under the 
rule of recognition of the system.  
By determination, it is not meant to advocate once a determination is made 
through a specific rule in a community, it must remain intact through generations. 
It is not meant that law freezes or the conceptions of justice or choices among 
alternatives in one community or at a period of time are immutable across times 
and places. There may be aspirations in one community that are duties in another 
or vice versa. There may also be conceptions of justice within a society that may 
no longer be popular within the same society. That is part of the evolution in law 
in any system including international law. The notion of a legitimate coherence of 
a rule with its background context itself promotes changes and flexibility in law 
by demanding detachment of an instance from a rule or general principle that is 
not coherent with what the common good may require for it according to the 
criteria of legitimacy.    
That law should be and is open to development is still a matter essentially 
different from who may bring about change or development to law according to 
the rules of the system. To utilize contingent general principles— or by that 
matter opinions or dicta expressing or advocating them however persuasive— as 
starting points or guidance to reasoning in making legal determination involving 
justice evaluation and political assessment is subject to validation by the rule of 
recognition. That principles, or opinions or dicta, can contribute to the process of 
determination does not per se confer the power to make legal determination. That 
power is subject to the rule of recognition. It is a matter of the rule of recognition 
to validate and recognize the power to engage in legal determination of the 
content of the rule in a particular penumbral situation—i.e. to review social aims, 
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weigh moral values, evaluate justice demands, and assess policy orientations at 
the background of a rule— in a community in balancing burdens and benefits. For 
hard collision of these aims, values, demands, and orientations creating hard 
penumbra of indeterminacy in rules, the question is whether the general rule of 
recognition of international law admits adjudicative determination of the content 
of international rules and obligations of States by international tribunals.  
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CHAPTER III                                                                                                                       
RECOGNITION AND CUSTOM     
 
The previous chapter articulated the legitimacy criterion of coherence for 
the determination of the content of international rules and the status of principles 
in view of this criterion. This chapter will address the power to make legal 
determinations in international law. The question to explore concerns whether 
legal determination in hard indeterminacies is vested in customary international 
law as a consensual framework of rules and obligations in international law or the 
general rule of recognition admits a creative function by international adjudicators 
to engage in legal determination, a task of moral and political nature, in hard 
penumbra.   
 
A. Recognition of Determination Power in International Law  
The rule of recognition of a system may empower its adjudicators a degree 
of discretion in making legal determinations for particular situations brought 
before them. To reiterate in cases facing the gap of law, national judges do not 
merely make new law but they initially apply the secondary rules that confer and 
restrict their discretionary power for the law-making exercise.
431
 It requires a rule 
of recognition to recognize adjudicative discretion for determination. A rule of 
recognition is also traceable in Dworkin‘s model of adjudication in which his 
three-stage interpretive formula presupposes rules of recognition in the name of 
assumptions or convictions.
432
 Still an acknowledgement of the rule of recognition 
goes beyond this by suggesting that even in a federal system like that of the 
United States in which States are under a single constitution, each State acts 
according to its own rules of recognition over matters of principle: 
The American Constitution provides a federal system: it recognizes 
States as distinct political communities and assigns them 
sovereignty over many issues of principle. So there is no violation 
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of political integrity in the fact that the tort laws of some States 
differ from those of others even over matters of principle. Each 
sovereign speaks with a single voice, though not in harmony with 
other sovereigns. But in a federal system integrity makes demands 
on the higher-order decisions, taken at the constitutional level, 
about the division of power between the national and the more 
local levels.
433
 
 
The hallmark of sovereignty in international law is much deeper and 
broader than that in a federal system. The allocation of lawmaking powers to 
States is a bedrock structural principle in international law. The rule of 
recognition of a system is a necessary condition of legitimacy and a fundamental 
requirement for the identification and validation of the lawmaking framework that 
cannot be transferred from one system to another. What lies at the heart of the 
legitimacy is that a lawmaking power for international adjudicators requires an 
international rule of recognition. The general rule of recognition of international 
law validates and requires the determination of the content of international rules 
and obligations in a consensual framework by the consent of States.
434
 Except for 
absolute principles or particular recognition of a constitutional approach to rights 
as in human rights, by virtue of the general rule of recognition of international, 
substantive primary rules and obligations of States are determined by specific or 
general consent of States.
435
 Accordingly, the general rule of recognition does not 
admit adjudicative creation by international adjudicators to engage in legal 
determination in a justice or policy evaluation for States in the interpretation of 
the content of indeterminate obligations of States in hard penumbra. This status of 
the general rule of recognition may further be assessed in light of the approaches 
to the question of the legislative function of international adjudicators displayed in 
the practice of States as well as the practice of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and the International Court of Justice.  Whether the notions 
of equity or non-liquet import an implied discretionary power for a general 
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adjudicative legislative function for international adjudicators to exercise the 
evaluation of justice or policy for States in international law is a matter to explore.   
 
i. Implied Discretionary Power: Equity, Non-Liquet, and Ex Aequo et 
Bono  
Non-liquet and equity constitute two different concepts. Non-liquet and 
equity as an aspect of justice were addressed earlier.
436
 Non-liquet even in the 
narrow sense of prohibiting a refusal to give a decision by the tribunal is 
controversial in international law.
437
 Far more disputable is the assumption of a 
general principle of the material completeness of the international legal system 
attached to non-liquet.
438
 It is this broader reading of non-liquet that suggests the 
power for an adjudicative creation of obligations in international law instead of 
rejecting of claims on the basis of the absence of positive rules imposing 
obligations. Equity is in no better position to provide such a power.  
To address these concepts in terms of implication for adjudicative 
discretion, it is appropriate to also explore Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice surrounding this implication. The question poses the 
boundary between Paragraph 1 (c), to which the prohibition of non-liquet and the 
application of equity are attributed, and  Paragraph 2 of Article 38 of the ICJ 
Statute, which bans an ex aequo et bono decision unless authorized by the 
parties.
439
 The question is whether, in the absence of particular recognitions or 
authorizations, notions of non-liquet or equity by implication provide a general 
power to international adjudicators to engage in a legislative function when 
interpreting the hard penumbra of international obligations of States. 
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 A distinction is usually made between a decision ex aequo et bono and a 
decision based on equity.
440
 Equity is deemed part of the law and decisions on that 
basis remain bound to the existing law while ex aequo et bono offers more 
discretionary power.
441
 Franck, while acknowledging that there is ―‗no bright line‘ 
between ex aequo et bono and equity‖ follows this distinction albeit on the 
assumption that general principles of law constitute the content of equity.
442
 
Akehurst, observing three notions of equity infra legem, praeter legem, and 
contra legem, maintains that while equity may be applied in some situations, it is 
not a source of international law.
443
 The application of equity infra legem is 
vaguely accepted, praeter legem is hotly disputed, and contra legem is 
unquestionably rejected.
444
 Nevertheless, this categorization of the notions of 
equity provides little as to an international tribunal‘s discretionary power.  
These notions can barely add clarity to the legal concept of equity or 
―justice as law.‖ As Ian Brownlie has observed ―the particular and interstitial 
significance of equity in the law of the nations, as a general reservoir of ideas and 
solutions for sophisticated problems it offers little but disappointment.‖445 The 
desirability and utility of equity in international law is questionable.
446
 A general 
principle of law does not provide a mandate to international adjudicators to apply 
equity. On this point, Akehurst stresses that ―[e]ven if such a general principle 
exists, it cannot be transplanted into international law, because the homogeneity 
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of values, which is the condition precedent for such a principle in municipal law, 
simply does not exist in international law.‖447    
It is notable that general principles are regarded as leading candidates for 
the content of equity. Some writers raising the distinction between equity and ex 
aequo et bono identify the content of equity with general principles of law.
448
  
This is even observable in the view that espouses the prohibition of non-liquet, 
which resorts to general principles of law in filling gaps to reconcile the decision 
with what purportedly the law requires.
449
 Yet as discussed general principles of 
law only beg the question as to providing content for equity because they 
themselves lead to fresh assessment of justice.
450
 The assumption that the 
application of general principles as the content of equity would be the application 
of law than a conception of justice is illusive. This assumption fails to justify a 
distinction between the application of equity and ex aequo et bono because 
general principles of law too, as elaborately shown, lead to a justice evaluation 
exercise depending on legal determination in a particular penumbral situation. 
Anchored in analogies with national legal systems and the notion of the 
judicial process of dispute settlement, advocates of the prohibition of non-liquet 
assume a general power for the international adjudicators to avoid non-liquet.
451
 
An advocate of equity as a source of international law follows in the footsteps of 
such a view for the application of equity in international law.
452
 Accordingly, in 
this approach from a ―judicially created notion of implied powers‖ a general 
authorization for international adjudicators to apply principles of equity is 
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inferred.
453
 The practice of tribunals, with the tacit acknowledgment by States 
attributed to it, is then advanced to rationalize such a power for international 
adjudicators.
454
  
A distinction between a decision ex aequo et bono and the application of 
equity has been made in a number of decisions by the International Court, which 
requires an assessment of the pertinent dicta whether they endorse a general 
discretionary power for international adjudicators. In international disputes before 
PCIJ, this distinction is traced to the opinion provided in the Meuse case.
 455
  
According to this view, principles of equity could be applied as general principles 
of law applicable under the then point 3 of Article 38 of the Statute of PCIJ.
456
 
The continental shelf boundary cases brought before ICJ also suggested that the 
application of equitable principles as general principles of law was to be 
distinguished from a decision ex aequo et bono.
457
 In these continental shelf cases, 
the general dictum on the distinction between equity and a decision ex aequo et 
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bono was predicated on the application of equity and equitable principles inside 
the law.
458
 In a separate opinion in the Barcelona Traction case, Judge Gerald 
Fitzmaurice also pointed to the distinction between equity and decisions ex aequo 
et bono.
459
 These dicta will later be assessed in terms of the position on the 
legislative function of international adjudicators.  
The question is whether under a system of dispute settlement governed by 
international law, the appreciation of equity or prohibition of non-liquet, even if 
expressly indicated, as in the dicta of the International Court or in the ICSID 
Convention respectively, establishes a general legislative function for 
international adjudicators in international law. The core matter that guides this 
analysis is whether the rule of recognition of international law permits notions of 
non-liquet or equity to import a general discretionary power for international 
adjudicators to perform a legislative task accompanied with the legal 
determination latent in the interpretation of the content of law. The following 
sections address this issue through exploring the approaches to the question of the 
legislative function of the international adjudicators in the practice of States and 
the International Court.    
  
                                                 
458
 See North Sea Continental Shelf cases (― when mention is made of a court dispensing justice or 
declaring the law, what is meant is that the decision finds its objective justification in 
considerations lying not outside but within the rules.‖ North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 457, 
para. 88. On this basis, the ICJ found that ―[t]here is consequently no question in this case of any 
decision ex aequo et bono.‖ Ibid; The ICJ in the Tunisia/Libya case declaring   ―[e]quity as a legal 
concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice‖ and that ―the legal concept of equity is a 
general principle directly applicable as law,‖ stated that ―[a]pplication of equitable principles is to 
be distinguished from a decision ex aequo et bono.‖ Tunisia/Libya, supra note 457, para. 71; 
Libya/Malta, supra note 457, para. 45; Bukina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute, where the Court 
rejecting the power to apply equity contra legem and equity praeter legem indicated that it might 
apply equity infra legem. Bukina Faso/Mali , supra note 457, p. 567 at paras. 27-28, The Court 
further linked equity infra legem to the applicable law and held that ―[i]t is not a matter of finding 
simply an equitable solution, but an equitable solution derived from the applicable law.‖ Ibid.   
459
 Barcelona Traction, supra note 424, p. 85, para. 36.  
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ii. Treatment of Adjudicative Determination Power in International 
Law     
a) The Practice of States 
1. Early Arbitration Treaties     
The application of equity or avoidance of non-liquet in the arbitral and 
claims commission practices of mainly the ninetieth century and some in the 
twentieth century, if the respective treaties were deemed to permit a legislative 
function for adjudicators, was based on built-in authorizations. The treaties 
constituting the arbitral tribunals or claims commissions had expressly authorized 
the tribunal to make decisions in accordance with equity or justice, thereby 
delegating a limited determination power to the tribunals. In a variety of 
formulations, references to make decisions according to ‗equity‘ or ‗justice‘ for 
arbitrators fashionably abounded in the treaties of that era providing for arbitral 
dispute settlement mechanism between States.  
The mixed claims commission established under Article VI of the Jay 
Treaty of 1794 between Great Britain and the United States concerning 
compensation for losses and damages resulting from lawful impediments to the 
recovery of pre-war debts was empowered to decide the claims ― … as equity and 
justice shall appear to them to require.‖460 Many other treaties providing for 
arbitral settlement of disputes between State parties embodied such authorizing 
references, empowering the tribunal to decide according to equity and justice.
461
  
These included treaties establishing various claims commissions for settling 
                                                 
460
 Mixed Commission Under Article VI of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation of 
1794 between the Great Britain and the United States ( 8 Stat. 116 (19 November 1794), (effective 
28 October 1795) reprinted in  John Bassett Moore ed.,  International Adjudications, Modern 
Series, v. 3, at 7.  [Moore Adjudication]   
461
 These references appeared in a variety of terms such as ‗justice and equity,‘ ‗principles of 
equity,‘ ‗absolute equity,‘ ‗justice, equity and good faith‘, ‗principles of international law and the 
maxims of justice,‘ ‗law and equity,‘ ‗principles of international law, equity, and the Laws of 
Nations,‘ ‗treaty rights, principles of international law and equity,‘ ‗international law and equity,‘ 
etc. See Jenks, supra note 440, at 343-390. Each formulation raises its own interpretative 
questions, but what they commonly share is the parties‘ authorization to the tribunal to decide a 
dispute according to equity and justice.    
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disputes between the United States, the Great Britain, France, Germany, and the 
Latin American countries.
462
 
That States have in the past provided for resort to equity by the 
adjudicators in numerous treaties as a means to fill the gaps and prohibit non-
liquet or even to modify the existing law does not establish recognition of such 
function by resort to equity in treaties that do not specify such adjudication. It is 
one thing to state that an authorization to make decisions in accordance with 
equity and justice implies according a discretionary power to the respective 
international adjudicator for a creative, legislative function. It is quite another, and 
egregiously unwarranted, thing to generalize such authorization itself to argue that 
in the absence of an express authorization such a discretionary power may be 
imported into the treaty due to the instances of such authorization in other treaties. 
The cases where international tribunals had been authorized by treaty to make 
decisions in accordance with equity or justice are not authority for the 
discretionary power in cases where the tribunals have not been given such treaty 
authorization.
463
  
Even if the particular nature of authorizations under past arbitration 
treaties is ignored, to suggest that international adjudication practice whether of 
past or present may per se create a rule of recognition in international law is 
unwarranted. Apart from the fact that the decisions of international tribunals are 
both inconsistent and controversial, this approach is not justified because 
international tribunals‘ decisions, even as important as ICJ‘s, do not enjoy a 
precedent status.
464
 This situation a fortiori applies to arbitral tribunals that are far 
below the stature of ICJ for international law.  It is unwarranted to assert that a 
subsidiary source without even a precedent status for substantive issues could 
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 See Jenks, supra note 440, at 343-390 in particular at 343, 353-355, 357, 365, 374.  
463
 Akehurst, supra note 347, at 801. In Barcelona Traction, the International Court rejected the 
generalization of jurisprudence of arbitral practice of the past century because ―the decisions cited 
rested upon the terms of the instruments establishing the jurisdiction of the tribunal or claims 
commission …‖ Barcelona Traction, supra note 425, p. 40, para. 63.  
464
 See ICJ Statute Article 59. (―The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the 
parties and in respect of that particular case.‖) Id. Article 38 (1) (d) also refer to judicial decisions 
as a subsidiary source subject to Article 59.  This is not to indicate that ICJ‘s decisions do not have 
persuasive value. That is another matter that in each case the persuasiveness of the ICJ decisions 
on the substantive issues should be weighed in terms of criteria of legitimacy.  
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without concordant State practice function as a basis for a framework rule of the 
system that is structural and foundational. The origin of the international rule of 
recognition rests heavily on State practice.
465
 Reliance on practices and verdicts in 
international dispute resolution, particularly the arbitral practice of late 18
th
 and 
nineteenth centuries, to support a general  discretionary power of international 
adjudicators for the application of equity or avoiding non-liquet loses weight 
firstly on account of the existence of particular authorizations embodied in the 
treaties or mandates or otherwise by parties conferring power. Accordingly, no 
actual arbitral practice existed to argue for the application of equity without 
authorization by State parties. Secondly, adjudicative practice in international law 
is in no juridical position to create such a power on its own.  
 
2. Architecture of Sources of International Law under Article 38  
The Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice marked a 
turning point in abandoning the practice of authorizing decisions based on justice 
and equity for international disputes. Despite prior practices, reference to equity 
or justice did not find its way in the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice.
 466
  This practice runs counter to the assertion of inclusion of 
discretionary power in the task of international adjudicators. The drafting history 
of Article 38 of the Statute of Permanent Court of International Justice 
unequivocally shows that the international adjudication has developed in the 
direction of avoiding a determination power for international adjudicators for a 
legislative function entering into moral or political evaluation.   
                                                 
465
 See Chapter I.  
466
 The Covenant of the League of Nations was created by the Treaty of Versailles, which called 
for the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Article 14. The Permanent 
Court of Arbitration was established at the First Peace Conference under the Hague Convention 
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899, July 29, 1899, entered into force 
September 4, 1900, reprinted in (1907) 1 A. J. Int‘l L. 103. This Convention of 1899, while still in 
force, was  replaced by the 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes, October 18, 1907, entered into force January 26, 2010, reprinted in (1908) 2 AJIL Supp. 
43.   
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Article 38 was crafted in a setting where numerous treaties embodied 
provisions allowing the tribunal to decide in accordance with justice and equity. 
In 1907 prior to the establishment of PCIJ, the Draft Hague Convention of the 
Second Peace Conference intending to establish an International Prize Court, 
provided that in the absence of the treaty provisions or the rules of international 
law ―the court shall give judgment in accordance with general principles of justice 
and equity.‖467 If reference to general principles of law contained in Article 38 
had meant the same as general principles of justice and equity, it would have 
replicated a similar formulation, but it did not because it would have met the same 
response by States as this provision received.  
In 1920, an advisory committee of jurists convened to draft the Statute of 
PCIJ.
468
 The records of the advisory committee debate on the text of Article 38 
show that even though certain members were of the view that a situation of non-
liquet should be avoided, the article was drafted not to accord discretionary power 
to international judges for a legislative function. This also indicates that avoiding 
non-liquet does not necessarily mean a creative, legislative function for the 
tribunal.  
 An earlier draft on the law that the Court must apply in settling disputes 
contained a broad wording. 
469
 Baron Descamps from Belgium, who had proposed 
the draft, while advocating the prevention of non-liquet, stressed that ―far from 
giving too much liberty to the judge‘s decision his proposal would limit it.‖470 In 
supporting general principles of law to avoid non-liquet or fill the gaps in other 
                                                 
467
 Article 7 of Draft Hague Convention Relative to the Establishment of an International Prize 
Court, Second Peace Conference, 18 October 1907, reprinted in (1908) 2 Am. J. Int‘l L. (Supp.) 
174, at 179.    
468
 Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Process-Verbaux of 
the Proceedings of the Committee, June 16
th
 –July 24th, 1920, with Annexes (The Hague, 1920).  
469
 Ibid. at 306, Annex No. 3, Proposal by Baron Descamp. This proposal read:  
―The following rules must be applied by the judge in the solution of international disputes; they 
will be considered by him in the undermentioned order: 
1. conventional international law, whether general or special, being rules expressly adopted by the 
States; 2. international custom, being practice between nations accepted by them as law; 3. the 
rules of international law as recognized by the legal conscience of civilized nations; 4. 
international jurisprudence as a means for the application and development of law.‖ Ibid.  This 
paragraph was among the draft articles proposed by the Committee President, Baron Deschamps 
of Belgium.  
470
 Ibid. at 311. For his support of prohibition of non-liquet, see ibid. at 310 where he exemplifies 
his case by an arbitration case. See also ibid. at 318.  
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sources of international law, Descamps assumed their function as objective justice 
not abstract justice or legislative function.
471
 Yet, the proposed draft was rejected. 
The discretionary power was attempted to be preserved through a wording 
including recourse to justice and equity. However, such a wording was not 
adopted and there was no reference to principles of equity. Modeling after arbitral 
treaties of the 19
th
 century, Albert De Lapradelle from France preferred the phrase 
―the Court shall judge in accordance with law, justice, and equity.‖472 In a similar 
vein, the Norwegian member, Francis Hagerup, preferred a wording empowering 
the Court to judge according to justice and equity in order to avoid declaration of 
non-liquet by the court in the absence of conventional or general rules.
473
 Hagerup 
supported that the Court must have the power to apply [equitable] principles to fill 
gaps in law.
474
  
  In objecting to the proposed draft, the American member of the 
committee, Elihu Root, stated ―[i]f these clauses were accepted, it would amount 
to saying to the States: ‗You surrender your rights to say what justice should 
be‘.‖475 Root was also of the view that ―[t]he Court must not have the power to 
legislate‖ and thus incompetent to fill the gaps and at best giving a 
recommendation instead of giving a biding decision.
476
  The Italian member, 
Arthur Ricci-Busatti, joined the view that ―legislation dealing with International 
Law comes within the power of the States. That fact does not prevent 
                                                 
471
 Ibid. at 324.  In his speech about his proposal, which was later rejected, Deschamps stated that 
he inserted ―amongst the principles to be followed by the judge in the solution of the dispute 
submitted to him, the law of objective justice.‖ Ibid. 
472
 See the view by Albert De Lapradelle, ibid at 295. In advocating this wording, Lapradelle still 
rejected the legislative function by the Court though supporting modification of law according to 
the ―exigencies of justice and equity‖ through such a wording. See Ibid. at 296.   
473
 Ibid. at 296. Hagerup was also of the view that the court must have the task to develop the law. 
See ibid. at 307-308. 
474
 Ibid. at 296. Accordingly, Hagerup insisted that the court must not refuse to give a decision on 
the ground of the absence of positive rules, and where a rule of international law existed, the Court 
might refer to equity only by parties‘ authorization. Ibid. Yet, he admitted that equity was ―a very 
vague conception.‖ Ibid. Supporters of the prohibition of non-liquet in the committee were of the 
opinion that a declaration of non-liquet by reason of the absence of rules would be a denial of 
justice, likening international adjudication with that of national systems. See ibid. at 312. These 
supporters such as La Pradelle did not wish the Court‘s competence to be limited but suggested 
―[t]he competence of arbitrators‘ might be limited.‖ Ibid. at 314.   
475
 Ibid. at 294.   
476
 Ibid at 309-310.  
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administration of justice.‖477 Opposing the proposed draft, the English member 
Lord Phillimore also stated, ―legislation in matters of international law could only 
be carried out by the universal agreement of all States.‖478 He further emphasized 
that he ―did not wish, in any case, to give international judges legislative 
powers.‖479 He posited that the International Court is not competent to fill the gap 
in cases where moral rights arise.
480
  
The final draft as now appearing in the ICJ Article 38 (1) (a, b, c) was 
drafted by Root together with Lord Phillimore who both rejected any legislative 
role for international judges.
481
 Apparently based on his assumption of objective 
justice, Descamps, for instance, saw point 3 referring to general principles of law 
in Article 38 to function to avoid non-liquet.
482
 A general prohibition of non-
liquet, however, is not consistent with the rejection of discretionary power of the 
Court by the committee and rejection of references to equity or justice. Lord 
Phillimore who co-drafted the current paragraph of Article 38 (1) referring to 
general principles of law, explained that it reflected principles ―accepted by all 
                                                 
477
 Ibid. at 314. (―By declaring the absence of a positive rule of international law, in other words 
an international limitation on the freedom of the parties, nevertheless a legal situation is 
established. That which is not forbidden is allowed.‖) Ibid.  
478
 Ibid.  at 295. 
479
 Ibid. at 316.  
480
 Ibid. at 316. (―[I]n every day life many cases appear in which there exists a right, or quasi right, 
of a moral order; a complaint could be justified, though it might not fall within the bounds of 
actual law, and consequently could not be recognized according to law. The result sometimes was 
the creation of a new statute; sometimes also the judge considered that he could judge without the 
law. If cases of this nature arises in international affairs, two solutions are possible: either the 
Assembly may be asked to fill the gap by means of legislation, or the question may be submitted 
to the Council for decision.‖)  Ibid. at 320. 
481
 See ibid. at 331 et seq. See the amended draft ibid. at 344, Annex No. 1, Amended Draft 
Proposed by Mr. Root. The amended draft read:  
―The following rules are to be applied by the Court within the limits of its competence, as 
described above, for the settlement of international disputes,  they will be considered in the 
undermentioned order: 
1. conventional international law, whether general or special, being rules expressly adopted by the 
States which are parties to a dispute; 2. international custom, being practice between nations 
accepted by them as law; 3. the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; 4. the 
authority of judicial decisions and the opinions of writers as a means for the application and 
development of law.‖ Ibid. The second reading of this amended text read: the preamble: ―the 
following rules of law‖ and paragraph 4: ―the authority of judicial decisions, and the doctrines of 
the best qualified writers of the various nations …‖ Ibid.  
482
 See ibid. at 336.  
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nations in foro domestico,‖ which he meant to be ―maxims of law.‖483 He also 
viewed that that as a matter of general principle if the claimant does not 
demonstrate the claim, no non-liquet would arise because ―[t]here is no question 
of a refusal of justice,‖ where ―the court could only say no injustice had been 
done.‖ 484 This is a situation that will ―possibly arise more often in international 
law.‖485  
In this setting of the rejection of reference to equity and justice and 
rejection of discretionary power and legislative power of international 
adjudicators, reference to decisions ex aequo et bono in case of authorization by 
the parties was added.
 
The clause was added to the PCIJ draft statute in response 
to the concern raised by the Greek representative that the Court should apply the 
principles of justice only if the parties agree so.
486
  
What further tie the realm of evaluation of justice and filling the gaps to 
decisions ex aequo et bono under Paragraph 2 of Article 38 are the developments 
taking place subsequent to the PCIJ Statute. In 1928, Article 28 of the General 
Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
 provided that ―[i]f nothing 
is laid down in the special agreement or no special agreement has been made, the 
Tribunal shall apply the rules … enumerated in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. In so far as there exists no such rule applicable to 
the dispute, the Tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono.‖ 487 Article 28 affirms that 
the scope of Article 38 of the PCIJ Statute is limited to existing laws and a 
function for the filling of gaps in the absence of rules, i.e. equity praeter legem 
                                                 
483
 Ibid. at 335. [italics added] He gave the examples of what he meant as ―certain principles of 
procedure, the principle of good faith, and the principle of res judicata, etc.‖  Ibid. For a list of 
maxims of law see also Jenks, supra note 440, at 412-414. Jenks regards notions such as estoppel 
and unjust enrichment not as maxims of law but ―concepts of equity‖ as ―equitable concepts‖ 
distinct from the maxims of equity.  Ibid. 
484
 Ibid at 316. The principle he mentioned was that ―the plaintiff must prove his contention under 
penalty of having his case refused.‖ 
485
 Ibid. at 316. 
486
 Modification to the Draft Article by the Third Committee of the First Assembly. See Rossi, 
supra note 452, at 91 n. 15 citing 10
th
 Meeting held on December 7, 1920, Minutes of the Meeting 
of the Subcommittee of the Third Committee, 1 League of Nations, the Records of the First 
Assembly, Meetings of the Committees 403, 403 (1920) 
487
 Article 28 of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes drafted by the 
Ninth Assembly of the League of Nations, 71 UNTS 101 (1928, 1950), revised by the United 
Nations in 1949, UNGA Res. 268A (III) of April 1949.   
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not solely equity contra legem, falls within the ambit of decisions ex aequo et 
bono not other paragraphs of Article 38.  
What sharply contrasts the General Act from PCIJ Statute is that PCIJ 
Statute and its successor, ICJ Statute recognizes a decision ex aequo et bono 
solely subject to parties agreement, whereas the failed General Act attempted to 
provide a general authorization for giving decisions ex aequo et bono in the 
absence of law. What matters significantly is that it would be illogical to conceive 
that the drafters of this General Act would have offered the formula of Article 28 
to provide for such authorization had they thought such authorization would have 
proceeded as a result of equity or non-liquet from point 3, currently sub-paragraph 
C of paragraph 1, of Article 38.  
In 1945, the text of Article 38 evolved within the Statute of International 
Court of Justice. The text received further elucidation with regard to the function 
of the International Court. To emphasize the function of the Court, the phrase 
―whose function is to decide in accordance with international law‖ was added to 
the top of Article 38 (1), while retaining the requirement for parties‘ agreement 
for decisions ex aequo et bono.
488
  This development further shows the rejection 
of a legislative function for the Court in the name of equity or non-liquet.  
The reference to general principles of law in Article 38 was, therefore, not 
to accord discretionary power or legislative function to international adjudicators 
or the application of equity or justice that leads to such a function. They did not 
mean to create a sweeping prohibition of non-liquet in the sense that material 
completeness of international law suggests. As a member of the committee of 
jurists preparing Article 38, Ricci-Busatti stated that the amended draft, which 
embodied reference to general principles of law as sources of law to be applied, 
―did not prevent the possibility of non-liquet.‖489 A legislative function was 
rejected by that committee. An advocate for the application of equity in 
international law admits that textual, logical, and historical readings of Article 38 
                                                 
488
 See Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organizations (San 
Francisco 1945) v. 13 at 493. 
489
 Process-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee of Jurists, supra note 468, at 338.  
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do not support incorporation of equity.
490
 This advocate of equity as a source of 
international law further acknowledges that ―the most obvious point of agreement 
among participants was the limitation placed on the court that it must not 
legislate.‖491 With this background, Robert Jennings finds it ―ironic that para. (c) 
[of Article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute] was later seen by writers like HERSCH 
LAUTERPACHT and JENKS as a tool for the expansion and change of the content of 
international law.‖492  
The architecture of sources of international law does not warrant that a 
determination power was a component of Article 38 or a companion to the notion 
of non-liquet or equity or general principles of law. Article 38 (1), enunciating the 
sources of international law for disputes involving States, was not drafted or 
subscribed to by States to include a legislative power for international 
adjudicators to engage in moral and political evaluation creating States‘ 
obligations. Principles were deemed to function as law without engaging the 
legislative function of international adjudicators. If most principles in fact result 
in a legislative function as contingent principles do, Article 38 is no authority for 
such a function.  
As an instrument expressing sources of international law for any disputes 
governed by international law, Article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute accords no power 
to international tribunals settling disputes under international law to engage in 
legal determination for justice evaluation or policy assessment. Such a power 
requires specific parties‘ authorization under a treaty for a decision a ex aequo et 
bono or decision in accordance with justice or equity. Such a power is not even 
extant in current arbitral treaties, instruments, or clauses. Reference to decisions 
ex aequo et bono and the requirement for parties‘ authorization has grown in this 
atmosphere of elimination of particular authorizations for decisions in accordance 
with equity and justice and instead requiring parties‘ authorization for such 
decisions. This is a practice now in operation in many institutional arbitral rules, 
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 See Rossi, supra note 452, at 87-88.   
491
 Ibid. at 115. 
492
 Jennings, supra note 419, at 39-40.  
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instruments, treaties, and clauses thereby not even establishing a particular 
authorization for the respective tribunal.   
 
3. Modern Arbitration Instruments   
References to justice and equity are also absent in arbitration instruments 
that deal with the applicable law questions in arbitral settlement. Current 
resolution of investor-State disputes are mostly brought before ICSID tribunals or 
forums constituted under UNCITRAL arbitration rules by virtue of agreements 
for arbitration under treaties or contracts. Arbitration rules governing these forums 
in part provide for the applicable law.
493
 None of these arbitration rules accords 
                                                 
493
 See: the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States, 18 March 1965, 575 U.N.T.S.  159, 4 I.L.M. 532, entered into force 14 October 1966 
[ICSID Convention]. The ICSID Convention   in Article 42 provides:  (1) The Tribunal shall 
decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the 
absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the 
dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be 
applicable. (2) The Tribunal may not bring in a finding of non liquet on the ground of silence or 
obscurity of the law. (3) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not prejudice the power of 
the Tribunal to decide a dispute ex aequo et bono if the parties so agree; ICSID Arbitration 
(Additional Facility) Rules (2006) [ICSID Additional Facility], available at  
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/AdditionalFacilityRules.jsp. The ICSID Arbitration 
(Additional Facility) Rules in Article 54 provides that (1) The Tribunal shall apply the rules of law 
designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Failing such designation by 
the parties, the Tribunal shall apply (a) the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it 
considers applicable and (b) such rules of international law as the Tribunal considers applicable. 
(2) The Tribunal may decide ex aequo et bono if the parties have expressly authorized it to do so 
and if the law applicable to the arbitration so permits; The UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (1985), as Amended in 2006, 24 ILM 1302 (1985) 
[UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules]. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in Article 28 provides that: 
(1) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law as are chosen 
by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Any designation of the law or legal 
system of a given State shall be construed, unless otherwise expressed, as directly referring to the 
substantive law of that State and not to its conflict of laws rules. (2) Failing any designation by the 
parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it 
considers applicable. (3) The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable 
compositeur only if the parties have expressly authorized it to do so. (4) In all cases, the arbitral 
tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the 
usages of the trade applicable to the transaction; The Rules of Arbitration of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (1998) [ICC Arbitration Rules], available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/ rules_arb_ english.pdf. The ICC 
Arbitration Rules in Article 17 on applicable Rules of Law provides:1. The parties shall be free to 
agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the Arbitral Tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In 
the absence of any such agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it 
determines to be appropriate. 2.In all cases the Arbitral Tribunal shall take account of the 
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the arbitral tribunal the power to decide in accordance with justice or equity. 
Additionally, they ban decisions ex aequo et bono without parties‘ authorizations. 
While ICSID arbitration prohibits a finding of Non-liquet, it expressly conditions 
the power of an ICSID Tribunal to decide ex aequo et bono on parties‘ 
authorization.
494
 Moreover, in disputes governed by international law, a 
prohibition of non-liquet such as that in ICSID Convention is bound by the 
broader context of non-recognition of a legislative function of the tribunal in 
engaging in justice evaluation or policy assessment in international law. In a claim 
of a breach of an obligation or a rule whose basis is the consent of States under a 
treaty or custom, the arbitral tribunal‘s duty to make a decision does not mean its 
power to create an obligation for States. Rejection of a claim for the absence of 
such an obligation is not non-liquet. This concept of prohibition of non-liquet 
reflected in the design of sources of international law as discussed, limiting it to a 
refusal to give a decision than a material completeness of law for consent-based 
obligations, is also reflected in the discussion of the ILC group for a model draft 
on arbitration procedure. In his comments on the draft Article 12 of the ILC 
Model Draft for Arbitral Procedure prohibiting non-liquet, Fitzmaurice viewed 
that ―... There seemed to be some confusion as to the exact connotation of the 
term non liquet. Article 12 did not mean that when the law was silent or obscure 
the tribunal was entitled to indulge in invention; it simply meant that the tribunal 
must render a decision.‖ 495 
Absence of authorization for adjudicative legislative function is now also 
reflected in instruments that provide for investment arbitration.
496
 What is 
conspicuous in investment treaties providing for the arbitration of investment 
                                                                                                                                     
provisions of the contract and the relevant trade usages. 3. The Arbitral Tribunal shall assume the 
powers of an amiable compositeur or decide ex aequo et bono only if the parties have agreed to 
give it such powers. 
494
 See ICSID Convention, Article 42 (3); ICSID Additional Facility, Art. 54 (2); UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, Art. 28 (3); ICC Arbitration Rules, Art. 17 (3).  
495
 ILC Report on Model Draft on Arbitral Procedure, adopted by ILC for General Assembly at its 
10
th
 session, General Assembly Resolution 989 (x) (A.CN4/113),.Yearbook of International law, 
1958, V..I, at 51. Roberto Ago also viewed that ―[w]hen international law contained no rule on a 
given matter, the consequence was not that the tribunal could not decide on the basis of law but 
that it had to base its decision on a recognition of the fact that States were under no legal 
obligation in that matter.‖ Ibid. at 54. 
496
 See Chapter IV, Section B (1) (c).  
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disputes against States is the absence of provisions, as opposed to particular 
authorizations in the arbitral treaties of the ninetieth century, to empower the 
tribunal to decide in accordance with justice or equity.  
The above international practices unambiguously exhibit the absence of a 
rule of recognition in international law for a general adjudicative determination 
power.   These developments strongly dismiss the assertion that asking a tribunal 
to settle a dispute would entail an authorization for the determination of the 
content of rules and obligations in a legislative function bearing on the evaluation 
of justice in hard penumbra. Prior to the twentieth century arbitration of State 
disputes featured the application of equity through powers conferred to the arbitral 
body under respective treaties. This practice most conspicuously emerged in late 
eighteenth century, peaked during the nineteenth century, dwindled through the 
twentieth century, and extinguished by the twenty first  century.   The architecture 
of the sources of international law as well as international instruments designing 
contemporary international arbitration for disputes involving States is consistent 
with the general rule of recognition of international law that does not admit a 
determination power for adjudicators to create the content of obligations in 
interpretation of hard penumbra. It remains to assess references to equity and its 
distinction from ex aequo et bono in reputed dicta of the International Court 
whether the practice of the International Court itself would support a legislative 
function.  
 
b) The Practice of the International Court     
The question of the adjudicative determination power in international law 
and the tie between general principles of law and decisions ex aequo et bono and 
non-liquet may further be explored through the angle of the dicta of the 
International Court bearing on the question of the adjudicative legislative 
function.   
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1. The Free Zones Case 
The PCIJ in the Free Zones Case held that the court did not have a 
legislative function creating rights and obligations.
497
 That the application of 
justice and equity is a function falling within the ambit of decisions ex aequo et 
bono was affirmed in Judge Kellogg‘s opinion expressed in his observations in 
the Free Zones case while agreeing with the Court‘ action in the Order of 6th 
December 1930.
498
 Interestingly, Judge Kellogg even viewed that an authorization 
by the parties to adjudicate ex aequo et bono does not extend to political 
questions.
499
 In his view, even an authorization pursuant to then second Paragraph 
and now Paragraph 2 of Article 38 shall not empower the court to deal with 
political issues. Even if this part of the Court‘s decision is disputable, it leaves no 
question that an adjudicative legislative function at least requires authorization by 
the parties according to Article 38. Where general principles or methods of legal 
reasoning such as analogy do involve a legislative function through justice or 
policy evaluation and choice such authorization is necessary.  The dicta of the 
International Court in other cases further reject an adjudicative legislative 
function. 
                                                 
497
 The Free Zones case (Switzerland v. France) (PCIJ, 1932, Series A/B No. 46). In this case the 
Court (by majority) raised doubts that even with parties‘ authorization to decide ex aequo et bono 
the Court may by its statute engage in judicial legislation by regulation of interests and the 
compatibility of such function with its judicial function. Ibid. A chamber of ICJ deciding the Gulf 
of Maine case has also suggested that political and economic considerations fall outside the power 
of the Court but they could be decided by an authorization to make a decision ex aequo et bono.  
(―However, the crux of the matter lies elsewhere. It should be emphasized that these fishing 
aspects, and others relating to activities in the fields of oil exploration, scientific research, or 
common defence arrangements, may require an examination of valid considerations of a political 
and economic character. The Chamber is however bound by its Statute, and required by the 
Parties, not to take a decision ex aequo et bono, but to achieve a result on the basis of law.‖) Case 
Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United 
States of America) ICJ Reports, October 12, 1984, at para. 59. 
498
 (―The authority given to the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono merely empowers it to 
apply the principles of equity and justice in the broader signification of this latter word.‖) Free 
Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France and Switzerland) 1930 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 
24 (Dec. 6), Separate Opinion of Judge Kellogg, para. 40.  
499Judge Kellogg viewed that parties‘ authorization for decisions ex aequo et bono shall not 
include ―questions involving the making of agreements between nations and the decision of 
disputes of a purely political nature, in accordance with considerations of political and economic 
expediency.‖ Ibid. Judge Kellogg indicated that political questions could be decided by arbitration 
where States authorize the tribunal to decide ex aequo et bono thereby including political 
questions in the scope of decisions ex aequo et bono in arbitration but still requiring parties‘ 
authorization. Ibid. at 42.   
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2. Maritime Delimitation Cases 
The decisions where the International Court distinguished between equity 
and decisions ex aequo et bono embodied dicta and circumstances that dismiss a 
legislative function for the international adjudicators. For the particular field of 
boundary delimitation of continental shelf, the ICJ suggested the application of 
equitable principles.
500
 In this regard, the ICJ took the view that according to 
international law the delimitation of continental shelf is to be effected by the 
application of equitable principles, as applicable rules and principles to be applied 
by the parties with the goal to achieve an equitable result.
501
 Reference to 
equitable principles in the particular case of maritime boundary delimitation cases 
was also due to recognition by the parties to the dispute. States parties to the 
disputes had expressed their position that delimitation was to be effected by 
applying equitable principles although they disagreed what principle, especially if 
equidistance, was the applicable equitable criterion.
502
 Even at some points, the 
application of equity in the particular situation of maritime boundary delimitation 
of continental shelves was associated with customary international law 
recognition in view of State practice in the development of the law of the sea.
503
 
                                                 
500
 (―[I]n this field it is precisely a rule of law that calls for the application of equitable principles.‖ 
The North See Continental Shelf, supra note 457, at para. 88. See also Libya/Malta, supra note 
457, at para. 45.   
501
 In the North Sea Continental Shelf, the ICJ held that international law of continental shelf 
delimitation has no single, imperative rule and allows various principles and methods to be applied 
by the parties taking into account equitable principles. See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 
457, at paras.  90, 92-93, 101 see also para. 85. The ICJ took a similar approach in its 1982 and 
1985 judgments on continental shelf cases. See  Tunisia/Libya, supra note 457, at paras. 70, 71, 
72, 133; Libya/Malta, supra note 457, at paras. 45, 76, 79.  See also the Gulf of Maine for a similar 
approach that also cited Article 83 (1) of UNLOS (1982) for emphasizing the need to arrive at an 
equitable solution.  Gulf of Maine, supra note 497, at para. 300.   
502
 See primarily: Tunisia/Libya, supra note 457, at paras. 2, 4, 23 and 25; Libya/Malta, supra note 
457, at  paras. 29,45.  
503
 See North Sea Continental Shelf cases, supra note 457, at para. 85. (―It emerges from the 
history of the development of the legal régime of the continental shelf, which has been reviewed 
earlier, that the essential reason why the equidistance method is not to be regarded as a rule of law 
is that, if it were to be compulsorily applied in all situations, this would not be consonant with 
certain basic legal notions which, as has been observed in paragraphs 48 and 55, have from the 
beginning reflected the opinio juris in the matter of delimitation; those principles being that 
delimitation must be the object of agreement between the States concerned, and that such 
agreement must be arrived at in accordance with equitable principles.‖) Ibid. See also The Gulf of 
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The application of equity in delimitation cases, therefore, has received a particular 
recognition for this field.  This recognition, however, was not a sufficient means 
to accord a discretionary power to determine a solution through judicial creation 
in an evaluative exercise because the equitable principles were not to be applied 
by the Court itself but by the parties. The equity principle overarching the 
delimitation of maritime boundary of continental shelves embodied another 
segment in addition to equitable principles and reaching an equitable solution. 
Equity also embodied the principle that such delimitation had to be effected by 
agreement.
504
 This additionally accorded a consensual basis to the reconciliation 
of conflicting interests and their underlying justice demands in the field of 
maritime boundary delimitation of continental shelves.   
In boundary delimitation of continental shelf, the ICJ, as per its mandate 
under the treaty between the respective parties conferring jurisdiction, mainly 
dealt with identifying the rules and principles applicable to the delimitation of 
continental shelf areas, and thereby the application of the equitable principles by 
the parties following indications given by the Court. This concern was common to 
a number of continental shelf cases.
505
 In these continental shelf cases, the ICJ 
                                                                                                                                     
Maine acknowledging a ― fundamental norm of customary international law governing maritime 
delimitation‖ providing that ―delimitation , whether effected by direct agreement or by the 
decision of a third Party, must be based on the application of equitable criteria and the use of 
practical methods capable of ensuring an equitable result.‖ The Gulf of Maine, supra note, 497, at 
para. 113, also para. 98.   
504
 (―[D]elimitation must be the object of agreement  between the States concerned, and that such 
agreement must be arrived at in accordance with equitable principles‖) The North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases, supra note 457, p. 46, para. 85. See also Article 83 (1) of the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (1982). (―The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable 
solution.‖) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N... Doc. 
A/CONF.62/ 122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). 
505
 See North Sea Continental Shelf cases, supra note 457, at paras. 2, 84; the Tunisia/Libya 
Continental Shelf, supra note 457, at para. 23, also paras. 2, 4; and the Libya/Malta Continental 
Shelf, supra note 457, at para. 1. As a case that differed on this point of jurisdiction, reference may 
be made to the Gulf of Maine brought before a Chamber of ICJ. The Chamber had been asked ―to 
decide in accordance with the principles and rules of international law applicable in the matter as 
between the Parties‖ what was ―the course of the single maritime boundary that divides the 
continental shelf and fisheries zones‖ of the two countries in the Gulf of Main area. Gulf of Maine, 
supra note 497, at para. 5. This case differed from the above continental shelf cases decided by ICJ 
in the significant aspect that the delimitation task was to be effected by the Chamber rather than by 
the parties. Ibid. para. 25. In the Bukina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute, the ICJ had also been given 
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provided certain indications, factors or procedures for the parties to follow in 
effecting the delimitation.
 506
 The ICJ, however, left open the question as to what 
equitable principle amounts to an equitable solution in the particular case of 
boundary delimitation of continental shelf. The Court identified, in the words of 
one critic, ―the principle of non-principle.‖507 The Court in effect assumed the 
situation to be in essence one that for which no single substantive rule existed, a 
non-liquet without filling the gap by the Court itself. The ICJ did not determine 
the content of the law applicable to the boundary delimitation for adjacent 
countries.   
It follows that the Court did not employ a discretionary power to create a 
substantive rule for the boundary delimitation. The ICJ was not engaged in 
formulating a rule or determination of the content of substantive rule for the 
maritime boundary delimitation of continental shelves but left it to the parties in 
following the Court‘s judgment to apply equitable principles in delimiting the 
boundary for which the parties had much leeway.
508
 Moreover, the International 
Court did not utilize or project equity as a device to assume a discretionary power 
to engage in a legislative function and determine the content of rules through 
assessment of justice. In the maritime delimitation cases, the equity pointed out by 
ICJ was not abstract justice. Although ICJ did not articulate the legal concept of 
equity or the content of equity, it did point out that equity was not deemed to be 
                                                                                                                                     
the task of ―indicating the line of the frontier between Burkina Faso and the Republic of Mali.‖ 
Burkina Faso/ Republic of Mali, supra note 457, p. 562. at para. 16, p. 633 at para. 148.  
506
 For instance in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the court indicated some factors to be 
taken into account by the parties in their negotiation including: ―the land is the legal source of the 
power which a State may exercise over territorial extensions to seaward, it must first be clearly 
established what features do in fact constitute such extensions,‖ the unity of deposits, and a 
reasonable degree of proportionality. The North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 457, at paras. 
96-98. The Court further indicated certain criteria for the negotiation process between the parties, 
which included the obligation to enter into meaningful negotiation, to act in a way that equitable 
principles are applied, and that the natural prolongation of land of one State does not violate that 
of the other. Ibid. para. 85. See also Libya/Malta Continental Shelf, supra note 457, at para. 46; 
Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf, supra note 457, at para. 133 (c). 
507
Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf, supra note 457, dissenting opinion by Judge Oda, at para. 1.    
508
 Although the goal is to reach equitable solution, ―there is no legal limit to the considerations 
which States may take account of for the purpose of making sure that they apply equitable 
procedures.‖ The North Sea, supra note 457, at para. 93.  
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abstract justice.
509
 This clarification indicates that ICJ, even if it had advanced 
equity as a legal concept applicable to all disputes, did not advocate the inclusion 
of what amounts to abstract justice, and concomitant adjudicative discretion to 
evaluate justice, under the rubric of equity or otherwise. By distinguishing the 
application of equity from a decision ex aequo et bono, the ICJ in the maritime 
delimitation cases did not express a discretionary power to engage in justice 
evaluation and selection among competing demands of justice for the 
determination of the content of substantive obligations of States in a creative 
function of international adjudicators.  
Even if the dicta of ICJ provide a discretionary power for the Court for the 
particular case of delimitation of boundary disputes, which is questionable in light 
of the above observations, the extension of such a power to other disputes that are 
to be decided under international law would be unfounded. The above 
observations set these dicta on the distinction between equity and ex aequo et 
bono in the layout of an accompanying particular recognition for the application 
of equity coupled with the ultimate determination of delimitation by the parties. 
Thus, the distinction in no way indicates advocating by the International Court for 
an adjudicative power to engage in abstract justice or legislative function in 
settling disputes under international law.   
With regard to what lies inside and outside the realm of law, the concept 
of equity and the three notions of equity under, additional, and contrary to law 
barely provide clarification to the issue of the adjudicative power to engage in a 
legislative function and evaluation of justice. The area of widest vagary is equity 
infra legem.
510
 The observations on maritime delimitation cases show that what is 
meant to be inside the law in the notion of a binding requirement of the law 
applicable to the case is not a legislative function or principles conducive to a 
discretionary power for the adjudicative determination of the content of 
                                                 
509
 See Libya/Malta, supra note 457, at para. 45, citing North See Continental Shelf, para. p. 47, 
para. 85. (―[I]t is not a question of applying equity simply as a matter of abstract justice, but of 
applying a rule of law which itself requires the application of equitable principles, in accordance 
with the ideas which have always underlain the development of the legal régime of the continental 
shelf in this field.‖ Ibid. See also Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf, supra note 457, at para.71. 
510
 There is no clear scope for equity infra legem, the type of equity which is supposed to function 
within the law. Views differ on what equity infra legem means. Akehurst, supra note 347, at 102. 
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international law. In these cases, a notion of equity under law, as such infra 
legem, was in operation in that both a rule of recognition and the will of parties 
requires, and thereby recognizes, the application of equitable principles. Still ICJ 
has not endorsed a legislative function for international law to create rights and 
obligations for States upon moral or political evaluation. This approach is 
observable in other practices of the International Court as well.  
 
3. Other Dicta    
In a separate opinion in the Barcelona Traction case, Judge Fitzmaurice 
called for the need of ―a body of rules or principles which can play the same sort 
of part internationally as the English system of Equity does.‖511 This view 
expresses desirability for the development of equitable rules in international law 
but suggesting it through the channels of international law. On this note, he 
viewed that ―[d]eciding a case on the basis of rules of equity, that are part of the 
general system of law applicable is something quite different from giving a 
decision ex aequo et bono.‖512 His view indicates that for the application of equity 
in international law an international system of equity is necessary. From this 
appreciation of equity or its distinction from ex aequo et bono, a creative role of 
international adjudicators through application of equitable principles or otherwise 
does not proceed.   
Early rejection of a legislative function of the International Court was 
reflected in the PCIJ‘s pronouncement in the Lotus case affirming the consensual 
basis of rules binding on States enunciating the freedom of action of States in 
                                                 
511
 The Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, (Belg v. Sp.) 
Judgment, Second Phase, ICJ Rep. 1970, Separate Opinion by Judge Fitzmaurice, at p. 85, para. 
36. Judge Fitzmaurice viewed that according to the existing law, the Canadian nationality of 
Barcelona Traction prevented the admissibility of the claim of the Belgium in protection of the 
Belgian shareholders, but the existing law was ―in this respect unsatisfactory‖.  Ibid. at p. 76, para. 
21, see also p. 84, para. 35. He regarded international law ―as deficient and underdeveloped in this 
field‖ Ibid. at p. 78, para. 25.  
512
 Ibid. p. 85, para. 36. [italics original]  
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international law.
513
 There are other illustrations of the line of practice by the 
International Court against an adjudicative legislative function for the creation of 
international obligations as well. In the South West Africa case, the ICJ held that 
―[a]s is implied by the opening phrase of Article 38, paragraph 1, of its Statute, 
the Court is not a legislative body. Its duty is to apply the law as it finds it, not to 
make it.‖514 On another occasion in its advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear 
weapons, the ICJ held that ―[i]t is clear that the Court cannot legislate.‖515 This 
holding on the non-legislative function of the court is consistent with the practice 
of the International Court. This holding survives the declaration of ICJ in its 
advisory opinion that it cannot reach a definitive answer on a specific issue before 
it, thus suggesting non-liquet.
516
   
                                                 
513
 S.S. Lotus Case, France v Turkey (1927) P.C.I.J. Ser. A. No. 10.  at 18. The Permanent Court 
of International Justice in Lotus Case acknowledged the weight of the consent of States in the 
formation of international obligations and rules declaring that ―the rules of law binding upon 
States .... emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usage generally 
accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate their relations 
between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common 
aims.‖ Ibid.  
514
 South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, 1966 ICJ Reports,18 July 1966,  at p. 48, para. 89. 
The court indicated that the legislative function falls within Article 38 (2). See ibid. at paras. 89-
90. (―It is always open to parties to a dispute, if they wish the Court to give a decision on a basis of 
ex aequo et bono, and are so agreed, to invoke the power which, in those circumstances, paragraph 
2 of this same Article 38 confers on the Court to give a decision on that basis, notwithstanding the 
provisions of paragraph 1. Failing that, the duty of the Court is plain.‖) Ibid. p. 48. para. 90. 
Rejecting a legislative function for international adjudicators is further reflected in the ICJ‘s 
distinction between substantive rights and recourse to a tribunal. See infra note 659 and 
accompanying text.  
515
 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Advisory Opinion of  8 July 1996,  
at para. 18.   
516
 In that advisory opinion, the Court declared that ―the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach 
a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an 
extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival would be at stake.‖ Ibid. at para. 
97, see also ibid. para. 105 (2E). This has been considered to be an admission of non-liquet.  See 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) ICJ, 8 July 1996, 
Dissenting Opinion by Judge Higgins, at para. 2. On this point, ―the Court effectively pronounces 
a non-liquet on the key issue on the grounds of uncertainty in the present state of the law, and of 
facts.‖  Ibid.  There is a view that the admission of non-liquet in this advisory opinion is because in 
such advisory opinions the court is not under the duty to settle a dispute otherwise it would avoid 
non-liquet by the duty to settle the dispute. See Prosper Weil, supra note 243, at 118. Weil 
acknowledges that the question of non-liquet is avoiding the statement that the law has no answer. 
Ibid. 118.  Wile also observes the application of the principle of freedom of State action as another 
approach whereby there would be no occasion for raising the issue of gap or non-liquet and even 
views that ICJ could have resorted to this principle in the Advisory opinion to avoid non-liquet. 
Ibid. at 110, 112-114, 117.  
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On lines with the freedom of action principle in international law, the ICJ 
in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion affirmed the principle that in the absence of a 
prohibitive rule the conduct of States is permissive.
517
 In a declaration, Judge 
Simma found the approach of the Court in this opinion reflective of an old vision 
of international law expressing ―the Lotus principle.‖518 Judge Simma argued that 
the Court could have considered whether international law tolerated or permitted 
the declaration of independence or it was neutral or silent on the matter.
519
 Judge 
Simma viewed that ―that the international legal order might be consciously silent 
or neutral on a specific fact or act has nothing to do with non liquet, which 
concerns a judicial institution being unable to pronounce itself on a point of law 
because it concludes that the law is not clear. The neutrality of international law 
on a certain point simply suggests that there are areas where international law has 
not yet come to regulate, or indeed, will never come to regulate. There would be 
no wider conceptual problem relating to the coherence of the international legal 
order.‖520 In this way, Judge Simma apparently is not suggesting a creative 
function for the Court because of non-liquet in such situations. Still, the question 
remains how the Court can avoid engaging in a creative exercise in deciding such 
areas of neutrality, silence or non-regulation in international law in a contentious 
case where there is a claim of violation of an international obligation of a State if 
not by rejecting the claim because of the absence of an obligation. A broader point 
implied in Judge Simma‘s opinion is that there might be areas where obligations 
of States in international law do not fit a consensual framework. It is always 
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 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, ICJ Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, paras. 79-84, 122-123.In response to the question 
by the UN General Assembly whether the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo was 
in accordance with international law, ICJ in its advisory opinion declared that there was no 
international rule to prohibit a unilateral declaration of independence, thus the Kosovo declaration 
of independence did not violate general international law. Ibid.   
518
 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence In Respect of 
Kosovo, ICJ Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, Declaration of Judge Bruno Simma, paras 2-3, 8-9. 
(―by upholding the Lotus principle, the Court fails to seize a chance to move beyond this 
anachronistic, extremely consensualist vision of international law.‖) Ibid. at para. 3.  
519
 ―[T]he court Could have explored whether international law can be deliberately neutral or silent 
on a certain issue, and whether it allows for the concept of toleration, something which breaks 
from the binary understanding of permission/prohibition and which allows for a range of non-
prohibited options. That an act might be ―tolerated‖ would not necessarily mean that it is ‗legal‘, 
but rather that it is ‗not illegal‘.‖ Ibid. at para. 9.  
520
 Ibid.   
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possible to espouse, as this thesis does, that the obligations of States in 
international law are not limited to consensual frameworks. Yet, that does not 
necessarily mean the collapse of the consensual framework of obligations of 
States in international law in every field. The thrust should be not to lose sight of 
the rule of recognition of international law in view of the common good of human 
beings.  
The Lotus and Kosovo and in between decisions rejecting a legislative 
function for the International Court are only components of the bulk of practice of 
the International Court itself together with the practice of States affirming the 
general rule of recognition of international law recognizing a consensual 
framework of determination of the content of primary obligations of States. This 
does not foreclose non-consensual frameworks for the obligations of States in 
international law. The international rule of recognition recognizes certain 
substantive limitations and obligations on States originating in absolute 
principles.
521
 The content of the international rule of recognition may also change 
by supporting practices and common good justifications in a particular field of 
international law as in human rights recognizing a constitutional approach to the 
construction of abstract rights of human beings and corresponding obligations of 
States.
522
 
In this setting, to cull from the dicta of the International Court on the 
distinction between equity and decisions ex aequo et bono or the avoidance of 
non-liquet, a general power for international adjudicators to create the content of 
rules in international law and engage in a legislative function would be untenable. 
A decision rejecting a claim based on the absence of an obligation in international 
law detracts from neither the notions of equity or non-liquet in international law 
nor the function of the tribunal in disposing of the case in a consensual structure 
of formation of rules and obligations. If asking a tribunal to settle a dispute were 
in and of itself a ground for conferring discretionary legislative power, the 
International Court should have relied on such a power in its decisions as a result 
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 See Chapter I, Section C (ii) and Chapter II, Section C (ii) (b). 
522
 See Chapter I, Section C (ii). 
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of mere submission of the case for settlement. Even if on occasions the Court may 
virtually have engaged in a creative role, the important factor about the practice is 
that the Court has not supported or justified such a function. The core of this 
function is engagement in political and moral evaluation of justice, policies, or 
social aims disguised in the employment of equity and general principles of 
contingent character, which in view of the absence of a general rule of recognition 
requires particular authorization for decisions ex aequo et bono. An implied 
discretionary power relegates the sources of international law to an empty shell 
undermining the whole system and the rule of recognition of international law.  
The foregoing practice shows that despite the dicta distinguishing between 
equity and ex aequo et bono, the International Court has indicated, though not 
articulated, the requirement of parties‘ authorization where the application of 
equity converts the function of the court into a legislative function be it a new rule 
or modifying an existing one. This practice is consistent with the State practice 
earlier identified, and the framework rule of legitimacy, affirming that the general 
rule of recognition in international law does not admit adjudicative creation of the 
content of international rules and obligations. Such a function requires either a 
particular authorization by the parties or a particular recognition for a field of 
international law such as human rights. The question of the constitutional 
construction of rights of human beings and corresponding obligations of States 
and limitations on the their actions towards human beings in the field of human 
rights will be addressed in the next chapter in contrast with the field of foreign 
investment. The situations where substantive, procedural, or structural principles 
of absolute dimensions may function in legal reasoning and settlement of disputes 
as equity inside the law need to be distinguished. A number of illustrations may 
be observed.  
 
iii. Equity Inside the Law    
Along the possibility of emergence of a particular recognition for a field of 
international law for reference to justice to determine the substance of rules and 
obligations as in the case of maritime delimitations or constitutional construction 
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of human rights, equity may also be deemed inside the law, infra legem, where it 
mirrors justice in absolute dimensions. This quality cannot be generalized to 
contingent principles. On the one hand, substantive, procedural or structural 
principles may themselves be of absolute dimensions representing a statement of 
the law. On the other hand, as a matter of fairness of process in an absolute 
dimension, justice under the law may be reflected in a particular recognition for 
the adjudicative discretionary power for the determination of the amount of 
compensation in the absence of a rule, in the penumbra of consequence regarding 
the quantum of compensation. These two cases will be discussed below.  
Justice inside the law is from one angle reflected in the application of 
absolute principles which whether of procedural or substantive character be they 
called principles of equity, justice, or fairness represent statements of law and are 
thus part of the law to be applied.
523
 Where an equitable principle by virtue of its 
absolute character expresses the statement of the law, its application is by 
character different from an implied power. The ICJ in Tunisia/Libya suggested 
that in the application of international law, the international court might choose 
among various interpretations the one ―closest to the requirements of justice.‖524 
This view fits a situation like the one espoused by Judge Hudson in the Meuse 
case, which is governed by a principle of absolute dimension where obvious 
fairness or justice can be conceived. It was particularly the absolute aspect of a 
principle that underlay the distinction between equity and ex aequo et bono in its 
inception pronounced in the Meuse case. Judge Hudson‘s opinion in the Meuse 
case essentially concerned a procedural principle of adjudicative process with an 
absolute aspect, which would be unwarranted to stretch it to rationalize a 
discretionary power to exercise justice evaluation by way of substantive equitable 
principles.
525
 What influenced this opinion was the ―obvious fairness‖ aspect of 
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 For absolute principles, see Chapter II, Section C (ii) (b). 
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 Tunisia/Libya, supra note 457, at para. 71.  
525
 What Judge Hudson relied on as a principle of equity was that a party that has continually 
breached a reciprocal treaty obligation cannot seek a relief to ―take advantage of a similar non-
performance of that obligation by the other party.‖ The Meuse case, supra note 455, at 77. This 
principle does not define the substantive content of the obligations of the parties but represents a 
principle of absolute dimension regarding the enforcement of the obligations. Judge Hudson 
referred to maxims ―equality is equity‖ and ―who seeks equity must do equity‖ in municipal laws 
171 
 
the equitable principle concerned.
526
 Contingent principles do not share this 
character. 
 
The theoretical link behind the virtue and propriety of this view is the 
absolute character of the principle, which is not an analogous authority for the 
application of equity for contingent principles. Never does this opinion entail a 
legislative function for international adjudicators or utilization of principles in 
engaging in such a function. Judge Hudson even cautioned that ―[t]he general 
principle is one which an international tribunal should make a very sparing 
application.‖527  That is why the principle ‗equality is equity‘ has received mixed 
reactions in the decisions of the International Court.  
In the Meuse case, the maxim ‗equality is equity‘ relied on by Judge 
Hudson reflected a procedural principle of absolute dimension, thus applicable by 
virtue of this nature and its obvious fairness demand. Whereas in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ held ―equity does not necessarily imply 
equality.‖528  The contrast lies in the fact that in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases the ICJ faced contingent substantive aspects of the principle in a penumbra 
hard case of delimitation of continental shelf between adjacent States. Absolute 
principles neatly qualify a character of obvious fairness or justice. Contingent 
principles, for which conflicting demands of justice are implicated, do not reflect 
obvious justice but justice subject to evaluation.  
The other manifestation of justice inside the law is where justice precludes 
denial of compensation on the ground of absence of rules applicable to the 
question of measure of damages while the law has determined that a conduct 
                                                                                                                                     
of Anglo-American systems. Ibid. at 77. One should recall that Lord Phillimore as the drafter of 
what now appears as paragraph C of Article 38 clarified the intention behind the principles as 
maxims of law. See supra note 483 and accompanying text.   
526
 The Meuse case, supra note 455, at 77.    
527
  Ibid.  
528
 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 457, p. 85, para. 46 [citation omitted].  The ICJ in the 
Bukina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute acknowledged this dicta in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
case stating ‗Equity does not necessarily imply equality‘ but applied equality as an equitable 
principle applicable to a disputed region (the region of the pool of Soum) in the case before it 
because in cases ―where there are no special circumstances the latter [equality] is generally the 
best expression of the former [equity]. The Bukina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute, supra note 457, p. 
633,  para. 150. [emphasis and clarification added] Remarkably, though subtly, the Court in the 
Bukina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute also affirmed the approach by the ICJ in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf that where special cases arise, namely penumbral cases, as in the delimitation of 
the continental shelf between adjacent countries, the principle may not work and thus not a 
statement of the law.  
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entitles a party to compensation. An area also ascribed to equity infra legem is the 
equitable calculation of damages for compensation.
529
 For instance, where the law 
entitles the claimant to compensation for pain and suffering, the difficulty of 
valuation of damages should not deprive the party of compensation.
530
  
In cases where a conduct has been determined under the law to entitle the 
party concerned to compensation, failure to award compensation on the ground of 
the absence of a rule on the quantum of compensation is a non-liquet against an 
absolute principle of justice. The ICJ in Barcelona Traction suggested this limited 
scope of non-liquet in international law when it attributed a legal vacuum to the 
―situation where a violation of law remains without remedy.‖531  
In the UNESCO case, decided by the Administrative Tribunal of the 
International Labor Organization, the tribunal, awarding compensation for the 
failure to rehire UNESCO‘s employees despite their contracts having fixed terms, 
found the amount of compensation not subject to a specific rule and thus held that 
―[t]he redress will be ensured ex aequo et bono ….‖532 The ICJ‘s advisory opinion 
was sought by the organ‘s executive board on the invalidity of the decision of the 
tribunal in part for being excessive to apply equity without an express agreement 
by the parties for a decision ex aequo et bono. The ICJ held that the Tribunal did 
not have the intention to ―depart from principles of law.‖533 This case has two 
important implications. One is that neither the Tribunal nor the Court in its 
advisory opinion distinguished between the application of equity and a decision ex 
aequo et bono. The other is that both the tribunal and the Court suggested that for 
the particular question of valuation of compensation, there is an authorization for 
the court not restricted by the general requirement for parties‘ authorization to 
apply equity, i.e. to decide ex aequo et bono. Whether the entitlement to 
compensation arises from conventional or general international law is immaterial 
in this respect. This particular recognition for the application of equity, deciding 
                                                 
529
 Akehurst, supra note 347, at 802. Another example is the discretion of the tribunal for resorting 
to equity for fixing ―a fair rate of interest‖ or ―a fair order concerning costs‖. Ibid. at 803.   
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 See Ibid. at 802-803. 
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 Barcelona Traction, supra note 425, p. 44-45, para. 80.  
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 Advisory Opinion on Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the I.L.O. upon complaints 
Against the U.N.E.S.C.O., ICJ Rep, 1956, at 100.   
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 Ibid. at 100.    
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ex aequo et bono, in the absence of a specific rule on compensation, which 
accords a discretionary power to the adjudicator to determine the amount of 
compensation, originates in an absolute principle of fairness whereby the absence 
of a rule on compensation should not negate the entitlement to compensation.  
The equity infra legem and prohibition of non-liquet may accord the 
adjudicator a degree of discretion for the calculation of compensation that the law 
has entitled it as a consequence that the law has determined. Here equity, together 
with the concomitant prohibition of non-liquet, is not supposed to address the 
legal status of a conduct but some degree of the consequence for a conduct that 
has already received legal determination. The vacuum of international law itself 
as to the conduct to which a violation is attributed admits no adjudicative creation 
of the content of the law to reconstruct the status of the law on the conduct itself 
unless upon particular authorization or recognition.  In hard cases equity infra 
legem may become very illusive and may distort the limited authorization for 
adjudicative determination of the amount of compensation. The discretion to 
measure compensation still must not distort the statement of the law. Absolute 
procedural fairness provides a particular recognition for a degree of adjudicative 
discretion to international adjudicators, not for the gap relating to the conduct, but 
to the gap relating to the consequence of the conduct to ensure that compensation 
is not denied for a conduct for which the law requires compensation.  
The exercise of this adjudicative discretion in making legal determinations  
whether by particular authorization or by absolute fairness for determining 
compensation is still bound by the criteria of legitimacy as well.  On the one hand, 
coherence requires the determination to be made with appropriate consideration of 
appropriate demands of justice for the common good. The requirement of 
coherence also bars the adjudicative body to display contingent substantive 
principles as statements of the law and application of an existing law in justifying 
their decisions while they represent an adjudicative determination. This will lead 
to disregarding or underplaying other demands of justice in violation of the 
legitimacy requirement of coherence for the common good.  Such an act would 
distort the statement of the law by projecting one demand of justice as the law 
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disregarding the other by being considered as a revision of the law against the 
requirement of coherence for such hard penumbral cases. Moreover, although the 
adjudicator may exercise discretion towards the parties of the case by virtue of 
this particular rule of recognition emanated from procedural justice, the general 
rule of recognition of international law still governs in that the decision rendered 
will not represent a juridical statement of a general rule. In legal determinations 
by adjudicators whether by way of authorizations by the parities for the conduct 
or particular recognition to meet the requirement of fairness not to leave a legally 
entitled claimant without compensation, the legal status of the matter remains 
subject to subsequent State practice and opinion.
534
 That international adjudicators 
may by virtue of a particular authorization or recognition engage in a certain legal 
determination does not relieve adjudicators from adherence to the criteria of 
legitimacy. Recognition of power for determination in the penumbra of 
consequence for compensation amount is no recognition for determination power 
for the conduct and creating of the obligations for which the consequence is 
attributed. Nor does an authorization or recognition for making legal 
determination relieves the adjudicators from the criterion of coherence to consider 
all justice demands for the common good. Nor must it in and of itself be regarded 
as the statement of law on the question of the amount of compensation. Departure 
from these criteria of legitimacy may often occur along the lines of lex lata and 
lex ferenda.  
 
iv. Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda 
Where in hard penumbra the application of equitable principles or general 
principles of law is conducive to political and moral evaluation, characteristic of 
contingent principles, it would be untenable to circumvent the rule of recognition 
of international law required for such evaluation. Parallel observations apply to 
the equity discourse. The accuracy of equity infra legem as a class of equity truly 
distinguishable from other types of equity on substantive issues is still a point to 
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ponder more deeply. The distinction between the notions of equity infra, praeter, 
and contra legem fails to delineate the scope of equity as the application of law as 
opposed to an adjudicative legislative function creating legal rights and 
obligations. Akehurst, acknowledging the merger of these notions of equity, states 
that:  
[E]quity infra legem can be used in a wide number of situations, 
ranging from cases which differ only slightly from a strict 
application of the letter of the law, through cases where the spirit 
of the law is made to prevail over its letter. Consequently a judge 
who wishes not to apply a rule of law can say that application of 
the letter of law is contrary to its spirit or that the legislator must 
have intended that there must be exceptions to the letter of law 
(equity infra legem) or that the law does not apply to the case and 
that the judge can fill the resulting gap by recourse to equity 
(equity praeter legem); or that the law is unjust and should not be 
applied (equity contra legem).
535
 
 
Oftentimes the line between equity infra, praeter or contra legem is 
illusory because in hard penumbral cases each, involving a general principle, 
entails fresh assessment of justice for the particular situation of hard penumbra for 
which the situation may fit the character of an unjust law or the absence/silence of 
law for the particular situation at issue. The equidistance in the maritime boundary 
delimitation of continental shelf is itself a vivid example.
 
 
In the conventional wisdom, the justice demand for the non-application of 
the equidistance rule to the particular situation of continental shelf delimitation 
may be attributed to a demand for the modification of the rule, thus conceived as 
equity contra legem. Some criticisms of the ICJ decision in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf are also in line with such an approach.
536
  Nonetheless, from the 
perspective of coherence and the requirement for the determination of the content 
of the rule for a penumbral hard situation, a rule for the particular situation of the 
lateral delimitation of continental shelf between adjacent States did not exist. In 
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 Akehurst, supra note 347, at 801-802.   
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 See for instance, the dissenting opinion by vice-President Kortesky in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf , supra note 457, at page 165-166; Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf,  supra note 
457, dissenting opinion  by Judge Oda, at para. 1; Wolfgang Friedman, The North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases— A Critique (1970) 64 Am. J. Int‘l L. 229, at 236.  
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effect, the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf and following cases as well as 
State practice treated the question of the delimitation of continental shelf in such 
situations as a penumbral hard case for which a rule did not exist.     
The ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf for the application of the 
equidistance method in boundary delimitation cases rejected the analogy of 
median-line delimitations between opposite States with lateral delimitations 
between continental shelves of adjacent States or analogy of waters (mostly 
internal waters such as lakes, rivers) with seabeds and continental shelf, implying 
that as a penumbral instance.
537
 In other words, even if the equidistance rule had 
been found a customary rule of international law, it had formed in the special 
instance of median-line delimitation between opposite States or internal waters, 
whereas delimitation of continental shelf areas for lateral delimitation of adjacent 
States requires rules of its own context not analogous to other situations. The ICJ, 
in interpreting a seemingly determinant treaty provision of Article 6 of the 
Geneva Convention of 1958 on Continental Shelf embodying equidistance rule 
espoused non-existence of the equidistance rule for the lateral delimitation of 
continental shelf for adjacent countries. Therefore, equidistance was not deemed 
lex lata for the penumbral situation of lateral delimitations between adjacent 
States. It only formed part of lex ferenda.  
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 (―Finally, it appears that in almost al1 of the cases cited, the delimitations concerned were 
median-line delimitations between opposite States, not lateral delimitations between adjacent 
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To illustrate the issue further, recalling the example of emotional damages, 
assuming that the law in a given system like that of the United Kingdom entitles 
the claimant to compensation for emotional injuries suffered away from the 
accident scene, the question of measure of damages in this particular situation is a 
penumbral case.
538
 If limited liability is considered for this particular situation, it 
could be interpreted, being an exception to the rule or not, as equity contra legem 
or praeter legem. In the conventional wisdom, it would be equity contra legem in 
view of the legal materials providing for unlimited liability and projecting the 
demand for modification or exception as a demand in justice criticism of an 
existing law. Whereas as a matter of legitimacy, the unlimited liability rule, like 
the equidistance for the delimitation of continental shelf for the adjacent States, 
for this hard penumbral situation does not exist because it lacks coherence for the 
common good.  Just as with the case of equidistance rule, it would be a distortion 
of the law to regard the unlimited liability rule as representing lex lata to justify 
the authority of this rule for penumbral hard cases. Such an approach would 
distort the scheme of liability behind the calculation of damages even if the law 
has determined that a specific conduct would give rise to entitlement to 
compensation. It would also distort the picture of gap and rule creation in 
penumbral hard cases discussed above which arise not only as to the legal 
determination of the conduct but also the consequence of the conduct. 
In these examples both general principles expressing equidistance and 
unlimited liability rooted in the pedigree of legal materials would be short of 
authority, for the penumbra of delimitation of continental shelf for adjacent States 
and compensation for emotional damages respectively in view of the legitimacy 
criterion of coherence for the common good. To argue that a type of equity has its 
allegiance to law and the other to the notion of justice is misleading in penumbral 
cases because they involve creation of new rules or obligations for particular 
situations not fitting ordinary instances. The distinction between outside and 
inside the boundaries of law for distinguishing decisions ex aequo et bono from 
decisions based on equity only begs the question, distorting the whole 
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interpretation ambiguity for the application of rules in penumbral instances. To 
situate equity inside the law and ex aequo et bono outside the law to justify the 
legal character of equity disregards the fact that being inside or outside the law is 
the foundation of the very controversy surrounding equity, justice, or fairness in 
legal discourse.  
These examples further exhibit the illusiveness of lex lata when 
penumbral hard cases are at issue. Penumbral hard cases are short of lex lata. It is 
the legitimacy requirement of coherence for the common good with appropriate 
consideration of all justice demands required by the practical reasonableness that 
makes a rule for ordinary instances non-existent for penumbral hard cases. By 
entering into the domain of penumbra, rules such as those discussed become 
general principles forming only part of the lex ferenda discourse for the 
determination of the content of law subject to evaluation of all justice demands 
and policy considerations for the common good of the community. Statements 
representing general principles are part of lex ferenda not determinative of lex 
lata. To project general principles as statements of law for a penumbral hard case 
is an affront to the legitimacy requirement of coherence.  
Consistent with the general rule of recognition of international law 
requiring specific or general consent of States, neither the architecture of Article 
38 of the ICJ Statute reflecting the sources of international law, nor State practice 
or the practice of the International Court warrants a general legislative power for 
international adjudicators entertaining disputes involving States governed by 
international law. In other words, the freedom of action and presumption 
associated with it ‗what is not prohibited is permitted‘ has gained concordant 
practices by States and the International Court as a presumption that requires 
demonstration of existence of rules or obligations established in international law 
to rebut. It should be reiterated that the consent or freedom of action of States is 
not the focus. What is material is the rule of recognition in view of the common 
good of human beings, which also accepts absolute principles as well as openness 
to practices and justifications for a non-consensual framework for the obligations 
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of States laying limitations on States in a constitutional approach to the rights of 
human beings in international law.  
The foregoing sections exhibit that the integrity of international law does 
not admit narrowing the scope of ex aequo et bono to exclude authorization for an 
adjudicative determination power or broadening the scope of paragraph C of 
Article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statue to include a sweeping application of equity or 
prohibition of non-liquet implicating an adjudicative determination power. The 
rule of recognition of the system of international law may not be assumed 
relinquished by implication. As the Chamber of ICJ in the ELSI case has held, it 
―finds itself unable to accept that an important principle of customary 
international law should be held to have been tacitly dispensed with, in the 
absence of any words making clear an intention to do so.‖539 To inject an 
adjudicative determination power in settling disputes under international law is 
not reconcilable with the criterion of legitimacy of the rule of recognition, which 
consistent with the practice of States and that of the International Court rejects a 
legislative function by international adjudicators.  
In the current structure of international law, an adjudicative legislative 
function to engage in justice evaluation or policy assessment requires a particular 
authorization by the parties or a particular recognition in a particular field of 
international law. National systems provide their own rules of recognition for the 
determination power by adjudicative bodies. Regional or even international 
institutions and organizations may also be established with their own systems and 
structures. In their design, such institutions and organizations may develop 
particular authorizations for the competencies granted to the deciding bodies 
functioning within the system. What follows from the requirements of legitimacy 
of coherence and rule of recognition is that the competencies and processes in 
such systems may not be taken for granted for or transferred to general 
international law and a system of adjudication governed by international law. 
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 Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (US v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 42, para. 50, 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/76/6707.pdf. 
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International law has its own determination structure unless particular 
authorization or recognition is established.  
In penumbral hard cases arising from ambiguous treaty obligations or 
customary rules, the authority of the law figures in fresh coherence for the 
common good according to the rule of recognition of the system. As a matter of 
general rule of recognition in international law, in areas subject to contingent 
principles, State practice and opinion are required to determine the content of 
primary obligations with the caveat of particular recognition for a particular field 
such as human rights. The general international rule of recognition does not 
validate the determination of the content of the law in a justice or political 
evaluation—often masked by reliance on general principles, standards, or tests in 
tandem with reliance on past decisions—in hard indeterminacies by an 
international tribunal deciding a dispute governed by international law without a 
particular authorization or recognition. Nor does the general rule of recognition of 
international law validate a common law development of international obligations 
of States by adjudicative decisions if not rooted in or subscribed by State practice 
and opinion within the customary framework. The general rule of recognition of 
international law requires customary determination and development of the 
content of rules in hard penumbra.  
 
B. Customary Framework of Determination   
The normative vehicle that can meet the legitimacy criteria of the rule of 
recognition and coherence for the common good in general international law is 
customary international law.
540
 Coherence and the rule of recognition require the 
customary framework of international law to locate and construct legal 
determinations for the content of the primary obligations of States that are in a 
consensual frame of rules and obligations in hard penumbra arising from treaty or 
custom unless a particular authorization or recognition is established. Customary 
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international law still has a framework of its own for generating authoritative 
rules in international law. This framework raises the constituent elements of 
custom. It also raises a theoretical analysis as to the question of the participation 
of contingent principles, decisions of international adjudicators, and academic 
opinion in the formation of an international customary rule than independent 
sources in a way reconcilable with the legitimacy criteria of coherence and the 
rule of recognition.  
 
i. Constitutive Elements of Customary Rules  
State practice and opinio juris are constitutive elements of customary 
international law. Customary rules of international law arise from State practice 
and opinio juris.
541
 State practice and opinio juris constitute the objective and 
subjective elements necessary for the formation of a customary rule of 
international law.
542
 In line with these elements, in a series of treaties on 
investment, States have further affirmed that customary international law ―… 
results from a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a 
sense of legal obligation.‖543 Accordingly, international law has also developed 
criteria of validity within its rule of recognition about how a customary 
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http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file
1_4004.pdf.  
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international rule forms. It requires the conditions of State practice and opinio 
juris. Thus, for the existence of a customary rule of international law for a 
particular situation, State practice and opinio juris for that particular situation 
must be established. State practice and opinio juris formed for ordinary instances 
of the rule are short of authority for hard penumbra by virtue of legitimacy criteria 
of rule of recognition and coherence for the common good. Each hard penumbra 
requires fresh customary determination for validation of the origin of the rule and 
coherence of its content.  
Where State practice and opinion may be located is one important 
question. What may indicate the practice and opinion of States may take various 
forms in States‘ actions (positive or negative), omissions, statements or votes. 
Usual candidates constitute the conduct of States, treaties, UN General Assembly 
Resolutions, domestic laws, diplomatic correspondence and public official 
statements by States.
544
 Treaties and General Assembly Resolutions stand out in 
these material sources.  
Treaties may be a raised as an indicator of an international customary rule. 
No doubt, treaties constitute a major source of international obligations among 
States. However, their scope is normally limited to the parties concerned and the 
obligations created do not have a general applicability for all States. Treaties 
made by two or a few States and even multilateral law-making agreements among 
many States are not per se the source of general rules.
545
 The question then arises 
about the evidentiary quality of treaties in indicating customary international law. 
Treaties may often indicate the absence of a particular legal obligation not 
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existing in customary international law.
546
 Ordinary treaties between two or more 
States ―can very rarely be used even as evidence to establish the existence of a 
rule of a general law.‖547 Multilateral lawmaking treaties may evidence general 
rules.
548
 Being a sign of the conduct of States, then multilateral treaties have to be 
examined on the basis of State practice and opinio juris. Thus, they must satisfy 
the requirements of State practice and opinio juris in evidencing customary law. A 
fortiori, a bilateral treaty cannot per se reflect a customary rule on a particular 
issue without other indicators of the custom outside the treaty framework to 
establish State practice and opinio juris. As such, there cannot be a categorical 
rejection or appreciation of the utility of bilateral treaties including investment 
treaties for reflecting or developing customary international law. It is the practice 
and opinion outside the bilateral treaty framework that matter much for the 
existence of a customary rule.  
The Resolutions of UN General Assembly may play a significant role for 
indicating the attitudes of States towards general law and reflecting or building 
customary international law although they are non-binding instruments. General 
Assembly resolutions can provide strong indication of a customary rule because 
they are backed by the votes of States. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ suggested 
that that the attitudes of States towards certain General Assembly resolutions may 
be used as evidence of opinio juris.
549
 As Brownlie puts ―if it is inferred that such 
resolutions can have no effect on the shaping of international law this is a capital 
error…. Thus the proceedings and the resolutions themselves constitute evidence 
of the formation of rules of customary or general international law.‖550  
The UN General Assembly is a unique forum where States cast their voice 
in a collective manner. They also do this in a quasi-legislative manner with 
deliberations among the States on a particular subject as if they are engaging in a 
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lawmaking endeavor for the global community. There is no compelling reason to 
disregard the UN General Assembly Resolutions on a particular issue in view of 
the debates concerned as a strong indication of existence or non-existence of a 
customary international rule on that issue. Positive collective action of States in 
voicing unanimously or in large number in support of a rule in this forum can 
indicate the opinion of States‘ as to what the law is.  Negative collective action in 
opposition to a rule in this forum or other similar forums is also an indication of 
what States believe the law is not. The engagement of States is much different 
from their practice in treaties or other bilateral or unilateral contexts. The general 
assembly is a unique global forum where the collective voice of States on a given 
matter can be obtained. The collective voice of States on an issue at the global 
level, positive or negative, indicates the opinio juris on that matter evidenced by 
the votes of States in a global forum where the practice of State is much like a 
parliament at the national level. That is to say, what is deliberated there intuitively 
though not technically is regarded as deliberation on what might be taken as rules 
of general application.  That is why States in the UN general assembly usually 
engage in heated debates and deliberations on a particular resolution. These 
resolutions can reflect a general consent and opinio juris of a customary law 
though not themselves binding on States.  The elements of State practice and 
opinio juris carry other important aspects as well.  
 
1. State Practice  
Generality and consistency are important aspects of State practice as an 
element of customary international law.
551
 For the formation of a customary rule, 
the general consent of States would be sufficient.
552
 For the analysis of general 
consent, the practices of States of different cultural backgrounds must count.
553
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Particularly those whose special interests are affected by the rule must be 
represented in its construction.
554
 The UN Charter has enunciated the equal rights 
of States.
555
 From the practical point of view, such equality may not have much 
value because States are not equal in power or position. Nonetheless, from the 
theoretical perspective, the equality of the rights of States does imply that the 
practice and opinion of States of different backgrounds must be considered in the 
formation of a customary rule. The proposition that States are equal in theory 
attempts to narrow the practical inequality by allowing weak States to participate 
in the determination of issues that matters to them.  The common good requires 
consideration of all appropriate justice demands in the construction of rules and 
thereby requirement for participation of States of different powers and positions to 
represent their demands of justice in the formation of customary rules to meet the 
consent. 
How such a consistent, general practice is demonstrated in practice is also 
a question that affects the legitimacy of the purported customary rule. Inherent in 
the element of State practice as a constitutive element of customary international 
law is what is attributed to customary law must empirically reflect State practice 
and opinion than the views of commentators or international tribunals.
556
 
Observing that what are attributed to customary international law instead of being 
demonstrated empirically, are what writers and tribunals conclude based on 
assumptions predicated among others on the past views of tribunals and writers, 
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thus generating ―paper norms‖, one commentator seems to find this situation a 
fatal defect of customary international law calling for its elimination.
557
  
Purported customary rules may often be taken for granted by tribunals and 
writers and often inferred from past views of other tribunals and writers than 
based on State practice and opinion. This situation, however, by no means 
warrants a radical call for the elimination of customary international law as a 
source of international law. Nor does the situation justify categorically ruling out 
treaties or UN resolutions and other State practice or opinions as part of material 
sources where they can contribute to the formation of customary law among other 
indications of practice and opinions of States or provide negative attitudes by 
States to a proposed or desired state for the law. The fact that some rules may 
often be raised that do not satisfy the elements of customary international law 
does not necessarily entail that no customary rule exists or none can come into 
existence. The focus must be on the general international rule of recognition that 
requires customary determination of the content of primary rules of obligations on 
a consensual basis, except for absolute principles and particular recognitions or 
authorizations,  as well as its component criteria that customary international law 
forms by the necessary elements of State practice and opinio juris. This does not 
mean that non-State actors including the views of academic writers and 
particularly decisions of international tribunals as subsidiary sources and more 
broadly NGOs cannot contribute to the formation of custom, if not as its creator. 
The question of participation of non-State actors in building customary 
international law in a manner compatible with the legitimacy criterion of the 
general rule of recognition of international law is linked to the element of opinio 
juris.  
 
2. Opinio Juris  
The second requirement of customary international law is opinio juris. 
This constitutive element for the formation of customary law is under Article 38 
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of the ICJ Statute described as ―a general practice accepted as law‖.558 In further 
elaboration, the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases held that  
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but 
they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be 
evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, 
i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very 
notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned 
must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a 
legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitua1 character of the 
acts is not in itself enough. There are many international acts, e.g., 
in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are performed 
almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations 
of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal 
duty.
559
 
 
To build the authority of customary international law opinio juris is indispensable. 
The element of opinio juris poses a question of circularity that how an 
international customary rule may ―come into existence (i.e. become authoritative) 
only by virtue of the … belief that it is already in existence (i.e. authoritative).‖560 
This question will be dealt shortly in view of determination and coherence for the 
common good that would explain the evaluative level of opinio juris without its 
circularity.    
While agreeing that practice alone cannot give rise to customary law, in 
discovering the second element necessary for the formation of the substance of 
customary law, Lon Fuller proposes that custom be interpreted in the light of 
interaction.
561
 Fuller confirms that the doctrine of opinio juris is respected in 
international law. Fuller finds this doctrine covering established customary law 
and not the situations where customary law is in the process of formation, 
apparently because of its circularity.
562
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The interaction theory and others cannot dispense with opinio juris for the 
emergence of an individual customary rule in international law. Opinio juris is a 
key criterion of validity for the formation of customary international law and its 
legitimacy in view of the rule of recognition. Moreover, it should not be thought 
that the consent basis is missing in a customary law that recognizes stable 
interactions. Fuller himself notes ―[i]f we speak of a ‗system of stabilized 
interactional expectancies‘ as a more adequate way of describing what the 
treatises call ‗customary law‘ we encounter the embarrassment that many of these 
expectancies relate to matters that seem remote from anything like a legal context. 
For example rules of etiquette fully meet the suggested definition, yet one would 
scarcely be inclined to call rules of this sort rules of law.‖563 Mere reliance on 
stable expectations as a sign of customary rule still poses graver difficulties from 
the common good standpoint. It was stable interaction among one group and other 
group (the black people) that the latter act as the slaves of the former. The first 
group created the expectation and the second group reacted to that expectation by 
satisfying the demands of the first group. Both groups relied on those reactions 
and expectations and both planned their affairs on that basis. Was there a 
customary law obligating the black people to act as slaves? Employers may create 
stable, widespread expectations for their employees that the latter work overtime 
without remuneration or work in poor health and safety conditions or that the 
employees including women and children perform harsh, onerous tasks in return 
for meager subsistence of life. Employees in such conditions may well react to 
those expectations by complying the wishes of the employers, expecting that they 
would keep their jobs or their means of living for survival. Both employers and 
employees rely on these expectations and plans and adjust their lives and affairs 
accordingly. Does it mean that there is a customary rule obliging employees to 
work in such circumstances? European empires had created stable expectations 
throughout the world that through colonization they should rule where they 
occupied. The colonized States reacted by meeting this expectation. Was there a 
customary law between the colonizing and colonized countries that sanctioned the 
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ruling of the former over the latter? It was stable widespread expectation that the 
gunboat policy would follow in the name of diplomatic protection. Was that a 
customary law between the host States and home States that if the former 
interfered with the interests of the latter, military intervention or other gross 
consequences should follow? Do such instances and similar ones represent 
customary law or merely actions and interactions grounded in fear, force, poverty, 
and power? Customary interaction anchored in power and fear, however stable or 
widespread and expressive of expectation, is nothing short of the gunman 
situation that has long lost its theoretical and practical grip. Mere reliance on 
stable, widespread expectations among the members of the community of persons 
and the States alike cannot per se justify an obligation under the rubric of a 
customary rule. 
For the formation of customary international law, opinio juris is a 
necessary criterion of validity. The circularity argument can be avoided by a 
theoretical account of opinio juris that both adheres to the general rule of 
recognition of international law requiring the general consent of States for the 
formation of primary rules on a consensual basis and embraces moral evaluations 
by States and non-State actors alike in the formation of customary international 
law. This account will be presented in the next section.  
 
ii. Constitutive Statements of Customary Determination    
The general consent of the participants reflected in opinio juris is required 
to shape a customary rule. The authority of a rule and participants in its 
construction and determination of its content may be described by reference to 
statements of authority. Statements about recognition of an authoritative rule may 
manifest themselves in three forms.
564
 These three statements are issued by the 
participant, the observer, and the jurist. The party affected by the rule issues the 
statement that X has authority because X‘s pronouncements give exclusionary 
reasons to anyone including the participant to act in accordance with those 
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pronouncements and as such to treat X as having authority and his 
pronouncements as authoritative.
565
 The observer issues the statement that X has 
authority without regarding X as having authority over himself but because some 
people treat X as having authority and because the group regard it as a good 
reason.
566
  Finally the jurist issues the statement that X has authority not because 
of regarding X‘s authority over himself nor as a result of reporting  ―other 
people‘s attitudes to X, but rather by way of stating what is the case‖ from the 
participant‘s point of view. This view can be the participant‘s view from a 
professional perspective without affirming or rejecting that there is good 
reason.
567
   
With these distinctions in mind and distinction of practical principles 
earlier discussed, authoritative customary international rules may arise from 
general practice of States and opinio juris without the circularity of opinio juris. 
The analysis of customary international rules in view of the statements of 
authority and practical principles not only explains the element of opinio juris in 
the determination of customary rules in a non-circular manner but also makes 
their determination compatible with the legitimacy criteria of the rule of 
recognition and coherence for the common good. The analysis of  customary 
international rules in light of statements of authority and practical principles also 
elucidates the participation of contingent general principles and the opinions of 
non-State actors including the opinions of international tribunals, academics, 
NGOs, etc. in the formation of customary rules at an evaluative level consistent 
with the criteria of legitimacy. This analysis consists in a formula for the 
formation of customary international law in which customary rule determination 
does not begin with State practice and opinio juris. The determination of the 
substance of customary rule in this formula originates in evaluative judgments 
through practical principles laying moral and political foundations for building 
State practice and opinions.   The determination of the substances of a customary 
rule of international law in this analysis consists of practical, empirical, and 
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juridical judgments about the existence and the extent of State practice and 
opinion.
568
  These judgments are discussed in terms of the non-legal and legal 
stages of formation of customary international law.  
Following Finnis‘ approach, in the formation and recognition of an 
authoritative customary rule of international law, there are, in order, two practical 
judgments and two empirical judgments at the non-legal stage, two practical 
judgments, one empirical judgment, and one jurist judgment at the legal stage. 
Opinio juris addresses practical judgments about a desirable but not yet legal 
pattern of conduct that occur at the non-legal stage, thus opinio juris is not about 
an already existing law.
569
 Two practical judgments of the non-legal stage rescue 
opinio juris from circularity. The first judgment is that in a specific domain of 
States‘ affairs it is desirable to have ―some determinate, common, and stable 
pattern of conduct, and, correspondingly, an authoritative rule requiring that 
pattern of conduct‖570  The second judgment is that it is or would be appropriate 
to have ―this particular pattern of conduct‖ if adopted as an authoritative, common 
rule.
571
 These two practical judgments expressed are not yet legal judgments.
572
 
These practical judgments represent practical principles expressing general and 
particular desirability.
573
  
This layer of the formation of a customary rule does not yet represent legal 
rules. It represents the expression of desirability of the international community as 
a whole for some pattern of conduct in general, on the one hand, and the 
expression of desirability for a particular pattern of conduct, on the other.
574
 The 
assessment of the desirability in the first place would be the common good of the 
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international community as a whole and its members and in the second place the 
interests of States making judgments.
575
 At this stage, the formation of custom is 
linked at the upper level to a communitarian-based element rooted in the common 
good of the members of the international community as a whole. Customary rule 
formation is still incomplete, only with the consensual-based elements is the 
process complete. A customary international rule comes into existence only when 
States subscribe to the desirable general and particular pattern of conduct through 
their widespread practice and opinion. As such, empirical judgments reflecting the 
widespread and general practice and opinion of States are required to complete 
custom formation.
576
 Two empirical judgments at the non-legal stage are 
involved. The formation or non-formation of an international customary rule 
depends on the empirical judgments that ―(i) the practice of many (or few) States, 
in the relevant domain, is convergent in pattern and is of the pattern‖ of the 
particular conduct of the second practical judgment, and (ii) other States do (or do 
not) acquiesce in that pattern of conduct.‖577  
If there is general widespread State practice coupled with opinio juris 
widely accepting the desired pattern of conduct reflected in the practical 
judgments, then there would now emerge two new practical judgments at the legal 
stage. The first one is that the general widespread State practice and widespread 
subscription by way of opinio juris to the pattern of conduct desired in the 
practical judgments of the non-legal stage are sufficient to warrant the judgment 
that there exists an authoritative international customary rule requiring X.
578
 The 
second practical judgment is that X ―is required (or permitted), by virtue of an 
authoritative customary rule of international law,‖ which in turn would allow the 
empirical judgment at the legal stage that ―States generally accept the rule that X 
is to be done (or may be done)‖ as well as the juridical judgment that ―according 
to international law, X is required (or permitted).‖579  
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Diplomatic immunity may serve a good illustration. First, practical 
judgments are made that in the domain of diplomatic relations that it is desirable 
to have some rule to protect diplomats serving in foreign countries. The particular 
conduct of allowing immunity for diplomats is advanced as appropriate for 
adoption by States through practical views or statements by some States reflected 
in their practice or practical views or statements by non-state actors. A large 
number of States accept this conduct through widespread practice and opinio 
juris. The general, widespread practice and subscription of opinio juris to the 
proposed pattern of conduct are sufficient to affirm that there is a binding 
customary rule requiring diplomatic immunity of diplomats in foreign States, 
allowing the statement that States accept that this rule must be observed. What 
follows is the jurist statement that under customary international law the 
diplomatic immunity of diplomats is required.  
As we ascend the layers of structure of custom formation from substance 
to framework rules, it is easier to identify agreement by States. As we descend 
from framework to substantive rules, the empirical demands are higher and more 
difficult to find the agreement of States in practice and opinion. As to the 
substance itself, it is far easier to discover general agreements of States that it is 
desirable or appropriate to have ‗some rule‘ than ‗this particular rule‘ in a specific 
domain.
580
 It is very plausible that States subscribe in practice and opinion that it 
is desirable or appropriate to have some rule in a specific domain, i.e. to basic 
practical principles, but not subscribe in practice and opinion to this particular 
rule, i.e. particular practical principles, proffered before them through practical 
views or statements of States or non-State actors. This should not be used as a 
weakness of customary international law or to discard the required elements for 
the formation and recognition of customary law on the pretext of circularity or the 
empirical difficulty. The determination of customary rules of international law 
with the involvement of practical, empirical, and juridical judgments elucidates a 
number of important factors for the formation and interpretation of customary 
rules of international law including those on foreign investment.  
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First, opinio juris is not paradoxical or circular when evaluative practical 
judgments are considered. Second, the practical judgments expressing general or 
particular desirability for a pattern of conduct are evaluative statements or views 
that do not determine the content of the rule or represent the legal status of the 
rule unless subscribed to by empirical judgments representing widespread State 
practice and opinion to both the general and the particular practical judgments.  
General State practice and opinio juris are required to meet the legitimacy criteria 
of the rule of recognition and coherence for the common good. The subscription 
of States in practice and opinion to a practical judgment expressing a general 
desirability of ‗some rule‘ is not enough to determine a customary rule. 
Customary determinations require subscription of States in practice and opinion to 
a particular practical judgment expressing the desirability of a particular proposed 
rule in a specific domain as well.  
Third, the determination of customary rules of international law embraces 
moral evaluations as well at some foundational level without bypassing the rule of 
recognition.  The practical judgments or views by States and non-State actors at 
the non-legal stage offer proposals as to a desired rule for a specific field of 
activity or relation at an evaluative level of the formation of customary 
international rules. Moral and political evaluative views or reasons advocating a 
conception of justice overwhelm this stage, which may or may not lead to 
adoption by States in their practice and opinions to reach a legal determination for 
the proposed rule.   
Fourth, the participation of non-consensual sources, i.e. contingent 
principles or views by non-State actors, in the formation of customary 
international law takes place through practical judgments at the non-legal stage. 
Contingent principles and views advocating them lack the status of law. These 
principles and views represent practical judgments that may or may not lead to the 
formation of a customary rule depending on the empirical judgments by States 
through their practice and opinions subject to the rule of recognition for the 
determination power. The non-legal stage may involve States or may very well 
involve non-State actors including international tribunals, jurists, NGOs, etc. 
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through practical judgments or views expressing desirability for a particular rule, 
advocating a demand of justice or a general principle of law. In fact, a good deal 
of participation for urging customary rule formation is owed to non-State actors 
that engage in practical judgments at the non-legal stage, calling for a new pattern 
of conduct or the change of an existing one on the part of States. These non-State 
actors alone or together with some States may act in pushing States to act by 
raising moral dimensions or considerations surrounding a desired pattern of 
conduct to follow or an undesirable pattern of conduct to cease. Oftentimes the 
share of non-State and sub-State actors is much greater than States themselves at 
the non-legal stage. They play a significant role in urging States to act in a 
particular way. Thus, the normative value of the non-legal stage is significant. At 
this stage, proposed rules are offered to States through practical judgments of 
State and non-State actors that a sphere of affairs requires some rule in general 
and in particular. The emergence of the rule as an authoritative rule still needs the 
adoption by States of the particular desired rule proposed by the practical views of 
States or of non-State and sub-State actors. The subsidiary sources of international 
law are not limited to views of international tribunals or academics but embody 
any other sources expressing moral and political evaluative views advocating a 
demand of justice including NGOs voicing for human beings or matters of 
concern for human beings such as environment and climate, natural resource, 
economic development, safety, health, and so forth.  In many instances, public 
opinion and non-State actors like NGOs have much greater weight in reshaping 
the conduct of States than jurists do.  
Fifth, the juridical judgment as to the existence of a customary rule of 
international law can only occur subsequent to the due establishment of the rule 
through State practice and opinio juris in order to meet the legitimacy criteria of 
recognition and coherence for the common good. A juridical statement expressing 
the authority of a customary rule of international law figures in the determination 
of the rule for a particular situation with an appropriate consideration of all 
demands of justice in a moral and political evaluation by way of State practice 
and opinion, subscribing to a practical judgment. In order to declare the existence 
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of a customary rule, the decisions of international tribunals must demonstrate the 
establishment of State practice and opinio juris. The statements of academics and 
international tribunals about the existence of a rule, which are not grounded in a 
customary determination by general State practice and opinion, merely represent 
their own practical views at the non-legal stage for a desirability proposed for 
adopting or changing a particular rule. Still, the emergence of a customary rule 
depends on the establishment of State practice and opinio juris to validate the 
juridical statement that there exists an authoritative (binding) customary rule.  
The difficulty in establishing an international customary rule leads to 
rejection of many purported rules attributed to customary international law 
because: 
Today … the world‘s nations do not share a common heritage, and 
international 1aw seeks to govern matters on which even nations 
with a European heritage have no common outlook. In addition, it 
is notoriously easier to disprove a consensus than to prove one. As 
empirical difficulties mount, that point becomes more pronounced. 
Looking at a few accessible jurisdictions may be sufficient to show 
a lack of consensus, but looking at a large number of jurisdictions 
that share common practices may not even be enough to show 
consensus.
581
 
 
If customary international law is, oftentimes in hard indeterminacies, stretched 
unduly to cover areas where general and widespread State practice and opinio 
juris are missing, it is not the defect of customary international law but the defect 
in its interpretation. What is unjustified is the attempt to rationalize rules that do 
not conform to the criteria of legitimacy for the determination of the content of 
obligations of States whether under treaties or custom. A criticism of customary 
international law that many alleged customary rules fail to show the required 
elements of State practice and opinio juris in essence cannot be attributed to 
customary international law because the purported rules are not customary rules 
of international law at all. They are practical views. The difficulty in establishing 
an international customary rule does not affect the foundation of customary 
international law. It rather exhibits the fact that not all practical views expressing 
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desirability for a proposed particular legal situation in hard penumbra may find 
their way in customary determinations.  
Customary international law endures as a vital source of international law 
in the construction and interpretation of the obligations of States in a consensual 
framework with evaluative moral layers, providing practices and principles for the 
lawmaking structure in international law and supplying authoritative 
determinations for the substance of obligations of States in hard penumbra. A 
consensual framework of the construction of obligations of States is still bound to 
the common good of human beings. There are significant caveats of common 
good restricting the consent of States. The practices building the international rule 
of recognition are open to common good justifications. The freedom of States‘ 
action is also subject to limitations in frameworks other than consent, notably 
limitations by virtue of absolute principles and particular recognition of a 
constitutional approach to rights in a particular field such as human rights. 
The difficulty in establishing customary international law should not be a 
pretext for an adjudicative determination of the content of international rules and 
obligations in hard penumbra. Such determination requires particular recognition 
or authorization. When hard indeterminacy arises, by virtue of the international 
rule of recognition requiring formation of primary rules of obligations in a 
consensual framework, a customary determination is required to make the content 
of the rule coherent for the common good.  
Determinacy of the substance of obligations of States in the field of 
foreign investment including the concept of expropriation is structured by the 
criteria of legitimacy of recognition and coherence for the common good. 
Arbitration of States obligations in hard penumbra under international law in 
foreign investment is bound to adherence to these criteria. This and previous 
chapters have presented the contingent character of principles for the formation of 
primary obligations of States and the consensual character for their determination 
in view of the criteria of coherence and recognition. These bases discipline rule 
formation in international law on foreign investment for the protection of foreign 
investors‘ property and ultimately the concept of expropriation to analyze the 
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legal determination for the conduct and consequence in instantiation of that 
concept in terms of legitimacy. The next chapter will assess the contingent and 
consensual character of rights of corporations and corresponding obligations of 
States in protection of foreign investors‘ property in international law and whether 
in this field a particular rule of recognition or authorization exists for departing 
from the general international rule of recognition requiring customary 
determinations in hard penumbra.    
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CHAPTER IV                                                                                                                         
PROTECTION OF PROPERTY OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The obligations of States for interference with foreign investors‘ property 
in international law whether arising from customary rules or treaty obligations in 
hard indeterminacies are required to be interpreted by adherence to the legitimacy 
criteria of recognition and coherence for the common good. The previous chapters 
displayed that indeterminate international rules and obligations arising in legal 
interpretation are devoid of authoritative force as to the particular penumbral 
instance. In areas of indeterminacy, because of the contingency of rights and 
principles involved, the determination of the content of States‘ obligations in an 
evaluative and selective exercise with appropriate consideration of all demands of 
justice is required to meet coherence for the common good. It was also shown that 
the power to engage in such determination must be validated by the rule of 
recognition of the system and that according to the general rule of recognition of 
international law, the determination function with moral and political evaluation is 
reserved to States in the consensual customary framework. Accordingly, the 
general rule of recognition of international law invalidates the adjudicatory 
determination of the content of States‘ obligations in hard penumbra. An 
adjudicatory determination power must be established by a particular 
authorization, e.g. decision ex aequo et bono, delegated by States to an 
international adjudicator. Otherwise, it requires the establishment of a particular 
rule of recognition in a field of international law to demonstrate consistent 
practices with the justification of the advancement of common good for a 
constitutional scheme of construction of rights in interpretation of indeterminate 
obligations in international law.  
Constitutional construction of rights entails the treatment of abstract rights 
and principles appearing in international instruments on human rights and the 
concomitant obligations of States as a matter of principle laying limitations on 
States in favor of human beings by an adjudicative body or any other decision 
maker. A rule of recognition validating a constitutional construction of rights of 
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individual human beings, including their property rights as well as civil rights, 
appearing in international instruments on human rights may now be observable in 
the field of human rights in view of both practices and the common good.  This 
chapter will examine the nature of rights of corporations and their construction 
according to the rule of international law. This examination will be in view of 
practices and the test of the common good for the desirability of a particular rule 
of recognition in the field of foreign investment for a constitutional construction 
of the rights of corporations and concomitant obligations of States in international 
law.  A thorough assessment of practices showing a particular rule of recognition 
in the field of human rights is beyond the purpose of this study. However, 
references will be made to the field of human rights in juxtaposing the nature of 
rights and their construction for individual human beings in contrast with those of 
property rights of corporations on the international plane in the field of foreign 
investment.    
    
A. Coherence and Contingent Nature of Rights of Corporations  
Substantive rights and principles expressing them may be absolute in 
character thereby even constituting a supreme source of international law that 
other sources may not override. As discussed such substantive absolute rights and 
principles are not numerous. Most of rights and principles are contingent in 
character. It is now to examine more closely the nature of the property rights of 
corporations in foreign investment. This raises the questions of the international 
minimum standard of treatment, acquired or vested rights, and property rights as 
human rights.   
 
i. The International Minimum Standard of Treatment     
The nineteenth century marks the era where the call for an international 
standard for the treatment of aliens in customary international law heightened. 
The desire for this standard emerged in response to developments in 
transportation and communication together with the phenomenon of 
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industrialization and the increase in cross-border movement of persons and 
capital.
582
 From the inception, foreign property was an important dimension of the 
standard. The standard involved a conflict between the interests of States 
exporting and importing capital.
583
 The question of expropriation of foreign 
property attracted much controversy over the minimum treatment of property 
acquired by aliens in foreign countries.
584
 The international minimum standard of 
treatment of foreign property assumes the recognition of certain property rights 
upon the admission of foreign property.
585
 The principal question is what those 
rights and corresponding obligations of States are in international law.  
A general international minimum standard of treatment emerged in 
competition to a demand of justice emphasizing on the national standard—also 
referred to as equality doctrine.
586
  According to the equality doctrine in 
substantive terms, a State‘s international obligation towards the treatment of 
aliens and their property is fulfilled once aliens receive treatment equal to that 
accorded to the nationals of the host State.
587
 A version of the national standard 
most closely adhering to the equality doctrine and popularly followed in Latin 
American countries emerged under the Calvo Doctrine.
588
 This doctrine was 
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 Andreas Hans Roth The Minimum Standard of International Law Applied to Aliens (Leiden: A. 
W. Sijthoff‘s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., 1949) at 30.  
583
 Brownlie, Principles, supra note 424, at 500.  
584
 Richard B. Lillich, ―The Current Status of the Law of the State Responsibility for Injuries to 
Aliens‖ in  Richard B.Lillich, ed., International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983) at 3; See also Alwyn V. Freeman, The 
International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 
1938)  at 515; Borchard noted that  ―[i]n recent years the question whether the protection of 
private property against confiscation is included within minimum standard has given rise to much 
debate.‖  Edwin M. Borchard ―The Minimum Standard of Treatment of Aliens‖ (1940) 38:4 Mich. 
L. Rev. 445, at 458-459. [Borchard, Minimum Standard]   
585
Roth, supra note 582, at 47, 165-166; Freeman, supra note 584, at 516. 
586
 The national standard discussed here is a notion in customary international law meaning that 
aliens and their property are entitled to no more favorable treatment than the treatment that the 
nationals of the host-States receive. This notion of the national standard is different from the 
treaty-based national treatment standard that refers to the treatment of investors no less than the 
treatment accorded to the nationals of the host-State. 
587
 Roth, supra note 582, at 62. This also meant that the home State of the foreigner had no right to 
intervene by way of diplomatic protection in the claim of its subject against the host State unless 
there was a denial of justice. Ibid. at 64; Lillich, supra note 584, at 4. To Latin American countries 
denial of justice meant failure to provide access to courts. Freeman, supra note 584, at 97; 
Borchard, Minimum Standard, supra note 584, at 456-457. 
588
 The Calvo doctrine rejected the duty of a State to accord treatment to aliens beyond that offered 
to nationals, subjecting them to national laws and tribunals as well as rejecting the diplomatic 
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deemed defective on the ground that it prompted non-responsibility in 
international law.
589
  
Prior to the advent of the international minimum standard of treatment, the 
national standard dominated the treatment of aliens.
590
 The national standard 
constituted the dominant standard in the mutual relations among European States 
while these States in their overseas relations demanded an international minimum 
standard of treatment.
591
 The international minimum standard of treatment has 
confronted adverse reactions in State practice. These reactions are reflected in 
conferences and debates for the codification of State responsibility for injuries to 
aliens and their property in the League of Nations in 1930 and later by the 
International Law Commission as well as practices surrounding the UN General 
Assembly Resolutions dealing with economic sovereignty of States.
592
 Developed 
States have also reacted to a general minimum standard of treatment of foreign 
investment more conspicuously in post-NAFTA practice.
593
  
                                                                                                                                     
protection. See Roth, supra note 582 at 76; Lillich, supra note 584, at 4; Samuel K.B Asante 
―International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal‖ (1988) 37 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 588,  at 
591-592. 
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 Lillich , supra note 584, at 5; Freeman, supra note 584,.at 505-506. 
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 See Freeman, ibid. at 501. See also Roth, supra note 582, at 63-68.  
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 Roth, supra note 582 at 64. For support for the national standard by those countries opposing to 
capitulations in their relations with western countries, see ibid. at 63-64. For cases that supported 
the national standard, see ibid. at 66-68. 
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 Preliminary Documents of the Conference for the Codification of International Law, The 
Hague, March-April 1930, (1930-Suppl.) 24 A J. Int‘l L 1; Fourth Report of the International Law 
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of Aliens, by F. V. Garcia Amador, Special Rapporteur, 16 February, 1959, Document 
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Report on State Responsibility];  Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources GA Res. 1803 
(XXVII), U.N. GAOR,   U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962), 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963); Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources, GA Res. 3171 (XXVIII), UN GAOR, UN Doc. A/9030 , Supp. No. 30 
(1973), 13 I.L.M. 238; Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
GA Res. 3201 (S-VI), UN GAOR, UN Doc. A/9559, Supp. No. 1 (1974), 13 I.L.M. 715; and the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281 (XXIX), UN GAOR, UN Doc. 
A/9631, Supp. No. 31 (1974), 14 I.L.M. 251. 
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 In the post-NAFTA practice the national standard is reflected in the US Bipartisan Trade 
Promotion Authority Act of 2002: ―the principal negotiating objectives of the United States 
regarding foreign investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to 
foreign investment, while ensuring that foreign investors in the United States are not accorded 
greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than United States investors in the 
United States, and to secure for investors important rights comparable to those that would be 
available under United States legal principles and practice, …‖ The Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
Authority Act in 2002 (the ―2002 TPA‖) enacted by the U.S. Congress (19 U.S.C.S. § 3801), 
section 2102(b) (3).  See also changes in the investment treaty practice in the post-NAFTA era, 
infra notes 676-682and accompanying text. 
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If the national standard is assumed as pure equality of nationals and aliens 
in disregard of what international law has determined as an obligation for States, 
this will repudiate the competence of international law to lay down minimum 
requirements for States in treatment of aliens and their property. The most 
troublesome aspect of the international minimum standard of treatment, however, 
has been its infusion with a general standard of justice. The standard was 
advanced on the assumption of a common standard for the treatment of aliens 
recognized by civilized nations.
594
 This attachment to civilized nations also 
projected the standard as a ―standard of civilized justice or civilization.‖595 
Conceptualization of the minimum standard of the treatment of aliens in terms of 
the standard of justice appears in the passage that  
There is a standard of justice, very simple, very fundamental, and 
of such general acceptance by all civilized countries as to form a 
part of the international law of the world. The condition upon 
which any country is entitled to measure the justice due from it to 
an alien by the justice which it accords to its own citizens is that its 
system of law and administration shall conform to this general 
standard.
596
  
  
This association of justice with a general minimum standard of treatment carries 
infinite substantive consequences capable of finding any conduct by a State as an 
international wrong. A corollary of this transpires in attempts to underlie a test for 
the application of the standard rather than underscoring the specific rules 
articulating those tests and the standard itself in contingent situations although the 
cases pronouncing these tests may have actually relied on specific rules and 
obligations for responsibility of States or actually concerned human beings. An 
early pronouncement of a test for the minimum standard appeared in the decision 
by the US-Mexican Claims Commission in the Neer case:  
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 Roth, supra note 582, at 87; Borchard, Minimum Standard, supra note 582, at 448-449. 
595
Roth, supra note 582, at 81.   
596
 Elihu Root ―The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad‖ (1910) 4:3 Am. J. Int‘l L. 
517, at 521-522.  Another example of infusing the minimum standard of treatment with the 
standard of justice appears in the statement by the US Secretary Hull in 1938 that ―when aliens are 
admitted into a country the country is obligated to accord the degree of protection of life and 
property consistent with the standards of justice recognized by the law of nations.‖ Note by the 
Secretary of State of the United States to the Mexican Ambassador at Washington (August, 22, 
1938) reprinted in (1938) 32 Am. J. Int‘l L. Supp. 191, at 198. 
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[T]he treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international 
delinquency should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful 
neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so 
far short of international standards that every reasonable and 
impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.
597
 
 
This standard has been raised in the context of investment treaties in the 
interpretation of the treaty obligation of fair and equitable treatment in tying the 
content of this obligation to the minimum standard of treatment under customary 
international law.
598
 Ironically, developed States resorted to this standard in 
opposition to an autonomous, expansive reading of their obligation of according 
fair and equitable treatment under investment treaties.
599
  The expansive approach 
has equally relied on general principles or notions such as good faith, legitimate 
expectation, or transparency in interpreting the fair and equitable treatment of 
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 For the autonomous reading of the treaty obligation of fair and equitable treatment in isolation 
from or parallel with general principles such as good faith or notions like transparency and 
legitimate expectation, see, for instance: CME v. Czech Republic, Case T 8735-01, (Sept. 13, 
2001) at paras. 156, 611 available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2001PartialAward.pdf; 
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Merits of Phase 2, supra note 598, at paras. 111-118.  
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foreign investment in international law evocative of a general standard of justice 
under minimum standard of treatment.
600
 
  The standard of justice still was not utilized to avail the injured aliens of 
redress for the justice denied to them by the host-States but to remedy the injured 
nation. A core aspect of the standard of treatment for injuries to aliens was the 
national character of the claim. The national character was rooted in the view 
espoused by Vattel, the founder of the international minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens, that ―[w]hoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State 
….‖601 The injured national did not control the claim as the home State could 
settle, compromise, release, or abandon the claim.
602
 Furthermore, the indemnity 
received by the home State belonged to the national fund.
 603
 There was no legal 
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206 
 
right for the injured national to receive the indemnity.
604
 This aspect of the 
standard divested aliens of the remedial aspects of the standard on a legal basis for 
the injury they had suffered. 
From one angle, adverse reactions to the minimum standard were a 
sustained opposition to the power system of the colonization era combined with 
bitter experiences of claims and interventions, demanding participation of States 
of non-Western traditions in the rule formation processes in international law.
605
 
From another angle, adverse reactions to the international minimum standard for 
the protection of property in foreign investment have been a corollary of the 
indeterminacy of purported rules and obligations that, while at times leading to 
the extreme of the equality doctrine, often carried a demand by the States for the 
establishment of specific determinate rules imposing obligations on them. Both of 
these demands are justified in terms of legitimacy. The latter demand poses 
disagreement over what the obligations of the States are to challenge the conduct 
of States and consequences for it in the field of foreign investment. The question 
of existence of obligations in international law is essentially distinct from the 
ability of States to disobey existing international obligations and evade 
international responsibility by invoking their national laws and their treatment of 
nationals.  
The syndrome of vagary of the international minimum standard in foreign 
investment is anchored in an assumption that the minimum standard than 
international rules can afford the bases of obligations of States. One approach 
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could be to suppose the standard ―is concerned with … the establishment of a 
somewhat indefinite standard of treatment‖ whose violation by a State engages its 
responsibility in international law.
606
 However, the content of the standard is 
acknowledged to be ―vague, deceiving and confused properly calculated to 
produce error, for it pretends to express a conception which is reality seldom if 
ever exits.‖607 Other scholars have also viewed that the international standard of 
justice ―has always suffered from a fundamental defect: its obvious vagueness and 
imprecision.‖608  
This vagary of content is associated with a general standard of justice with 
infinite substantive consequences to challenge any conduct by a State as an 
international wrong. The appreciation of the international minimum standard of 
treatment standard in foreign investment still is not, nor is justified to deem it, 
independent of specific rules providing the minimum requirements established in 
international law for the treatment of the foreign investors‘ property. As an 
advocate of the international minimum standard of treatment once put ―… the 
international standard is nothing else than a set of rules, correlated to each other 
and deriving from one particular norm of general international law, namely that 
the treatment of alien is regulated by the law of nations.‖609 The minimum 
standard of treatment obtains its content from specific rules of international law. 
This aspect of the standard has now been explicitly supported by the United 
States, a long time proponent of protection of property of foreign investors, in 
reaction to general principles and standards in interpretation of treaty obligations, 
thereby rejecting the idea of international responsibility based on general 
principles and standards.
610
 The core tenet of international minimum standard is 
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―have crystallized into customary international law in specific concepts.‖ The term ―fair and 
equitable treatment‖ refers to ―the customary international law minimum standard of treatment‖ 
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that States may not avoid international responsibility for injuries to aliens in all 
circumstances by treating aliens and nationals equally, which is distinct from its 
content and mode of application.
611
  
The value and status of the international minimum standard of treatment in 
international law has been obscured by the generality ascribed to it. The national 
standard is not and cannot be assumed to import a notion of equality doctrine 
repudiating the competency of international law in providing minimums for the 
State conduct, which is the core of the international minimum standard of 
treatment. Such an assumption is not even attributable to all supporters of the 
national standard.
612
 The international minimum standard of treatment itself is a 
standard of competency of international law demanding compliance by States 
with minimums determined in international law for the treatment of alien 
property.  The international minimum standard of treatment expresses the 
competency of international law to provide minimums without determining their 
substance per se. The standard leaves each minimum for each specific situation of 
particularly hard indeterminacy in foreign investment to determination within 
specific rules. Rules concerning denial of justice, expropriation, full protection 
                                                                                                                                     
which encompasses rules such as ―those for denial of justice, expropriation and other acts subject 
to an absolute, minimum standard of treatment under customary international law. … The 
pertinent rules of the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens, 
according to the Respondent, are ―specific ones that address particular contexts. There is no single 
standard applicable to all contexts.‖ Ibid. at para. 110.  [Footnotes Omitted]. Elsewhere, in 
reaction to claims of a general obligation for legitimate expectations of investors or a predictable 
and transparent legal framework for investment or refraining from arbitrary conduct, the United 
States declared that none of these constitutes a general, stand-alone customary rule of international 
law.  See the response by the United States in the Glamis Gold Ltd. v. the United States of 
America, May 16, 2009, paras. 575-582, 589-597, available online at 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_us_glamis.htm. The United States declared that the 
existence of no customary rule has been demonstrated to require ―States to regulate in such a 
manner—or refrain from regulating—so as to avoid upsetting foreign investors‘ settled 
expectations with respect to their investments.‖ Ibid. at para. 575. The United States also stated 
that ―[i]mperfect legislation or regulation, however, does not give rise to State responsibility under 
customary international law‖ and that ―[u]nder international law, every State is free to ‗change its 
regulatory policy,‘ and every State ‗has a wide discretion with respect to how it carries out such 
policies by regulation and administrative conduct.‘‖ Ibid. at 591. The United States and Canada 
have also changed their model investment treaties in response to claims of violations of their treaty 
obligations that are sources of hard indeterminacies. See infra notes 676-677 and accompanying 
text. 
611
 Brownlie, Principles, supra note 424, at 503.  
612
 (―[T]hose supporting the national treatment principle are not necessarily committed, as is 
sometimes suggested, to the view that the municipal law has supremacy over international 
law….‖) Brownlie, Principles, supra note 424, at 503. 
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and security and the like in international law on foreign investment represent one 
level of the specification process of minimums for specific situations. Further 
levels of the rule specification include the determination of the content of each 
rule for such-and-such conduct and such-and-such consequences in hard 
indeterminacies. The requirement of determination is not merely consistent with 
the status of the international minimum standard of treatment as a standard of 
competency of international law. Determination of the content of the rule is more 
importantly the requirement of the legitimacy criterion of coherence for the 
common good, which as a moral and political evaluation task is subject the rule of 
recognition of international law.  
The international minimum standard of treatment originally concerned the 
personal security of aliens to safeguard aliens‘ enjoyment of life, and liberty 
against States‘ arbitrary acts.613 In fact, the Neer case that gave rise to the 
landmark pronouncement on the application of the minimum standard of 
treatment concerned the personal security of aliens as opposed to the protection of 
foreign property.
614
 This original association of person and property is a source 
for a great deal of confusion for an unfounded combination of the dignity of 
human beings with the property of corporations in the discourse of the standard of 
justice whose weight for human beings and corporations cannot run on equal 
footing in common good.
615
 A general substantive standard or principle for the 
treatment of corporations in international law begs fundamental questions of 
legitimacy right from the standpoint of justice itself for rule coherence and 
recognition required by the common good. A general minimum standard, as other 
contingent principles, under lofty appellations of justice, fairness and equity will 
not meet the legitimacy requirements of recognition and coherence for the 
common good in international law for the protection of the property of 
corporations. Resort to a general principle with an undetermined content to 
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measure international responsibility for States‘ conduct and its consequences in 
the protection of foreign corporations has always bred acute confrontation of 
justice. Clashes of justice demands in the field of foreign investment have 
concerned the political and territorial integrity of nations on a gunboat policy, or 
their economic development prosperity on an inequitable compensation scheme, 
or their constitutional viability for legitimate regulation on an approach oscillating 
between relinquishing regulation and shrinking public wealth through payment of 
compensation for regulation. This leads the study to examine another attempt for a 
general principle in the notion of acquired or vested rights for the protection of 
property rights of corporations in international law and its weight in light of the 
legitimacy requirements of coherence and recognition.  
ii. Vested or Acquired Property Rights  
For the protection of property in international law, ‗vested rights‘ or 
acquired rights‘ are familiar terms. What has been sought of principles expressing 
these notions is that a State may not extinguish the property rights legally 
acquired by foreigners under its existing laws.
616
 In 1959, the ILC Report on State 
Responsibility, which at the time attempted to address primary rules of 
obligations of States towards aliens in its codification agenda, viewed that States 
have an obligation under international law to respect acquired rights of aliens.
617
 
The notion/principle of vested or acquired rights itself depending on the 
standard of justice, fairness and equity is the ancestor of a series of other 
principles advanced for the property protection of corporations in foreign 
investment.  From this principle, estoppel, good faith, pacta sunt servanda, 
legitimate expectation, proportionality, and full compensation among other 
notions have proceeded in the interpretation of expropriation in investment 
arbitration under State contracts or treaties to measure the responsibility of States 
for arbitrary, unjust, or unfair conduct in interfering with the property of foreign 
                                                 
616
 See S. Friedman, Expropriation in International Law (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1953) 
at 122. For writers supporting acquired rights in a notion that ―[w]hilst a State is free to modify the 
position of foreigners with respect to future, a State is forbidden to destroy rights already acquired 
under pre-existing legislation,‖ see Ibid. at 122, n. 44.  
617
 1959 ILC Report on State Responsibility, supra note 592, at p. 5, para. 15.  
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corporations and the consequences for such conduct.
618
 Likewise, general 
principles or notions such as good faith, legitimate expectation, or transparency in 
interpreting the fair and equitable treatment of foreign investment in international 
law have surfaced in investment treaty arbitration.
619
 Similarly, an autonomous 
version of fair and equitable treatment has been advanced to measure the conduct 
of States in treatment of foreign investment. The autonomous approach employs  
semantically less stringent tests such as what is unfair or inequitable than what is 
‗surprising‘ or ‗shocking‘ or ‗outrageous‘ or ‗egregious‘ or ‗patently or grossly or 
manifestly unfair or unjust‘ or ‗in gross denial of justice‘ or ‗manifestly arbitrary‘  
or other equally question-begging tests in the field of substantive rights of 
corporations in foreign investment.
620
 This has also involved the attribution of a 
customary origin to such principles, standards and tests.
621
   
                                                 
618
 The arbitral cases involving hard indeterminacies of expropriation will be addressed in Chapter 
V.  
619
  See for supra note 600. The notion of contingency of standards and principles articulated in 
this study should not be confused with the non-contingent character of the fair and equitable 
treatment in another notion. The non-contingency attribute of fair and equitable standard has been 
raised in contrast to national treatment or most-favored nation standards whose contents are 
ascertained by reference to the national law of the host State or its treaties with other countries. 
See Stephen Vasciannie ―The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment 
Law and Practice‖ (1999) 70 Brit. Y.B. Int‘l L. 103, at 106.  
620
  For the autonomous reading of the obligation of fair and equitable treatment see, supra note 
599.  The ‗shocking‘, ‗outrageous‘, ‗bad faith,‘ ‗outrageous‘ or ‗egregious‘ or ‗patently or grossly 
or manifestly unfair or unjust‘ or ‗in gross denial of justice‘ or ‗manifestly arbitrary‘ and similar 
terms of the so-called ‗high threshold‘ are anchored in the Neer case thought to be somewhat 
relaxed by the ELSI case.   Arbitrariness, shocking, grossly unfair and the like in international law 
have their affinity with  procedures in the administrative and judicial proceedings under the denial 
of justice rule, which includes the element of exhaustion of local remedies, for the due process and 
operation of the rule of law. Such tests in both Neer and ELSI cases were raised in relation to the 
rule of denial of justice in the judicial and administrative proceedings.  For Neer and ELSI cases, 
see supra note 597 and accompanying text.  For the content of the fair and equitable treatment 
under the minimum standard of treatment, since 2004 the United States has clarified in its 
investment treaties that ―[f]or greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international 
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded 
to covered investments. The concepts of ―fair and equitable treatment‖ and ―full protection and 
security‖ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, 
and do not create additional substantive rights.  The obligation in paragraph 1 to provide: (a) ―fair 
and equitable treatment‖ includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or 
administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied 
in the principal legal systems of the world….‖ The United States Model Treaty of 2004 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Article 5, [U.S. 2004 
Model BIT], available online at http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/38710.pdf.   
621
  In accommodating the autonomous approach of fair and equitable treatment to post-award 
NAFTA FTC interpretation requiring reference to customary international law, the Pope & Talbot 
Tribunal posited that bilateral investment treaties existing in thousands evidence fairness elements 
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Despite all their variations, general principles and standards advanced for 
the protection of corporations in foreign investment aim to perpetuate the legal 
framework standing at the time of the acquisition of property or the establishment 
of investment in the territory of the host State to challenge States‘ power to 
introduce or change laws and policies altering that framework. The grand 
principle of acquired or vested rights has never received a credit to this effect. 
Neither do its offspring. The principle of acquired rights has been used ―in an 
improvident way in the past as a rather vague doctrinal obstacle to any act 
affecting the interests of aliens, in spite of the fact that the domestic legal systems 
of the capital-exporting States did not apply such a general principle.‖622 The 
Preparatory Committee of the League of Nations for the Codification of 
International Law on State Responsibility for Damages Caused in Their Territory 
to the Person or Property of Foreigners observed controversies among States in 
their response to the question whether a State is responsible for legislation that 
infringes vested rights.
623
 There is little doubt that the background of such 
controversies also impeded the realization of the project of International Law 
Commission in codifying State responsibility for injuries to aliens and their 
property, pushing the ILC to shift its work from defining the obligations of States 
to ―secondary rules‖ of responsibility.624 The final product by the ILC culminating 
                                                                                                                                     
in addition to customary international law evolving the Neer test and that this notion is now itself a 
customary international law, rejecting Canada‘s assertion that the standard is the test set by the 
Neer case.  Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award on Damages (May 31, 2002) at paras. 61-62, 
available online at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada_pope.htm. 
622
 Ian Brownlie, Legal Status, supra note 445, at 270. See also Freidman, supra note 616, at 123 
referring to the practice of the United States with regard to the ―effects of the prohibition laws in 
the United States, which destroyed investments valued at millions of dollars‖ as well as other 
practices including ―the upheavals brought about in England and elsewhere by death duties, town 
planning, and the redistribution of land.‖ Ibid.  
623
 Preliminary Documents of the Conference for the Codification of International Law, supra note 
592, at 50. Among the responses were doubts as to the meaning of vested rights as well as 
responses by some States that it was impossible to provide a general answer to that   question. 
Ibid.  
624
 For such a shift in the program of ILC on State responsibility see Daniel Bodansky and John R. 
Crook, Symposium, ―The ILC‘s State Responsibility Articles: Introduction and Overview‖ (2002) 
96 Am. J. Int'l L. 773, at 777-779. The distinction between ―primary rules‖ and ―secondary rules‖ 
was first made by Roberto Ago, the second Rapporteur of ILC, obviously to dissociate the ILC 
work from injury to aliens that under that distinction were considered to be the ―primary rules‖ not 
able to be determined by the ILC work. See Ibid.  
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in a draft Articles on State Responsibility in 2001 leaves it open what constitutes 
primary rules and obligations of States.
625
  
The 1959 ILC report itself gave an important caveat with regard to 
acquired rights that  
[T]he principle of respect for acquired rights does not imply an 
absolute or unconditional obligation. The idea of ‗respect‘ in no 
way corresponds to that of ‗inviolability‘. … And the protection 
extended to patrimonial rights is—if such a term may properly be 
used—particularly ‗relative‘. In fact, from the point of view of 
international law, respect for acquired rights is conditional upon 
the subordinate to the paramount needs and general interests of the 
State. This is not solely due to the fact that ‗in principle, the 
property rights and the contractual rights of individuals depend in 
every State on municipal law . . .‘  It is also, and indeed primarily, 
due to the fact that, according to a fundamental legal precept, 
private interests and rights, regardless of their nature and origin or 
of the nationality of the persons concerned, must yield before the 
interests and rights of the community. International law cannot 
ignore this universal precept.
626
 
 
Criticisms have continued to be leveled against the principle of acquired 
rights or similar principles. For instance, Ian Brownlie observes that ―[t]he 
principle of acquired rights is thought by many to be unfortunately vague, and the 
difficulty is to relate this principle to other principles of law: in short this and 
other general principles [unjust enrichment, abuse of rights] beg too many 
questions.‖627 Acquired rights are protected in international law but that alone 
cannot determine the scope of protection. A general principle of acquired rights 
for the protection of the property of corporations in foreign investment suffers 
from the same syndrome as its peers do in the deficit of adherence to the 
                                                 
625
 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Adopted by the 
International Law Commission at its Fifty-Third Session (2001) official Records of the General 
Assembly, Fifty-Sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), Chap. IV.E.1).  
626
 1959 ILC Report, supra note 592, at p. 5, para. 15.   
627
 Brownlie, Principles, supra note 424, at 510, [clarification added]. Brownlie identifies the 
concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as ―a counterpart to the concept of 
acquired rights.‖ Brownlie, Legal Status, supra note 445, at 270.  See also Friedman, supra note 
616, at 120-126. (―The Concept of acquired rights is obscure, ambiguous and indefinable. It finds 
no support in international judicial decisions and was practically repudiated by States during the 
preparatory work for the Codification Conference and cannot, therefore, be raised to the dignity of 
a principle of international law.‖) Ibid. at 126.  
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requirements of legitimacy for recognition and coherence for the common good. 
This deficit of legitimacy also invalidates a purposive approach to the protection 
of property rights of corporations in international law narrowing the purpose of 
investment treaties on semantic terms to encouragement and protection of 
investment without considering other purposes and demands of justice in hard 
indeterminacies to predicate the general principles in favor of their property 
protection. The problem of purpose and object is far deeper than these issues. The 
lack of justification to base the interpretation and identification of the content of 
States‘ obligations in foreign investment on the purpose of investment protection 
and promotion lies in a more fundamental problem. To resort to such a purpose in 
the interpretation of States‘ obligations in foreign investment is unjustified 
because it would bypass the legitimacy criteria required to engage in the 
evaluation of competing purposes, aims, or objects and the underlying demands of 
justice that precede the formation of the authority of the rule or obligation for the 
particular hard indeterminate instance. 
 The theoretical explanation in legitimacy terms is what earlier discussed 
in detail about the contingency of most rights and principles and the justice 
demands surrounding legal determination in areas of indeterminacies of the law 
requiring coherence for the common good by a body validated by the rule of 
recognition of the system.  Our classification of contingency to which most rights 
and principles, no matter of national or international pedigree, belong without 
expressing the statement of the law now assists in characterizing the substantive 
rights of corporations arising from customary law or treaties as contingent.  
The legitimacy requirements of the recognition and coherence for the 
common good dismiss the scheme of assuming principles of having a binding 
force for all situations, which in effect masks the creative function of adjudicators 
relying on such principles. Not only would States have little space for legislative 
power  and regulation of the economic activities of foreign investors conferred to 
States by international law under self-determination if every conduct of States 
could be challenged as a matter of principle in indeterminate treaty and customary 
obligations than an internationally determined rule. But also it would frustrate the 
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legitimacy requirement of coherence for the common good if in interpretation of 
indeterminate obligations of States contingent principles expressing the interests 
of corporations were deemed lex lata and those expressing the interests of States 
deemed lex ferenda. This way of rationalizing a decision in favor of the former 
against the latter interests would foreclose a chance for the competing demands of 
justice to be appropriately considered.  
Being contingent in the legal discourse of foreign investment, the property 
rights of corporations and principles expressing them do not state the law but are 
subject to evaluation of justice and policies to determine the scope of the rights of 
corporations and obligations of States where their justice demands collide in hard 
instances. In foreign investment, the substantive principles that  ‗the destruction of 
property rights is forbidden‘, i.e. principle of acquired rights, ‗breach of a promise 
is forbidden‘, i.e. the principle of good faith or pacta sunt servanda, ‗acting 
contrary to what has created reliance for others is forbidden‘, i.e. legitimate 
expectation or estoppel, and the like are all contingent. They are contingent on 
rule specification and determination as to what constitutes a conduct against good 
faith or reasonable expectation and the appropriate consequence for it in each hard 
penumbral situation all depending on evaluation of demands of justice and other 
elements of the common good by the recognized agent to make legal 
determination in an evaluative exercise.   
Because of the contingency of the rights of corporations in international 
law and principles expressing them, being subject to the legitimacy criteria of 
recognition and coherence for the common good, there is no monolithic legal 
principle to describe expropriation or its consequences in a single rule applicable 
across factual situations in hard indeterminacies. Legitimacy requires 
determination to make the content of the rule coherent for such and such conduct 
and consequences in hard penumbral cases by reference to common good and 
reference to customary determination in adherence to the rule of recognition of 
international law validating States as the rule-makers with power to make justice 
evaluation in this field on a consensual basis.  
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Ordinary instances of expropriation may follow a similar legal solution. 
Nonetheless, when penumbral hard cases arise— as in economic development 
reforms or regulation in the public interest— the question whether the conduct 
constitutes expropriation or what consequence is appropriate depends on a fresh 
assessment of appropriate justice demands according to the legitimacy criteria of 
recognition and coherence. The rule of expropriation in international law on 
foreign investment serves as a minimum rule in specifying the scope of protection 
of acquired rights and other principles limiting the freedom of States. The content 
of the rule may not in circle consist in the principles which it seeks to determine 
their scope and relations with other principles in balancing conflicting interests 
and demands of justice.  We may now discuss whether a human rights discourse 
for property rights can affect these requirements of legitimacy for legal 
determination by States of rights of corporations in international law and the 
corresponding obligations of States in adhering to coherence and the rule of 
recognition.  
 
iii. Property Rights and Human Rights 
A number of declarations and conventions on human rights include the 
protection of property. On the international scale, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights enunciates the protection of property for all human beings, 
nationals or foreigners. In Article 17 (2) the Declaration provides that ―[n]o one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.‖628 On the regional scale, the 
European Convention for the Protection Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms provides for the right of all persons whether natural or legal to 
―peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.‖629 Likewise, the American Convention 
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 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, General Assembly Rresolution 
217 A (III).  of 10 December 1948.Article 17:  ―(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone 
as well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.‖ Ibid.  
629
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
Europ. TS No. 5, 213 UNTS 221 . [European Convention on Human Rights] The convention itself 
does not have a provision for respect for property but it came under protocol 1 later. Protocol 1 to 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 1,  March 20, 
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on Human Rights [ACHR] provides for the protection of property by providing 
that ―[e]very person has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property.‖630  
As a declaration, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not 
express qualifications to the right of property. In contrast, both European and 
American conventions on human rights specify qualifications to the property of 
private persons and their defeasibility to public interests. The European 
Convention does not even express compensation as a condition for the deprivation 
of property in the interest of public. Moreover, the European Convention adds 
―[t]he preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a 
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties.‖631 Whereas the American Convention provides for 
‗just compensation‘ and due process as well.632  
What is significant for the present study is the distinction between human 
beings and corporations. For instance, the right to own property is a fundamental 
human right according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
633
 
However, it would be absurd to stretch this human right to the right of foreign 
                                                                                                                                     
1952, Europ. TS No. 9, 213 UNTS 262. The Protocol does not address compensation. (―Every 
natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be 
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for 
by law  and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, 
however, in any way  impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to 
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of 
taxes or other contributions or penalties.‖ Ibid. Article 1; See also the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. (―Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his 
or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in 
the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair 
compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law 
in so far as is necessary for the general interest.‖)  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, Art. 17(1), Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 12, reprinted in 40 ILM 266, 269 (2001).  
630
American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 22 
November 1969 entered into force July 18, 1978. Available 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/treaties/b-32.html. Article 21. Right to Property, (―1.Everyone 
has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and 
enjoyment to the interest of society. 2.No one shall be deprived of his property except upon 
payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and 
according to the forms established by law. 3.Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by 
man shall be prohibited by law.‖) Ibid.  
631
 See Article 1 of Protocol 1 to European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 629. 
632
 See Article 21 (2) of the American Convention of Human Rights, supra note 630. 
633
 See Article 17 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 628. 
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corporations for the acquisition of property or the entry and establishment of 
foreign investment. That right has no universal or customary basis in international 
law and is only available to foreign investors by way of a treaty. Even more, the 
protection of property that has customary pedigree in international law is not on 
the same footing with the protection for corporations in foreign investment.  
Although the Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights also refers 
to legal persons, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the regional 
conventions on human rights have been oriented towards the protection of human 
beings and reference to right of property of people is made along with the political 
and civil rights and freedoms of human beings. The centrality of human beings in 
these instruments is self-evident. None of them attempts to impart a human right 
protection of property to the protection of the property of corporations in foreign 
investment. Even the European Convention on Human Rights envisaging legal 
persons, has the most restrictive language for the protection of property.
634
 The 
property rights of foreign corporations cannot be elevated to a universal or 
multilateral regime of protection of human beings.  The evolution of the field of 
human rights has even outshined the protection of personal security component of 
the international minimum standard for treatment of non-nationals.
635
   
Human rights and foreign investment are two distinct fields of 
international law with discrete structures for the construction of rights of human 
beings and corporations and corresponding obligations of States. Two major 
distinctions can be made between the rights of human beings under human rights 
and the rights of corporations in foreign investment and the corresponding 
obligations of States in light of the criteria of legitimacy for the rule of 
recognition and coherence for the common good.  
Turning to the first distinction, unlike certain rights of human beings, the 
property rights of corporations belong to the majority category of contingent 
                                                 
634
 See supra note 629. 
635
 It is confirmed that ―[a]s regards natural persons, most injuries that in the past would have been 
characterized as ‗denial of justice‘ are now subsumed as human rights violations … ‖, Lori F 
Damrosch. et al. International Law, Cases and Materials 4
th
 ed. (St. Paul: West Group, 2001) at 
768.  In respect of human rights, international law has acquired a new content. Brownlie, 
Principles, supra note 424, at 505.  
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rights and principles expressing them. The 1959 ILC Report on State 
Responsibility acknowledged for the protection of acquired property rights by 
international law ―the resulting obligation of the State to respect them cannot be 
of the same nature and scope as when the rights involved are rights inherent in the 
human person.‖636 In international law, respect for the property of foreign 
investors is not absolute.
637
 The ICJ in the Barcelona Traction held that 
obligations for the protection and treatment of ―foreign investments or foreign 
nationals, whether natural or juristic persons‖ that a State is bound to upon their 
admission ―are neither absolute nor unqualified.‖638 The emphasis on non-
absolute character of substantive rights of corporations in international law in this 
study refers to what was elaborately discussed earlier in contrast with contingent 
principles that legitimacy requires their determination in specific rules imposing 
obligations on States according to the rule of recognition to obtain binding force 
as an authoritative statement of law.
639
  
Human beings enjoy certain absolute rights and principles expressing them 
due to the basic value of human life and dignity.
640
 Many procedural rights and 
principles relating to due process and the rule of law in administrative and judicial 
processes in the national systems may also have an absolute dimension.
641
 Persons 
including investors in their human capacity enjoy the protection of human rights 
for the value of the life and dignity of human beings, which in absolute 
substantive rights for human beings and many procedural rights related to due 
process of law can readily enable judgments of grossly unfair, arbitrary, unjust 
and the like.  
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 1959 ILC Report on State Responsibility, supra note 592, at p.  3, para. 7. 
637
  See Oppenheim, supra note 119, at 912. 
638
 Barcelona Traction, supra note425, at p. 32, para. 35 (―when a State admits into its territory 
foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend 
to them the protection of the law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded 
them. These obligations, however, are neither absolute nor unqualified.‖ Ibid. 
639
 See Chapter II, Section C (ii) (b). 
640
 See ibid. 
641
 In international law, this field of rights and principles has found its own specific rule through 
the rule of denial of justice that concerns the administrative and judicial decision-making 
processes.  
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There is a difference between the international minimum treatment 
obligations of States grounded in absolute rights and principles associated with 
the life and dignity of human beings and those depending on determination. A 
minimum treatment originating in absolute rights expressed by absolute principles 
is incommensurable with a minimum treatment exposed to contingent principles 
where the concomitant content of States‘ obligation is subject to legal 
determination by the practice and opinion of States in hard penumbra surfacing in 
investment disputes governed by international law. The former does  not implicate 
a discrepancy of practice in the formation of a rule but a practice in the violation 
of legal statements manifested in absolute principles for which international 
tribunals have the power by the rule of recognition of international law to 
disregard the consent of States as absolute principles operate out of a consensual 
scheme of law. The latter, to which the legal discourse of corporations in 
international law is subject, relates to State practice and opinion, whose existence 
for each instance in hard penumbra must be established and for which the rule of 
recognition of international law bans international tribunals to create the content 
of the rules and obligations. The legitimacy criteria of the rule of recognition and 
coherence for the common good require further distinction between human beings 
and corporations.  
Fairness, justice, and equity are foundations of rules that provide their 
authoritatively and legitimately determined content for a particular situation of 
conflicting demands of justice not their substitutes unless reflecting an absolute 
right and its concomitant principle. Substantive rights of corporations consisting 
in the instrumental value of property are contingent requiring their determination 
and that of concomitant obligations of States in international law according to the 
rule of recognition of international law. Absolute rights and principles may also 
entail a test of obvious fairness or justice and similar notions in adjudication that 
are not relevant to substantive contingent rights and principles involving 
conflicting demands of justice requiring the rule of recognition to validate the 
power to make determination of the content of law engaging in moral and political 
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evaluations.
642
 Accordingly, in legal interpretation of the protection of 
corporations in foreign investment being subject to contingent substantive rights 
and principles, the yardsticks of obvious fairness or justice, or general principles 
and standards do not represent the statement of law. They only veil the creative, 
justice and policy evaluation exercise of the arbitral tribunal in the face of the rule 
recognition. The question is not whether a general test, standard, or principle has 
evolved to become more or less strict in customary international law. It rather 
concerns its irrelevancy at all for the substantive rights of foreign corporations 
and concomitant obligations of States in international law in hard indeterminacies 
without determination according to the rule of recognition for rule specification. 
In the contingent areas, general principles, standards, and tests such as equality or 
proportionality measuring justice, fairness, or equity may be applied to 
interpretation only if the rule of recognition of the system validates the power of 
the adjudicator to engage in moral and political assessment. The general 
international rule of recognition does not admit of such a power for international 
arbitrators in settling foreign investment disputes. This dimension of the 
legitimacy for the validation of the determination power by the rule of recognition 
leads to consideration of the second major distinction of rights of human beings 
and those of corporations in international law with regard to the structure of the 
determination of these rights and corresponding obligations of States.  
 
B. Recognition and Consensual Structure of Rights of Corporations 
 The adjudicative discretion in international law generally rests on non-
liquet and equity that were discussed earlier.
643
  The bottom line of this section is 
whether the obligations of States towards foreign corporations in hard cases is 
structured to be or should be determined by States in a consensual manner or by 
arbitral tribunals in a constitutional manner. According to the general rule of 
recognition of international law only the consensual manner of determination for 
moral and political evaluation in hard indeterminacies is recognized and validated 
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 See Chapter II and III. 
643
 See Chapter III. 
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in international law. A great source of confusion is the field of human rights 
where practices and common good may potently justify a reform in the 
international rule of recognition for a constitutional approach to the rights of 
human beings and obligations of States towards human beings. This structure of 
constitutionality cannot be transferred to rights of corporations in international 
law without underlying supporting practices and common good justification. For a 
constitutional determination of rights of corporations and obligations of States by 
arbitral tribunals in foreign investment there must be supporting practices as well 
as common good justification to exhibit a change or a desirability of change in the 
consensual pattern of recognition in the international system in foreign 
investment.  
 
i. Consensual Design and Practice in Foreign Investment     
a) Approaches to Discretion and Constitutionalism Implications   
 Not all suggestions for arbitral discretion are predicated on explicit 
advocacy for a constitutional approach to rights of corporations or moral and 
political evaluations by arbitral tribunals. Three related approaches may be 
discussed in this section. These approaches do not necessarily converge in the 
appreciation or deprecation of investment treaties or investment arbitration. Still 
they assume that at a policy level States have delegated discretion to tribunals 
rather than approaching the issue from the viewpoint of an interpretive problem at 
the adjudicative level. They make a straying short-cut by attributing to States the 
grant of authorization for adjudicative creation instead of taking the disciplined 
road of structure of determinacy and legitimacy in international law.  
  One approach to constitutionalism in investment treaties addresses the 
implications of investment treaties for domestic constitutional orders than 
focusing on, though perhaps assuming, the question of the discretion of arbitral 
tribunals and the constitutional construction of the rights of investors. This 
approach depicts the global processes of constraining States‘ powers under 
investment treaties restricting the democratic decision making processes at 
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domestic level as a ―new constitutionalism‖.644 The new constitutionalism is of 
course of a wider scope concerning mechanisms for making and enforcing rules to 
limit market intervention by States deemed represented by GATT/WTO regimes 
at the trade level and extended to investment treaties processes by analogy of the 
practices while also considering the instrumentality of favorable conditions for 
investment for trade regimes.
645
 An aspect of the new constitutionalism is that 
constraints on State domestic policies through investment treaties may have 
implications on the internal constitutions of States and their interpretation (when 
in conflict with treaty provisions).
646
 Investment treaties certainly create 
constraints on States. That is not the question here.  
 The core point here is who determines the substance of those constraints 
and obligations of States. This issue requires examining the practices and 
justification of the common good to gauge the assertion of actual or desirable 
delegation by States of their right to determine the content of their obligations in 
hard indeterminacies to arbitral tribunals in a constitutional approach to the rights 
of corporations in investment arbitration. The new constitutionalism in the notion 
of constraints on States beyond their own constitutions is a phenomenon that 
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 David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism (2000) 25 Law & Soc. 
Inquiry 757, at 758, 767-768. (―The new constitutionalism refers to the quasi-legal restructuring of 
the State and the institutionalization of international political forms that emphasize market 
credibility and efficiency and also limit the processes of democratic decision making within nation 
States. The project mandates the insulation of key aspects of the economy from the influence of 
politicians or the mass of citizens ‗by imposing, internally and externally, ‗binding constraints‘ on 
the conduct of fiscal, monetary, trade and investment policies‘.  By limiting State action with 
regard to key aspects of economic life, the new constitutionalism confers privileged rights of 
citizenship and representation on corporate capital, while at the same time constraining democratic 
processes. Central to the new constitutionalism, then, is the imposition of ‗discipline‘ on State 
institutions, both ‗to prevent national interference with property rights and [to provide] entry and 
exit options of holders of mobile capital with regard to particular political jurisdictions.‘ Ibid. at 
758. [citations omitted]. 
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 See ibid. at 758-759. ―The proliferation of investment rule-making structures signals that trade 
promotion is viewed no longer as sufficient to ensure the background conditions for freedom of 
movement in the global marketplace; rather, the necessities of foreign direct investment (FDI) are 
considered as linked closely to trade.‖ ibid. at 759. 
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 Ibid. at 777-781. A constitutionalization approach to international trade has proponents and 
opponents. For advocating a constitutionslization approach to trade with the aim of promoting 
human rights, see for instance Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations ‗Global 
Compact‘ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from 
the European Integration 13 Eur J Int'l L 821.  EU Petersmann, ‗Taking Human Dignity, Poverty 
and Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston‘ (2002) 13 Eur J Int'l L 
845, 850. For a trenchant opposition to this approach see, Philip Alston, ‗Resisting the Merger and 
Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann‘ (2002) 13 Eur J Int'l L 815.  
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concerns policy options of States in entering into an investment treaty with such 
constraints on their actions lawful under their own constitution. Such constraints 
may simply reflect restrictions on States already existing under customary 
international law that an investment treaty merely provides a means for their 
enforcement under arbitration not available without the treaty. For various reasons 
grounded in convenience or self-interest at a policy level, States may also to 
undertake constraints in clear lex specialis beyond their obligations under 
customary international law. Nonetheless, it is quite another matter to read States‘ 
consent to obligations under investment treaties to include a constitutional 
determination of rights of corporations in hard indeterminacies, which begs the 
criteria of legitimacy. This is not a problem at the policy level of States. It is 
primarily a problem of interpretation at the adjudicative level whose solution is to 
be sought, as this study urges, in the legitimacy criteria of the rule of recognition 
and coherence for the common good. These criteria reveal deficiencies of 
analogies with national systems and other fields of international law unfounded in 
practice or justification in common good.    
 A second approach is to draw arbitral discretion from broad language in 
investment treaties. This approach, therefore, heavily capitalizes on the obligation 
of fair and equitable treatment to suggest that by inserting a general standard or 
principle in their treaties States are implied to have empowered tribunals to 
exercise discretion.
647
 Apart from deviating from the legitimacy criteria of 
recognition and coherence for the common good, this inference of arbitral 
discretion runs afoul of the integrity of investment treaties. To argue for discretion 
under this treaty clause with vast possibilities of finding any conduct that may 
seem to the tribunal unfair and unjust as a violation of the treaty would turn the 
clause into a catch-all, ubiquitous principle, rupturing the integrity of the treaty 
itself or general international law in relation to other rules of the system. A 
general standard of justice, fairness, or equity tends to attract compensation for 
any conduct where other applicable treaty clauses or rules of international on 
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 For a study suggesting this approach in relation to the treaty obligation of fair and equitable 
treatment, see generally Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the 
International Law of Foreign Investment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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foreign investment and property are doomed to failure.
 648
 Likewise, this approach 
would result in a disservice to useful rules of the system. The approach recalls a 
sweeping view of denial of justice in international law repudiated in the scholarly 
words that ―[t]o say that denial of justice is simply any State act resulting in 
‗great‘, ‗substantial‘, or ‗clear‘ injustice is to submit a convenient formula under 
which a multitude of claims not warranted by the law of nations might be 
presented.‖649  
 A third approach, besides the broad language argument, infers the 
discretion of arbitral tribunals under investment treaties from States‘ consent to 
arbitration and analogies of investor-State disputes and their adjudication under 
investment treaties with disputes between individuals and governments in national 
systems. This approach emphasizes a prospective, compulsory manner of 
arbitration under investment treaties for the general class of investors than a 
specific investor as under a contract to interpret broad terms in investment 
treaties.
650
 According to this view, by allowing investors to bring claims of 
responsibility against States in arbitration under investment treaties, States  
delegate ―public authority to private arbitration‖ for arbitration of any dispute 
regarding their ―exercise of public authority in relation to foreign investors‖ in a 
―public law adjudication‖, whereby arbitral tribunals possess ―comprehensive 
jurisdiction‖ for settlement of ―regulatory disputes‖ to ―review and control States‖ 
and to make States liable through application of broad terms or ―treaty‘s standards 
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 This is evident in investment treaty arbitrations whereby almost all claims of violation of the 
expropriation clause are also coupled with the claims of violation of the fair and equitable 
treatment. Even if such a power were explicitly conferred to an arbitral tribunal to treat the fair and 
equitable clause as discretion for justice and policy evaluation, it would only concern the fair and 
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expropriation in terms of the extent of compensation or damages may be different from the legal 
consequence for a violation of fair and equitable treatment (e.g. for denial of justice rule) and the 
extent of compensation or damages for such a violation. Yet, assuming fair and equitable 
treatment as a standard of fairness or equity importing arbitral discretion would deflate the 
expropriation rule under the treaty and general international law on the conduct of the State in the 
first place by its openness to find any conduct of States interfering with the property of foreign 
investors unfair or inequitable and thus compensable, which under the expropriation rule would 
not be admissible at all.   
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 Freeman, supra note 584, at 104. (―Continued loose usage of the term … must inevitably inject 
a new source of disagreement among States and retard the formulation of serviceable rules.‖) Ibid 
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 See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford; New 
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of review‖ similar to national systems.651 This argument attempts to keep distant 
from likening rights of foreign investment with constitutionality of human 
rights.
652
 Nevertheless, it retains the very lines of the constitutionality of the rights 
of individuals in certain respects.
653
  Read from this viewpoint, conformity with 
international law shrinks to ―analogy with international law.‖654  
 That investment treaties do not create a reciprocal relationship between 
investors and States, retaining the reciprocity between States, is acknowledged but 
largely downplayed in these approaches.
655
  The practice in investment treaties 
relating to the reciprocal relation between States and the consensual character of 
the substance of obligations is a core matter for their interpretation. The practice 
relating to the structure of the substance of States‘ obligations in a consensual 
manner within investment treaties and the overarching international law 
framework is a key component of the identification of the rule of recognition for 
the determination of the content of their obligations not to be succumbed to the 
conjecture of observers. The legitimacy criterion of the rule of recognition for a 
justice evaluation determination would be at stake where the consensual character 
of the substance of obligations of States under investment treaties is detached 
from the reciprocal relations designed by States under the treaty or broader 
relations of States under international law. The least persuasive attempt would be 
to detach investment treaties from their backbone of international law, where 
investment treaties have most bonds and bounds, and attach them to the 
substantive or adjudicative analogies of national systems, with which investment 
treaties have least affinity, thereby according a constitutional tinge to foreign 
investors‘ rights without justifications of practice and  common good.   
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 Ibid. at 39-43. The author criticizes likening of investment protection with human rights in a 
way that the rights of investors subordinate other interests and rights and investment promotion 
and protection should be prioritized over other purposes. Ibid. 136-143. The writer also observes 
that rights of investors under investment treaties limited to investors having foreign assets are not 
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 See ibid. at 131.  
227 
 
 Balancing private interests of investors and those of States is part of 
coherence and determination task to be made for the common good as a criterion 
of legitimacy in the construction of rights and obligations. The determination task 
for coherence for the common good requires in the first place recognition of the 
power to engage in weighing justice demands and policy options for States. The 
above approaches unjustifiably infer from States‘ agreement to a direct claim by 
investors against States in a prospective fashion, their agreement to the 
determination of the substance of the rights of investors and obligations of States 
in a constitutional approach or creative function by arbitral tribunals in hard 
indeterminacies. This is a false assumption. The authorization by States under 
investment treaties for foreign investors to bring a direct claim against States, 
even if this right of standing is assumed as their own right than the right of their 
home States, is no justification for the determination power of arbitral tribunals.  
 
b) Jurisdiction and Substance    
That the language is broad capturing regulatory activities of States does not 
warrant the imposition of the authority of the law beyond what international law 
imposes.
656
 There is also overemphasis on the general, prospective, and regulatory 
than consensual arbitration under investment treaties being all jurisdictional 
aspects confused with substantive matters. Such an approach reflects only one 
side of the practice that by no means proves the other side for a jurisdiction or 
power to arbitral tribunals to create international obligations for States to measure 
States‘ exercise of authority over foreign investment.  
 By distinguishing jurisdiction from substance, it is not meant to argue that 
substance and jurisdiction may not interact in dispute settlement as vividly doing 
so in investment treaty arbitration.
657
 It is rather to highlight that the consent to 
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 Moreover, not all treaty provisions are of the same level of abstraction. For instance, fair and 
equitable treatment is far more abstract than expropriation. Overemphasis on abstraction and 
labeling them as a standard of review would also result in impairing the integrity of the treaty. See 
supra note 648 and accompanying text. 
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 One example is deciding on the content (substance) of the umbrella clauses in investment 
treaties for deciding on the jurisdiction of the tribunals.  See for example SGS Société Générale de 
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arbitration does not necessarily entail the consent to arbitral tribunals‘ creation of 
the content of the States obligations. Mere general, compulsory, prospective 
jurisdiction does not warrant the justice evaluation of the tribunal. From the 
jurisdictional viewpoint, investment treaty arbitration may constitute a major 
development in international law. This, however, does not change the structure of 
international law and investment treaties for the substance of the obligations of 
States and the claims of their violation under investment treaties.  What is 
material is the consensual character of the substance of the obligations of States 
not bound to the advance consent for arbitration under investment treaties. The 
general and prospective character of consent to arbitration does not affect the 
consensual nature of substance of obligations of States in foreign investment. The 
former is a jurisdictional matter and the latter a substantive issue.
658
 Whatever 
implications of the novelty for jurisdictional matters in investment treaties, they 
cannot be stretched to substantive law governing the substance of the dispute. As 
the ICJ has pointed out ―[j]urisdictional clauses do not determine whether parties 
have substantive rights, but only whether, if they have them, they can vindicate 
them by recourse to a tribunal.‖659 The Methanex Tribunal stated that ―from the 
time of the Alabama award, it has been accepted that States may agree to arbitrate 
by specifying the principles and rules of law they wish the tribunal to apply. This 
is frequently referred to as arbitration on an agreed basis. When the parties wish to 
arbitrate on an agreed basis, a tribunal is then bound by law and honour to respect 
and give effect to the parties‘s selection of the rules of law to be applied.‖660 This 
makes the mandate of the arbitral tribunals limited to what States have determined 
                                                                                                                                     
Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13 
(Aug. 6, 2003), 42 ILM 1290, paras. 163-174; SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. 
Republic of the Philippines (Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (Jan. 29, 2004), paras. 113-
129, available at http:// www.worldbank.org/icsid/ cases/SGSvPhil-final.pdf.  
658
 Even the consent to arbitration is also consensual in reciprocity to the other State party‘s 
consent to arbitration. It is not, however, to argue that investor-State arbitration and commercial 
arbitration run on the same model. Moreover, by giving advance consent to arbitration a State is 
not giving a right to action to all foreign investors to bring a claim but investors of the other State 
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 South West Africa, supra note 514, at para. 65.  
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 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America (Aug. 3, 2005), Part IV, Chapter C, at para. 
23. [footnote omitted], available online at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_us_methanex. 
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in their treaties or what general international law has determined in a customary 
framework. 
 Acceptance of investor-State dispute settlement does not entail acceptance 
of creation of obligations that do not exist. A mandate by States establishing the 
competence of an arbitral tribunal to decide a dispute does not import a mandate 
to create rules and obligations. Such a separation of substance and jurisdiction is 
no hindrance to the function of an investment arbitral tribunal to reach a decision 
as a decision rejecting a claim based on the absence of an obligation derogates 
nothing from the function of the tribunal in disposing of the case.
661
 Jurisdiction is 
not equal to discretion. Investor-State arbitration is not a forum to review and 
control State actions but to decide on the breach of the obligations of the States 
under the treaty and international law. The consent to jurisdiction of an arbitral 
tribunal is no sanction for moral and political exercise by the tribunal for the 
creation and determination of the scope of rights of investors and obligations of 
the States in hard indeterminacies by the same tribunal deciding a violation of a 
treaty obligation or a rule of international law. That a State by advance consent to 
investment arbitration by investors of the other party is authorizing a sort of 
arbitration of whatever label involving a moral and political evaluation by arbitral 
tribunals in hard indeterminacies is a baseless assumption not attributable to the 
intention of the States in investment treaties. Even a vague dispute settlement 
provision in a treaty should not be construed in such a manner. No State would 
accept such a broad interpretation of their consent to arbitration even if it does not 
act or react to it for self-interest gains. States under investment treaties consent to 
arbitration for the violation of their existing obligations under investment treaties 
or international law generally. 
 The approaches linking jurisdiction to substance or relying on abstract 
provisions and advance consent within investment treaties reflect only one portion 
of the practice and a narrow part of the broader practices and legal order 
underlying investment treaties. Only an approach that isolates investment treaties 
from surrounding practices, from the context of international law and from the 
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common good may elicit a creative function to investor-State arbitral tribunals 
from the consent of States to allow investors‘ claims and incorporation of general 
terms. Neither investment treaties stipulations, nor overarching purposes, nor 
surrounding practices of States, nor underlying structure in international law 
admit the function of arbitral tribunals to create obligations of States. A State 
consents to investment arbitration in a package of the whole text and context of 
the treaty including other provisions of the treaty such as the governing law on the 
dispute and the applicable institutional rules on the power of arbitral tribunals in 
deciding according to the law. Furthermore, the legal background of the treaty 
extends to the sources of international law to which all treaties are subject. 
Investment treaties must be read in the whole spectrum and broader order of 
international law to which investment treaties belong including the structural 
criteria of legitimacy for recognition and coherence for the common good. The 
general rule of recognition of international law forbids an arbitral tribunal‘s 
determination of the content of States‘ obligations towards investors in hard 
indeterminacies often masked behind employing a principle, rooted in rules 
applied in national or international law for ordinary instances of the rule, or 
relying on other tribunals‘ own determinations outside the customary framework 
of rule determination. It requires supporting practices and justification of the 
common good to warrant and validate a reform in the international rule of 
recognition in the field of foreign investment for a constitutional reading of rights 
of corporations and adjudicative justice and political evaluation by arbitral 
tribunals in hard indeterminacies.  
 
c) Design and Practice 
1. Arbitral Tribunal Practice      
 Rarely if ever investment arbitral tribunals themselves actually express 
advocacy for a justice evaluation power to create the content of treaty obligations 
or international rules for States. On the contrary, there exist arbitrations even 
those with dicta on general concepts such as manifest injustice, arbitrariness, 
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unfairness and the like that showed their adherence to a consensual character of 
the substance of the obligations of States in interpreting treaty obligations of hard 
indeterminacies. Broadly speaking, two approaches reveal arbitral tribunals‘ 
adherence to the consensual character of the substance of investment treaties 
obligations and rights of investors by the arbitral tribunals in the interpretation of 
State obligations under investment treaty clauses of hard indeterminacies.  These 
approaches include reference to the specific consent of States parties to the treaty 
and general consent of States under customary international law.  
 The first approach consists of ante and post consent of State parties for 
their intention on the substance of their obligations. Displaying the first approach, 
one way of seeking the consent of the State parties to the treaty is to seek their 
intention on the substance of their obligations under the treaty by reference to 
their intention manifested prior to the conclusion of treaty. This may include 
reference to rules of interpretation under the Vienna Convention to one way or 
another obtain the intention of the parties while quite often arguably.
662
  This 
approach may often fail to provide solutions and may result in attributing to States 
what they have not intended particularly in hard indeterminacies. Accordingly, 
reference to the criteria of legitimacy within the broader spectrum of international 
law is required to identify the substance of the obligations of States, which may 
go beyond the specific consent of the State parties but may not go beyond the 
general consent of States within the customary framework. Another way of this 
approach is to locate the specific consent of State parties over an ambiguous treaty 
obligation in other treaty provisions for the violation of the treaty. The SD Myers 
Tribunal applied this approach.
663
 This approach may also depart from the 
specific consent of States parties to the treaty but the attitude remains to search 
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 The S.D. Myers Tribunal while holding that the breach of fair and equitable treatment occurs if 
―it is shown that an investor has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that the 
treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the international perspective,‖ did not apply a 
general standard of justice or arbitrariness but found a breach of fair and equitable treatment by 
Canada because of the breach of a specific  international obligation of Canada under NAFTA, 
namely national treatment. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada (Nov. 13, 2000) (First Partial Award), 40 
ILM 1408, at paras. 263, 266. See also The Metalclad Tribunal which heavily relied on 
transparency requirement in other provisions of NAFTA. Metalclad, supra note 600, at paras. 71, 
75-76. 
232 
 
the intention of the parties than entrenching the tribunal‘s own conception of 
justice.
664
  
 The arbitral tribunals‘ reference to or recognition of the State parties‘ 
unanimous expression of their intention on the substance of their obligation after 
the conclusion of the treaty or during its interpretation in the course of a dispute is 
another example of adherence to the consensual character of investment treaty 
obligations. Thus, the ADF Tribunal in adhering to the unanimous submissions of 
NAFTA State parties stated that ―we have the Parties themselves—all the 
Parties—speaking to the Tribunal. No more authentic and authoritative source of 
instruction on what the Parties intended to convey in a particular provision of 
NAFTA, is possible.‖665 A similar holding appears in the Methanex Tribunal‘s 
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 ADF, supra note 598, para 177 [emphasis added]. Even the claimant had not disputed the 
authority of the NAFTA FTC interpretation but argued that the FTC interpretation had the 
character of an amendment to be subject to internal procedures of the NAFTA parties for 
ratification to become effective.  See ibid.  See also Glamis, supra note 610, para. 599. In Pope and 
Talbot, the Tribunal had first rejected the declaration of the United States as the home State of the 
investor on fair and equitable treatment. See Pope and Talbot, supra note 598, at para. 114.  Later 
the Pope and Talbot Tribunal objected to NAFTA FTC interpretation of Article 1105 raising 
concerns about a post-award interpretation and retrospective effect of the interpretation on the 
NAFTA tribunal decision on merits already made, which in the view of the Tribunal offended the 
rule of law by rendering the disputing State party as  ―judge in his own cause.‖ See Pope & Talbot, 
Inc. v. Canada, Award on Damages (May 31, 2002), para. 13 (1), available online at  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada_pope.htm.  Like all contingent principles the 
obligation that the Pope and Talbot Tribunal was creating was retrospective and in itself contrary 
to the rule of law not to mention the violation of legitimacy criteria of coherence and the rule of 
recognition.  Some other tribunals also gave indications that may be read as a rejection of the 
submission of the home State of the investor. See GAMI Investments, Inc. v. United Mexican 
Status (Nov. 15, 2004), at paras. paras. 29-30, available online at http://naftaclaims.com/ 
Disputes/Mexico/GAMI/GAMIfinalAward.pdf. This is still different form the position by the Pope 
and Talbot Tribunal in rejecting the declaration of the United States as the home State of the 
investor on the substance of the fair and equitable treatment. See Pope and Talbot, Merits Phase 2, 
supra note 598, at para. 114.  In GAMI the home State, the United States, posited that NAFTA 
Article 1116 was not meant to ―derogate from the rule that shareholders may assert claims only for 
injuries to their interests and not for injuries to the corporation.‖  GAMI, ibid. at para. 29. The 
Tribunal rejected that this is the general rule. Ibid. para. 30. This position about what the general 
rule contains, which requires reference to general consent of States under customary international 
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statement that ―even if Methanex‘s assertions of the existence of a customary rule 
were correct, the FTC interpretation would be entirely legal and binding on a 
tribunal seised with a Chapter 11 case. The purport of Article 1131(2) is clear 
beyond peradventure (and any investor contemplating an investment in reliance 
on NAFTA must be deemed to be aware of it).‖666 Here, the Tribunal rightly 
acknowledges the rights of States parties in investment treaties to override a 
customary rule of non-peremptory character derogation from which is permissible 
under international law.  
 The second approach adhering to the consensual character of the 
obligations of States under investment treaties is displayed by recourse to the 
general consent of States under specific customary rules of international law. 
Most explicitly, the Loewen Tribunal took this approach.
667
 A similar position for 
reference to the general consent of States was taken by the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia in its review of Metalclad arbitral award holding that ―… 
treatment may be perceived to be unfair or inequitable but it will not constitute a 
breach of Article 1105 unless it is treatment which is not in accordance with 
international law. In using the words ‗international law‘, Article 1105 is referring 
to customary international law which is developed by common practices of 
                                                                                                                                     
law and not solely the consent or intention of one or more of the State parties, is different from the 
rejection of a joint interpretation by the State parties on the substance of their obligations and what 
they have intended under those obligations.  
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 Methanex, supra note 660, Part IV, Chapter C, at para. 20. The Tribunal supported this view by 
reference to the Vienna Convention Article 39 whereby for amendment of treaties the agreement 
of the parties is sufficient with no particular form or requirement of re-ratification. Ibid. at para. 
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structural general principles of law within national systems or ―international constitutional 
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 The Tribunal in the Loewen case, had found that ―[b]y any standard of measurement, the trial 
involving O‘Keefe and Loewen was a disgrace …. By any standard of evaluation, the trial judge 
failed to afford Loewen the process that was due..‖ The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. 
Loewen v. United States of America, (June 23, 2003) ICSID case  no. ARB(AF)/98/3, 42 ILM 811 
(2003), at para. 119. Nonetheless, applying the rule of denial of justice, the Tribunal rejected the 
claim because the claimant had not completed the process for available local remedies. Ibid. at 
para. 217.   
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countries.‖668 Likewise, the position of customary international law was sought by 
the ICSID Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan holding that, as a breach of contract is not 
by itself a violation of international law, an ambiguous umbrella clause of the 
investment treaty cannot elevate the breach of contract to the violation of the 
treaty to qualify arbitration under the treaty.
669
 It is not simply to stress that the 
Tribunal rightly applied the principle in dubio mitius in relations between States 
and foreign corporations, which conforms to the structure of international law. 
The emphasis is more on the Tribunal‘s reference to what States have generally 
accepted in international law in the absence of clear intention of the parties on the 
issue.
670
 In the same vein, the Methanex Tribunal referred to customary law on 
expropriation for interpreting the content of the NAFTA Article 1110 on 
compensable regulation.
671
  
 All these approaches distinguish the rights of investors under an 
investment treaty from rights approaches in a domestic adjudication system. There 
is affirmation that a treaty need not express that the arbitral tribunal shall decide 
‗on the basis of law‘.672 Rather a justice evaluation, a determination exercise, 
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development of the law shape in adherence to the rule of recognition of international law requiring 
a customary framework of rule determination. Otherwise, it would be much of the character of a 
decision ex aequo et bono for which the Tribunal acknowledged it did not have a power. See 
Chapters II and III.  Indeed, as a member of the CME Tribunal in the Final award, Ian Brownlie in 
a separate opinion in effect rejected adjudicative precedents in international law or principles 
derived solely from tribunals without being backed by State practice. This is reflected in 
Brwonlie‘s view that ‗full compensation‘ under the Hall Formula, which many international 
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oftentimes occur behind reliance on general principles or the purpose of 
investment treaties or decisions of other tribunals relying on such principles or 
purposes. An advocate of the public adjudication approach to investment treaty 
arbitration, while advocating taking into account public interests of the States and 
not giving priority to investment protection in the adjudication of investment 
disputes, relies on general principles primarily of domestic law origin and less of 
international law origin to resolve the so-called regulatory disputes.
673
 This only 
begs the capacity of general principles in view of the criteria of legitimacy. In the 
first place, an arbitral tribunal is unable to unravel concepts of hard 
indeterminacies in a single domestic system like the United States, not to mention 
the EU and constitutions of other countries, entangled in the constitutional and 
jurisprudential maze peculiar to that system let alone most domestic laws and 
constitutions. Domestic legal concepts and principles of contingent character form 
in a package of their own cultural, political, constitutional, and legal contexts 
barely transferable to international law in hard penumbra. More importantly, 
resort to general principles fatally begs the question about the function of 
principles and their dependency on determination and for rule coherence 
according to the rule of recognition. General principles of any origin stop short of 
authority once in hard indeterminacy zone whose utilization would only engages 
the tribunal‘s justice evaluation and policy assessment for which a rule of 
recognition is required not to mention the requirement of advancing the common 
good where such a recognition exists. The theoretical analysis for the contingency 
of substantive principles was offered in previous chapters calling for the 
                                                                                                                                     
tribunals have supported, is not a general rule of international law because it has been rejected in 
State practice, thus referring to State practice for identification of the general rule of international 
law on compensation. See CME Czech Republic B.V (Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, Final 
Award, Separate Opinion by Ian Brownlie, 14 March, 2003, at paras. 26-32.  
673
  Van Harten, supra note 650, at 143-145. The public law adjudication approach to settlement of 
disputes under investment treaties relies on a banal ploy as it ―calls for the application of 
principles developed domestically and, to a lesser extent, in the international sphere in cases where 
courts and tribunals directly resolve regulatory disputes between individuals and the State….The 
primary reference point in this regard must be domestic law, both as a source of analogous rules 
and principles and as evidence of the practice of the States parties to the treaty, given that in the 
case international law it is often not possible to disentangle distinctively ‗public law‘ principles 
from awards and decisions that have been made in the context of reciprocally consensual 
adjudication between States.‖  Ibid. at 143-144. 
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coherence of the content of the law for particular hard situations in a consensual 
determination under the general rule of recognition in international law. At this 
juncture, additional elements will be examined to discover whether practices 
display the emergence of a trend towards a positive practice for a constitutional 
adjudicative determination of the rights of corporations and accompanying 
obligations of States in the field of foreign investment or exhibit further negative 
practice towards this sort of determination in bolstering the general rule of 
recognition.  
 
2. State Counter-Practice  
In the recent past, States reacted to claims of internationalization of their 
contracts with foreign corporations particularly in the field of natural resources for 
huge compensation attributed to the requirements of international law. The States 
whose special interests were directly affected stopped earlier practice of vague 
choice of law clauses referring to equity, general principles, or even international 
law and subjected their contracts to the law of the State party in a negative 
response to arbitral awards anchored in general principles and the decisions of 
tribunals.
674
 This attitude dominated the practice of developing countries 
possessing key natural resources such as oil.
675
  
There is remarkable practice in foreign investment whereby States by 
questioning the existence of the alleged obligations in reaction to claims of State 
responsibility have displayed a negative attitude to a justice evaluation exercise by 
arbitral tribunals in the interpretation of treaty obligations that are sources of hard 
indeterminacies in investor-State dispute settlement. With the proliferation of 
investment treaties, developed States exposed to claims of violation of treaty 
obligations of hard sources of indeterminacies such as fair and equitable treatment 
                                                 
674
 See Georges R. Delaume, ―The Proper Law of State Contracts Revisited‖ (1997) 12:2 ICSID 
Rev. 1, at   11. (―Recent years have witnessed a determination on the part of a number of States to 
relocalize State contracts under the aegis of their own legal system.‖) Ibid. See also: Stephen I. 
Pogany, ―Economic Development Agreements‖ (1992) 7:1 ICSID Rev. 1, at 13-14; Stephen J. 
Toope, Mixed International Arbitration (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited, 1990) at 20-21.   
675
 See ibid. 
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or expropriation and the duty to pay compensation have reacted on the very same 
lines that developing countries reacted in the past. These reactions have 
demonstrated a consensual structure of the scope of States‘ treaty obligations in a 
negative attitude towards justice evaluation and creative role of the arbitral 
tribunal determining the obligation of States in international law in hard cases. In 
reaction to claims of violation of their commitments under investment treaties, 
Canada and the United States changed their model investment treaties. This 
practice has figured among others in modification of the key obligations of fair 
and equitable treatment and expropriation to express the intention of the State 
parties as to the content of the obligations of fair and equitable treatment and 
expropriation. The United States changed its model investment treaty with 
significant changes to these clauses.
676
 Canada also changed its model investment 
treaty including changes to these clauses.
677
 This practice is appearing in all 
subsequent investment treaties concluded by the United States and Canada and the 
network of State parties to these treaties.
 
The United States has entered into 
investment agreements that represent this practice.
678
 Investment agreements 
                                                 
676
See U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 620, Article 5 and Annex A on the obligation of fair and 
equitable treatment and Article 6 and Annexes A and B on expropriation.  
677
 See Canada Model BIT, supra note 664,   Article 5 (2) on fair and equitable treatment and 
Article 13 and Annex b. 13 (1) on expropriation. 
678
 Free Trade Agreements between the United States and other countries, available online at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements. These include:  Free Trade Agreement 
between Singapore and the United States, May 6, 2003, available online at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset_upload_ file708_ 
4036.pdf; US-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 2003, available online at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/asset_upload_file1_4004.pdf; 
Free Trade  Agreement  between Australia and the United States, May 18, 2004, available online 
at http:// www. ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/asset_upload_file248_ 
5155.pdf; Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Central American Countries 
(Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic 
(CAFTA-DR), August 5, 2004, available online at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/ 
agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file328_ 4718.pdf; Free Trade Agreement between  Morocco and 
the United States, entered into force on January 1, 2006;  Trade Promotion Agreement between 
The United States and Peru, April 12, 2006, entered into force on February 1, 2009; Trade 
Promotion Agreement between the United States and Colombia, November 22, 2006; Trade 
Promotion Agreement between the United States and Panama, June 28, 2007; Free Trade 
Agreement between  Korea and the United States, June 30, 2007;  Free Trade Agreement between  
Oman and the United States, entered into force on January 1, 2009. See also U.S. recent BITs, 
available online at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties. These 
include: Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and Uruguay 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, November 4, 2005; 
Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and Rwanda Concerning the 
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entered into between Canada and other countries in recent years similarly exhibit 
this practice.
679 
The practice is not limited to the United States or Canada. Besides 
the network of States that have entered into investment agreements with the 
United States and Canada. A number of other States have followed these models 
as well. For instance, ASEAN members consisting of ten countries signed a 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement in 2009 that reflects changes in the US 
model.
680
 Australia, New Zealand, and ASEAN members have also entered into 
an investment agreement adopting this model.
681
 Likewise, the COMESA 
members comprising nineteen States adopted an agreement on a common 
investment area with similar provisions.
682
 
 Certainly, these textual reformulations will not obviate hard 
indeterminacies arising from these obligations, requiring their interpretation 
within the framework of legitimacy. What matters here is the significance of the 
practice itself for the structure of determination of rights and obligations in the 
field of foreign investment.  The linkage between the content of these obligations 
to the State intention manifested in State practice is another strong demonstration 
                                                                                                                                     
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Signed February 19, 2008.  The 
agreements with Panama, Korea and Colombia await ratification. 
679
 These include Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Colombia, November 21, 2008; Free 
Trade Agreement between Canada and Peru, August 1, 2009; and Free Trade Agreement between 
Canada and Panama, May 14, 2010. Available online at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/index.aspx?lang=en#free; Agreement between Canada 
and the Government of Jordan for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, June 28, 2009; 
Agreement between Canada and the Government of Latvia for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investment, May 5, 2009; Agreement between Canada and the Government of Romania for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment, May 8, 2009; Agreement between Canada and the 
Government of Czech Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, May 6, 2009. 
Available online at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-
acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx. 
680
 See ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, supra note 664.  This agreement upon 
entry into force would replace earlier ASEAN agreements on investment. ASEAN member States 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations include: Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People‘s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union 
of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand 
and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. 
681
 Free Trade Agreement between ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand, Signed 27 February 
2009, available online at www.asean.fta.govt.nz.  
682
 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Common Investment Area, 
adopted by the Twelfth Summit of the COMESA Authority of Heads of Governments, Nairobi, 
Kenya, 22
nd
  and 23
rd
 May 2007. COMESA member States comprise Burundi, Comoros, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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of the consensual determination of obligations of States and the rights of 
corporations in foreign investment, which cannot exceed the general consent of 
States within the customary determination of international law where their 
specific treaty consent is indeterminate. This practice further demonstrates a 
negative attitude by States to leave the determination of their obligations in 
foreign investment in hard cases having important justice and policy implications 
for States to arbitral tribunals for a constitutional determination of rights of 
corporations in an adjudicative moral and political evaluation. 
 The reactions to the provisions of the OECD draft on a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI), including NGOs‘ outcry among others, 
prompted a clarification of the proposed draft by the Chairperson of the MAI 
Negotiating Group, which is instructive for this discussion. In his report on the 
MAI, the Chairman of the Negotiating Group included an interpretative note to 
the then draft MAI Article 1 on ‗general treatment‘ including fair and equitable 
treatment and Article 5 on expropriation. This interpretative note clarified that   
This Article on General Treatment, and the Article on 
Expropriation and Compensation, are intended to incorporate into 
the MAI existing international legal norms.  The reference in 
Article -- to expropriation or nationalisation and ‗measures 
tantamount to expropriation or nationalisation‘ reflects the fact that 
international law requires compensation for an expropriatory 
taking without regard to the label applied to it, even if title to the 
property is not taken.  It does not establish a new requirement that 
Parties pay compensation for losses which an investor or 
investment may incur through regulation, revenue raising and other 
normal activity in the public interest undertaken by governments.  
Nor would such normal and non-discriminatory government 
activity contravene the standards in this Article.
683
  
 
This clarification by the MAI Negotiating Group consisting of developed 
countries is plainly another affirmation of the consensual character of the rights of 
corporations under investment treaties and corresponding obligations of States.  
Accordingly, the clarification repudiates any assertion of constitutional or quasi-
                                                 
683
 The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Report by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group) 
DAFFE/MAI(98)17, 4 May 1998, at 13,15, available online at http://www. oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ 
ng/ng9817e.pdf.  
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constitutional rights of corporations and limitations on State conduct in treatment 
of foreign corporations by adjudicative determination of the scope of obligations 
of States. Likewise, it disproves the assertion that the grant of the right to bring a 
claim by the corporations under investment treaties includes, imports, or implies 
the determination of their substantive rights by the arbitral tribunal in a 
constitutional or creative fashion in hard indeterminacies.   
 These practices surrounding investment treaties by developed States 
accentuate that, notwithstanding the grant of the right to bring a claim to 
investors, States determine the content of their obligations, without leaving a 
significant issue such as regulation to the arbitral tribunal‘s evaluation of justice 
and policy. These practices reveal the consensual character of the scope of 
obligations of States in hard indeterminacies in foreign investment rather than an 
adjudicative creation of obligations laying limitations on their actions similar to 
constitutional or creative patterns that may be available in adjudication within 
other systems. States have recorded their negative attitude to such a function by 
arbitral tribunals in foreign investment in areas of hard indeterminacies of moral 
and political evaluations with democratic and economic repercussions. From 
another angle, such practices only represent a part of the broader consensual 
structure of rights of corporations under investment treaties and more broadly in 
international law. On the one hand, retaining control over the scope of obligations 
within treaties is simply a tool along all other options of States for termination, 
modification, clarification of their treaty obligations by their mutual consent or 
other valid resources that reciprocal and consensual treaties characterize. On the 
other hand, another aspect of a consensual structure of rights of corporations in 
foreign investment manifests itself in the governing law order provided in 
investment treaties themselves or falling within the arbitration instruments or 
sources of international law.  
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3. The Governing Law Order   
 As discussed before major arbitration rules typically utilized in investor-
State dispute settlement require parties‘ authorization for decisions ex aequo et 
bono.
684
 The governing law provisions of investment treaties or in arbitration 
rules more generally as well as the sources of law delineate the power of arbitral 
tribunals to decide the disputes according to the applicable law. In tandem with 
the obligations undertaken, investment treaties, the arbitration rules, and the 
sources of international law on the treaty lay down the governing law whereby an 
arbitral tribunal must decide disputes over those obligations. States may designate 
in their investment treaties the substantive applicable law for the settlement of 
disputes. In the absence of such provisions on applicable law, the arbitration rules 
on the applicable law as well as the general sources of international law to which 
all treaties belong are applicable. The governing law is an integral part of the 
control mechanism tied to the grant of jurisdiction to an investment arbitral 
tribunal to ensure that the outcome is what the law has determined.  
 Those investment treaties that include an applicable law clause typically, 
though not uniformly or universally, refer to the provisions of the investment 
treaty and international law as the applicable substantive law sometimes with an 
express reference to national laws or obligations of States under other 
international agreements. Many investment treaties provide that the arbitral 
tribunal must decide according to the provisions of the treaty and the applicable 
rules of international law.
685
 Indeed, reference to the investment treaty and 
international law as the applicable law constitutes the trend commonly practiced 
among BITs.
686
 As to the applicable law to the substance of investment claims of 
breach of the treaty obligation, NAFTA provides that ―a Tribunal established 
under this Subchapter shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this 
                                                 
684
 See Chapter III, Section A (ii) (3). 
685
 This does not necessarily preclude the application of the national laws of the host States that 
may in many respects be relevant such as whether the investment has been made in accordance 
with the law of the host State.  
686
 See UNCTAD, BITs 95-06, supra note 72, at 115-116. 
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Agreement and applicable rules of international law.‖687 Another example 
includes the Energy Charter Treaty, although this treaty lacks the genuine 
reciprocity involved in NAFTA due to investment claims dynamics between two 
developed States.
688
 To illustrate further, reference may be made to the BIT 
between Mexico and the United Kingdom, which designates the treaty and 
international law as the governing law of the investment treaty claim.
689
  
 There are also treaties that contemplate national laws at some levels 
alongside treaty provisions and applicable rules of international law as the 
applicable law. Reference to the provisions of the treaty and the applicable rules 
of international law, similar to NAFTA, represents the treaty practice of Canada 
and the United States in their recent investment treaties regarding the law 
applicable to a claim of a breach of investment treaty provisions.
690
 The US and 
Canadian investment treaties maintain this governing law clause for a breach of 
an obligation under the investment treaty.
691
 
 The United States has also distinguished the governing law for the claims 
of the breach of investment treaty obligations from those for the breach of an 
investment treaty authorization or agreement. The provisions of the treaty and 
applicable rules of international law govern the former claims, whereas the latter 
claims are subject to the applicable law specified in the investment authorization 
or agreement or agreed by the disputing parties in whose absence the host State‘s 
law and applicable rules of international law shall govern, resembling Article 42 
                                                 
687
 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 ILM 605 (1993), entered into force 
January 1, 1994, Article 1130. 
688
 (―A Tribunal established under this paragraph shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance 
with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international law.‖)  Energy Charter Treaty 
(1994) 34 ILM 360 (1995), Article 26 (6). [ECT] 
689
 The BIT between the Mexico and the United Kingdom of 2006, Article 17 on the Applicable 
Law: ―1. A tribunal established in accordance with this Section shall decide the submitted issues in 
dispute in accordance with this Agreement and the applicable rules and principles of international 
law.‖ Ibid. See also the FTA between Panama and El Salvador, Article10.32 (1). Panama-El 
Salvador Free Trade Agreement, March 6, 2002, available online at http://www.world 
tradelaw.net/fta/agreements/panelsfta.pdf.  
690
See U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 620, Article 30 (1): ―Subject to paragraph 3, when a claim 
is submitted under Article 24(1)(a)(i)(A) or Article 24(1)(b)(i)(A), the tribunal shall decide the 
issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules of international law.‖ Ibid.; 
Canada Model BIT, supra note 664, Article 40 (1): ―A Tribunal established under this Section 
shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of 
international law.‖ Ibid.  
691
 See the treaties referred in supra notes 678-679. 
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of the ICSID Convention.
692
 The Canadian Model BIT does not address 
investment authorization and investment agreements as the US Model does. 
However, some recent Canadian investment agreements provide for a claim of a 
breach of a ―legal stability agreement‖ by a tax measure with a governing law 
similar to the provisions in the US Model for the claims of a breach of an 
investment authorization or investment agreement.
693
 Some other treaties refer to 
national laws with no such distinctions. The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement illustrates a treaty with reference to applicable laws of State party.
694
 
The agreement between Thailand and New Zealand exemplifies another 
investment treaty for recourse to national laws along with the rules of 
international law and the provisions of the treaty.
695
 Similarly, the Argentine and 
New Zealand BIT contains an applicable law clause that among others takes into 
account the laws of the State party in addition to the treaty and international 
law.
696
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 See U.S. 2004 Model BIT,  Article 30 (2): ―Subject to paragraph 3 and the other terms of this 
Section, when a claim is submitted under Article  24(1)(a)(i)(B) or (C), or Article 24(1)(b)(i)(B) or 
(C), the tribunal shall apply:  (a) the rules of law specified in the pertinent investment 
authorization or investment agreement, or as the disputing parties may otherwise agree; or (b) if 
the rules of law have not been specified or otherwise agreed: (i) the law of the respondent, 
including its rules on the conflict of laws;18 and (ii) such rules of international law as may be 
applicable.‖  Ibid. 
693
 For distinguishing investment authorization or agreement see, Canada-Peru FTA, supra note 
679, Article 837 (2): ―Subject to the other terms of this Section, when a claim is submitted to 
arbitration for a breach of a legal stability agreement referred to in paragraph 2 of Articles 819 or 
paragraph 2 of Article 820, a Tribunal established under this Section shall apply: (a) the rules of 
law specified in the legal stability agreement, or as the disputing parties may otherwise agree; or   
(b) if the rules of law have not been specified or otherwise agreed: (i) the law of the disputing 
Party, including its rules on the conflict of laws, 5 and (ii) such rules of international law as may 
be applicable.‖ Ibid. See also Article 819 and 820 for provision for a claim that a tax measure is in 
breach of a legal stability agreement.  Article 820 addressed the issue for claims on behalf of an 
enterprise.  
694
 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, supra note 664, Article 40 (1): ―Subject to 
paragraphs 2 and 3, when a claim is submitted under Article 33 (Submission of a Claim), the 
tribunal shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement, any other applicable 
agreements between the Member States, and the applicable rules of international law and where 
applicable, any relevant domestic law of the disputing Member State.‖ Ibid.  
695
 See the agreement between Thailand and New Zealand whereby the arbitral tribunal shall 
decide in accordance with the national laws and regulations of the State party as well as provisions 
of the treaty and international law.  Closer Economic Partnership Agreement between Thailand 
and New Zealand (2005), Article 9.16.5, available at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-
agreement/thailand/thainzcep-december2004.pdf. 
696
 The Agreement between the Government of the Argentine Republic and the Government of 
New Zealand for the Promotion and Reciprocal protection of Investments, 27 August 1999), 
available online at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina_newzealand.pdf. 
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 The governing law on the substance of claims under investment treaties is 
part of the mandate whereby the arbitral tribunal obtains the consent of the State 
to the dispute settlement and direct claims by investors. There is an inherent 
interaction of national laws and international law in foreign investment.  
Whatever oscillation between national laws and international law in the governing 
law of investment treaties, it may not go beyond the confines of international law 
to moral and political assessment by the arbitral tribunals. What is conspicuous in 
investment treaties providing for the arbitration of investment disputes against 
States is the absence of provisions, as opposed to particular authorizations in the 
arbitral treaties of the past centuries, to empower the tribunal to decide in 
accordance with justice or equity.  Even in cases of the silence or ambiguity of an 
investment treaty on the applicable law, such silence or ambiguity is no 
justification to imply the adjudicative creative power of arbitral tribunals in 
investment treaties. The general rule of recognition of international law requires 
parties‘ authorization for such a power. More specifically, major arbitration rules 
typically utilized in investor-State dispute settlement reject a justice or political 
evaluation engagement by the arbitral tribunals, requiring parties‘ authorization 
for such engagement by empowering decisions ex aequo et bono, which are a 
justice evaluation exercise.
697
 The practices surrounding investment treaties 
themselves reject such an exercise by arbitral tribunals.
698
  Accordingly, where 
investment treaties are silent or ambiguous on the applicable law, the arbitral 
tribunals are still bound by the general rule of recognition of international law 
including, inter alia, the governing arbitration rules not to engage in a justice 
evaluative exercise. The significant point is that in contrast with arbitral treaties of 
the past centuries, investment treaties do not empower arbitral forums to decide in 
accordance with equity or justice, nor such a power is sanctioned by the 
arbitration rules or admitted by the general rule of recognition of international 
                                                                                                                                     
(―... the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the provisions [o]f this Agreement, the 
laws of the Contracting Party involved in the dispute, including its laws on conflict of laws, the 
terms of any specific agreement concluded in relation to the investment from which the dispute 
arose and the relevant principles of international law.‖) Ibid. Article 12 (5).   
697
 See Chapter III, Section A (ii) (a) (3). 
698
 See above, Section B (i) (c) (1) & (2). 
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law. The obligations of the States under investment treaties do not exceed those in 
customary international law because the tribunal is not empowered to enter into a 
justice and political evaluation unless authorized by the parties.  
 Consistent with the general rule of recognition of international law, these 
practices reinforce the point that by allowing direct claims against States in 
foreign investment, States are not admitting a constitutional reading of investment 
treaty provisions for the rights of corporations or empowering arbitral tribunals to 
determine their obligations in a justice or political assessment in hard 
indeterminacies.  It would be unimaginable, and unfounded to imply, that a State 
in consenting to an arbitral tribunal to decide its violations under an investment 
treaty has accepted the creation of the very obligations by the same tribunal in 
hard indeterminacies. In the absence of an express authorization by the parties, no 
general rule of recognition of international law accords an investment arbitral 
tribunal a justice-evaluation or policy-assessment power to create obligations. 
 
4. State Parties Joint Interpretation   
 One of the other most candid negative practices to a constitutional 
interpretation of the rights of the corporations and concomitant creative function 
of the arbitral tribunal in foreign investment has also surfaced in the control of the 
investment treaty interpretation by way of joint interpretation. Practice has 
surfaced in the control of the tribunal in the post-dispute phase through joint 
interpretation of State parties in clarification of their intention binding on the 
investor-State arbitral tribunal. NAFTA pioneered emphasis on this clarification 
in investment treaties. Initially, this power under NAFTA was contemplated under 
NAFTA Article 1131 on interpretation of Annexes.
699
 The interpretation by the 
                                                 
699
 This commission provides authoritative interpretation of NAFTA provisions under Article 1131 
(2). Article 1131: ―Interpretation of Annexes 1.   Where a disputing Party asserts as a defense that 
the measure alleged to be a breach of this Chapter is within the scope of an exception set forth in 
Annex I, Annex II, Annex III or Annex IV, on request of the disputing Party, the Tribunal shall 
request the interpretation of the Commission on this question. The Commission shall have 60 days 
to submit its interpretation in writing to the Tribunal. 2. If the Commission submits to the Tribunal 
an agreed interpretation, the interpretation shall be binding on the Tribunal. If the Commission 
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State parties of their obligations under investment treaties is a normal corollary of 
the reciprocal, consensual character rather than a constitutional nature of 
investment treaty rights.  
 State parties to investment treaties modeled after the U.S. 2004 Model BIT 
have clarified their interpretive power of their obligations under investment 
treaties by incorporating a provision in the applicable law clause of the investment 
treaties to the effect that a joint interpretation of a provision of the treaty is 
binding on the arbitral tribunal.
700
 Canada has also inserted this power of State 
parties in the governing clause in its new model BIT.
701
 This is now the treaty 
practice of Canada as well.
702
 A number of countries are also incorporating such 
clarifications in investment treaties. ASEAN, by way of example, has 
incorporated identical provisions in the governing law clause of its 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement signed in 2009.
703
 A number of other 
agreements between countries other than the United States and Canada also 
embody the same provisions.
704
  
This control device additionally displays that States are not leaving the 
determination of the content of their obligations in hard indeterminacies to arbitral 
                                                                                                                                     
fails to submit an agreed interpretation or fails to submit an agreed interpretation within such 60 
day period, the Tribunal shall decide the issue of interpretation of the exception.‖ Ibid.  
700
 U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 620, Article 30 (3): ―A joint decision of the Parties, each 
acting through its representative designated for purposes of this Article, declaring their 
interpretation of a provision of this Treaty shall be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or 
award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that joint decision.‖ Ibid. The US Model and 
treaties following that model have made the governing law of the treaty subject to these 
provisions. See ibid. Article 30 (1).  
701
 Canada Model BIT, supra note 664, Article 40 (2): ―An interpretation by the Commission of a 
provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this Section, and any 
award under this Section shall be consistent with such interpretation.‖ Ibid. 
702
 See for example Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement, supra note 679, Article 837 ( 3) ― An 
interpretation by the Commission of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal 
established under this Section, and any award under this Section shall be consistent with the 
interpretation.‖ Ibid.  
703
 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, supra note 664,  Article 40 (3): ―A joint 
decision of the Member States, declaring their interpretation of a provision of this Agreement shall 
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http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/panelsfta.pdf. 
247 
 
tribunals. Plainly, by giving an overriding effect to the interpretation by the States 
parties of the investment treaty, this practice being in conformity with the general 
rule of recognition joins the negative attitude towards the idea of constitutionality 
of the rights of corporations and justice evaluation exercise by the arbitral tribunal 
in hard indeterminacies.   
Post NAFTA investment treaty arbitration induced remarkable State 
practice in line with long extant practices on the international plane for the 
consensual character of the substance of the obligations of States in foreign 
investment. Strikingly enough, post-NAFTA practices under investment treaties 
have been driven by the United States that with a long history of advocacy for the 
protection of corporations abroad is a major player in foreign investment as a 
home and host State of foreign investment. If a developed State cannot afford a 
regime of protection that is pernicious to the viability of an ordinary system of 
governance, it would be hard to ascribe such a regime to other States. That self-
explains the popular growth of these practices in the post-NAFTA era, which 
dismiss adjudicative determination of the content of States‘ obligations and 
constitutional interpretation of rights of foreign corporations in investment treaties 
arising from penumbral hard cases.  
A constitutional approach does not fit the legal structure of foreign 
investment in international law. Unless specifically provided otherwise by States, 
a foreign investment tribunal‘s task is to settle the dispute ultimately governed by 
international law in accordance with existing law not its own self-created law and 
obligations. A constitutional approach to the determination of the rights of 
investors and the obligations of States with concomitant creative function of the 
arbitral tribunals engaging in the evaluation of justice in hard indeterminacies 
offends the rule of recognition in international law. Such an approach would be 
irreconcilable with the structure of international law, inconsistent with the sources 
of international law enunciated in the letter and enshrined in the spirit of Article 
38 of the ICJ Statute, incompatible with contemporary State practice designing 
dispute settlement, incongruous with the practice of international tribunals, and 
discordant with the design and practices of investment treaties. A contrast with the 
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rights of human beings in human rights will further illuminate this consensual 
structure of the substance of the law on foreign investment in hard 
indeterminacies. 
 
5. Contrast with Constitutional Rights of Human Beings in Human 
Rights  
The idea of equating the dignity of human beings with the entity of 
corporations is in itself deplorable. A human right carries its own qualification, 
belonging to human not non-human beings.  In the field of human rights, even as 
to the contingent property rights of human beings and concomitant obligations of 
States in their expropriation, a constitutional rather than consensual determination 
of rights and obligations may be observable.  Supporting practices and common 
good may justify reforming the content or origin of the rule of recognition in 
international law for the treatment of human beings and determination of their 
rights irrespective of the consent of States endorsing a decision/determination 
favorable to human beings. A change in the international rule of recognition for 
the protection of human rights does not establish a change in the international rule 
of recognition for the protection of corporations. Although the right to property is 
recognized in both fields of human rights and foreign investment in international 
law, its determination and the power involved is not the same for corporations in 
foreign investment. There is a constitutional dimension to the interpretation of 
human rights within their own context not transferable to the field of foreign 
investment.  
The consensual character of the rights of corporations may further be 
illustrated by a contrast with practices under the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Provisions in human rights instruments include absolute rights or rights 
whose interpretation may for the dignity of human beings require interpretation 
favorable to individual human beings including where property rights of 
individual human beings are at issue as a human right. This belongs in human 
nature and dignity. It is not sound analogy to assimilate the treatment of human 
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beings in human rights and property of corporations into one legal discourse. 
Scholars have objected to such an analogy.
705
  
Unlike foreign investment, reform in the field of human rights in 
international law is accompanied by supporting practices and common good 
justifications. One area of contrast is the multilateral character of human rights 
instruments.
706
 This factor coupled with other factors points to a constitutional 
approach to human rights. Investment treaties are bilateral relations without 
garnering even a support so far for a multilateral regime of foreign investment 
even among developed countries.
707
 This status of human rights instruments in 
contrast to investment treaties indicates that States at least from the normative if 
not actual practice standpoint recognize broad rights for human beings operative 
among States at a universal level free from the types of self-interests and 
negotiated bargains between individual States for gains and costs typical of 
investment treaties.  The status of individual human beings as the ultimate and 
genuine constituents of national and international communities also justifies a 
constitutional interpretation of the rights of human beings in many respects 
favorable to human beings creating new restraints on States beyond existing rules 
and obligations. There are also textual and contextual grounds in the pertinent 
instruments and practices that further separate the character of rights of 
corporations in foreign investment from the rights of human beings.   
On the textual basis, that some investment treaty provisions are broad or 
abstract does not earn them a status parallel with human rights provisions. As a 
second level of contrast, investment treaties as part of a rule-based system are 
basically obligation-oriented quite distinct form a human right convention or 
instrument that are rights-oriented and principle-based. Even advocates of public 
adjudication in investment treaty acknowledge that investment treaties in neither 
preamble nor operative provisions resemble human rights provisions.
708
 For 
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instance, NAFTA Article 1110 on expropriation begins with ―No Party shall …‖ 
In contrast stand human rights conventions and instruments in their provisions on 
protection of property not to mention those on civil and political rights of human 
beings. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 17 (2) 
provides that ―No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property‖ or the 
European Convention on Human Rights provides that ―Every natural or legal 
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be 
deprived of his possessions ...‖ or the American Convention on Human Rights 
provides that ―Every person has the right to the use and enjoyment of his 
property…. No one shall be deprived of his property‖ or the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that ―Everyone has the right 
to… No one may be deprived of his or her possessions …‖ 709 There is rights-
oriented language in human rights instruments indicative of a constitutional 
determination of rights of human beings and obligations of States as opposed to 
the obligation-oriented language indicative of a consensual determination of the 
rights of corporations in foreign investment.  
A third contrast may be illustrated by the power of adjudicators under 
European Convention on Human Rights. Investment arbitration is bound by 
numerous provisions and rules that ban a creative role for arbitrators.
710
 On the 
contrary, there is much flexibility in the European Convention on Human Rights 
for creativity. This creativity has further figured in the Convention itself. Instead 
of the applicable law or governing law, the European Convention on Human 
Rights in Article 45 only requires the judges of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) to give reasons.
711
This is far less restrictive than instruments that 
require the adjudicator to decide in accordance with the terms of the treaty and 
rules of international law or in accordance with the applicable law. A wider 
                                                                                                                                     
State‖ and that ―investment treaties in the great majority of cases do not use bold rights-affirming 
language to describe the standards that constrain States in order to protect foreign investors.‖ Van 
Harten, supra note 650, at 140. 
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discretion has been accorded to the ECHR to ignore partial remedy envisaged 
under the local law and instead award ―just satisfaction.‖712 These are only 
explicit provisions that provide for a discretionary power for ECHR judges in 
their decisions although they may not use it overly, building the practice for a 
constitutional construction of rights. In this background, the ECHR in its 
decisions on property protection of individuals (including corporations) has 
scarcely resorted to international law. Instead, the ECHR has employed a creative 
role by adopting a (distributive) justice measure like the proportionality test in the 
distribution of benefits and burdens in determining the balance between the 
conduct of State and its burden on the individual, while considering the margin of 
appreciation for States‘ freedom in regulating public affairs.713 This part of the 
jurisprudence of the ECHR is inextricably tied to the function of the Court subject 
to its own rule of recognition. Absent specific authorization, arbitrators of 
investor-State disputes cannot assume a power on analogies with ECHR or similar 
forums of human rights, or the constitutional schemes of national systems such as 
the US Fifth Amendment, or authorizations elsewhere to engage in moral and 
political evaluations denied to them by the rule of recognition of international law 
governing the dispute. In employing the proportionality or similar tests the ECHR 
or national courts act under their own of rule of recognition validating the power 
to make the determination of rights and obligations in a constitutional manner 
engaging in moral and political evaluations. The proportionality test where 
reflecting contingent principles which characterize the protection of property for 
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corporations is a measure for determination in the law making process requiring a 
rule of recognition for such a function. It would be an affront to the rule of 
recognition to resort to the proportionality test for appraising States‘ conduct 
towards foreign corporations in investment arbitration, in replication of ECHR or 
other tribunals, in the absence of an authorization for a decision ex aequo et bono 
or an otherwise specified justice evaluation function.  
A fourth level of contrast is the attitude and practice of the ECHR unlike 
investment treaty tribunals. Investment treaties tribunals rarely expressly advocate 
departure from the intention of the States parties or a constitutional approach to 
rights of investors.
714
 The European Commission of Human Rights in its report in 
the Golder Case made the distinction between the constitutional aspect of the 
Convention on Human Rights and treaties creating mutual obligations. It was thus 
held that ―[t]he overriding function of the [European] Convention [on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] is to protect the rights of individuals and not 
to lay down as between States mutual obligations which are to be restrictively 
interpreted having regard to the sovereignty of those States.‖715 The ECHR has 
explicitly assumed a duty to interpret the convention in a constitutional manner 
because of the nature of the human rights convention, which is not available in 
investment treaties representing a reciprocal framework of obligations. The 
ECHR referred to ―the special character of the Convention as an instrument of 
European public order (ordre public) for the protection of individual human 
beings ….‖716 Likewise, Paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the Treaty on European 
Union enunciates the status of fundamental rights in a constitutional setting within 
the EU. Under that Paragraph ―[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights . . . 
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, as general principles of Community law.‖717  
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On a number of distinctions mirrored in the surrounding design and 
practices, the constitutional approach within ECHR stands on its own rule of 
recognition. The ECHR is exercising a determination function whose rule of 
recognition lies in State practice reflected in the Convention itself as well as the 
practice of the European Court itself coupled with common good justification 
including the human centrality of the convention and the public character of the 
Court. This ensemble of political and moral underpinnings builds the components 
of the rule of recognition to validate the discretionary power of judges in ECHR 
to engage in a justice evaluation and policy review of the member States in a 
constitutional attitude towards the rights of human beings and restrictions on the 
actions of States. The moral and political underpinnings of the European 
Convention on Human Rights allow its expansive interpretation favorable to 
human beings not in a framework of consensual, reciprocal obligations but a 
rights-based constitutional framework in protection of individual human beings. 
The political and cultural integrations that underscore the delegation of sovereign 
rights in matters of the determination of member States‘ obligations in a 
constitutional framework within the EU are absent in investment arbitration as 
well.  
Property protection in foreign investment within investment agreements 
and international law stands distinct in the nature of determination from domestic, 
regional and international constitutional or special frameworks even though there 
may exist some treaty provisions with pedigree in a particular legal system like 
the US treaties influenced by the US system. Academic writers have rightly 
pointed out that the political or economic context of regulatory takings in the 
domestic law of the United States is different from those in international law.
718
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An approach attempting to liken the property protection in investment treaties or 
international law with that within domestic or special international regimes 
misconceives the underlying rule of recognition backed by practices and common 
good justification. Constitutionality of rights of corporations in international law 
requires at least the formation of a new rule of recognition supported by the 
practice and common good. As observed, the practice is already in the negative 
trend. The desirability for an adjudicative determination in investment arbitration 
in a constitutional approach to rights of corporations and limitations on the actions 
of States may now be examined.   
 
ii. Desirability in Light of the Common Good   
The practices enumerated in the previous section dismiss a constitutional 
design of the rights of corporations and their adjudicative determination by 
arbitral tribunals, which is consistent with the general rule of recognition in 
international law. A final test for this is the common good whether the rule of 
recognition of international law validating and requiring the consensual 
determination of rights of corporations and corresponding obligations of States, 
whereby indeterminate obligations are to be interpreted in light of customary 
determinations, would advance the common good or hinder it.  Before dealing 
with this question, a distinction must be made between the question of 
adjudicative discretion and the question of the institution of arbitration generally 
and its role. The following assessment in view of the common good should not be 
regarded as undermining the desirability of the institution of arbitration; it solely 
concerns the question of the desirability of adjudicative determination in investor-
State arbitration. The desirability of investor-State arbitration per se establishes no 
support for the desirability of adjudicative determination in policy assessment and 
justice evaluation for public affairs of States by arbitrators in investment 
                                                                                                                                     
US Claims] Tribunal and that continue to condition its operation are so singular as to undercut the 
general application of lessons or insights derived from its practice.‖ Toope, ibid. [clarification 
added]. Sornarajah, also points out similar caveats about the decisions of the tribunal.  Sornarajah, 
ibid.  
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arbitration. Arbitral tribunals may perform their function in an orderly fashion to 
hold States responsible for the violation of obligations undertaken under the treaty 
or within international law but nothing of this task justifies the creation of 
obligations by the arbitral tribunals.  Does common good support the desirability 
of a reform in the content of the international rule of recognition in the field of 
foreign investment to call for an adjudicative determination of the obligations of 
States by the arbitral tribunals?  This question may be examined in view of the 
public character of forum and self-determination of States as conditions to justify 
the advancement of common good in this field. 
 
a) Investor-State Arbitration and the Public Character of the Forum   
Adjudicative determination power in national legal systems derives from 
and is bound by the criteria of legitimacy of the system consisting in the rule of 
recognition and coherence for the common good.
719
 This restricted recognition is 
accompanied by the common good justification that courts in national legal 
systems as well as those such as the European Court of Human Rights are public 
in character by both possessing a public office and having features of the public 
service. The public character of the forum constitutes one prerequisite of the 
common good that a constitutional approach to rights of corporations in 
international law and their determination by arbitral tribunals in a justice 
evaluation cannot dispense with.   
Judicial power by public courts to make legal determinations in national 
systems is premised on the desirability that national legal systems should be 
complete in the sense that they must provide answer to every coordination 
problem and where there is a gap, it is necessary for judges to fill it. This 
assumption itself draws on the assumption of the public character of the office of 
judges in national legal systems. Distributive justice may sometimes justify 
permitting those in public office to exercise discretion to adequately discharge 
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their responsibilities.
720
 Investor-State arbitrators as opposed to judges in 
domestic systems do not hold common or public office and do not serve public to 
enjoy the discretionary authority in hard indeterminacies that judges in domestic 
systems may sometimes have according to the rule of recognition of the system.  
National judicial systems are part of the ―institutional aspect of the Rule of 
Law.‖721 The judicial institution still has certain characteristics earning them the 
character of a public institution. These characteristics include independence, 
openness, accessibility, and reviewability.
722
  All of these features of the public 
character of the forum constitute prerequisites for justification of common good in 
varying degrees. 
Accessibility in investor-State arbitration is rooted in the market grounds 
than common good stems. Even on the market basis, the current design of 
investor-State arbitration only serves the elites of the market actually leaving 
myriad of small businesses or entrepreneurs without accessible arbitration 
recourse. This is due to the tremendous cost of investor-State arbitration that only 
large multinational companies can afford.
723
  
Openness is also a major issue in investor-State arbitration. The problem 
of access to information in investor-State arbitration may potentially be repaired 
by the publication of awards and the documents of the proceedings.  According to 
an academic, unlike the transparency aspect of openness, participation by amicus 
curie is less important because national legal systems, except for the US courts, do 
not treat this matter as fundamental.
724
 Nevertheless, the absence of non-party 
participation in national courts may not be as important because the courts 
themselves are public office with a public function often without necessitating 
non-parties‘ participation to represent the public than third parties representing 
private interests. Whereas in investor-State arbitration non-parties like NGOs 
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often represent the public not third-party private interests. Although the State is 
the primary entity to defend its people before investor-State arbitration, non-
parties like NGOs representing the interests of the public as a whole or human 
beings in particular in issues such as human rights and environment can bring an 
important dimension to their protection affected in a forum which is not itself a 
public forum. A technical obstacle such as cost implications for the participation 
of amicus curie in the arbitral proceedings compounds the problem, thus 
rendering the system less likely to meet this aspect of the common good.  
Openness is a critical aspect for international arbitration. The tribunals that are 
making decisions with far-reaching repercussions for a State cannot advance 
common good without, among others, an open system in which non-parties 
representing human and public interests and the public itself affected are 
adequately informed and represented to further check the limits of the tribunal‘s 
adjudicative power.  
A critical impediment to common good desirability of adjudicative 
determination in investment treaty arbitration is also the issue of the dependency 
of arbitrators on the business.  Arbitrators lacking tenure security, which domestic 
judges enjoy, are perceived to depend on those appointing them and the claimant 
investors instigating claims thereby influencing decisions in favor of investors to 
keep the business running.
725
 This is a perceived bias rather than an actual one.
726
 
Nevertheless, it exposes arbitration of investor-State disputes to a systematic 
partiality in favor of investors. Bias is a perennial problem long lingering in 
investor-State arbitration. Before the advent of investment treaties, arbitration of 
State contracts was marred by the perception of bias in favor of multinational 
corporations through de-localizing or internationalization of the law governing the 
contract detaching it from the law of the State party. This prompted observers to 
characterize arbitration of State contracts a private power mechanism.
727
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Investment arbitration deviates from its very fundamental cause, the 
impartiality of the forum. Investor-State arbitration has risen from a basic 
assumption that the national courts of the State party may not be impartial in 
dealing with foreign investors. The impartiality of national courts is also certainly 
a perceived one.  Judges of a public court of a country dealing with investors‘ 
claims against their home State are not necessarily deemed partial. Likewise, 
arbitrators are not necessarily deemed partial. It is not the integrity of arbitrators, 
some being eminent academics in international law or distinguished judges of the 
ICJ or supreme Courts of States, in investment disputes that is in trouble.  
Tribunals such as S.D. Myers, SGS v. Pakistan, ADF, and Methanex to whom 
others may join indeed illustrate independency from market or corporate interests 
preoccupancy. That does not mean that any arbitral award against a State is 
necessarily a partial decision either.  It is rather the defect of the system of 
investor-state arbitration to design a framework immune from a perception of 
dependency for business on corporate and market interests by arbitrators.  This is 
not a systematic deficit for which this study calls for the elimination of the 
institution of arbitration. This defect rather drastically detracts from the 
desirability of the power of arbitrators to engage in moral and political evaluation 
in hard indeterminacies of international obligations of State.   
A short answer to the problem of arbitrators‘ errors in law is an appeal 
system of judicial review.
728
 The review of adjudicative decisions may from one 
angle concern the mechanism for correction of errors within the judiciary itself. 
Judicial discretion in national legal systems is limited and subject to some safety 
valve of the judicial and legislative system available to national legal systems. 
The judicial discretion of judges operates in a structure where judicial decisions 
are under layers of control in appeal systems from lower courts to higher courts 
up to the supreme courts. These safety valves are absent in investor-State 
arbitration and even a single appeal system would be insufficient to mend the 
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layers of control disciplining judicial discretion. An appeal body in investor-State 
arbitration would not be a substitute for the unifier of the content of international 
law as supreme courts or legislatures unify the opposing legal opinions in national 
systems. Even if there were a stable, substantial and substantive appeal system in 
investment arbitration, there still would be the absence of a legislator representing 
the people affected advancing their common good to reverse judicial 
determinations. Important for the common good is the public representation in 
making important decisions that significantly affect a community. The issue here 
is not simply a correction mechanism for the decisions of the adjudicators by 
higher courts but the reversibility of decisions by an elected public office like the 
legislator. Judicial determination even by the supreme courts is systematically 
open to legislative reversal. Legislators may repeal a supreme court decision by 
introducing a law. In Hart‘s words, ―elected legislature will normally have a 
residual control and may repeal or amend any subordinate laws which it finds 
unacceptable.‖729 Public representation in the construction of legal rules affecting 
vital social and economic affairs of a community with assessment of justice 
demands and policy matters arising in hard indeterminacies lies at the core of the 
evaluation of the common good for measuring the desirability of an adjudicative 
determination of the content of the law for a State in investor-State arbitration. 
Moreover, the authority of courts ultimately consists in the will and ends of 
human beings that justify the intervention by the courts as a pillar in the check and 
balance of power equilibrium to constrain the actions of governments that are or 
should be constituted by the human constituents for the cause of their flourishing. 
Thus, the intervention of the national courts to construct or make determination of 
constitutional rights of individuals even in the face of a majoritarian legislator is 
grounded in this conferment of sovereignty by human beings and this cause for 
human beings neither of which is relevant to the rights of corporations in 
international law. The question closely draws on self-determination and self-
preservation of States in international law as the other prerequisite for measuring 
such desirability, which will be discussed shortly.  
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Judicial discretion in national legal systems is accompanied by 
institutional safeguards not merely within the judicial institution itself but the 
entire machinery of the State grounded in its constitution. Institutional safeguards 
systematically though not perfectly ensure both the integrity of the judiciary as an 
accessible, open, and independent public institution and its integration within the 
entity of the State leaving avenues to restore the democratic process of legal 
determinations. These systematic safeguards are missing in investor-State 
arbitration.     
The constitutive elements of a public court and its discretionary power in 
national legal systems for engaging in legal determinations of rules and 
obligations are foreign to investor-State arbitration to justify the desirability of 
adjudicative determination of the rights of corporations and obligations of States. 
As far as lawmaking power by adjudicators is concerned, a public office bound to 
advancing the common good with assurances of public service through 
maintaining an independent forum, accessible to all, with an open process, and 
decisions that can be reviewed and reversed is required to justify recognition of a 
constitutional, adjudicative determination of the content of the law. These 
systematic deficiencies in investor-State arbitration are obstacles to desirability 
for a reform in the rule of recognition.   
Adherence to criteria of legitimacy lends credibility and integrity to 
investor-State arbitration. Adjudicative determination would be pernicious to the 
institution of arbitration as well.  By adhering to the rule of recognition, arbitral 
tribunals would also promote the broader objectives of the institution of 
arbitration as a neutral forum to entertain investor-State disputes. The overall 
NAFTA Tribunals‘ credibility lies in their virtual adherence to the rule of 
recognition not substituting their conceptions of justice for determinations 
reflected in the practice and opinion of States in hard indeterminacies. The other 
way round, by relying on devices that turn on the discretion of arbitrators in an 
evaluative exercise for morality and policy, the very integrity of the institution of 
arbitration would be at stake.  Adjudicative determination in international law 
may self-defeat the institution of dispute settlement. This self-defeating 
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ramification for adjudicative creation of the content of rules may in part result 
from States‘ disenchantment with the institution of dispute settlement. This is a 
phenomenon acknowledged by advocates of judicial discretion. Thus, Hersch 
Lauterpacht views that ―[t]he very existence of an international judiciary might be 
imperiled if, in the present state of international organization, the conviction 
gained ground among Governments that circumspection and restraint are absent in 
the conflict between what has been called judicial idealism and the claims of State 
sovereignty.‖730  An adjudicative creation of international obligations may 
accelerate adverse reaction to the very interests it seeks to protect.  This has 
particularly surfaced in States‘ reactions to the interpretation of their treaty or 
contractual obligations in investor-State relations.
731
 Therefore, the interests of 
investors may just as well justify the containment of arbitral discretionary 
power.
732
 A State reaction may also manifest in a more direct opposition to 
investor-State arbitration. For instance, the United States and Australia Free Trade 
Agreement does not have a binding arbitration mechanism for direct claims of 
investors against the State parties.
733
 Further negative reaction by States is 
illustrated by the withdrawal of Bolivia and Ecuador from the ICSID 
Convention.
734
 These reactions represent counter-production of adjudicative 
discretion in creating obligations of the States in their treatment of foreign 
investors, undermining the institution of arbitration itself.  
The issue in focus is still far from defeating or diminishing the institution 
of dispute settlement. It is rather the question of the justification of the common 
good for a reform in the international rule of recognition for a constitutional 
approach to rights of corporations and obligations of States. Such a justification 
collapses in light of the deficits of the public characteristics of courts in investor-
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 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of the Law in the International Community (Hamen: Archon 
Books, 1966) at 104.   
731
 See above, Section, B (i) (c) (2). 
732
 See also: Loewen, supra note 667, at para. 242; Van Harten, supra note 650, at 146.  
733
 US-Australia FTA, supra note 678, Article 11.16. 
734
 See ICSID Convention, List of Contracting States, available online at  
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&language=English.  
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State arbitration. The question may now be explored in terms of another aspect of 
common good reflected in the value of self-determination of States.  
 
b) Self-Determination and Human Rights to Development and Regulation  
There is a general argument that investment helps the economy, creates 
jobs, and in the end is supposed to contribute to the wealth of people and persons. 
There is no doubt that investment backed by sound policies could contribute to 
economic growth and eventually benefit human communities. Yet, this does not 
warrant the determination of the protection of foreign investment and the 
concomitant justice and policy assessment in hard penumbra by arbitral tribunals. 
It rather necessitates States‘ freedom to devise and revise their economic policies 
for the well being of their people and leaving the protection of foreign investment 
to the specific or general consent of States. The question of presumption of the 
freedom of action of States in foreign investment and rights of corporations being 
subject to contingent principles and the consensual limitations on the conduct of 
States in this field is a basic one that previous chapters dealt with in great length. 
Now the question is whether it is desirable to treat rights of corporations and the 
contingent principles in a constitutional approach to justify the adjudicative 
creation of obligations limiting the conduct of States. This may now be discussed 
in view of self-determination of States and the rights of peoples and human beings 
to development and regulation.  
Self-determination constitutes a basic value of international law.
735
 It is 
part of the basic value of self-determination recognized by international law for 
the nations to determine their social and economic policies. The Charter of the 
United Nations has expressed this principle in Articles 1 (2) and 55.
736
  This 
structural principle has also been enunciated as one of the basic principles of 
international law in the Declaration on the Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with 
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736
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the Charter of the United Nations.
737
 Covenants on human rights embody this 
basic value providing that ―[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination.‖738 
As a basic value of the international community, by virtue of the requirement of 
practical reasonableness, self-determination must be respected in every act 
without being directly attacked.
739
  
Self-determination underscores other rights of peoples and human beings 
in international law. Self-determination is the underlying tenet for the economic 
sovereignty and rights of States including the concept of sovereignty over natural 
resources.
740
 It equally underlines the ―right to development‖.741 A fortiori, States‘ 
right to regulate public affairs according to the rules of international law is a basic 
right of States in protection of human beings and promotion of human rights. The 
common good also requires States representing peoples to build social and 
economic infrastructures and regulate the economic activities for the good of the 
human constituents.   
The right to expropriation, particularly in issues of economic development 
such as natural resources is also grounded in this basic value of international law. 
Thus, recognition of the right to expropriate the property of foreign investors is 
rooted in the protection of human rights in the collective sense and the self-
determination of States. Grounded in sovereignty and self-preservation of States, 
the right of States to expropriate property of foreign investors is the uncontested 
element of all practices and instruments on the protection of aliens in international 
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 Article 1 (1) of The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered 
into force Jan. 3, 1976. (―1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.‖) Ibid. 
739
 See supra notes 330, 383-384 and accompanying text.   
740
 See Brownlie, Legal Status , supra note 445, at 255.  
741
See Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/41/128 (1986). Article 1 (2) of the Declaration provides that ―[t]he human right to 
development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, which 
includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both International Covenants on Human Rights, the 
exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources.‖ 
[Emphasis added] 
264 
 
law.
 742 
All key General Assembly Resolutions on the subject affirm this right 
despite their variations on the exercise of the right.
743
 These resolutions varied in 
the substance they provided and the support they received.
744
   
The ILC Report suggested a general status to the principle of acquired 
rights.
745
  However, the right to expropriate rooted in the structural principle of 
self-determination and self-preservation of States, presuming States‘ freedom in 
economic actions towards foreign corporations, may shrink to a lip service if the 
principle of acquired rights or other substantive principles in the field of foreign 
investment are to be of presumptive character. Under customary international law 
on State responsibility, in the words of the ICL Report itself, ―an act of 
expropriation, pure and simple, constitutes a lawful act of the State and, 
consequently, does not per se give rise to any international responsibility 
whatever‖  except ―in the exceptional circumstances.‖746  If those exceptional 
circumstances giving rise to State responsibility are supposed to be culled from 
contingent general principles with their reach to infinite instantiation possibilities, 
no conduct of State would be immune from a selective conception of justice as a 
ground of State responsibility instead of established rules of international law. On 
this note, the police power, eminent domain, necessity and other exceptions are 
not exceptions to general principles of protection of property. These exceptions 
have been raised with regard to State responsibility.
747
 Other general or specific 
exceptions within investment treaties or international law have the same function 
of exempting State responsibility. State responsibility may only arise from a 
                                                 
742
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violation of a primary rule of international law.
748
 Thus, responsibility requires 
existence of a primary obligation and the exceptions may justify a relief from 
responsibility for a wrongful act. Still, what constitutes a wrongful act depends on 
the content of the obligation in the first place, a task that ILC ultimately 
abandoned with respect to the protection of alien including their property in view 
of controversy surrounding general principles advanced in this field and 
particularly foreign investment. Breach of a primary obligation requires the 
determinacy of the obligation for its scope before being capable to give rise to a 
breach. The contingency and consensual character of the rights of corporations 
shed light on the question of police power and other exceptions whether of treaty 
or customary origin in the legal discourse of property protection in foreign 
investment. A police power exception discourse within a constitutional regime 
such as the United States is not a valid analogy for international law on foreign 
investment since no such constitutionality exists in international law. These 
exceptions concern State responsibility arising from the violation of existing 
primary rules. They do not concern the content of the primary rules themselves in 
hard indeterminacies. Wherever an obligation is established, a State must 
demonstrate existence of such exceptions to relieve from responsibility. Yet, the 
demonstration of the obligation itself for the alleged instances in the first place is 
a fundamentally different matter resting on the foreign investor. Where a primary 
obligation is itself indeterminate in as to a particular hard instance, it initially 
requires a customary or conventional specification of such an instance. This is a 
key issue to distinguish the police power, eminent domain, necessity and other 
exceptions to State responsibility under conventional or customary international 
law from hard indeterminacies where the content of obligation is indeterminate as 
to an ambiguous instance. In such a case, an alleged violation of an indeterminate 
rule poses not a question of fact but the very existence of the rule in the first place 
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for the claimant investor to demonstrate. None of these exceptions excusing State 
responsibility becomes even relevant where the primary obligation is in the hard 
indeterminacy zone. Only if the rights of foreign corporations in international law 
and corresponding obligations of States are treated in a constitutional approach in 
a matter of principle do such exceptions surface as relevant to the determination 
of the content of obligations. Yet, in foreign investment both practices and the 
common good stand against a constitutional construction of rights of corporations 
and corresponding obligations of States in a matter of principle. 
 State responsibility may not arise from contingent principles for a hard 
case whose legal status has not received determination within the framework of 
international law. Otherwise, in the grand area of contingent principles 
surrounding coordination problems in international law, State responsibility can 
follow from any conduct that the adjudicator conceives contrary to international 
law.  It is affirmed that ―[s]ince States have rights to far-reaching social reforms, 
the respect due to the property of aliens cannot be absolute so as to prevent any 
action by the States which might diminish or even extinguish their property 
rights.‖749 States‘ right to self-determination and self-preservation in international 
law underscoring their rights to development, expropriation, and regulation 
maintains their prerogative status in international law for the presumption of the 
lawfulness of their actions in international law on foreign investment requiring a 
rule of international law to the contrary. Brownlie describes, ―State measures, 
prima facie a lawful exercise of powers of government.‖750 Another dimension to 
this structural presumption in favor of the conduct of States grounded in their self-
determination requiring demonstration of restrictive rules in foreign investment is 
the jurisdictional right of States under international law to regulate property or 
contract within their territory.  Hence, the ILC observed the right of expropriation 
―as a discretionary power inherent in the sovereignty and jurisdiction which the 
State exercises over all persons and things in its territory ....‖751 More precisely, 
Brownlie states ―[i]t is always admitted that presumptively the ordering of persons 
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and assets is an aspect of domestic jurisdiction of a State and an incident of its 
sovereign equality and independence in the territorial sphere. Customary law 
contains long-established exceptions to the territorial competence of States.‖752 
The international law exceptions to sovereign powers of States recognized by 
international law to secure their self-determination and self-preservation in 
economic development and regulation of economic affairs in the interests of their 
people cannot be assumed on a contingent principle or creation by the tribunal.  
Common good does not support a determination power for arbitral 
tribunals in foreign investment disputes to engage in moral and political 
evaluations creating the content of international obligations of States in hard 
indeterminacies. It would be far from desirable if arbitral tribunals were to create 
international obligations for States restricting their constitutional capacity for 
adopting or implementing social and economic policies for the wellbeing of their 
people or diminishing their funds by way of compensation to foreign corporations 
because of such policies. In view of the vast variety of States‘ actions for the 
public wellbeing, such a power for arbitral tribunals would directly attack the 
basic value of self-determination of a community by transferring justice or policy 
assessments for every public program in the field from the democratic decision-
making processes of States to arbitral tribunals. Self-determination is a basic 
value of the international community that can be not focused but cannot be 
directly attacked. The supposition of a determination a power for investment 
arbitral tribunals as a general state of the law is not only unsupported in practice 
but unjustified from the point of common good as well. Such a power would 
directly attack self-determination of States thereby violating the requirement of 
reasonableness for respect for every basic value in every act. Arbitral tribunals 
cannot presuppose an implied power, which would lead to a direct attack of a 
basic value of self-determination of a State in deciding its conduct for the 
wellbeing of its people not restricted by established rules of international law.   
If in relation to human beings limitations upon the freedom of action of 
States is to be measured solely in a consensual regime of obligation requiring the 
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consent of States, it leaves much to deplore.  Consent does not explain the whole 
normative gamut of primary rules for restrictions on the conduct of States in 
international law. In relation to human beings, there exist both absolute rights that 
do not originate in the consent of States and constitutional rights whose 
construction departs from the consent of States in a constitutional interpretation 
and determination in favor of human beings. The key to this scheme of rights for 
human beings is the justification of the common good.  The field of human rights 
stands out in a distinctive structure because human beings are the ultimate and 
genuine element of the common good and basic values of life, community, etc. 
that gauge the basic values of the international system such as sovereignty in 
adherence to human basic values for which the international community 
complements national communities.
753
 Sovereignty belongs to the structure of 
international law viewed from this complementary perspective for securing basic 
human values thereby collapsing whenever departing from advancing the 
common good of human beings including through restrictions on States in a 
constitutional scheme of determination of rights of human beings by way of 
principles.  
It is part of the duty of States to human beings to regulate domestic affairs 
for a prosperous economy, for development, for clean water, air and environment, 
for healthy and safe living conditions, and for equal chances in life for every 
human being. Common good justifies a consensual scheme of rights of 
corporations and obligations of States that allows States to steer their regulatory 
wheel to devise and revise social and economic programs to enhance living 
conditions of human beings. Moreover, what lends legitimacy to sovereignty of 
States in the end is the good of human beings constituting States and voting for 
the political powers that are from the common good standpoint subject to 
restrictions wherever such powers fail to advance the flourishing of human 
beings. States have obligations towards human beings who actually vote and 
establish them or in principle should. Governments are accountable to the people 
as they are or should be constituted ‗by the people and for the people‘.   There is a 
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bond of common good between human beings and States to which the authority of 
States is bound. The accountability of States towards human beings justifies 
subordination of the political powers to what the good of human beings demands. 
Sovereignty and other values of the international system safeguarding States, 
therefore, may be subordinated to basic values of human beings where the life and 
dignity of human beings are at issue.  These values of international law, however, 
may not be subordinated to the instrumental value of the property of corporations 
in a scheme of constitutional determination of rights of corporations in a direct 
attack of self-determination of States. The consensual scheme in foreign 
investment is indeed a common good requirement to safeguard rights of human 
beings against multinational corporations that are no less-powerful than many 
States demanding the protection of human beings against  their actions just as 
against the abuse of power by States. The rule of recognition of international law 
supported by practices and common good does not permit a constitutional 
approach in foreign investment in the sense that the determination of the content 
of rules implicating the capacity of States to regulate their affairs for the benefit of 
human beings transfers from the competence of States to that of arbitral tribunals. 
If investment arbitral tribunals were to assume such a determination power 
in hard cases, States and their human constituents would lose their voice in 
matters that vitally affect them. There is no justification for malleable moral and 
political conceptions to permeate the decisions of investor-State arbitral tribunals 
in hard indeterminacies. Giving effect to a treaty provision or customary rule in 
foreign investment does not entail the creation of obligations not accorded by the 
treaty or the customary rules as in penumbral situations occur. The rejection of a 
claim due to the absence of an obligation and its violation in a consensual frame 
of obligations in foreign investment is also a legal effect although it might not be 
a desirable one to some observers. Desirability is the realm of political and moral 
evaluation not representative of the statement of the existing law. If any gap in the 
hard penumbra in foreign investment were deemed a gap to be filled rather than 
absence of an obligation, there would be no room for a meaningful participation 
by States to engage in determination of the content of their obligations. If against 
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the practices and common good justifications the power of an investment tribunal 
is stretched to determine the content of States‘ obligations in hard 
indeterminacies, this not only shrinks the efficiency of international law by 
making its rules uncertain but also shreds its legitimacy making the system 
uncertain and incoherent by disposing of its rule of recognition. If moral and 
political evaluations in hard indeterminacies were supposed to vest in arbitral 
tribunals, then treaties and customary international law as the prime sources for 
State participation in international rulemaking would merely be either a 
subordinate or a neutral source. In such a scenario, no State would any longer be 
an effective actor in the formation of rules for novel situations that vitally matter 
for them. For the protection of corporations, the structure of international law 
remains a consensual determination of the rights of corporations and 
corresponding obligations of States to be broken down in specific rules to impose 
obligations on States. Both practices shaping the rule of recognition and the 
common good justifying that rule in international law maintain this scheme of 
solving coordination problems in the field of foreign investment. 
There will be little point for nations in engaging in investment agreements 
if the purpose of these agreements is not to be construed for the ultimate benefits 
of nations to promote their higher living standards, wealthier societies, and 
healthier environments. This ultimate goal is achieved, far beyond through 
investment attraction, by means of the structural capacity of States to regulate 
investment flows and activities to ensure that the desirable effects of investment 
are both actually delivered and constantly delivered without destroying or eroding 
other infrastructures of the human community such as health, environment, 
culture, labor protection, and the economy itself. Compounded by the lack of the 
public character of investor-State arbitral forums, the common good will be 
destroyed or severely diminished if the very means, i.e. the regulatory power, 
required to protect basic values of human beings is to be curtailed by obligations 
created by arbitral tribunals rather than international law. The scheme of self 
determination of States in regulating and controlling foreign corporations cannot 
be predicated on a constitutional adjudicative creation of obligations and their 
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retrospective application to States claimed to be violating them, thereby unduly 
deterring States from fulfilling their own constitutional tasks and duties towards 
human beings or subjecting them to compensation, often in huge amounts. 
Practices in international law reject a scheme of a constitutional determination of 
rights of foreign corporations and implied adjudicative determination power by 
arbitral. Nor does the common good justify the desirability for such a scheme.   
Factual analysis of the question of expropriation in hard indeterminacies is 
restricted to ascertaining whether an alleged instance is covered by the scope of 
primary rules on that issue duly established in international law without 
employing contingent principles or engaging justice assessments. Moral or policy 
evaluation underlying the determination of rules on expropriation, being a creative 
task, should not permeate the factual assessment of the conduct of States in 
violation of existing obligations.  In foreign investment general principles of law 
are not substitute for customary international law so that anytime a customary 
international rule is hard to establish, a general principle of law be advanced to 
rationalize a desired outcome. Determination of the scope of obligations for 
expropriation of foreign investors‘ property in measuring the conduct of States 
and its consequence in hard indeterminacies is according to the criteria of 
legitimacy reserved for States. Customary international law is the appropriate 
source to cull legal determinations of primary obligations of States in hard 
indeterminacies towards corporations in foreign investment.  
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CHAPTER V                                                                                                                                                                                                 
CUSTOMARY DETERMINATIONS AND HARD PENUMBRA 
IN THE CONCEPT OF EXPROPRIATION  
 
Absent a particular authorization for arbitral tribunals to make decisions 
according to justice, it requires determination in the customary framework of 
international law to impose an obligation on States for their conduct and its 
consequence for the expropriation of the property of foreign corporations in hard 
indeterminacies.  Accordingly, to identify the content of rules of international law 
on expropriation, recourse must be made to the constituent elements of customary 
law. To this end, opinio juris and practice in the analysis offered in this study for 
judgments building customary determination will be employed to identify the 
statement of the law.
754
 Hard indeterminacies in the concept of expropriation as to 
the conduct of States for exercising regulatory measures and compensation for 
exercising economic reforms in natural resources will be examined.  
 
A. State Regulation for Public Wellbeing  
The question that is addressed here with regard to the conduct is whether 
bona fide regulation of States interfering with foreign investment constitutes 
indirect expropriation in international law making States liable for compensation. 
What is meant by bona fide regulations, in the language of recent investment 
treaty practice, are ―regulatory actions … designed and applied to protect 
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the 
environment.‖755 Thus, the subject of regulation examined below is limited to the 
question of bona fide regulation including that for environment, health, safety, or 
other forms for human protection including human rights and subjects falling 
within the sustainable development discourse.
756
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i. Lex Lata in the Background     
In 1962, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed the 
Resolution 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. The 
Resolution 1803 constitutes a significant instrument for exploring opinions and 
practices both before and after the Resolution in order to appraise the status of 
customary law on each particular question about expropriation and compensation 
for it in international law.
757
  However, to represent customary law, it requires 
examination of other practices and opinions to meet the requirements of opinio 
juris and State practice for each particular instance. The Report on State 
Responsibility prepared by the ILC in 1959 provides important data as to these 
practices and opinions. With regard to expropriation, Article 4 of the Resolution 
1803 provides that 
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on 
grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest 
which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private 
interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall 
be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in 
force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its 
sovereignty and in accordance with international law….758 
 
The Resolution 1803, just as with many investment treaties, does not define 
expropriation, nationalization, or requisition. State acts on a wide-scale program 
for transferring ownership from private owners to public ownership usually in key 
economic sectors or industries is commonly known as nationalization. Therefore, 
nationalization has found a distinct term of art in international law as the 
prototype of an ―impersonal‖ or ―general‖ act of expropriation as opposed to 
                                                                                                                                     
taxation which usually follow specific provisions under tax treaties for which international law 
does not consider liability for compensation. To the contrary is the example of actions that are 
regulatory or implemented by legislation or regulation such as nationalizations that expropriate the 
property of foreign investors but international law does require compensation.    
757
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―individual or personal‖ acts of expropriation targeting individual property.759 
This also carries a distinct legal situation, which would be revisited. Expropriation 
in general denotes ―the deprivation of a former property owner of his property.‖760 
Substance still overrides the terminology.
761
 What matters is the substance and 
status of international law on the particular hard penumbral question of bona fide 
regulations for public wellbeing affecting foreign investment.  
Before the question of bona fide regulation arose as a hard penumbra in 
investment treaty arbitration, the instances, views and practices surrounding the 
customary rule concerned direct expropriation primarily and more recently 
expropriation in indirect forms. It should be reminded that many arbitral cases of 
the past featured a special mandate in one way or another for the tribunal to 
decide also on the basis of equity or justice, which do not represent the law for 
later cases.
762
 Prior to 1960s, instances of direct expropriation underlay the 
practice and opinion of States as to the customary concept of expropriation for a 
duty of compensation. In these instances, the State‘s intent to expropriate was 
either express or obvious, the conduct resulted in the deprivation of property 
through physical seizure or removal of title, and the State was directly enriched as 
a result of the act.  
The elements of intent, deprivation, and enrichment were involved in both 
individual expropriations and expropriations of general application not targeted 
against a specific property.
763
 The latter expropriations occurred under reforms in 
agrarian, mining or other sectors, which were sometimes motivated by 
revolutionary changes in the political structure of  States as in France, the former 
Soviet Union, Mexico, Poland, former Czechoslovakia, former Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Albania, and Germany (Eastern zone) and 
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sometimes for development programs as later in France, Great Britain, and 
Japan.
764
 These elements also prevailed in the actions by Cuba in 1960 with 
regard to the property of foreigners in the sugar and oil industries and the 
expropriation of the Dutch property by Indonesia.
765
  These features were also 
extant in outright nationalizations since 1950s mostly in the context of oil 
concession agreements, which peaked in 1970s and 1980s.
766
 
The arbitral views also implicated cases featuring the elements of intent, 
deprivation and direct enrichment. These characteristics existed in the deprivation 
of movable or immovable property usually the land owned by an individual.
767
 
The cases concerning requisition of property carried the same features.
768
 
Moreover, these elements characterized the cases of holders of concessionary 
property rights as intangible rights.
769
  
Concurrent to these instances and cases, there were acts interfering with 
economic activities or businesses that generally did not rise to the level of 
international law at all for (or an expression of desirability for) a duty for 
compensation in international law because they represented the eminent domain 
of States. Examples include, measures taken by the United States, France, and 
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others in prohibiting the manufacturing of certain products.
770
 Likewise, cases of 
partial interference of the sort of good will of a company were deemed not to give 
rise to a duty for compensation.
771
 The tradition of outright expropriations has 
become dormant though susceptible to eruption in any major political or 
economic turmoil. This has shifted both practical and empirical judgments to 
indirect expropriation.
772
  
The Polish Upper Silesia and Norwegian Ship-Owners cases emerged 
where the Tribunals found intangible property rights under contracts related to the 
expropriated tangible property to be expropriations just as well despite the fact 
that the respective States did not purport to expropriate the contracts.
773
 These are 
the prime cases assumed to indicate that the intent of the State is not necessary for 
expropriation to arise, representing cases of indirect expropriation.
774
 Still, the 
elimination of the intent of the State altogether from elements of expropriation 
does not follow necessarily from Upper Silesia and Norwegian Ship-Owners 
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cases. Firstly, as practical views these decisions do not per se change the element 
of intent existing in the overwhelming instances upon which the State practice and 
opinion built the customary rule for  expropriation. Secondly, these cases, and 
apparently the academic views on them, concerned the question of ‗express‘ or 
‗stated‘ intent not the ‗existence‘ of intent to expropriate on the part of the State. 
Thirdly, in both cases the contractual claims were ancillary and part of the 
physical taking of assets (ships and factory). It is very plausible that those 
tribunals inferred the intent to expropriate the ancillary intangible rights from the 
intent of the State to expropriate the tangible property. In other words, these cases 
were not addressing bona fide regulatory measures of States. Thus, to count the 
decisions in Upper Silesia and Norwegian Ship-owner cases even as practical 
views in favor of the rejection of the intent of the State as a necessary element to 
characterize regulatory measures as (indirect) expropriation liable to 
compensation is of much doubt.  
The events and views underlying the practice and opinion of States 
embodied the elements of intent, deprivation and direct enrichment in the concept 
of expropriation. Regulation was not the focus of instances of the expropriation 
rule. Neither did practical views exist to provide proposals for the opinio juris and 
subscription by State practice to conceive bona fide regulation as part of the 
concept of expropriation under the customary law reflected in the opinion and 
practice of States. Regulation was not the subject of opinions and practices 
building the customary rule.  
 There is a tendency to tie the question of regulation in international law to 
indirect expropriation. Originally, indirect expropriation concerned the form of 
expropriation for situations with all the characteristics of intent, deprivation, and 
enrichment but without outright seizure of property, or formal transfer of title or 
ownership or formal expression of intent, formal decree or other formal forms. 
Indirect expropriation was not meant to capture legitimate State regulation by the 
sole effect or removal of intent. Indirect expropriation was exclusive of bona fide 
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regulation. The Harvard Draft was less clear on this point.
775
 This conception of 
indirect expropriation found more expression in the OECD Draft Convention on 
the Protection of Foreign Property in 1967 explaining the notion of indirect 
deprivation under Article 3:  
By using the phrase ‗to deprive…directly or indirectly …‘ in the 
text of the Article [3] it is, however, intended to bring within its 
compass any measures taken with the intent of wrongfully 
depriving the national concerned of the substance of his rights and 
resulting in such loss (e.g. prohibiting the national to sell his 
property of forcing him to do so at a fraction of the fair market 
price). 
776
 
 
Likewise, the Commentary on the American Law Institute‘s Restatement Third of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States separated bona fide regulation from 
measures in forms that may harbor elements of indirect expropriation. The 
Commentary noted that   
A State is responsible as for an expropriation of property when it 
subjects alien property to taxation, regulation, or other action that 
is confiscatory, or that prevents, unreasonably interferes with, or 
unduly delays, effective enjoyment of an alien‘s property or its 
removal from the State‘s territory… A State is not responsible for 
loss of property or for other economic disadvantage resulting from 
bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other 
action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police 
power of States, if it is not discriminatory…777  
 
More importantly, this conception of indirect expropriation was the natural 
corollary of  the status of customary international law on bona fide regulation, 
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which did not look to the effect but the unlawful character of the conduct as well 
to characterize a regulation as expropriation. In their study of postwar lump sum 
agreements, Lillitch and Weston observed that ―postwar international claims 
tended to define ‗indirect‘ foreign-wealth deprivations as effective and permanent 
denials of the ‗use and enjoyment‘ of alien-owned property, and . . . compensated 
for such deprivations . . . only to the extent that the claimed losses have not 
resulted from good-faith (i.e., nondiscriminatory) exercises of regulatory 
power.‖778 They further stated that ―customary international law generally has 
reached the same results.‖779  
Notwithstanding the involvement of factual issues in questions of indirect 
expropriation, under customary international law there has been a legal criterion 
with respect to characterization of regulation as expropriation, which is of 
essential necessity. Customary international law has required an additional 
element of unlawfulness to characterize a regulation as (indirect) expropriation. 
Not only the intention of the State but also intention in bad faith through the 
unlawful character of the regulation under international law was required to 
qualify compensation. What is meant by the unlawful character here for the 
characterization of regulation as expropriation includes a breach of a condition of 
legality of non-discrimination, public purpose and due process determined in 
customary international law to describe what is ‗arbitrary‘ and wrongful not solely 
a breach of a treaty.
780
 Customary international law recognizes the power of States 
to regulate as a matter of self-determination and sovereignty unless the regulation 
by character is unlawful. The line between indirect expropriation and non-
compensable regulation might often be in factual terms so nebulous but that does 
not dispense with the juridical line in terms of the demonstration of the unlawful 
character of the regulation as per customary determinations.  
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International law imposed no limitation on regulation except under rules 
such as non-discrimination or due process whereby compensation may be 
required for interference with property as a result of discrimination or lack of due 
process amounting to denial of justice in international law. Adverse regulatory 
measures have been compensable in international law by virtue of their unlawful 
character—not their effect or otherwise— for specific wrongful actions such as 
discrimination or lack of due process resulting in denial of justice. These 
situations carry the element of not only the intention of the State but also intention 
in bad faith under such specific rules of international law.  
Before the rise of investment treaty arbitration in the post-NAFTA era, no 
sustained practical view existed to even set a proposing stage for States‘ 
subscription through their practice and opinion to conceive, include, and 
recognize bona fide regulation as a compensable conduct under the concept of 
expropriation in customary international law. Past instances of expropriation and 
practical views requiring compensation for them do not support that States in their 
practices and opinions on accepting the duty to pay for compensation were 
accepting a limitation on their bona fide regulations as compensatory in 
international law. No such limitation existed in international customary law.  This 
is, furthermore, the conception of indirect expropriation expressed by States today 
as to their obligation for expropriation and ‗effect tantamount or equivalent to 
expropriation‘. The clarification offered in certain recent investment treaties that 
has gained momentum since 2004 by the introduction of the new US Model BIT 
explains this conception of indirect expropriation as ―an action or series of 
actions‖ which ―has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal 
transfer of title or outright seizure.‖781  
In international law, bona fide regulation has been a lawful act without 
liability for compensation not as a matter of police power doctrine in domestic 
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systems rather by virtue of international law‘s own basic value of self-
determination and structural sovereignty. A conception of indirect expropriation 
to include bona fide regulation to fall within the scope of the concept of 
expropriation, as a hard penumbra requires determination in customary 
international law to meet the legitimacy requirements of coherence and 
recognition. The categorization between direct and indirect expropriation should 
not be the focus of the legal analysis. Rather whether there is a customary 
determination to impose a limitation on States to make them liable to compensate 
for bona fide regulation in the absence of an unlawful element determined in 
customary international law itself such as a violation of the non-discrimination 
rule.  
The problem is in the first place rooted in the tendency to draw from the 
(indirect) expropriation rule in international law a principle of general application 
applicable to all State measures that ignore the legitimacy criteria requiring 
coherence of the content of the law for each hard penumbra according to the rule 
of recognition. Even if there exists or emerges  a criterion— like   the sole effect 
of the State‘s conduct irrespective of the State‘s intent— for measuring direct or 
indirect expropriation, such a criterion may not automatically transfer in a 
principle fashion to the hard penumbra of bona fide regulations to express their 
legal status in international law. The particular situation of bona fide regulation is 
a hard penumbra in the legal concept of expropriation in international law that 
follows its own criteria of legitimacy for coherence and recognition in a 
customary determination not to be borrowed in analogy from either domestic 
approaches or approaches in international law on other instances of direct or 
indirect expropriation. For a positive customary determination to form, it requires 
widespread State practice and opinion in subscribing to a given practical view 
proposing compensation for bona fide regulation. A few negative reactions would 
signify the opposite in State practice and opinion and non-emergence of such a 
new limitation.  It is appropriate to examine the practical views emerging as lex 
ferenda to include bona fide regulation in the concept of expropriation liable to 
compensation and the State reaction to such lex ferenda.  
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ii. Lex Ferenda and Bona Fide Regulation 
a) Liability beyond Customary International Law  
1. The Sole Effect of the Conduct 
Some tribunals have viewed that for indirect expropriation to occur the 
sole effect suffices not the intention of the State.
782
 Academic opinion has also 
implied the sole effect criterion by suggesting that where the effect is similar to 
direct expropriation, the investor would probably be covered under the BITs.
783
  
The US jurisprudence on indirect taking leans toward the distinction between a 
taking for the public use and a taking out of police power for regulatory purposes 
requiring compensation for the former but not for the latter.
784
 In criticizing this 
approach, Higgins suggests a sole effect test by asking ―is this distinction 
intellectually viable? Is it not the State in both cases (that is, either by a taking for 
a public purpose, or by regulating) purporting to act in the common good? And in 
each case has the owner of the property not suffered loss?‖ and views that 
―[u]nder international law standards, a regulation that amounted (by virtue of its 
scope or effect) to a taking, would need to be ‗for a public purpose‘ (in the sense 
of in the general, rather than for a private, interest). And just compensation would 
be due.‖785 This approach is traceable in views of a number of tribunals. 
According to the Santa Elena Tribunal, ―expropriatory environmental 
measures—no matter how laudable and beneficial to society as a whole— are in 
this respect similar to any other expropriatory measures that a State  may take in 
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order to implement its polices: where property is expropriated, even for 
environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the State‘s obligation 
to pay compensation remains.‖786 This statement treats liability for environmental 
regulatory measures affecting foreign investment as other instances of 
expropriation. Nonetheless, the tribunal was addressing a case which was already 
determined in international law as an instance of expropriation. The case 
concerned an outright (regulatory) decree with the intent to expropriate the subject 
land for a public purpose for which Costa Rica had proposed payment of 
compensation.
787
 That such an outright act of expropriation had to be 
compensated was not in dispute at all, rather the amount of compensation was 
disputed.
788
 This case represents a classical instance of expropriation for which 
international law has already determined the duty of compensation.  
Nationalizations are regulatory measures in a wider scope, which are still 
compensable in international law. Therefore, the Santa Elena case and the above 
passage by the tribunal is of no weight for regulations lacking the feature of an 
outright, direct expropriation because it was addressing situations that 
international law already determines as expropriation and compensable as such 
not addressing the areas of hard indeterminacy regarding the conduct of the State.  
Relying on the above passage by Santa Elena Tribunal, the Tecmed 
Tribunal held that ―we find no principle stating that regulatory administrative 
actions are per se excluded from the scope of the Agreement.‖789 Likewise, the 
Azurix Tribunal appreciated the passage by the Santa Elena Tribunal about 
environmental measures.
790
 In a far distant context than that underlying the Santa 
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Elena case, the Azurix Tribunal held that  ―[f]or the Tribunal, the issue is not so 
much whether the measure concerned is legitimate and serves a public purpose, 
but whether it is a measure that, being legitimate and serving a public purpose, 
should give rise to a compensation claim.‖791 The Azurix Tribunal then suggested 
that if regulation tantamount to expropriation were not compensable for being 
taken for public purpose, it would be contradictory to the requirement that 
expropriation for public purpose should be compensated.
792
 The Azurix Tribunal 
exposes the issue of bona fide regulations to a contradiction with general law 
(restated in BITs) that requires compensation for expropriations taken for public 
purpose. This approach rests on the question-begging assumption that such 
measures are tantamount or equivalent to expropriation in the first place on the 
sole effect doctrine or other doctrines of similar effect applicable to the direct or 
indirect expropriation. No contradiction arises from the statement that 
international law does not measure bona fide regulation by reference to its sole 
effect or similar criteria.   On the other hand, these practical views suggesting the 
sole effect doctrine for measuring States‘ regulation as compensable expropriation 
tend to focus on the common public purpose in both regulation and indirect 
expropriation. However, the public purpose of the measure, which both an 
indirect expropriation and a regulatory action may share, is not at issue. Rather, 
the question is whether international law in its customary determination has 
included bona fide regulation without an intention manifested in an act such as 
discrimination in the concept of expropriation. What is not necessary is the 
expressed or acknowledged intention in indirect expropriations in form. An 
unlawful element such as discrimination is still necessary.  
 The sole effect test is further implied in a ―consequential‖ approach to 
expropriation that relies on the causal link of regulatory measures and a purposive 
frame of a BIT for investment promotion and protection based on the 
‗tantamount‘ phrase in a BIT expropriation clause.793 The academics holding this 
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view maintain, ―lawful regulation …is not expropriation.‖794 However, these 
scholars are suggesting a novel BIT obligation, whose breach renders the 
regulatory conduct of the State unlawful. They posit that ―consequential 
expropriations involve deprivations of the economic value of a foreign 
investment,  which, within the legal regime established by a BIT, must be deemed 
expropriatory because of their causal links to failures of the host State to fulfill its 
paramount obligations to establish and maintain an appropriate legal, 
administrative, and regulatory normative framework for foreign investment.‖795   
 What begs the question is where those paramount obligations come from 
whereby the scope of a BIT expropriation clause is construed in this manner to 
include regulations as consequential expropriations? The issue concerns a hard 
penumbra under investment treaties posing the scope of the primary obligation of 
the State on expropriation in the first place. Such an obligation may not be taken 
for granted on a purposive interpretation of the expropriation clause or the treaty 
as a whole by reference to the investment protection purpose of the treaty or other 
purposes attributed to a BIT. The investment promotion or protection purpose in a 
BIT framework furnishes no conclusive legal statement for the scope of the 
expropriation clause to include regulations as consequential expropriations but a 
purpose among competing purposes and demands of justice requiring 
determination according to the rule of the recognition. To attribute such an 
obligation to States in the hard zone of regulation requires a customary 
determination.  
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 The sole effect doctrine misrepresents customary international law in that 
almost all instances, views, and practices in the background of the opinions and 
practice of States featured elements of intent and enrichment in addition to effect. 
The core problem of a sole effect doctrine for the regulatory measures of States is 
still disregarding coherence for the common good. The doctrine essentially 
perpetuates a notion of treating all instances emerging in the standard and 
penumbra areas of the concept of expropriation alike by the sole measure of their 
effect. The sole effect doctrine fails to appreciate that coherence may require 
another solution, i.e. liability by the unlawful character, for the particular situation 
of regulatory measures formed in the customary determination to give rise to an 
authoritative statement of international law in this hard penumbra. The application 
of the sole effect doctrine would further disregard coherence for the common 
good by the very projection of the sole effect test as the statement of the law for a 
situation where international law has no such a determination for this particular 
hard issue. Even if the concept of expropriation in international law consisted in 
the sole effect for the ordinary instances, this criterion would cease to express the 
authority of the law for the hard penumbral instance of interference of regulation 
with foreign investment. Moreover, treating the sole effect as the representation of 
the law would deny coherence for the common good by disregarding the equal 
weight of the competing demands of justice in constructing the content of the law 
for the particular situation of regulations and treating them as demands for the 
revision of the law projected in the sole effect doctrine. This departure from 
coherence drastically detracts from the sole effect doctrine even as a practical 
view in the legal discourse of the concept of expropriation in the international law 
on foreign investment. Furthermore, to rise to a juridical statement of international 
law for measuring bona fide regulations of States affecting foreign investment, the 
sole effect proposal requires subscription by State practice and opinion.    
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2. The Proportionality Test  
 
The proportionality test is a test that merges in a determination task. In 
distinguishing regulation from a ‗taking‘, Weston advocated ―the test of a policy 
which favors a peaceful, productive, and equitable global economy perceived in 
terms of the common inclusive interests of world community perceived in terms 
of aggregate well-being.‖796 There is no objection to this test but the question is 
that whether an arbitral tribunal is empowered to engage in such a task not to 
mention the requirement for a genuine coherence following such an 
empowerment. The proportionality test poses the same concern.  
The proportionality between the aim and the burden of a regulation has 
been suggested to test whether legitimate regulation can be considered 
expropriation and thus to be compensated. The test has been developed in the 
ECHR jurisprudence and context.
797
 In investment treaty arbitration, this test has 
gained support in some tribunals.   
Having viewed that ―regulatory actions and measures will not be initially 
excluded from the definition of expropriatory acts,‖ the Tecmed Tribunal 
appreciated the proportionality test from the ECHR system as a yardstick in 
addition to its effect in order to gauge the characterization of such acts as 
expropriation.
798
 The Tribunal acknowledged, as a starting point, ―the due 
deference owing to the State when defining the issues that affect its public policy 
or the interests of society as a whole, as well as the actions that will be 
implemented to protect such values.‖799 The Tribunal, however, assumed a power 
for itself to second-guess those policies and values by questioning whether the 
State actions ―are reasonable with respect to their goals, the deprivation of 
economic rights and the legitimate expectations of who suffered such 
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 Weston, supra note 772, at 124. 
797
 See Chapter IV, Section B (1) (c) (5).  
798
 Tecmed, supra note 599, at para. 122. To this end, the Tecmed Tribunal held that it ―will 
consider … whether such actions or measures are proportional to the public interest presumably 
protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments, taking into account that the 
significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the proportionality.‖ Ibid. 
799
 Ibid.  
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deprivation.‖800 The Tribunal suggested a reversion to the sort of effect doctrine 
of substantial deprivation and the absence of compensation for such deprivation as 
the yardstick to measure the proportionality.
801
  
The Tecmed Tribunal also overstated the holding of the ECHR that 
considered a political right of voting for electing authorities making decisions as 
an element of distinction between foreign investors and nationals.
802
 The ECHR 
has expressed that view in the context of a human rights convention and 
protection of individual human beings. Little difference exists between domestic 
corporations and foreign corporations as neither enjoy the political right of voting 
to elect decision makers. Foreign corporations cannot exercise a political right of 
voting in their home country either although they may heavily lobby in the 
political processes which multinational corporations do everywhere. Even if the 
distinction holds good as such, it does not necessarily mean that in the assessment 
of proportionality the foreign investors should receive less burden than nationals. 
Although foreign investors do not enjoy some political rights, many multinational 
companies benefit enormously from economic advantages far greater than 
nationals do by profiting hugely from local societies and resources. The profits 
obtained from a country could no less equally be raised as a demand of justice to 
be taken into account in assessing the burden of regulation and, by that measure, 
huge profits accrue to foreign investors in comparison to national individuals. 
Referring to Tecmed, the Azurix Tribunal also welcomed the 
proportionality test employed by the ECHR as a yardstick in addition to the effect 
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 Ibid.  
801
 (―To value such charge or weight, it is very important to measure the size of the ownership 
deprivation caused by the actions of the State and whether such deprivation was compensated or 
not.‖) Ibid.  
802
 (―On the basis of a number of legal and practical factors, it should be also considered that the 
foreign investor has a reduced or nil participation in the taking of the decisions that affect it, partly 
because the investors are not entitle to exercise political rights reserved to the nationals of the 
State, such as voting for the authorities that will issue the decisions that affect such investors.‖) 
Ibid. In  the case of James and Others v. United Kingdom, the ECHR held that ―[e]specially as 
regards a taking of property effected in the context of a social reform, there may well be good 
grounds for drawing a distinction between nationals and non-nationals as far as compensation is 
concerned. To begin with, non-nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike 
nationals, they will generally have played no part in the election or designation of its authors nor 
have been consulted on its adoption. Secondly, . . . there may well be legitimate reason for 
requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest than non-nationals‖ James, supra 
note 713, at 39, para. 63.  
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of the measure and its aim.
803
  Likewise, the Tribunal in the LG&E case, while 
recognizing the right of States to adopt policies for public purpose, advocated the 
proportionality test espoused by the Tecmed Tribunal.
804
  
The proportionality test has gained no express support in the NAFTA 
arbitration. NAFTA Tribunals have generally avoided the proportionality test. The 
tribunal in the Fireman‘s Fund cases, noting the Tecmed Tribunal‘s reliance on 
the proportionality factor, held that ―[t]he factor is used by the European Court of 
Human Rights, and it may be questioned whether it is a viable source of 
interpreting Article 1110 of the NAFTA.‖805 The NAFTA clause on expropriation 
still has no special character in narrowing the concept of expropriation within 
NAFTA to make it distinct from other investment treaties. The particular status of 
regulation emanates from customary international law governing all investment 
treaties posing a hard penumbra in the concept of expropriation. The transposition 
of a proportionality doctrine from the ECHR context to investment treaty 
arbitration is unfounded. One commentator who tends to support a degree of 
discretion for arbitral tribunals in deciding the question of indirect expropriation, 
has also described the employment of the proportionality test in invest arbitrations 
as a task ―to redo the regulator‘s work‖ that ―may be deemed unwise or indeed 
unpalatable‖.806  
The essential objection to the proportionality test is the legitimacy deficit 
for its employment in investment arbitration. The proportionality test would lead 
to second-guessing the policies and values of States—a matter that is not vested in 
arbitral tribunals. The proportionality carries a political and moral assessment 
function to be applied in determination of the content of the law by those 
recognized by the rule of recognition in international law or according to clear, 
specific authorization. The proportionality test is not a test to identify the 
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 Azurix, supra note 790, at paras. 311-312. The Azurix Tribunal rejected the expropriation claim 
on the ground of lack of sufficient impact on the investment. Ibid. at 322.  
804
 LG&G v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, 2006, 46 ILM 36(2007), at para. 195. The Tribunal 
tended to rely on the effect factor in rejecting the claim of expropriation because the measures by 
Argentine did not have a severe, permanent impact on LG&E‘s investment as it did not deprive it 
of the enjoyment of investment or cause loss of the control of investment. Ibid. at paras. 198-200.  
805
 Fireman‘s Fund v. Mexico, ICSID Award, ARB (AF)/02/01, July 14 2006, at para. 176(j), 
n.161.    
806
 Paulson , supra note 772 ,  at 11.  
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statement of the law for a claim of regulatory expropriation against a State to be 
applied by the arbitral tribunals in investment arbitration. For the employment of 
the proportionality test or similar tests in investment arbitration, it requires 
specific authorization by the parties. In the absence of parties‘ authorization, to 
employ the proportionality test to measure the conduct of States towards foreign 
corporations in investment arbitration would offend the rule of recognition.
807
  
The proportionality test as a determination task engaging in moral and 
political assessments is a criterion within the institution of the ECHR subject to its 
own rule of recognition establishing the power of the ECHR. International 
arbitrators in investment arbitration cannot transplant a determination power from 
ECHR or similar forums of national or international character or the constitutional 
schemes of national systems operating under their own rule of recognition or 
delegation of power. They cannot engage or mask their moral and political 
assessment to create an obligation for States for the benefit of corporations under 
a power denied to them by the rule of recognition of the international law 
governing the dispute. The introduction of the proportionality test in the analysis 
of international law on expropriation would, as reliance on contingent principles 
does, shift the identification of the statement of international law to the creation of 
the law. This is not a matter of citing another case whose statement of the law 
might itself be doubtful instead of establishing the statement of the law through 
recognized sources; this is even more offensive to the rule of recognition by 
introducing a fairness tool and foisting it as the statement of the law. Of course, 
international law looks at the proportionality of the burden on investors and 
benefit to the public; that is part of the requirement of coherence and advancement 
of the common good. Nonetheless, coherence merges with the rule of recognition 
to validate the power to engage in determination and coherence.  In the absence of 
                                                 
807
 For a provision that may arguably suggest a reference to some degree of proportionality test, 
though not solely, in an investment treaty, see ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, supra note 
681, Annex on expropriation and compensation, paragraph 3 (c); ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement, supra note 664, Annex 2, para. 3. In these provisions, the proportionality 
of the government action to the public purpose is listed among factors to be considered in 
assessing indirect expropriation. However, both agreements exclude the legitimate, non-
discriminatory regulatory measures for public purposes such as environment, health from the 
scope of indirect expropriation.  See infra notes 834-835 and accompanying text.   
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a particular rule of recognition for the adjudicative determination power, the 
employment of the proportionality test along with other general tests for the 
determination of the content of international law in the evaluation of justice 
demands to make it coherent, is a process of rule formation vested in customary 
determinations by States not investment arbitral tribunals. The effect or burden 
doctrines with respect to bona fide regulation are only part of the lex ferenda 
confronted by competing lex ferenda that advocate or suggest the maintenance of 
the current regime of customary international law that requires an additional 
unlawful element to characterize regulation as expropriation.   
 
b) Liability by the Character of the Conduct under Customary International 
Law  
Many instruments and opinions acknowledge the lex lata in international 
law on the particular situation of the relation of regulation to expropriation to 
require an unlawful element to characterize regulation as expropriation. The 
OECD Draft Convention on Protection of Foreign Property and the US 
Restatement Third, together with other studies, earlier discussed were among 
instruments that expressed the status of international law.
808
 This status was also 
acknowledged in certain arbitral tribunals before the rise of investment treaty 
arbitration.
809
 
Recently opinions have further mounted both within and outside arbitral 
tribunals that acknowledge and support the position of international law on bona 
fide regulation as stated in earlier documents. These opinions are not limited to 
tribunals. NGOs have also expressed their view. Among the NGOs, supporting 
the position of customary international law reference may be made to the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development. The IISD Model International 
Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development provides that  
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 See supra notes 776-779 and accompanying text.  
809
 See Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates, 23 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 378, at 387, para. 
26 (1989). 
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Consistent with the right of States to regulate and the customary 
international law principles on police powers, bona fide regulatory 
measures taken by a Member State that are designed and applied to 
protect or enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
public health, safety and the environment, shall not constitute an 
indirect expropriation under this Article.
810
 
 
Customary international law at least has a twofold legal criterion to 
characterize as expropriation a regulation that does not fall within the direct 
expropriation category. The arbitral views are not uniform and some are even 
ambivalent or innovative in relation to the position reflected in customary 
international law. According to the Fireman‘s Fund case, the issue concerns a 
distinction between ―compensable expropriation and non-compensable 
regulation.‖811 As such, discrimination was conceived, in its ordinary context of 
direct expropriation than the particular situation of regulation, as a factor to 
distinguish between a compensable and non-compensable expropriation and not 
as a factor characterizing expropriation itself.
812
 Although the result concerns the 
question of compensation for expropriation, the legal criterion for the distinction 
between regulation and expropriation is an issue relating to the conduct of the 
State whether it is characterized in international law as expropriation. The 
consequence of compensation results from this legal characterization.  Both in the 
past practices and recent practices of States, as will be seen, States are not 
asserting that their bona fide regulation is expropriation but not compensable 
rather that it is not expropriation. It is one thing to State that an unlawful element 
is also required as a necessary condition in addition to a substantial impact on 
investment to characterize a regulation of general application as expropriation and 
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 Institute for Sustainable Development in its Model International Agreement on for Investment 
for Sustainable Development, April 2005, in Article 8 (I). http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/ 
investment_model_ int_agreement.pdf.  See also Sornarajah, supra note 718 at 299-300. 
(―Regulatory functions are a matter of sovereign right of the host State and there could be no right 
in international law to compensation or diplomatic protection in respect of such interferences.‖) 
Ibid.     
811
 Fireman‘s Fund, supra note 805, at paras. 176(j), 205-206.    
812
 See ibid. at  paras. 205-206. The Tribunal found the Mexican regulation discriminatory that 
could have given rise to a claim under NAFTA Article 1102 or 1105 or 1405 had the Tribunal had 
jurisdiction for claims under those articles but found that it had not given rise to expropriation 
under NAFTA Article 1110 because the investment had become worthless. Ibid. at paras. 203, 
207, 217.  
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by that matter compensable. It is another matter to argue that discrimination or 
another element of unlawfulness is a factor to measure whether what is already 
expropriation by other tests (the effect) is compensable or non-compensable. The 
latter is the corollary of treating all instances of expropriation alike without 
considering the particular situation of regulation as a hard penumbra with its 
distinct legal position in the discourse of expropriation. The vice of this argument 
is that it would result in the sole effect doctrine, quite contrary to international 
law, to hold a regulation compensable where the substantial impact exists but an 
unlawful element is absent.  
The Feldman Tribunal stated  
The Tribunal notes that the ways in which governmental 
authorities may force a company out of business, or significantly 
reduce the economic benefits of its business, are many. In the past, 
confiscatory taxation, denial of access to infrastructure or 
necessary raw materials, imposition of unreasonable regulatory 
regimes, among others, have been considered to be expropriatory 
actions. At the same time, governments must be free to act in the 
broader public interest through protection of the environment, new 
or modified tax regimes, the granting or withdrawal of government 
subsidies, reductions or increases in tariff levels, imposition of 
zoning restrictions and the like. Reasonable governmental 
regulation of this type cannot be achieved if any business that is 
adversely affected may seek compensation, and it is safe to say that 
customary international law recognizes this …813 
 
The Feldman Tribunal while advocating freedom of States in legitimate regulation 
did not  express the legal criteria for characterization of regulation as 
expropriation or whether such criteria are issues regarding compensation than the 
characterization of the conduct of expropriation. The Tribunal still refereed to the 
US Restatement Third that together with other instruments and practices do 
provide answers to this question.
814
  
That regulation is not expropriation in international law is also reflected in 
the SD Myers Tribunal‘s dicta that ―[t]he general body of precedent usually does 
not treat regulatory action as amounting to expropriation. Regulatory conduct by 
                                                 
813
 Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID No. ARB(AF)/99/1 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Dec. 16, 2000), 42 
ILM 625 (2003), para. 103.  
814
 Ibid. at paras. 103,105.  
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public authorities is unlikely to be the subject of legitimate complaint under 
Article 1110 of the NAFTA, although the Tribunal does not rule out that 
possibility.‖815 Despite this strong position, the S.D. Myers Tribunal suggested 
that a permanent impact resulting in deprivation of property and benefit to the 
State could lead to expropriation.
816
 The Tribunal did not articulate the position of 
customary international law for an additional element of unlawfulness such as 
discrimination to characterize regulation as expropriation.   
The Glamis Tribunal seems to acknowledge the two-tier test for bona fide 
regulations, contained in customary international law, by its reference to effect as 
a threshold but not a sufficient criterion for characterizing a regulation as 
expropriation not expropriation as non-compensable. Observing that the term 
expropriation in NAFTA ―incorporates by reference customary international law 
on that subject,‖ the Glamis Tribunal referred to the US Restatement Third to 
discover the content of customary international law that ―[a] State is not 
responsible, however, ‗for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage 
resulting from bona fide … regulation … if it is not discriminatory‘.‖ 817 
Acknowledging reference to customary international law to interpret the 
expropriation clause, the Saluka Tribunal held ―[i]t is now established in 
international law that States are not liable to pay compensation to a foreign 
investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory powers, they adopt in a 
non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulations that are aimed at the general 
welfare.‖818 This statement appears to be supportive of the application of the 
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 SD Myers, supra note 663, at 281.  
816
 Ibid. (―Expropriations tend to involve the deprivation of ownership rights; regulations a lesser 
interference.‖) Ibid. at 281. (―In this case, the Interim Order and the Final Order were designed to, 
and did, curb SDMI‘s initiative, but only for a time. CANADA realized no benefit from the 
measure.) Ibid. at 287.    
817
 Glamis, supra note 610, at para. 354. The Tribunal, however, in what it referred to ―the 
foundational threshold inquiry of whether the property or property right was in fact taken‖  
continued whether there has been a substantial deprivation at all as the threshold question. Ibid. at 
357. The Tribunal held that ―the first factor in any expropriation analysis is not met.‖ Ibid. at para. 
536.  
818
 Saluka Investments BV (the Netherlands v. Czech republic, partial Award, 17 March 2006. 
para. 255.  
The Tribunal also held that ―[i]n the opinion of the Tribunal, the principle that a State does not 
commit an expropriation and is thus not liable to pay compensation to a dispossessed alien 
investor when it adopts general regulations that are ―commonly accepted as within the police 
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criteria of customary of international law. However, apparently the Tribunal did 
not consider the unlawful test provided by the customary international law such as 
discrimination for this particular situation decisive of what is and what is not 
unlawful regulation in international law.
819
 The Tribunal held that ―[i]t thus 
inevitably falls to the adjudicator to determine whether particular conduct by a 
State ‗crosses the line‘ that separates valid regulatory activity from expropriation. 
Faced with the question of when, how and at what point an otherwise valid 
regulation becomes, in fact and effect, an unlawful expropriation, international 
tribunals must consider the circumstances in which the question arises.‖820  
Instead of appreciating that in foreign investment regulatory  measures of 
States are prima facie lawful and search for specific restrictions by way of a 
customary rule such as discrimination to rebut that presumption, the Saluka 
Tribunal suggested engaging in a factual analysis, which invites legal 
determination under what is reasonable or not in the opinion of the Tribunal.  The 
Tribunal did not analyze the facts in view of whether the measure was for instance 
discriminatory as a legal criterion determined in customary international law for 
what is arbitrary or unreasonable to measure the unlawfulness of the regulatory 
conduct of States. Rather, the Tribunal engaged in determining whether the 
conduct was reasonable or unreasonable in the opinion of the tribunal.
821
 The 
Tribunal indicated that an error or improper act on the part of the Czech Republic 
might have changed the opinion of the Tribunal in finding expropriation as if such 
                                                                                                                                     
power of States‖ forms part of customary international law today.  There is ample case law in 
support of this proposition. As the Tribunal in Methanex Corp. v. USA said recently in its final 
award, ―[i]t is a principle of customary international law that, where economic injury results from 
a bona fide regulation within the police powers of a State, compensation is not required‖. Ibid. at 
para. 262 [footnotes omitted] 
819
 (―[I]nternational law has yet to identify in a comprehensive and definitive fashion precisely 
what regulations are considered ―permissible‖ and ―commonly accepted‖ as falling within the 
police or regulatory power of States and, thus, noncompensable. In other words, it has yet to draw 
a bright and easily distinguishable line between non-compensable regulations on the one hand and, 
on the other, measures that have the effect of depriving foreign investors of their investment and 
are thus unlawful and compensable in international law.‖ Ibid. at para. 263. 
820
 Ibid. at para. 264. [italics original]  
821
 (―The Czech State, in the person of its banking regulator, the CNB, had the responsibility to 
take a decision on 16 June 2000. It enjoyed a margin of discretion in the exercise of that 
responsibility. In reaching its decision, it took into consideration facts which, in the opinion of the 
Tribunal, it was very reasonable for it to consider. It then applied the pertinent Czech legislation to 
those facts – again, in a manner that the Tribunal considers reasonable.‖ Ibid. at para. 272. 
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an error or improper act criterion had substituted the unlawful test required by the 
customary international law or had constituted an additional element of 
unlawfulness.
822
  
There is no doubt that the facts and context of a case constitute an 
important aspect of dispute settlement analysis. Nevertheless, the factual analysis 
should assist whether the facts substantiate the criteria determined by the 
customary law such as discrimination. A factual analysis, in areas of hard 
penumbra for which an investment arbitral tribunal has not been specifically 
authorized to engage in justice evaluation, should not amount to a substitution of 
the conception of justice of the tribunal for the legal criteria determined in 
customary international law. A factual analysis in the sense of engaging the 
tribunal‘s creative role in the hard penumbra of State regulatory power is short of 
legitimacy of rule of recognition. This is not a question of predictability solely but 
how the legal criteria form in such hard penumbra obtaining authoritative 
statement and in their absence how to treat a claim of a violation of non-existing 
rule and dismissal of a creative role. A tribunal may validly argue that the content 
of law should change, but may not assume the power to make itself such a change 
in a hard penumbra of international law on foreign investment.  What customary 
international law has determined as the criterion or criteria for unlawfulness of 
regulations of general application, discrimination for instance, is precisely the line 
authoritatively determined by the legitimate body of the system to characterize 
what regulation is considered expropriation where regulation is not subject of 
direct expropriation with the elements of intent and enrichment existing in direct 
expropriation. Manifesting elements of intent to expropriate and direct enrichment 
in addition to the effect of deprivation, regulation constitutes a direct 
expropriation and compensable.
823
 Absent those other elements of direct 
expropriation, intent and direct enrichment, regulatory actions of States prima 
facie bona fide and legitimate in international law must be tested by a customary 
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 (―In the absence of clear and compelling evidence that the CNB erred or acted otherwise 
improperly in reaching its decision, which evidence has not been presented to the Tribunal, the 
Tribunal must in the circumstances accept the justification given by the Czech banking regulator 
for its decision.‖) Ibid. at para. 273.  
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 For an example, see the cases of nationalizations, supra note 766. 
297 
 
requirement of an unlawful element determined in customary international law to 
qualify as expropriation.  Otherwise, what is the point in acknowledging that in 
international law bona fide regulations are not expropriation and thus non-
compensable if at any rate that proposition of the law is to yield to adjudicative 
determinations. If international law has determined discrimination or another 
element of unlawfulness as the legal criterion to rebut the presumption of bona 
fide, legitimate, or normal attributes of a regulation, thus qualifying it as 
expropriation, then that must be the criterion to be applied by the tribunal without 
masking moral and political evaluations behind factual analysis.  
The controversial or changing character of what the elements of 
unlawfulness for characterization of regulation as expropriation  are or could form 
in customary international law does not affect, the dual test necessity for this 
characterization namely the test of unlawfulness in addition to its effect to feature 
regulation as (indirect) expropriation. The Methanex Tribunal comes closest to the 
dual test required in customary international law. The Methanex Tribunal held 
that   
In the Tribunal‘s view, Methanex is correct that an intentionally 
discriminatory regulation against a foreign investor fulfils a key 
requirement for establishing expropriation. But as a matter of 
general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a 
public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process 
and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is 
not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific 
commitments had been given by the regulating government to the 
then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the 
government would refrain from such regulation. 
824
  
 
Obviously compensation cannot count as an element for the 
characterization of the conduct as expropriation because it will negate the point of 
the unlawfulness test altogether by requiring compensation on its own measure of 
non-compensation. The duty to pay compensation for expropriation is an element 
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 Methanex, supra note 660, Part IV, Chapter D, para. 7. See also para. 15 that because the 
regulation measure was not unlawful in international law (not discriminatory, for public purpose 
and according to due process of law) it did not constitute expropriation. Ibid. The Methanex 
Tribunal also held that the California regulation did not have the ―features associated with 
expropriation‖, namely the loss of control. Ibid. at para. 16. 
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of unlawfulness for what is determined to be expropriation on other grounds of 
unlawfulness to characterize the conduct as expropriation. The other elements of 
unlawfulness as the Methanex Tribunal indicated include discrimination, public 
purpose or due process. The Methanex Tribunal‘s holding on these elements is not 
a practical view proposing modification to the existing law but a pronouncement 
of customary international law.   
The view by the Methanex Tribunal regarding the specific assurances, 
albeit widely shared among tribunals or academics, still seems more part of the 
practical opinion than a clear customary rule. If a specific assurance not to 
regulate is provided under a treaty, a conduct contrary to the treaty commitment is 
no doubt an unlawful act in customary international law though not an absolute 
one. However, the same cannot be said with certainty about specific assurances 
not to regulate provided under a contract, legislation, or other acts governed by 
domestic legal systems. The Methanex Tribunal is suggesting that regulation 
against a specific commitment not to regulate makes the regulation unlawful and 
could qualify as expropriation if the test of effect is also met.
825
 This position, 
sounding very persuasive from the practical view perspective, does not seem to 
have ripened into customary determination yet. To accord an international 
character to specific assurances provided to foreign investment under frameworks 
other than treaties is often, though not always successfully, sought through an 
umbrella clause that the majority of investment treaties including NAFTA do not 
feature.
826
 The argument of legitimate expectation arising from specific 
assurances as a factor to characterize the expropriation itself as unlawful without 
violating a treaty commitment or elements of legality in customary international 
                                                 
825
 Ibid. Part IV, Chapter D, at para. 7-8. See also Feldman case, for another recent case where the 
Tribunal  seems to approve that specific and ―definitive‖ assurances to the investor may be an 
element to characterize the regulation as expropriation and compensable under NAFTA. Feldman, 
supra note 813, at para. 148. On the other hand, a number of Tribunals have also attempted to go 
beyond what is a specific assurance to regulate to a more general approach of legitimate 
expectation advocating that general representations and assurances on which the investor has 
relied on also constitute a legitimate expectation and a conduct contrary to that requires 
compensation.  See for instance: Metalclad, supra note 600,  at para. 103; Azurix, supra note 790, 
at para. 318.  
826
 Approximately 40% of BITs contain an umbrella or respect clause. UNCTAD, BITs 95-06, 
supra note 72, at 73. It has been deleted from the US Model BIT. See ibid. at 74. NAFTA does not 
have an umbrella clause it either. 
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law is separate from the argument of utilizing specific commitments for the 
purpose of increasing compensation.
827
    
The international law characterization of expropriation for regulations that 
do not feature direct expropriation consists in the unlawful character of the 
conduct besides the gravity of its effect. It would be easier to receive customary 
determination for a practical view that proposes an addition or modification of an 
element of lawfulness such as that a conduct contrary to a specific commitment 
not to regulate constitutes an unlawful act characterizing regulation as 
expropriation.
828
 It would be far harder to obtain a customary determination to a 
practical view advocating a sole effect or similar doctrine to eliminate the 
requirement of an unlawful element for such characterization. The particular 
situation of regulation of States without an unlawful character falls within the 
freedom of action of States in international law for bona fide regulation. A change 
in the current customary determination for treating bona fide regulation as 
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 See below, Section B.  
828
 In a number of recent model and concluded investment treaties a variety of language has 
emerged in the discourse of indirect expropriation that recognize assurances by the States as a 
factor to be considered in a case by case analysis among the factors of the impact and the character 
of the conduct of the State. This in more general terms is reflected in the US and Canadian Model 
investment treaties. See U.S 2004 Model BIT, supra note 620, Annex B, Expropriation, Para. 4 (a) 
(ii). (―.... 4. The second situation addressed by Article 6 [Expropriation and Compensation](1) is 
indirect expropriation, where an action or series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent to 
direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure. (a) The determination of 
whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect 
expropriation, requires a case-by case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: (i) 
the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or series of actions 
by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not 
establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the government action 
interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the 
government action‖) Ibid. ; Canada Model BIT, supra note 664, Article 13(1), Paragraph (b) (ii). 
―The determination of whether a measure or series of measures of a Party constitute an indirect 
expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:  i) 
the economic impact of the measure or series of measures, although the sole fact that a measure or 
series of measures of a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment does 
not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; ii) the extent to which the measure or 
series of measures interfere with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and  iii) the 
character of the measure or series of measures‖ Ibid. A more specific provision is reflected in the 
recent ASEAN practice. (―[W]hether the government action breaches the government‘s prior 
binding written commitment to the investor whether by contract, licence or other legal 
document.‖)  ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, supra note 664, Annex 2 on 
expropriation. See also ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, supra note 681.  In all these 
approaches, legitimate expectation is only one factor among others for the assessment of indirect 
expropriation and more importantly in all these approaches legitimate, non-discriminatory 
regulatory action is excluded from the scope of indirect expropriation.   
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expropriation as proposed by practical views require subscription by States and 
fresh customary determination to meet the rule of recognition.  
 
iii. Recent State Practice    
If there exists a customary determination to add a customary rule imposing 
a limitation on States by characterizing bona fide regulations interfering with 
foreign investors‘ property due to its sole impact or proportionality as  
expropriation and thereby liable to compensation, domestic approaches to the 
contrary are immaterial. The emergence of a customary rule is still required to 
positively establish such a determination not by proposals found in arbitral or 
academic opinions but by the subscription of States to such evaluative opinions in 
abundant State practice and opinion to satisfy the requirements of customary rule 
formation for this particular situation of hard penumbra. A few instances of 
negative State practice, on the other hand, would signify non-emergence of the 
rule and thereby absence of liability for the States to compensate for bona fide 
regulation.   
States by treating the particular situation of bona fide regulation within the 
contours of current customary international law separate from indirect 
expropriation are giving negative attitude to views that suggest the elimination of 
the unlawfulness test for the characterization of regulation as expropriation. The 
interpretative note by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group of MAI seems a 
good starting point. This interpretative note does not represent State practice and 
opinion in the strict sense. Nevertheless, the interpretative note reflects the 
negative attitude of the States emerging among the countries surrounding the 
question of expropriation and similar issues in the negotiation of MAI which the 
Chairman of the MAI Negotiation Group attempted to clarify. In his report on the 
MAI, the Chairman of the Negotiating Group included an interpretative note to 
the then draft MAI Article 1 on ‗general treatment‘ including fair and equitable 
treatment and Article 5 on expropriation. This interpretative note clarified that   
This Article on General Treatment, and the Article on 
Expropriation and Compensation, are intended to incorporate into 
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the MAI existing international legal norms.  The reference in 
Article -- to expropriation or nationalisation and ‗measures 
tantamount to expropriation or nationalisation‘ reflects the fact that 
international law requires compensation for an expropriatory 
taking without regard to the label applied to it, even if title to the 
property is not taken.  It does not establish a new requirement that 
Parties pay compensation for losses which an investor or 
investment may incur through regulation, revenue raising and other 
normal activity in the public interest undertaken by governments.  
Nor would such normal and non-discriminatory government 
activity contravene the standards in this Article.
829
  
 
This interpretative note maintains the position of customary international law that 
the question of regulation is a particular situation not considered expropriation, 
which MAI did not aim to change. Recent investment treaty practices, despite 
their variations, also show this position and a negative approach to the elimination 
of the criterion of unlawfulness for finding regulation as expropriation.  
The U.S. 2004 Model BIT provides that ―[e]xcept in rare circumstances, 
non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the 
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.‖830 This provision is now 
in the treaties that the U.S. has concluded with Singapore, Chile, Australia, 
Morocco, Colombia, Panama, Korea, Oman, Uruguay, Rwanda and the CAFTA 
State Parties including the Central American Countries (including Costa Rica El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic.
831
 
A similar approach but not in identical language appears in the Canadian 
investment treaties. The Canadian Model BIT provides that ―[e]xcept in rare 
circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures are so severe in the 
light of their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been 
adopted and applied in good faith, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
                                                 
829
 The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Report by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group) 
DAFFE/MAI(98)17, 4 May 1998, at 13, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ 
ng9817e.pdf.  
830
 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 620, Annex B, Expropriation, Paragraph 4 (b).   
831
 For these treaties see, supra note 678.   
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health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.‖832 
This provision appears in the FTAs that Canada has entered into with Colombia, 
Peru, and Panama as well as recent BITs.
833
  
The approach by the ASEAN countries is even more restrictive by not 
considering ―except in rare circumstances‖ as provided in the US and Canadian 
models. The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement and the FTA 
between ASEAN Countries, Australia and New Zealand provide that ―[n]on-
discriminatory measures of a Member State that are designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the 
environment, do not constitute an expropriation of the type referred to in sub-
paragraph 2(b).‖834 Paragraph 2 (b) in both agreements addresses the question of 
indirect expropriation. Excluding bona fide regulation from indirect expropriation 
is also reflected in the Common Investment Area adopted by the Member States 
of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). In this 
regard, the COMESA Common Investment Area provides that ―[c]onsistent with 
the right of States to regulate and the customary international law principles on 
police powers, bona fide regulatory measures taken by a Member State that are 
designed and applied to protect or enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, 
such as public health, safety and the environment, shall not constitute an indirect 
expropriation under this Article.‖835 
What all these recent treaty practices share in common is excluding bona 
fide regulation from the scope of indirect expropriation. They all exclude 
legitimate, non-discriminatory regulatory measures for public purposes such as 
environment or health from the scope of indirect expropriation and thereby from 
the factors to be employed for finding an indirect expropriation in a factual 
analysis. Instead, these agreements follow the legal criterion determined under 
customary international law, namely the unlawful character of the conduct 
                                                 
832
 Canada Model BIT, Annex B.13(1), Paragraph (c). 
833
For these treaties, see supra note 679.  
834
 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, supra note 664, Annex 2, Paragraph 4; 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, supra note 681, Annex 2, Paragraph 4.  
835
 Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area, supra note 682, Article 20 
(8). The language of Article 20 (8) of the COMESA Common Investment Area replicates the 
language in the IISD Model Investment Agreement. See supra note 810.   
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manifested in a customary element of unlawfulness such as discrimination, to 
qualify regulation as (indirect) expropriation.  While, ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement, ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, and COMESA 
Common Investment Area exclude bona regulation without exception, the US and 
the Canadian Model provide ―except in rare circumstances‖.836 The Canadian 
Model goes further to illustrate a situation of rare circumstance ―when a measure 
or series of measures are so severe in the light of their purpose that they cannot be 
reasonably viewed as having been adopted and applied in good faith.‖837 No 
doubt, such language can be subject to various interpretations. The question is 
what determines the legal criteria to count a ‗rare circumstance‘ of non-
discriminatory regulation as indirect expropriation.  
One interpretation might be that a non-discriminatory regulation of 
substantial impact on foreign investment could qualify as indirect expropriation 
without an additional element of unlawfulness, thus verging on the effect doctrine.  
It would be incoherent to read these agreements to include regulation as a part of 
indirect expropriation subject to the factors provided for the assessment of indirect 
expropriation absent the required unlawful elements provided for the particular 
situations of bona fide regulation. Customary international law has provided for 
the unlawfulness character of the conduct, in addition to the effect of the conduct, 
as the criterion to distinguish legitimate, normal, etc. regulation from what is 
considered to be indirect expropriation. A rare circumstance can also include 
other elements of unlawfulness such as the absence of due process or any other 
element of unlawfulness that ripens into customary international law. It may also 
include the violation of absolute principles of due process.  In this sense, an 
obvious bad faith may be ascribed to a situation where due process is absent but 
may not be attributed to contingent situations of hard penumbra.  
The exclusionary approach to bona fide regulation by way of requiring an 
unlawful element does not seem to have been abandoned by contemplating ‗rare 
circumstances‘ so as to invite the effect doctrine from the back door. Moreover, 
                                                 
836
 See supra notes 830, 832 and accompanying text. The US approach to include this exception is 
seemingly anchored in the US domestic taking jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court.   
837
 See supra note 832 and accompanying text. 
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absent specific lex specialis to the contrary, the operation of customary 
international law as the law governing the penumbral situation of legitimate 
regulation under expropriation clauses of investment treaties would narrow the 
scope of rare circumstances to measures that, while being for public purpose and 
non-discriminatory, feature another element of unlawfulness such as the absence 
of due process. Therefore, the elimination of the customary criterion requiring the 
unlawfulness of the regulatory conduct is not a corollary of such a provision for 
rare circumstances.  
No sufficient positive State practice and opinion exist to demonstrate a 
customary determination, in modification of the existing customary international 
law, to characterize as expropriation a bona fide regulation affecting foreign 
investment in the absence of an unlawful element. The practical views suggesting 
the elimination of an unlawful character have received a negative response by 
States as well as by competing practical views among others by the NGOs as 
important players advocating the protection of human beings. Customary 
international law, and recent concordant State practice, has treated bona fide 
regulation as a particular situation of its own legal context and determination in 
the legal specification and instantiation of the international expropriation rule. 
Where the features of direct expropriation, i.e. intent to expropriate and direct 
enrichment in addition to the effect are present, customary international law 
characterizes regulation as expropriation and compensable. Where those features 
of direct expropriation are absent, customary international law requires an 
unlawful element in a customary determination itself to characterize regulation as 
indirect expropriation and compensable. This is a process of determination and 
specification of general principles of good faith, legitimate expectation etc. in 
specific rules which is not only compatible with but required by the legitimacy 
criteria of the recognition and coherence for the common good.      
By virtue of self-determination of States, bona fide regulation in protection 
of human rights, labor rights, environment, and any other sustainable development 
objectives for human wellbeing shall always operate without giving rise to State 
responsibility in international law on foreign investment. To reverse this order 
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authoritatively in the interest of foreign corporations, the investment protection 
claim in such a hard penumbra requires a customary determination within the 
criteria of legitimacy. The particular instance of bona fide regulation in 
international law has its own context and conflict of justice demands for 
consideration and determination of its own legal criteria subject to the 
requirement of coherence for the common good according to the rule of 
recognition. A great source of confusion and departure from legitimacy is rooted 
in tendencies to explain, by way of analogy with shifting conceptions of justice, 
the hard penumbra of bona fide regulation through what international law has 
developed or is developing for indirect expropriation. A tendency to measure the 
legal situation of regulatory measures by reference to standards or principles 
employed in indirect expropriation is implied in the Pope & Talbot statement that 
―[r]egulations can indeed be characterized in a way that would constitute creeping 
expropriation... Indeed, much creeping expropriation could be conducted by 
regulation, and a blanket exception for regulatory measures would create a gaping 
loophole in international protection against expropriation.‖838 On the one hand, 
such an approach is open to the treatment of the moral and political underpinnings 
of all instances posed by the concept of expropriation in the same gravity of 
justice and the same level of legal solution for measuring the regulatory measures 
of States in international law, thus departing from coherence for the common 
good. On the other hand, latent in such a view is a material completeness 
approach that by turning on the creative function of the tribunals and already 
determining the instance of regulation subject to the general principles and 
standards of expropriation bypasses the rule of recognition as well. Adhering to 
the legitimacy criteria of recognition and coherence for the common good is not 
equivalent to appreciating a ―gaping loophole‖ in rule determination or 
interpretation. These criteria may require not a blanket exception for regulations 
but a blanket recognition of bona fide regulations in international law on foreign 
                                                 
838
 Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award on Merits, Phase One, 26 June 2000, at para. 99.  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeInterimMeritsAward.pdf. In a similar 
perspective, some scholars posit that regulatory measures should be assessed by reference to 
―standards of protection that have been developed for all other instances.‖ Dolzer and Schreuer, 
supra note 782, at 110.   
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investment except for exceptional cases of unlawful conduct determined in 
customary international law. Such an unlawful conduct may manifest itself in 
discrimination, lack of due process, or lack of public purpose already in the 
corpus of customary international law or other determinations as may emerge in 
customary international law, limiting the way that regulations of general 
application may be conceived as indirect expropriation. Similar generalization and 
departure from recognition and coherence have also overshadowed the question of 
compensation for expropriation in the context of economic development reforms 
in natural resources.   
 
B. Economic Development Reforms in Natural Resources: Future 
Profits in Penumbra of Legality and Compensation   
 
Hard penumbra in economic reforms has emerged as to the nationalization 
of natural resources and the relation between States and foreign investors under 
economic development agreements chiefly in the petroleum sector where the State 
nationalizes the industry and terminates agreements with foreign investors to 
effectuate economic reforms sought under nationalization. This area has primarily 
posed hard indeterminacy as to the consequence of the conduct in international 
law, particularly for future profits in compensation for nationalization. 
Nonetheless, the compensation has significantly hinged on the penumbra of the 
conduct as to its legality in international law. The question relates to the legality 
of unilateral termination of economic development agreements in international 
law on the one hand raising the general principle of pacta sunt servanda, and 
compensation for it on the other hand raising the issue of future profits for full 
compensation. Therefore, the hard penumbra relates to the question what the 
customary international rule on expropriation contains as to both the conduct and 
consequence of such a unilateral termination.  
A distinction must be made right from the beginning as to two arguments 
regarding the application of international law to economic development 
agreements. The first one is that rules of customary international law on 
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expropriation applies to this set of contracts, though not all contracts under 
international law, with or without stabilization clauses, not as a matter of contract 
law or investors as contract parties but as a matter of rules of expropriation and 
foreign investors as owners of property. The second argument, quite different, is 
not solely the application of rules on customary international law on expropriation 
to economic development agreements but the modification of the rule right in its 
core by arguing that the unilateral termination of the agreement with or without 
stabilization clauses constitutes an unlawful, wrongful conduct. It follows that 
such unilateral termination entails either restitution (specific performance) or if 
impossible full compensation including future profits.
 
This situation constitutes a 
hard indeterminacy that requires a customary determination for its legitimacy. It is 
this matter that invites further exploration.   
 
i. Lex Lata in the Background 
The duty to pay compensation for expropriation is well settled in 
customary international law although some States have denied this duty in the 
history of expropriations.
839
 This duty was not at the core of controversy 
surrounding the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in 1960s and 
1970s. Rather the amount of compensation was at the core of disagreement.  To 
assess the argument that a unilateral termination of economic development 
agreements resulting from nationalizations is unlawful in international law 
justifying future profits, the starting point is that in customary international law 
―an expropriation is not necessarily ‗unlawful‘ even when the action imputable to 
the State is contrary to international law.‖840  In a broader sense, four elements are 
                                                 
839
 1959 ILC Report on State Responsibility, supra note 592, at p.18-19.  The duty to pay 
compensation for expropriated property is a ―generally accepted requirement … although there is 
much disagreement as to the appropriate standard of compensation.‖ Oppenheim, supra note 119, 
at 920-921. Investment treaties have consolidated this aspect of compensation by providing for the 
duty to pay compensation for expropriation. See also Schachter noting that investment treaties 
provide ―further evidence of the generally accepted rule that compensation should be paid when 
property is expropriated.‖ Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, (1982-V) 
178 Rec. des Cours,  at 324.   
840
1959 ILC Report on State Responsibility, supra note 592, p. 13, para. 50. 
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often considered to constitute the conditions of legality of an expropriatory 
conduct in customary international law for expropriation: whether the conduct is 
discriminatory, not for a public purpose, not according to due process, or not 
accompanied with compensation.
 
 
The G.A. Resolution 1803 Article 4 only pointed to the absence of public 
purpose and compensation for the unlawfulness of expropriation.
841
 Other 
conditions for non-discrimination or due process were absent in the text of the 
Resolution. However, this textual deficiency would not change the status of the 
customary rule existed before or emerged after it. Non-discrimination, due 
process, and non-violation of a treaty were embodied in the customary rule and its 
empirical and practical judgments components existed prior to 1962. Thus, the 
1959 ILC Report observed where a State was forbidden to expropriate under a 
treaty, expropriation would be unlawful.
842
  The ILC report also noted public 
purpose, due process, and payment of compensation as conditions against 
arbitrariness, thus unlawful by that matter.
843
 In the current investment treaty 
practice, NAFTA Article 1110 illustrates a typical reference to these conditions as 
well as non-discrimination.
844
   
                                                 
841
 See supra note 758 and accompanying text.  
842
 1959 ILC Report on State Responsibility, supra note 592, p. 13, para. 50. (―Unlike other acts 
and omissions of this nature which are qualified with the same adjective or the adjective 
‗wrongful‘, an expropriation can only be termed ‗unlawful‘ in cases where the State is expressly 
forbidden to take such action under a treaty or convention.‖) Ibid.   
843
 Ibid. at p. 14, para. 51. These are the limitations measuring arbitrariness that international law 
imposes on the exercise of the right of expropriation. Ibid. The ILC report did not raise non-
discrimination among these conditions of arbitrariness or conditions of lawfulness in relation to 
expropriation. It referred to the requirement of non-discrimination in relation to the procedure 
whereby expropriation is effected or in relation to fixing the amount of compensation in that 
discrimination to the prejudice of aliens in comparison to nationals in these relations gives rise to 
State responsibility. See ibid. paras. 62 and 90 respectively.  
844
 NAFTA Article 1110 (1): ― No Party shall directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment (‗expropriation‘), except: (a) for a public 
purpose;  (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and the 
general  principles of treatment provided in Article 1105; and (d) upon payment of compensation 
in accordance with  paragraphs 2 to 6.‖ Ibid.  See also UNCTAD, BITs 95-06, supra note 72, at 
47-48, U.N. UNCTAD observes a convergence in BITs regarding these conditions but 
acknowledges that significant differences exist among BITs on this matter in particular regarding 
due process and compensation. Ibid. at 47.  
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All of these conditions have their own penumbra.
845
 Nonetheless, in 
relation to the consequence of expropriation, no major contest has emerged in the 
practice of States as to the conditions of public purpose, non-discrimination, or 
due process. In contrast, the question of compensation for the consequence of 
expropriation for future profits of economic development agreements has given 
rise to hard indeterminacy in economic reforms in natural resources.  
The general principle drawn from the distinction between lawful and 
unlawful expropriation with regard to the consequence of expropriation is one to 
typically require restitution and in its impossibility full reparation or 
compensation for the latter. Upon this basis, the PCIJ, pronouncing that the 
violation of a treaty commitment not to expropriate was an unlawful conduct, 
predicated its judgment for reparation including future profits in the celebrated 
case of Chorzów Factory.
846
 In that case, the PCIJ declared ―[t]he  action of 
Poland which the Court has judged to be contrary to the Geneva Convention is no 
expropriation- to render which lawful only the payment of fair compensation 
would have been wanting ….‖847  Thus, the PCIJ stated   
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal 
act—a principle which seems to be established by international 
practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals—is 
that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all consequences 
of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all 
probability, would have existed if that act had not been committed. 
Restitution in kind, or if that is not possible, payment of a sum 
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear 
…–such are the principles which should serve to determine the 
amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international 
law.
848
  
 
                                                 
845
 On public purpose, the ILC report stated that ―it is for municipal law, and not for international 
law, to define in each case the ‗public interest‘ or other motive or purpose of the like character 
which justifies expropriation.‖ 1959 ILC Report on State Responsibility, at 16, para. 59. On 
controversy surrounding non-discrimination, see Maniruzzaman A. F. M. ―Expropriation of Alien 
Property and the principle of Non-discrimination in International Law of Foreign Investment: An 
overview‖ (1998) 8:1 J. Trans‘l L. Policy 57.   
846
 The Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17.  
847
 Ibid. at 46. The action by Poland had been found to be contrary to the explicit commitment 
under the Geneva Convention for not to expropriate unless in cases provided under the convention. 
Ibid. 
848
 Ibid. at 47.  
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In relation to restitution, the PCIJ did not rule it out as a remedy for 
unlawful expropriation.
849
 However, the specific question of future profits is in 
focus here. Moreover, the question is not concerned with the factual barriers to 
future profits such as their speculative nature or the inability of the business at the 
time of expropriation to generate revenue so that the absence of such barriers can 
rationalize the loss of profits.
850
 The question rather concerns the very status of 
the rule whether international law requires future profits for the remaining term of 
an economic development agreement unilaterally terminated by a State under 
nationalization and economic reform in natural resources.  
From the standpoint of customary international law, the lawful or unlawful 
character of the conduct was a key issue in the concept of compensation for 
expropriation in relation to State responsibility under international law. The 
distinction was fundamental in two respects. The first one was that whereas 
responsibility for unlawful conduct ―arises directly and immediately from the act 
or omission causing the injury,‖ the responsibility for lawful conduct depends on 
the arbitrary nature of the conduct and unlawful by that matter.
851
 Thus, the 
responsibility that arises from an unlawful act may not have the same 
consequences for responsibility that arises from an arbitrary act, i.e. the absence 
of compensation for instance.
852
 This leads to the second aspect of the distinction 
                                                 
849
 For the discussion of the impossibility of restitution, see, Higgins, supra note 772, at 316.  
Higgins views that the PCIJ pointed to factual impossibility as when the expropriated property is 
in the hands of third party while observing others indicating also a legal impossibility as in the 
nationalization of natural resources where the State is unwilling to restore the situation and cannot 
be forced to. Ibid. 316-317. For the view that considers restitution a higher remedy than damages, 
see ibid. at 320. Higgins states ―the case law properly read shows that restitution is in general 
terms a recognized remedy, but that it has not been an established remedy in the field of 
concessions. State practice seems to support this view.‖ Ibid.  For treating the holding of the PCIJ 
in the Chorzów Factory Case as obiter dicta, see the BP case in stark contrast with the Texaco 
assuming it a general principle. See BP, supra note 766, at 337-338; Texaco, supra note 766, at 
498. 
850
 For these issues, see Dolzer and Schreuer, supra note 782, at 274-275. 
851
 1959 ILC Report on State Responsibility, supra note 592, at para. 64.  
852
 Ibid. at para. 65. (―[E]ven if compensation is inseparable from expropriation, ‗ confiscation‘ 
should not be confused, as it sometimes is, with ‗unlawful‘ expropriation. As it is the ‗unlawful‘ 
character of an act of expropriation which makes it intrinsically contrary to international law and 
hence capable of immediately and directly involving the responsibility of the State, measures not 
of this character cannot have the same juridical consequences. The position is, however, different 
in regard to what were called above ‗arbitrary‘ acts of expropriation; even if compensation is an 
inescapable requirement, ‗confiscation‘ is, or derives from, a measure which is lawful in itself, so 
that international responsibility could arise only from the nonobservance of a requirement 
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dealing with the extent of compensation, particularly whether future profits are 
included in the amount of compensation due for lawful expropriation. This 
distinction has been essential in international law for separating compensation for 
lawful expropriation from reparation for a wrongful act. The Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility provides for full reparation in cases of wrongful conduct.
853
 
The distinction is key to the question of future profits (lucrum cessans) in the 
amount of compensation.
854
 This is particularly so because no customary rule 
imposes on States to pay for loss of profits in lawful nationalizations.   
 
a) Lawful Conduct  
It may be argued that as a condition of legality compensation in full or 
adequate sense includes future profits even for lawful conduct. According to one 
school of thought, lawful compensation may in terms of the quantum of 
compensation be similar to reparation.
855
 The question begs more exploration in 
light of the future profits for the economic development agreements and the status 
of customary international law on full compensation to which future profits was 
associated.  The holding of the PCIJ whereby if the right of the State is not limited 
                                                                                                                                     
concerning compensation.‖) Ibid. On the other hand, the distinction indicates that a situation 
where other conditions of legality (arbitrariness) are met may still be unlawful because of being 
against an express treaty commitment not to expropriate.   See ibid. at para. 50.  
853
 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 54, Article 31. 
854
 See: Chorzów, supra note 846, at 46-47; 1959 ILC Report on State Responsibility, supra note 
592, at para. 64, 77. (Reparation for unlawful acts includes ―not only the direct loss but also any 
other damages caused by the illegal act or omission for which reparations to be made. 
Compensation for lawful expropriation, on the other hand, is limited to the value of the property 
expropriated.‖) Ibid. at 64; Derek William Bowett, ―State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary 
Developments on Compensation for Termination or Breach‖ (1988) 59 Brit. Y.B. Int‘l L. 49. (―For 
the correct principle is believed to be that loss of future, whilst a legitimate head of general 
damages for unlawful act, is not an appropriate head of compensation for a lawful taking.‖ Ibid. at 
63. Brownlie makes distinction between different kinds of unlawful expropriations as well. 
Brownlie, Principles, supra note 424, at 515. (―The practical distinctions between expropriation 
unlawful sub modo, i.e. only if no provision is made for compensation, and expropriation unlawful 
per se would seem to be these: the former involves a duty to pay compensation only for direct 
losses i.e. the value of the property, the latter involves liability for consequential loss (lucrum 
cessans) ….‖ Ibid. See also Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, ―International Law in the Past Third of 
a Century‖ (1978-I) 159 Rec. des Cours 1, at 298. 
855
 See R.Y. Jennings, ―State Contracts in International Law‖ (1961) 37 Brit. Y.B. Int‘l L. 156, at 
172. Jennings also indicated that the terms of the concession affect the assessment of 
compensation. Ibid. For recent writers who suggest no difference between lawful and unlawful 
expropriation for the question of compensation arguing that the value of the property does not 
depend on the legal characterization, see Reisman and Sloan, supra note 772 at 134-137.  
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by a treaty commitment not to expropriate property, ‗fair compensation‘ would 
apply, does not support future profits for lawful expropriations unlike reparation 
for wrongful expropriation for which the PCIJ allowed future profits under that 
characterization.
856
  
The argument that future profits is included in the calculation of 
compensation finds its closest link to the full compensation inferred from the so-
called Hull rule that compensation must be ‗adequate‘, as well as ‗prompt‘ and 
‗effective.‘857 There are a number of valuation methods that each in its own 
situation may be appropriate to reach a fair market value. Fair market value may 
be compatible with net book value, discounted cash flow (on a going concern 
basis), liquidation value, etc. depending on the case.
 858
 What is at the core of 
matter and fiercely controversial in economic development reforms in natural 
resource is future profits for the term of the contract associated with concepts of 
full (adequate) compensation rationalized to reach market value on a going 
concern basis in a discounted cash flow method.  
Future profits have been deemed relevant in situations where the property 
has been a ‗going concern‘ in particular in nationalization and termination of 
concessions. The argument is that as compensation should correspond to the full 
or fair market value of the property where the property or undertaking is a going 
concern, the compensation must restore what would have been earned had the 
expropriation not occurred.
859
 The valuation method introduced to this end is the 
discounted cash flow.
860
 The rationale for future profits and the going concern 
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 Chorzów, supra note 846, at 46-47.  
857
 Note by the Secretary of State of the United States to the Mexican Ambassador at Washington 
(August, 22, 1938) reprinted in (1938) 32 Am. J. Int‘l L. Supp. 191.  
858
 According to the World Bank Guidelines on Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 
―Compensation will be deemed adequate if it is based on the fair market value of the taken asset as 
such value is determined immediately before the time at which the taking occurred or the decision 
to take the asset became publicly known.‖ The World Bank Guidelines, supra note 71, at 1382.   
859
 B.A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1959), at 111-114.    
860
 The World Bank has defined the valuation methods:  
―Without implying the exclusive validity of a single of single standard for the fairness by which 
compensation is to be determined and as an illustration of the reasonable determination by a State 
of the market value of the investment under Section 5 above, such determination will be deemed 
reasonable if conducted as follows: i. for a going concern with a proven record of profitability, on 
the basis of the discounted cash flow value; ii. For an enterprise which, not being a proven going 
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basis employed by the PCIJ was still the unlawful character of expropriation.
861
 
Indeed, the going concern basis and discounted cash flow method for the 
assessment of compensation for the company and undertaking expropriated under 
a nationalization measure begs the preliminary question whether future profits are 
determined to be  included in the amount of compensation as a matter of law.  
 Full compensation for expropriation has been contested in view of lump 
sum agreements.  Scholars have argued that lump sum agreements, which provide 
for partial compensation, comprise important State practice.
862
 On the particular 
question of the adequacy of compensation, most lump sum agreements have 
provided ―substantially less than ‗adequate‘ much less ‗full,‘ compensation.863 
                                                                                                                                     
concern, demonstrates lack of profitability, on the basis of liquidation value; (iii) for other assets 
on the basis of (a) replacement value or (b) the book value in case such value has been recently 
assessed or has been determined as of the date of the taking and therefore can be deemed to 
represent a reasonable replacement value. For this purpose of this provision, - a ‗going concern‘ 
means an enterprise consisting in income-producing assets which has been in operation for a 
sufficient period of time to generate the data required for the calculation of future income and 
which could have been expected with reasonable certainty if the taking had not occurred, to 
continue producing legitimate income over the course of its economic life in the general 
circumstances following the taking by the State; - ‗discounted cash flow value‘ means    the cash 
receipts realistically expected from the enterprise in each future year of its economic life as 
reasonably projected minus that year‘s expected cash expenditure, after discounting this net cash 
flow for each year by a factor which reflect the time value of money, expected inflation and the 
risk associated with such cash flow under realistic circumstances. Such discount rate may be 
measured by examining the rate of return available in the same market of alternative investments 
of comparable risk on the basis of their present value; -‗liquidation value‘ means the at which 
individual assets comprising the enterprise or the entire assets of the enterprise could be sold under 
conditions of liquidation to a willing buyer less any liabilities that the enterprise has to meet; - 
‗replacement value‘    means the cash amount required to replace the individual assets of the 
enterprise in their actual State as of the date of the taking; and -‗book value‘ means the difference 
between the enterprise‘s assets and liabilities as recorded on its financial Statements or the amount 
at which the taken tangible assets appear on the balance sheet of the enterprise, representing their 
cost after deducing the accumulated depreciation in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting  principles.‖ The World Bank Guidelines, supra note 71, at 1383. 
861
 See supra notes 847-848 and accompanying text. That is why most writers and tribunals 
advocating future profits in natural resources cases, introduced the internationalization of 
economic development agreements terminated as a result of nationalization to assert the 
unlawfulness of the conduct than relying on full compensation.  See below, Section (ii). 
862
 Lillich and Weston, Lump Sum Agreements 1975, supra note 778; Burns H. Weston, Richard 
B. Lillich and David J. Bederman, International claims : their settlement by lump sum agreements, 
1975-1995 ( Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc., 1999.) at 97-98 [Lump Sum Agreements 
1999]. The compensation formulas adopted in lump sum agreements are (sometimes radically) 
short of the Hull formula of prompt, adequate and effective particularly with regard to promptness 
and full compensation construed from adequacy. See Lump Sum Agreements 1975, at 208 et seq. 
In their observation, these writers do not accept or reject the Hull formula. See ibid. at 208.  Same 
finding has been mentioned in the study of the lump sum agreements from 1975 to 1995. Ibid. 
Lump Sum Agreements 1999, at 77 et seq. 
863
 Ibid. at 217.  
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Nevertheless, reliance on lump sum agreements is not always well founded as 
they represent negotiated deals that should not be seen per se representing opinio 
juris.
864
 The practice of lump sum agreements is itself not sufficient to 
demonstrate customary international law. Yet, the practice preceding lump sum 
agreements not necessarily that proceeding from them matters. For instance, in 
European nationalizations, the legislative acts of the expropriating countries 
provided for compensation in some cases less than the total value of the property 
and sometimes less than half or sometimes even one third of the value far below 
adequate or full compensation.
865
The practice of the offer of compensation by 
States preceding the settlement of disputes is still a practice independent of lump 
sum agreements. Therefore, the bargain character of lump sum agreements does 
not detract from the fact that the European States in their practice of 
nationalization had provided for compensation less than the total value of the 
expropriated property or even less than half.   
It is the status of customary international law on other grounds that matter, 
mainly the absence of a customary rule requiring full compensation for the hard 
penumbra of nationalizations.  Customary international law never contained a rule 
to require future profits for lawful nationalizations. It is ―an erroneous and 
distorted image‖ that traditional international law required the Hull formula for 
nationalizations of general and impersonal character.
866
 Not only State practice 
but also academic views and tribunal decisions did not corroborate the assertion 
that the Hull formula reflected customary international law.
867
  
Unlike the practice allowing loss of profit from the property between the 
time of expropriation and the payment of compensation, the award of damages by 
a tribunal was controversial for ―the heading lucrum cessans namely the loss of 
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 They provided ―‗negotiated‘ compensation‖ and involved ―‗compromise‘ formulas‖  similar to 
past lump sum agreements for reparation for injuries to aliens due to wrongful acts. 1959 ILC 
Report on State Responsibility, supra note 592, p. 22, para. 84.  
865
 Ibid. p. 21, at para. 83.  
866
 Garcia-Amador, supra note 744, at 208.  
867
 See Schachter, supra note 839, at 323-324. Schachter wrote that ―[a]dvocates of the Hull 
formula often characterize it as a traditional rule of international law. The record does not support 
this.‖ Ibid. For a case assuming the traditional view but observing a change in international law in 
a way undermining full compensation for large-scale nationalizations, see INA Corporation v. 
Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373, at 378, (1985). 
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future profits from property such as invested capital or a concessionary right 
granted for a specific number of years.‖868 Some writers argued that State practice 
of many States did not support the assertion that general expropriation should be 
compensated and States‘ agreement to pay compensation was out of grace or 
convenience after their affirmation that they were not bound to pay compensation 
and the payments were generally in lump sum not in relation to the damages.
869
 
Others suggested that in large-scale nationalizations appropriate compensation in 
a sense of equitable compensation would be appropriate.
870
  
There has emerged strong negative reaction to the suggestion of full 
compensation in a way to rationalize future profits in nationalizations or 
promptness in payment of compensation in such large-scale economic reforms. 
Both G.A. Resolutions 1803 and 3281 carried opposition to a notion of 
compensation that included future profits in nationalizations and long-term 
concessions in natural resources. This was reflected in reference to appropriate 
compensation as well as opposition to the approach that advocated the 
unlawfulness of the unilateral termination of States‘ contractual relations under 
nationalization.  The duty to pay compensation as a result of nationalization is not 
compromised by General Assembly Resolutions on the matter.
871
 On the other 
hand, these resolutions continue to show that full compensation particularly in 
large-scale nationalizations is not a requirement of international law. Even before 
the advent of G.A. Resolutions, the ILC observed that the Hull formula as the 
requirement by ―certain States‖ expressing ―the orthodox view‖.872 Adequate was 
meant to denote ‗fair‘ or ‗just‘ as the Chorzów case found appropriate for lawful 
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 White, supra note 771, at 15.  
869
 S. Friedman, supra note 616, at 206-209. 
870
 Schachter, supra note 839, at 325. Lauterpacht has argued more generally that ―in regard to 
interference with rights of property, neither full compensation nor total denial of redress might in 
sound law meet the requirements of justice. Partial compensation adjusted to the particular 
circumstances of each case, while giving the impression of a compromise, might nevertheless 
represent a juridically sound and equitable solution.‖ Lauterpacht supra note 231, at 122. On 
support for partial compensation, see also L. Oppenheim International Law: A Treaties, Hersch 
Lauterpacht ed. (London: Longmans Green and Co. Ltd., 1955) at 352.    
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 Schachter, supra note 839, at 326;  Aréchaga, supra note 854, at 301-302. 
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 1959 ILC Report on State Responsibility, supra note 592, p. 19, paras. 72-73.  
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compensation.
873
 Additionally, adequate compensation was favored in ordinary 
cases of individual expropriations to cover the value of the expropriated 
property.
874
 For nationalization, the ILC observed the differences of views among 
those that treated compensation of nationalization the same as other cases of 
expropriation arguing for full compensation, those that argued that compensation 
for nationalization falls entirely within the States‘ discretion, and those that call 
for a flexible middle ground of partial compensation consistent with the practice 
in lump-sum agreements.
875
   
International law did not have a customary determination to require future 
profits in the notion of full compensation for lawful nationalizations. The question 
now to raise is whether investment treaties have changed customary international 
law that did not require future profits in compensation for lawful nationalizations 
in economic development reforms. One study of BITs notes widespread usage of 
Hull formula either by reference to the exact term ‗adequate‘ or assumed in 
references to terms such as ‗the market value,‘ ‗fair market value,‘ or ‗genuine 
value‘ of the asset expropriated.876 This widespread usage within investment 
treaties is not per se sufficient to change the status of customary international law. 
A number of points may be made.  
From the language point of view, mere reference to ‗full,‘ ‗adequate,‘ 
‗going concern‘ is insufficient to demonstrate the acceptance of States to pay 
future profits in all situations that may arise. Firstly, BITs differ on the question of 
calculation and payment of compensation.
877
 That is BITs do not even provide a 
uniform approach to the quantum of compensation that is the essence of adequacy 
of compensation and the subject of controversy. Secondly, the term ‗adequate‘ 
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 Ibid. at paras. 73-74, 90.  Even with respect to this type of expropriations, the ILC commented 
that foreign investors should not expect the international standard of adequacy or compensation at 
all where investments are made in a country whose constitution provides for less or non-
compensation, in which cases the principle of acquired rights cannot be invoked. Ibid. at para. 89.  
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 Ibid. at para. 74.  
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 Ibid. p. 23, para. 91. For the position that full compensation of the value of the property may 
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denoted ‗fair‘ or ‗just‘ appropriate for lawful compensation.878 In addition, mere 
reference to ‗adequate‘ or ‗just‘ is not enough.879  
From the customary law standpoint, bilateral treaties are of far less weight 
than multilateral treaties and conventions in declaring or making customary law, 
requiring widespread practice and opinion outside the treaty framework.
880
 An 
important distinction must be made between an issue that has found other support 
for a customary status as opposed to an issue that has been contested in the past. 
The latter would require overwhelming practice outside the treaty to show a 
change of customary international law on the particular matter. There exists little 
evidence to demonstrate that by agreeing to adequate compensation under 
investment treaties States are subscribing as law to the view that in case of 
economic reforms under nationalizations in natural resources they must pay future 
profits for the term of economic development agreements.  The assumption would 
particularly be flawed in light of the requirement of opinio juris.  
A widespread utilization of language in investment treaties is not per se 
sufficient to meet the requirement of opinio juris and requires other indications of 
practice and opinions. From this perspective, it has been viewed that  
Much has been made of the fact that many bilateral investment 
treaties concluded in recent years include compensation clauses 
that are similar to the Hull standard. It is contended that these 
should be considered as evidence of customary international law. 
The difficulty with the argument is that the agreements are 
bargained-for arrangements in which the States that grant 
protection to foreign investors receive benefits in exchange by way 
of trade or financial aid. The very negotiations of such reciprocal 
contractual arrangements shows they are not merely declaratory of 
existing obligations. One cannot assume the rules adopted are 
considered obligatory in the absence of the treaty.
881
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 See supra note 873 and accompanying text. 
879
 1959 ILC Report on State Responsibility, supra note 592, p. 20, at para. 77. (―[I]t is clear that 
the mere requirement that compensation should be ‗adequate‘ or ‗just‘ does not in itself provide a 
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At the time this view was advanced, bilateral investment treaties were in 
hundreds. They are now in thousands. Nonetheless, the increase in number does 
not change the point. The voluminous number of investment treaties is not 
sufficient to change or develop a customary international rule.
882
 The reasons that 
a State may enter into an investment treaty may differ from country to another on 
the level of development and considerations whether it exports or imports 
investment and for economic or non-economic benefits. Moreover, such an 
increase in a broader perspective may signify States‘ willingness to participate in 
international affairs that build or maintain relations with other States or their 
desire to have a world player standing. More narrowly, developing countries may 
enter into investment treaties to attract investment. Although this latter ground is 
not substantiated, entering into an investment treaty for investment attraction to 
boost the economy detracts from the assertion that developing States are accepting 
this part of the treaty, i.e. full compensation, out of law rather than convenience 
and self-interest. For developed States too, the reason may be that they are 
contracting out of custom than developing it.
883
  
Even in contexts other than natural resources but of significant financial 
burden for States, investment treaties are still not deemed to have changed 
customary international law. By referring to the practice of States under General 
Assembly Resolutions, Brownlie considered that the ‗appropriate‘ not ‗full‘ 
compensation constitutes contemporary international standard on 
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 On this point see, Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v Congo) (Preliminary 
Objections), ICJ General List No 103, 24 May 2007, at  para. 90.The ICJ held that ―The fact 
invoked by Guinea that various international agreements, such as agreements for the promotion 
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tension between the NEIO and the many scores of bilateral investment treaties providing for full 
compensation in the event of nationalization.‖ Ibid.   See also UNCTAD observing that capital-
exporting countries turned to BITs because developing countries denied conditions for the 
lawfulness of expropriation including Hull formula as part of customary international law. 
UNCTAD 95-06, supra note 72, at 47. 
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compensation.
884
 This view further affirms that customary international law in this 
respect has not changed as a result of the widespread usage of the Hull formula in 
investment treaties. The fact that investment treaties surged in the wake of 
financial crisis of 1990s by no means signifies that States have abandoned their 
position as a matter of law on so controversial a point.  
In light of fierce opposition to full compensation and future profits in State 
practice, it would require cogent State practice and opinio juris outside the 
investment treaty to meet the requirements of customary international law for 
subscription to the view advocating future profits in compensation for 
nationalizations. Moreover, a general usage even if it ripens into customary 
international law for an ordinary circumstance of compensation is inadequate to 
build a customary rule for a specific situation of hard indeterminacy. Assuming 
that investment treaties have developed customary international law for emerging 
a rule of full compensation for expropriation, such a rule would lack authority for 
a hard case like economic reforms in natural resources. On major issues of 
controversies in the legal discourse of expropriation including full compensation 
for future profits in natural resources, legality of unilateral termination of 
economic development agreements, or indirect expropriations, investment treaties 
per se are not reflective of customary international law. State practice and opinion 
outside the investment treaty framework are required to establish a customary 
determination. A general treaty term for full compensation is devoid of the 
authority of legal statement once entering a hard penumbra.  
Compensation for nationalization in economic development in natural 
resources has required its own rule for which the statement of the law for ordinary 
expropriations do not operate. The ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case declared, 
―arrangements made in respect of compensation for nationalization of foreign 
property. Their rationale too, derived as it is from structural changes in a State‘s 
economy, differs from that of any normally applicable provisions.‖885 Such a 
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 See CME, Separate Opinion by Ian Brownlie, supra note 672, at paras. 26-32.  
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 Barcelona Traction, supra note 405, p. 40, para. 61. See also Brownlie, Principles, supra note 
424, at 513. (―The principle of nationalization unsubordinated to full compensation rule may be 
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difference requires compensation for nationalization as a lawful conduct ―on a 
basis compatible with the economic objectives of the nationalization, and viability 
of the economy as a whole‖ which in relation to the amount of compensation 
means only ―a duty to pay compensation for direct loses, i.e. value of the 
property‖ not lucrum cessans.886  
A further point reflected in these observations is the lack of a consensus 
among practical views, not to mention the absence of sufficient State practice and 
opinio juris of States, to demonstrate that full compensation particularly future 
profits was a requirement of customary international law for economic reforms 
arising from nationalizations as a result of the duty to pay compensation. No such 
customary determination has been formed. It is a requirement of legitimacy that 
precludes the application of full compensation to penumbral hard cases even if it 
is assumed that through the history of international law there is consistent and 
general practice for full compensation. Full compensation, adequate compensation 
and whatever other terms taken to import  future profits for the whole term of a 
nationalized economic development agreement such as  a going concern basis or 
discounted cash flow method fail to determine, as a matter of principle if any, the 
statement of the law for a hard situation as natural resources.  The product of a 
consistent and general practice for full compensation, if any, would be a guiding, 
contingent ‗general principle‘ not a binding, authoritative rule for a hard 
penumbra. The justice background of compensation for expropriation of a small 
business or entrepreneurship on a going concern valuation cannot be compared 
with justice and fairness implications of going concern of a company in relation to 
natural resources, requiring its own coherence for the common good. The 
common good is the decisive element for compensation in hard indeterminacies 
not terminology or a general principle. It requires authoritative determination to 
include loss of profits in the quantum of compensation in nationalization of 
natural resources and termination of concessions whose legitimacy must be 
measured by the genuine respect it pays to the common good by considering all 
                                                                                                                                     
supported by reference to principles of self-determination, independence, sovereignty and 
equality.‖) Ibid.  
886
 Brownlie, Principles, supra note 424, at 514-515. 
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justice demands according to the rule of recognition. The principal objection to 
the full compensation in natural resources reform is in light of the criteria of 
legitimacy.  
It was earlier indicated that the rule of recognition admits a degree of 
discretion for the arbitrators to determine the amount of compensation where the 
law has determined that the conduct is liable to compensation but without 
engaging in determination as to the conduct. That discretion does not warrant 
departure from the requirement of the legitimacy of the coherence for the common 
good to give genuine, appropriate consideration to all demands of justice without 
giving a substantive principle an overriding character projected as law in the 
absence of the rule. In such a situation, the legitimacy requirement of coherence 
for the common good permits no a priori status of lex lata for a general principle 
of full compensation including future profits in favor of the private party. That 
principle is only one principle, a practical judgment, among others as lex ferenda 
for determination in conformity with common good requiring appropriate 
consideration of demands of justice of States owning resources.  
To give full compensation a status of a general principle of law would 
accord a lex lata status in a hard penumbra to a contingent principle of lex ferenda 
weight, thereby giving an advantage to private corporations over the interests of 
States, suppressing the demands of justice of the States whose appropriate 
consideration is required by the common good. To meet coherence, it requires far 
beyond recognizing that a general principle is a matter of weight. It requires 
genuinely treating the principle and the practical view expressing it only as a 
conception of justice part of the lex ferenda itself rather than the conception of 
justice that international law has adopted expressive of lex lata with superficial 
treatment of equally appropriate competing views and principles subordinated as 
lex ferenda. This is also the core challenge in view of the legitimacy criteria of the 
rule of recognition and coherence for the application of general principles of law 
to characterize unlawful the nationalizations of natural resources affecting 
economic development agreements. Equally important, the discretion as to the 
amount of compensation does not warrant the legal determination of the conduct 
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itself such as its lawfulness or unlawfulness by the tribunal in the task of 
measuring compensation.   
 
b) Unlawful Conduct  
The question in this section is that whether observance of an economic 
development agreement also constituted a condition of legality for expropriation 
in customary international law. Put differently, did a unilateral termination of an 
economic development agreement between a State and a foreign corporation in 
natural sources subjected to a measure of nationalization constitute an unlawful 
conduct in customary international law to justify full compensation?    
In customary international law a breach of contract did not constitute an 
unlawful conduct. The proper law of a contract between a State and a private 
party was the law of the State party.
887
 Destruction of contractual rights by a State 
fell within the realm of expropriation.
888
 As a result, the conduct would lead to 
State responsibility under the conditions of expropriation.
889
 The freedom to 
terminate a concession or an economic development agreement  to effectuate 
nationalization in natural resources in the relation of States and foreign investors 
emerged as a hard penumbra for which customary international law did not 
impose a limitation on States except under the rules of lawful expropriation.  
The unilateral termination of a contract was not among the conditions of 
legality of expropriation contained in Paragraph 4 of the United Nations General 
                                                 
887
 The Permanent Court of International Justice in the Serbian Loans case held that ―any contract 
which is not between States in their capacity as subjects of international law is based on the 
municipal law of some country.‖ Serbian Loans case, (1921 Ser .A ) 20/21 P.C.I.J. at 41. The court 
also held that ―a sovereign State… cannot be presumed to have made … the validity of its 
obligations … subject to any law other than its own‖, ibid. at 42. This remains the position of 
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international law and when a claim for breach of a contract between an alien and a government 
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Assembly Resolution 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.
890
 
Paragraph 8 of the Resolution 1803 provided that  
Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by, or between, 
sovereign States shall be observed in good faith; States and 
international organizations shall strictly and conscientiously 
respect the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural 
wealth and resources in accordance with the Charter and principles 
set forth in the present resolution.
891
 
 
The phrase ‗by, or between, sovereign States‘ has been taken as an indication that 
the paragraph elevated foreign investment agreements to the international plane in 
the sense that the unilateral termination of an economic development agreement 
would be unlawful in international law like a breach of treaty.
892
 The question 
arises what part of customary international law this paragraph reflects. The 
paragraph can also mean that such agreements are also subject to the governance 
of international law and its existing rules on expropriation than the exclusive local 
law, being the proper law of the contract, without adding to the rules of 
expropriation. Starting with the Paragraph 8 itself, this paragraph was produced as 
an amendment to the Resolution drafted by the United States and the United 
Kingdom, approved by the General Assembly and incorporated in the Resolution 
1803.
893
 The amendment, however, did not receive so substantial a majority as 
Paragraph 4 did.
894
 From the standpoint of State practice and opinion, there was 
no acceptance of such provision as an element of unlawfulness in international 
law for the conduct of States for unilateral termination of contract in the practice 
of non-western countries. Nor did such an element even exist in the genuine 
practice of western countries. The United Kingdom, for instance, has unilaterally 
changed its engagements with foreign investors in the regulation of petroleum 
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 See below, Section. (ii). 
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 See Garcia-Amador, supra note 744, at 171-172. 
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 See ibid. at 171-172. ( ―The result of the vote, however, reflected certain reluctance on the part 
of the developing countries to accept the legal implications of the clause that was incorporated into 
the General Assembly resolution.‖ Ibid. at 172.    
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industry without paying compensation.
895
 The position of the United Kingdom has 
been that agreements with foreign investors may not fetter its powers to legislate 
and regulate its natural resources.
896
 This situation has been differentiated from 
concessions in view of the absence of international arbitration for recourse in the 
UK licenses and thereby its treatment as a domestic matter.
 897
 Yet, the absence of 
arbitration and stabilization provisions or reference to international law in the 
petroleum licenses of developed countries does not change the fact as to the 
United Kingdom‘s practice contrary to a general principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
The United Kingdom that has asserted the unlawfulness of cancellation of 
contracts against other States has not even considered relevant the duty to pay 
compensation under international law for unilateral changes to its licenses. The 
United Kingdom has still treated engagements with foreign investors in the oil 
exploration arrangements, where foreign investors deployed capital and assumed 
risks, incapable of fettering its sovereign rights unsubordinated to a general 
principle of pacta sunt servanda. That means the United Kingdom did not accept 
this principle as the authority of the law upon itself. Bowett observes that ―[t]he 
idea that the assertion of a governmental power to vary contracts with foreigners 
is essentially a policy favoured by developing countries is quite untenable.‖898 He 
continues that ―[i]t will have become clear to oil companies that the UK and 
Norwegian Governments are no more willing than their OPEC counterparts to 
stick rigidly to contracts they deem unreasonably disadvantageous and there is no 
absolute constitutional protection in either country for the principle pacta sunt 
servanda.‖899 The genuine position of States on a particular issue such as natural 
resources and unilateral termination of commitments towards them is a significant 
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part of empirical practice and opinion of States as to the matter to assess the 
customary status. Whether the action of that particular State is itself actionable 
under international law is another matter. Thus, ironically on grounds of eminent 
domain, parliamentary sovereignty or otherwise, developed States as ―exporters of 
capital reserve to themselves legal powers they are not always prepared to 
recognize in others.‖900   
Furthermore, there is no compelling evidence or reason that by agreeing to 
Paragraph 8 of the Resolution 1803, developing countries accepted the equation 
of their investment contracts with a treaty and their cancellation as an unlawful 
conduct in international law to justify future profits on that ground. More 
plausibly, by agreeing to Paragraph 8, these countries only accepted subjecting 
their contracts with foreign corporations to international law on rules of 
expropriation and duty to pay compensation for expropriating the contract as a 
lawful conduct in international law. This conclusion is also supported by the 
debate surrounding the absence of a similar provision in the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties, militating against the internationalization of economic 
development agreements in the sense of their equation with treaties to justify the 
unlawfulness of their unilateral termination by developing countries. The then 
Group 77 expressed their view that  
The countries of Group 77 did not deny the general duty of all 
States to fulfill their obligations, but considered that such 
agreements [between foreign corporations] were not international 
agreements, since they were not concluded between States and 
were therefore governed by the domestic law of the States 
concerned. They did not have international status, because private 
companies were not subjects of international law. The developing 
countries refused to accept the formula in alternative 4 [embodying 
the developed countries views] because they felt that it would be 
tantamount to conferring international status on such companies 
and making the legal bond between the company and the State a 
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 Brownlie, Legal Status, supra note 445, at 280. Brownlie suggests that ―the principles of 
international law stated by publicists which prevent legislative annulment or modification of 
concession contracts should be examined in the light of municipal law position on ‗Contracts of 
Public Authorities.‖ Ibid.  
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bond of international law. Disagreement on that issue was 
radical.
901
 
 
Now, as earlier noted, there are two aspects in this respect. One assumption is to 
read the above statement together with Article 2 (c) of the G.A. Resolution 3281 
as an attempt to detach economic development agreements entirely from 
international law including rules of expropriation and the duty to compensation in 
case of nationalization of natural resources.
902
 Such an attempt on the part of 
developing countries, if any, would be only one indication of practice without 
supporting practice and opinion outside the Resolution to eliminate the 
governance of international law on the issue of expropriation and nationalization. 
A different reading of the statement above would be that a unilateral termination 
of economic development agreements resulting from nationalization of natural 
resources even against the contract or a specific contractual commitment not to 
change or terminate the contract constituted a lawful conduct in international law 
though as a direct expropriation to be compensated under international law. It is 
this second aspect that matters for compensation, since in international law no 
customary rule has emerged to determine this particular hard instance of unilateral 
termination of economic development agreements as an unlawful expropriation 
solely by its breach of a contractual term rather than by a violation of an 
independent condition of legality such as discrimination.  
This status of customary international law was explicit in the ILC study of 
the matter in 1959. The 1959 ILC Report on State Responsibility described the 
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 Statement by the President of Group 77. G.A. Second Committee (1638 Mtg.) 382, U.N. Doc. 
A/C.2/SR 1638, at 383. quoted in Garcia Amador,  supra note 744, at 172-173. This statement was 
not mentioned in the Texaco case that gave a broad interpretation to the acceptance of States of 
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 The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281, supra note 592. Article 2 
(c) of this Resolution subjected the duty to pay compensation for nationalization to the sole 
governance of domestic law. (―Each State has the right to … (c ) to nationalize, expropriate, or 
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internationalization theory that attempted ―to extend the notion of ‗unlawful‘ 
expropriation to cases in which the State and the alien individual are bound by a 
contractual relationship‖ as ―a tendency, of relatively recent origin but shared by 
some authoritative writers.‖903  This tendency was ―based on the idea that, by 
analogy with treaties, the non-observance by the State of the obligations which it 
has assumed in those contracts or concession agreements constitutes a ‗wrongful‘ 
act, which gives rise to direct and immediate international responsibility. In brief, 
the premise is that the principle pacta sunt servanda applies equally to treaties and 
to contractual relationships between States and alien private persons.‖904 The 
theory in a broader sense attempted to rationalize that mere annulment of contract 
as a result of nationalization was unlawful and in a narrower sense that if 
nationalization and the concomitant termination was against a specific stipulation 
within the contract, a stabilization clause not to expropriate, then it was unlawful 
in international law.
905
 The ILC, therefore, indicated the absence of a customary 
rule to create an international obligation for States that their unilateral termination 
of an economic development agreement in foreign investment either with or 
without a specific stipulation for not to nationalize constituted a wrongful, 
unlawful conduct on the international plane adding to the conditions of legality of 
expropriation.  
What was advanced as the internationalization theory was a ‗tendency,‘ a 
‗suggestion,‘ a ‗proposal,‘ rooted in analogy of an economic development 
agreement with a treaty and in what is identified as a practical view not the 
statement of the law. The theory was not even the prevailing practical view. The 
ILC acknowledged that the ―[t]he majority opinion, however, does not seem to 
support this tendency.‖906 Additionally, it was pointed out that according to the 
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 1959 ILC Report on State Responsibility, supra note 592, p. 14, para. 52, p. 26, para. 102 
et.seq.  
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―the traditional position‖ or the ―prevailing doctrine and practice‖ substantive law 
of the contract was governed by the municipal law.
907
 The governance of 
international law was not really at issue.  Instead, the question concerned whether 
international law contained a rule to make a unilateral termination or non-
performance of the contract per se as unlawful in international law. It was 
acknowledged that ―in traditional practice and doctrine a non-performance of 
contract gives rise to State responsibility only if it involves an act or omission 
contrary to international law‖ contrary to the new doctrine that considered ―mere 
non-performance of the contract would, at least in principle, constitute an 
‗unlawful‘ act.‖908 
It is, therefore, a distortion of law and violation of legitimacy to project the 
internationalization theory, which was a practical view among others, as the 
position of international law.  Customary international law did not embody a rule 
to designate unilateral termination of economic development agreements as 
unlawful in international law. There is no prejudice against the collapse of this 
status of customary international law. Yet, such a collapse or change requires a 
customary determination.  
 
ii. Lex Ferenda and Internationalization of Economic Development 
Agreements  
The practical views advocating the theory of internationalization of 
economic development agreements peaked in 1950s to 1980s. The Special 
Rapporteur of the ILC that had observed the theory of internationalization of 
                                                                                                                                     
to the Person or Property of Foreigners noted responses to the question whether a State is 
internationally responsible for enacting a legislation incompatible with the terms of a contract or 
concession . Only 23 countries replied, which did not include the United States. The Committee 
observed that in general most replies were positive but there was hesitation. The hesitation raised 
was that some States considered the violation of a contract or concession a matter of municipal 
law and  some calling for distinction among different situations, while some advocating a general 
approach. Particular difficulty was observed as to responsibility for a legislation of a general 
character. See, Preliminary Documents of the Conference for the Codification of International 
Law, The Hague, March-April 1930, (1930-Suppl.) 24 A J. Int‘l L 1, at 49-50.  
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 1959 ILC Report on State Responsibility, supra note 592, at pp. 26-27, paras. 104-106, pp. 30-
31 paras. 121-124.  
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contracts as a ‗tendency of recent origin‘ joined that practical view that considered 
economic development agreements would create international obligation and their 
mere non-performance unlawful giving rise to international responsibility.
909
 
Some academics have advocated the internationalization theory.
910
 The essence of 
the argument is that as concessions or economic development agreements are 
different from ordinary contracts, by their character or by explicit contractual 
provisions such as recourse to arbitration, reference to international law or general 
principles of law or stabilization clauses, they create an international obligation.
911
 
Thus in an analogy with treaty and on the basis of pacta sunt servanda or other 
general principles of law such as acquired rights, though sometimes 
acknowledged not to be absolute, non-performance of the agreement was 
considered to be unlawful giving rise to State responsibility requiring reparation 
for wrongful conduct than compensation for lawful expropriation.
912
   
The internationalization theory received reactions in notable arbitrations 
dealing with disputes arising from economic development agreements in natural 
resources raising both the legality of termination of long-term petroleum 
concessions in the exercise of the right of nationalization and the question of 
future profits particularly in view of stabilization clauses embodied in the 
agreements. In BP v. Libya,  the sole Arbitrator found Libya‘s repudiation of the 
concession against international law because no compensation had been offered to 
BP after almost two years from nationalization thus a confiscatory nationalization 
and additionally that ―it was made for purely extraneous political reasons and was 
arbitrary and discriminatory in character.‖913 Thus, no occasion arose in that case 
to examine the internationalization theory and the question of stabilization. The 
sole arbitrator, however, rejected reversal of nationalization by an award of 
restitutio in integrum or specific performance or even that such a remedy 
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constituted a general principle of law.
914
 More importantly, the sole arbitrator in 
the BP case gave an important dictum on the question of damages signifying that 
even in an unlawful nationalization on grounds of discrimination resulting in an 
unlawful termination of a concession, the fact that the agreement has a 
stabilization clause could not justify ownership to the oil after nationalization.
915
  
The sole arbitrator in Liamco Arbitration considered economic 
development agreements (concessions) of essentially private nature and governed 
by principles of private law of contracts supporting the sanctity of contracts and 
validity of stabilization clauses.
916
 Nonetheless, the sole arbitrator found the 
nationalization and the concomitant termination of the concession lawful  
consistent with customary international law, holding that ―it may be safely laid 
down that it is lawful to nationalize concession before the expiry of the 
concession term, provided that the measure be not discriminatory nor in breach of 
treaty, and provided that compensation be paid.‖917 Like the arbitrator in BP, the 
arbitrator in Liamco held that restitutio in integrum was not possible against a 
nationalizing State and would amount to cancellation of nationalization.
918
 The 
arbitrator also held that ―the question whether or not the concessionaire may claim 
compensation for all the loss of profits for the unexpired term is still a 
controversial point which has not been definitely settled.‖919  
Most explicitly, the internationalization theory was adopted by the sole 
arbitrator in the Texaco Arbitration. The sole arbitrator viewed that the concession 
on the ground of its embodiment of clauses referring to arbitration, general 
principles of law, stability of the concession and its character as economic 
development character was internationalized in the sense that its unilateral 
revocation was unlawful in international law.
920
 The sole arbitrator heavily relied 
on the stabilization clause and respect for it by virtue of pacta sunt servanda to 
hold that the unilateral termination of the concession implementing the 
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overarching nationalization was unlawful in international law and awarded 
restitutio in integrum as a remedy equally found to be a general principle of 
law.
921
 Thus, the principle of pacta sunt servanda was considered to create an 
international obligation not to expropriate the concession against a stabilization 
clause. The arbitrator in the Texaco Arbitration tended to reject that the 
internationalization of the contract would mean either that international law 
governs the contractual relation or that the contract is assimilated with a treaty.
922
 
Yet, the distinction was more to mean that the private parties did not have full but 
limited capacity under international law.
923
 The distinction made little difference 
for the question of the unlawfulness of nationalization in equation of the 
concession with a treaty, since in the analysis of the sole arbitrator the concession 
was given an effect to render nationalization unlawful in international law no less 
than the effect of a treaty provision, i.e. overriding the right of a State to 
nationalization. The sole arbitrator attempted to rationalize the operation of pacta 
sunt servanda to this field on the ground of favorable practice by States. In this 
way, the sole arbitrator read the phrase ―by, or between‖ in Paragraph 8 of G.A. 
Resolution 1803 as an equation of contracts with treaties.
924
 That provision, 
however, by no means establishes such an equation for holding a nationalization 
unlawful for its mere being contrary to a contractual provision.
925
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A similar question was raised in the Aminoil Arbitration as to the effect of 
a stabilization clause as part of the internationalization theory to render 
nationalization and its resulting termination of concession unlawful. The Aminoil 
Tribunal, by majority, held that the stabilization clause before it could not 
preclude the State from nationalization because on the one hand the concession 
agreement itself had changed in character acquiesced by the parties overtime, and 
on the other hand, the stabilization clause was not specific enough to include 
nationalization covering only confiscation.
926
 The Tribunal found the 
nationalization not confiscatory thus lawful in international law as well as 
consistent with the concession agreement.
927
 Therefore, the position of the 
majority of the Tribunal on the theory of internationalization and a stabilization 
clause specifically forbidding nationalization is unclear. In a separate opinion, 
Fitzmaurice disagreed with the Tribunal that the stabilization clause did not cover 
nationalization, or that nationalization upon offer of compensation was not 
confiscatory, or that by the change in the nature of the concession over time the 
stabilization clause even if construed to originally prohibit nationalization had lost 
that original position.
928
 Yet, he did not disagree on the question of the quantum 
                                                                                                                                     
The sole arbitrator in the Texaco Arbitration, however, did not mention this important statement 
by the Chairman of Group 77. 
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of course, a truism that multinationals may be more powerful than small States. Without exploring 
this question fully, there is one question that stands out. The resources of a corporation entails 
considerable flexibility in changing the location of assets and in changing the organisation of the 
assets. The resources of a country, its human and natural resources, are a given: they are 
necessarily fixed.‖ CME, Separate Opinion by Ian Brownlie, supra note 672, at para. 76. 
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of compensation.
929
  This is an important aspect of this separate opinion because 
the compensation in the award followed the scheme of compensation for lawful 
nationalization and equity based on a reasonable rate of return. By agreeing to the 
scheme of compensation applied by the Tribunal, Fitzmaurice, while considering 
nationalization in that case inconsistent with the stabilization clause and unlawful, 
implied the rejection of the assertion that the compensation for nationalization and 
the long term concession should include future profits for the term of the 
concession based on claimant‘s calculations.     
There are various grounds to object to the internationalization theory. One 
objection concerns the lack of an international obligation for the private party.
930
   
Moreover, the engagement of a State under a treaty is much higher in terms of the 
consequences of a breach and by that matter the evaluation of the effect of general 
principles of pacta sunt servanda or good faith in the formation of the rule by the 
recognized body of the system. The practical view equating an economic 
development agreement with a treaty is not always elevating the concession but 
degrading the treaty or international law in general as well. One equally 
unacceptable corollary of the internationalization theory of economic 
development agreements is the validity of Calvo clauses on the international plane 
as well.
931
  
The fundamental objection in terms of legitimacy here to the 
internationalization theory is still its projection as lex lata than its real status as lex 
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ferenda. Customary international law regards unilateral termination of an 
economic development agreement a lawful conduct giving rise to payment of 
compensation under existing expropriation rules.   According to White, in 
international law, ―the right of concessionaire was assimilated to other kinds of 
property owned by an alien in that the expropriation of this right by means of 
premature cancellation of the concession was not per se an international wrong, 
unless it was in a breach of a treaty provision. The responsibility of the 
expropriating State arose only if the cancellation were arbitrary, discriminatory or 
if adequate compensation were not paid.‖932 Still, White viewed that a contractual 
commitment not to nationalize is unlawful.
933
 The argument advanced is that 
international law does not prevent a State to restrict legislative freedom for a 
limited period of time.
934
 Yet this only shifts the argument as the question is what 
customary rule prohibits a State to revoke a stabilization clause. What rule of 
international rule exists to make a difference between a contract and a 
stabilization clause to justify that pacta sunt servanda cannot restrict a State in 
international law but a stabilization clause as part of the contract can? What 
customary international rule characterizes the international legal order of a 
stabilization clause equating it with a treaty? The view is not expressing the status 
of custom but a practical view part of the internationalization theory.  
International law applies to investment contracts by virtue of customary 
rules on expropriation of foreign property. That is a limitation upon States. 
Investment contracts still have not acquired the status and effect of a treaty to 
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render their unilateral change unlawful under international law.
935
 Nor does a 
choice by the parties of public international law as the governing law place the 
contract on the international plane because ―a State contract is not a treaty and 
cannot involve State responsibility as an international obligation.‖936 Brownlie, 
noting a school of thought that argues a breach of a State contract per se gives rise 
to international responsibility, maintains that ―apart from the merits of these 
arguments, it has to be recognized that there is little solid evidence that the 
position they tend to support corresponds to the existing law.‖937 Brownlie adds 
that ―[t]here is no evidence that the principles of acquired rights and pacta sunt 
servanda have the particular consequences contended for.‖938  
 There is no State practice and opinion to corroborate that the status of 
customary international law has changed with regard to stabilization clauses. 
While stating conditions of legality for the conduct of State in expropriation such 
as discrimination as part of international law with certainty, Brownlie only 
observes that ―it has been suggested that this category includes … takings 
contrary to promises amounting to estoppels.‖939 With reference to the Aminoil 
approach, a stabilization clause may be taken by a tribunal to weigh different 
circumstances as to the annulment of the contract.
940
 Still Brownlie, in response  
to the view asserting that terminating a concession in violation of an explicit 
undertaking in the concession not to annul was unlawful independent of the law 
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on expropriation for payment of compensation, states that ―[t]his view almost 
certainly does not represent the positive law‖ though ―not without merit.‖941  
From the municipal law standpoint, equality of the contracting parties to 
justify the prevention of a unilateral termination by the public authority in public 
contracts is also a fiction.
 
A stabilization clause in public contracts is short of 
validity in the law of the US, UK and other developed countries.
942
 Likewise, 
public law, which takes into account economic development as a pertinent factor 
lowering compensation, is advanced as a more relevant basis for the assessment of 
the valuation of the expropriated assets than a private law basis.
943
   
There is no customary determination to accord an economic development 
agreement or a stabilization clause therein a status of an international law 
obligation to render its unilateral termination or the nationalization act unlawful 
on the international plane. It requires other conditions of legality established in 
customary international law to characterize the conduct unlawful. This status of 
                                                 
941
 Brownlie, Principles, supra note 424, at 525. (―When a concession contract is made with a 
foreign interest, it is quite unrealistic to treat this contract as a fundamental law, overriding the 
power of legislation within the State concerned producing rigidity in the economy. … What 
foreign investors cannot expect to obtain is an acquired right, so to speak, to influence or even 
control the economy of the host State as a result of legal doctrines that purport to create 
indefeasible rights for foreign investors.‖) Brownlie, Legal Status, supra note 445, at 309. 
942
 The practice of States in their domestic laws shows public contracts by virtue of their special 
position may be unilaterally terminated by the government. Brownlie, Principles, supra note 424, 
at 524. See also Bowett, supra note 854, at 55-56. Bowett observes that the in the United States 
public contracts provide for a ‗termination for convenience‘ clause, which in its absence is implied 
by the US Courts, whereby anticipatory profits shall not be recoverable but only certain profit for 
the work done. Ibid. at 56. In the US and the UK systems, upon cancellation of public contracts as 
a result of expropriation effected by a legislative act, the statutory right becomes an implied term 
of the contract and the cancellation is a lawful act without incurring  damages (future profits) but 
only just compensation.  Bowett ibid. at 57-58. Bowett cites US Supreme Court holding that ―The 
taking of private party for public use upon just compensation is so often necessary for the proper 
performance of governmental functions that the power is deemed essential to the life of the State. 
It cannot be surrendered, and, if attempted to be contracted away, it may be resumed at will.‖ Ibid. 
at 57, citing Georgia v. City of Chatanooga, 264 US 472, 480 (1924).)  The study of municipal 
systems of developed countries supports this view: ―[t]he most radical of special prerogatives 
enjoyed by the administration is the right to terminate the contract unilaterally, when the public 
interest so requires. This drastic power is a wide spread feature of national systems of 
procurement, and is evidently considered necessary in order to maintain the freedom of action of 
public authorities.‖ International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. 2, Contracts in General, 
ch. 4, Public Contracts at 40.  
943
 Brownlie, Legal Status, supra note 445, at 281. (―The valuation of expropriated assets should 
not be on a private law basis but on a public law basis. The modern public law basis would involve 
assessment in terms of an allowance in favour of territorial sovereign to the extent that the objects 
of the company concerned had digressed from an objective standard of reasonable economic 
development.‖) Ibid. 
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customary international law has remained unchanged.  Investment treaties do not 
even in general terms provide for a unilateral termination or breach of a contract 
as a condition of legality for expropriation.
944
  
Rarely does an investment treaty contain respect for commitments as a 
condition of expropriation, thereby turning it into an unlawful conduct.
945
 Within 
other provisions of the treaty, an umbrella clause is a familiar term that deals with 
States‘ commitments outside the treaty such as contractual commitments. The 
majority of investment treaties do not embody even a broad umbrella clause.
946
 
Moreover, when a general umbrella clause enters a hard penumbra, its effect 
would go no further than reverting to a contingent general principle of pacta sunt 
servanda depending on customary determination for the specific situation of the 
hard penumbra. This can explain the approach by the SGS v. Pakistan to rightly 
find a general umbrella clause incapable of impeding the conduct of the State 
when having far-reaching implications for the State for which the acceptance of 
the treaty obligation by the State is unclear.
947
 Even if there were specific treaty 
provisions prohibiting a unilateral termination of economic development 
agreements in the field of petroleum or other natural resources, such provisions, 
while relevant to the parties to the treaty, would fail to be per se declaratory of 
customary international law. It would require indications outside the treaty 
context demonstrating State opinion and practice to accept the unlawfulness of 
such a termination under international law.  
States‘ acceptance that international law applies to their contract does not 
mean creating rules for international law by the tribunal to characterize lawful 
conduct unlawful in international law. It requires a customary determination 
through State opinion and practice for the particular situation of economic 
development of natural resources to demonstrate formation of a new customary 
                                                 
944
 The four conditions of legality commonly embodied are non-discrimination, due process, 
public purpose, and payment of compensation. See supra note 844.  
945
 The FTA between New Zealand and China contains a general provision on the prohibition of 
expropriation contrary to other commitments of the State. See the Free Trade Agreement Between 
The Government of New Zealand And The Government of the People‘s Republic of China, 2009, 
Article 145 (1) (d), available online at http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/2-Text-of-
the-agreement/0-downloads/NZ-ChinaFTA-Agreement-text.pdf. 
946
 See supra note 826. 
947
 See supra note 669 and accompanying text. 
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rule to hold their unilateral termination unlawful. Under customary international 
law, with permanent sovereignty over natural resources grounded in the structural 
principle of self-determination and self-preservation, nationalization of natural 
resources even in the face of a contractual commitment for the stability of contract 
is lawful. No customary rule has emerged to prescribe otherwise.   
The most fundamental objection to the internationalization theory is in 
view of the legitimacy criteria of recognition and coherence. The sole arbitrator in 
Texaco was ready to accept that without a stabilization clause the concession 
provided freedom to amend or terminate the contract similar to an administrative 
contract but not with a stabilization clause.
948
 The sole arbitrator in Texaco asked 
if the right to nationalize, as a right within the  framework of international law, 
does not have limits in international law and that if it authorizes States to 
disregard international commitments.
949
  Yet, the sole arbitrator bypassed the 
fundamental question as to how those limits are written into international law. 
This is right in view of the legitimacy criterion of recognition. The limits on the 
rights of States in international law on foreign investment derive from customary 
determinations not the practical views of a tribunal. Those who express practical 
views are not the authors of international law.  
The sole arbitrator in Texaco branded the conflicting views and practices, 
which were consistent with customary international law that did not determine the 
unilateral termination of a concession unlawful in international law, as lex ferenda 
and contra legem.
950
 Instead, the arbitrator in that case projected his own practical 
view, rooted in analogy of economic development agreements with private 
contracts for the equality of contracting parties and at the same time analogy with 
treaties to deem the contractual obligations of States of an international character, 
as lex lata and positive international law.
951
 The sole arbitrator substituted his own 
lex ferenda for the lex lata of international law that did not in a customary 
determination impose a restriction upon the conduct of States for unilaterally 
                                                 
948
 Texaco, supra note 766,  at 56,72. 
949
 Ibid. at 61,74. 
950
 See ibid. at 55-57, 72, 79-80, 87-88.  
951
 Ibid.  
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terminating a contract except for the payment of compensation under rules of 
international law on lawful expropriation. Projecting practical views, which may 
be compatible with certain principles or practical views expressed by other 
tribunals or academics, as lex lata is a major flaw in view of the legitimacy 
criterion of coherence as well. Even assuming the power of the sole arbitrator in 
Texaco to apply general principles of law in a creative function to engage in 
justice evaluation, which the sole arbitrator did not assert and clearly presented its 
award as lex lata, by branding competing views as contra legem, the arbitrator 
still did not take into appropriate consideration other demands of justice. The sole 
arbitrator was bound by virtue of the contingent character of principles relied and 
the legitimacy criterion of coherence for the common good to take into account 
those principles and practical views expressing them as only one demand of 
justice. Accordingly, coherence required taking into appropriate consideration the 
competing or conflicting demands of justice expressed by other principles such as 
self-determination, which was of structural character in international law and by 
no means subordinated to a substantive principle of pacta sunt servanda in a 
contractual relationship of States. Instead, the sole arbitrator assumed and 
projected the contingent principles of pacta sunt servanda and good faith in this 
hard penumbra and the practical views including his own advocating them, as the 
authoritative statement of the law. By presupposing the principles advocated by 
his practical view as the status of law rationalizing restitution rather than payment 
of compensation for nationalization, the sole arbitrator in Texaco departed from 
the legitimacy criterion of coherence for the common good. Nationalizations for 
economic reforms in natural resources are not exempt from the duty of 
compensation under customary international law. Yet, to include restitution or 
future profits in this hard penumbra requires a genuine consideration of the 
demands of justice for the common good. In the Texaco Arbitration, the award of 
restitution, instead of compensation under customary international rules on lawful 
expropriation, was a latent determination task without a genuine consideration of 
the competing demands of justice represented by the principle of self-
determination in international law. Under the analysis in the Texaco Arbitration, 
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the principle of self-determination was already subordinated as lex ferenda to the 
overriding character of pacta sunt servanda and the practical views expressing it 
assumed as lex lata.  This way the common good never came into focus to meet 
legitimacy.    
A practical view for the internationalization of economic development 
agreements emerged which still has supporters but never in a unanimous or 
prevalent fashion even in the capacity of a practical view. A customary rule did 
not exist to prescribe that nationalization amounting to a unilateral termination of 
an investment agreement was per se unlawful irrespective of respect for other 
conditions of legality for expropriation. Moreover, for the internationalization 
theory and its desired outcome to obtain a binding statement of the law, it required 
a customary determination by way of subscription by States in their practice and 
opinion. A positive subscription and customary determination has never 
materialized to endorse the internationalization theory. Future profits in 
calculation of compensation is therefore unwarranted on the ground of the 
unlawfulness of the unilateral termination of economic development agreements 
under nationalization in natural resources as this conduct is lawful in customary 
international law.  
The question of future profits may still be examined in terms of equity. 
That consideration is possible in view of the legitimacy requirement of the rule of 
recognition that permits a degree of discretion in measuring compensation in the 
absence of a rule. The arbitrator in Liamco referred to equity for the assessment of 
compensation.
952
 It was unclear whether the figure it reached represented 
compensatory future profits avoiding unjust enrichment of the State or 
anticipatory profits in excess of a fair rate of return carrying unjust enrichment of 
investors. The Aminoil Tribunal also referred to equitable considerations in the 
assessment of the amount of compensation for nationalization based on a 
                                                 
952
 Liamco, supra note 766, at paras.  43-45, 149-151, 156-162, 167-171. The Tribunal awarded $ 
66 million (instead of about $ 186 million claimed) as equitable compensation for the 
nationalization of the concession rights of LIAMCO in Raguba Field but without explaining the 
details how it reached this sum and how much was for the unjust enrichment of Libya or how it 
was different from the loss of profit (apparently all for the unjust enrichment as the compensation 
for physical assets and equipment was  awarded under a separate heading) Ibid.  
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reasonable rate of return.
953
 The reasonable rate of return was adopted by the 
Tribunal to represent the legitimate expectation and the equilibrium of the 
contract in calculation of risks and benefits.
954
 On the other hand, the reasonable 
rate of return adopted by the Tribunal did not incorporate future profits for the 
term of the concession based on the claimant‘s methods and calculations.955 The 
sole arbitrator in BP pointed out a more fundamental legal factor. One basis for 
future profits is the assumption of ownership rights in natural resources extracted 
after nationalization for the private company. The BP arbitrator rejected that 
assumption.
956
 Hence, even an unlawful nationalization as was found in the BP 
case on the basis of discrimination was not deemed to automatically recover 
future revenue from the resources as one basic corollary of nationalization is the 
cessation of ownership to the resource extracted after nationalization for the 
private company.  
Future profits may be raised as a demand of justice against a mere net 
book  valuation of the nationalized property in natural resources that fails to 
compensate investors for their capital invested and remuneration for services 
                                                 
953
 Aminoil, supra note 766, at 1016,-1017, 1036-1038. 
954
Ibid. at 1037-1038. The Tribunal held that ―… when a concession comes to an end.  
Compensation then must be calculated on a basis such as to warrant the upkeep of a flow of 
investment in the future.‖ Ibid. at 1033, para. 147. It also held that ―…with reference to a long 
term contract, especially such as involve an important investment, there must necessarily be 
economic calculations, and the weighing up of rights and obligations, of chances and risks, 
constituting the contractual equilibrium. This equilibrium cannot be neglected- neither when it is a 
question of proceeding to necessary adaptations during the course of the contract, nor when it is a 
question of awarding compensation.‖ Ibid. at 1034, para. 148. The Tribunal found stabilization 
clause, though not effective to forbid nationalization, as a factor that ―created for the 
concessionaire a legitimate expectation‖ to be considered in the assessment of compensation, Ibid. 
at 1037, para. 159, which the Tribunal linked to the respect for the concession equilibrium and 
reasonable rate of return.  Ibid. 1037, paras, 159-160.  
955
 Ibid. at 1035, paras. 153-154. The claimant‘s amount represented ―an estimate on lines of the 
principle of a restitutio in integrum founded on the assumption that the Concession should have 
continued for its full term under the contractual conditions fixed in 1961, without modification. 
This calculation is based on a projection of quantities of oil recovered, the prices, the costs of 
production, and the operations to be undertaken until the end of the concession.‖ Ibid. at para. 153. 
The Tribunal arrived at slightly over $ 200 million, which less Aminoil‘s liabilities came to $ 83 
million reaching to almost $ 180 million with the inclusion of interest, against the claimant‘s 
amount of which the sole item of lost profits claimed was close to $ 2.6 billion.  See ibid. at 984, 
1041-42, paras. 178-179. 
956
 (―The contention as to the ownership of oil extracted from the concession area after the date of 
the BP Nationalisation Law is based on the assumption that the BP Concession survived the 
nationalisation; that assumption is not accepted by the Tribunal. … It may be added that the fact 
that ownership of the oil it its natural strata is vested in the State of Libya under the Petroleum 
Law of 1955 does not argue in favour of the claimant.‖) BP, supra note 766, at 355. 
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rendered which are only recoverable in a fair rate of return through the revenue 
(future profits) from the resource produced in the future. Oil companies are well 
entitled to a fair rate of return for their share in making a barren field a 
commercial field. However, fairness also demands not to allow anticipatory 
profits that go beyond a fair rate of return in proportion to capital invested and 
services rendered to avoid unjust enrichment on the part of the investors.   
Whether outright nationalization or participation arrangements these have 
usually followed circumstances that push the oil price not attributable to extra 
work or services of the foreign oil company but other circumstances including 
policy decisions of oil producing countries at the global level. The increase in the 
oil price, which is the primary cause for the redistribution of future profits, is 
rarely attributable to the oil company to have a genuine claim for it beyond a fair 
rate of return from the revenue of the oil to recover capital investments and 
remuneration for services rendered. It is often a surge in the oil price that disrupts 
the original equilibrium of the agreement resulting in profits of the companies far 
in excess of the stated, agreed, assumed, or anticipated rate of return earning them 
their anticipated return for their investment, risks and services far earlier than the 
projected years of amortization. A fair rate of return not for the revenue lost 
during the term of the concession but in proportion to the capital invested and 
services rendered to compensate the portions of the capital and remuneration that 
are not yet recovered seems an equitable basis for compensation of nationalization 
in revenue generating natural resources. In fairness, neither a net book valuation 
denying remuneration of investors for the services rendered nor a discounted cash 
flow valuation for future profits for the term of the contract meets the demands of 
justice. Both methods are prone to unjust enrichment. An equitable compensation 
is thus bound by the legitimacy requirement of coherence for the common good to 
consider the competing demands of justice. This in the first place requires 
refraining from according a lex lata status to the principle of full compensation or 
practical views advocating unlawfulness of unilateral termination of economic 
development agreements to rationalize future profits for the term of the 
concession from the legal standpoint. In hard penumbra of economic development 
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agreements subjected to economic reforms in natural resources, the remedy of 
such future profits is substantiated neither in law nor in fairness.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has maintained that the authority of international rules hinges 
on adherence to structural criteria of legitimacy. Recognition and coherence were 
advanced as tests of authoritative force of international obligations. These criteria 
were developed in a common good approach to frame the determinacy of the 
substance of international obligations of States and their authoritative force in 
international law on foreign investment beyond principles, precedents and 
analogies. An underlying theme articulated thorough these criteria was that the 
substance of law in hard indeterminacies in international law requires moral and 
political evaluation germane to its own particular context and subject to its own 
rule of recognition to meet the legitimacy of structure.   Consistency or stability in 
the application of general rules in this account of determinacy and legitimacy 
became illusive for their deficiency in an authoritative force for a particular 
indeterminate instance in need of fresh construction by the criteria of coherence 
and recognition. 
Building upon the rule of law and legitimacy in the notion of limitation on 
authority and power of rules and rule-makers, this study displayed the tie between 
the authoritative determinacy of the substance and the legitimacy of structure of 
rules. The thesis has espoused a common good approach to justify both the test of 
coherence to assimilate moral evaluation and consideration of all demands of 
justice in rule formation in each particular situation of indeterminacy and the test 
of recognition to discipline validation of powers of rule-makers. The common 
good was also discussed to assess desirability in light of compatibility with human 
values and dignity in the validation criteria of the rule of recognition for the 
consensual or constitutional scheme of, and concomitant participants in, the 
construction of rights and obligations in international law.  
Raising determinacy and indeterminacy from the open texture of law 
standpoint in legal theory lying at the root of legal interpretation—discrete  from 
conflict between existing rules at its surface—the thesis showed that moral and 
political conceptions than legal prescriptions in established authority figure in 
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areas of indeterminacies. Different sorts of principles including practical, moral 
and general principles of law were distinguished to further display the deficit of 
authoritative force of most substantive principles introduced as contingent 
principles as opposed to absolute principles. All these underlined the distortion of 
lex lata rooted in contingent principles and precedents and dependency on fresh 
evaluation and legal determination to make the scope of the law coherent for the 
particular situation of indeterminacy. General principles and precedents of 
national or international pedigree lack authority once in the indeterminacy zone 
where coherence requires fresh justice evaluation rendering Statements expressing 
them all some demands in lex ferenda. The substance of law in hard 
indeterminacies cannot replicate conceptions of justice germane to contexts of 
different moral and political dimensions without meeting the common good. 
Coherence was stressed as a legitimacy criterion to make legal determination and 
extend legal order into a particular field of indeterminacy taking into account all 
justice demands and associated social aims or policy considerations for the 
common good in an evaluative exercise. The rule of recognition was emphasized 
as a legitimacy criterion to measure validation of the power of international 
adjudicators to engage in such an evaluative function.  
Practices surrounding international adjudication and architecture of 
sources of international law were discussed at the State and International Court 
levels to further assess the status of the adjudicative determination power in 
international law. Consistent with the general rule of recognition of international 
law recognizing and validating a consensual framework of construction of 
primary rules and obligations of States, these practices showed that adjudicative 
legislative function engaging in moral and political evaluations for States is not in 
line with the general rule of recognition of international law. These practices 
further did not corroborate the resort to notions of equity, non-liquet, material 
completeness of law, or the gaps of law to rationalize an implied discretionary 
power for international adjudicators to create rules and obligations for States. 
Particular authorization or recognition was noted in that States may by way of 
particular authorizations delegate a determination power to international 
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adjudicators or a reform may occur in the content of the international rule of 
recognition for recognition of a constitutional construction of rights in a particular 
field as in human rights. Aside from such particular authorization or recognition 
or areas subject to absolute principles, with the incapacity of contingent 
substantive principles to define the content of justice, equity, or fairness for a 
particular issue in hard cases, customary international law was described as the 
genuine framework of legal determination in a consensual pattern for hard 
indeterminacies in international law. On this account, the customary framework of 
determination, unlike general principles, was identified as the scheme of 
construction of general primary rules of obligations compatible with the structural 
criteria of legitimacy of coherence and recognition for the determination of the 
substance of States obligations in hard indeterminacies in foreign investment. An 
evaluative account of customary international was also offered with a key 
distinction between the constitutive elements of customary international law and 
the constitutive statements building customary determinations. This account 
explained an utterly obscure aspect of customary international law, namely 
participation of non-State actors at an evaluative level of customary rule 
construction, thereby reconciling primary and subsidiary sources of international 
law in a disciplined manner compatible with its rule of recognition. Practical 
views by State and non-State actors—along with principles and precedents 
expressing them— were presented as the evaluative layer of customary 
international law determination occurring in lex ferenda distinguished from the 
lex lata status of a customary determination built by States‘ subscription through 
widespread, general State practice and opinion to a proposed lex ferenda.  
 The rule of recognition and coherence for the common good in the next 
step framed the analysis of property protection of corporations in international law 
on foreign investment to justify contingent nature and consensual structure of the 
property rights of corporations in this field. The criterion of coherence and 
theoretical underpinnings of contingent principles explained the defects of a 
general standard of treatment, vested or acquired rights or conflation with human 
rights in the legal discourse of protection of property of corporations in foreign 
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investment. Rights of human beings in human rights stand in stark contrast to 
rights of corporations in foreign investment. This contrast was described in two 
major distinctions. The absolute character of human rights or constitutional 
structure for their construction and corresponding obligations of States were 
distinguished from the contingent character and consensual structure of rights of 
corporations in foreign investment. The consensual characteristic of rights of 
corporations was substantiated in the first place by  practices in this field that 
consistent with general rule of recognition accentuate reference to the intention or 
consent of States in specific or general terms for the scope of their obligations in 
hard penumbra. The consensual structure for the determination of rights of 
corporations in foreign investment was also justified in terms of common good. 
The public character of a forum essential to justify in view of the common good 
the desirability of an adjudicative determination of the content of obligations of 
States was found to be absent in investor-State arbitration. The thesis also 
underscored the basic value of self-determination of States in international law as 
another essential element of common good to make such a determination 
justifiable. It underlined that self-determination of States in the interests of 
flourishing their human members would be directly attacked if moral and political 
evaluations and subsequent legal determination of hard questions in foreign 
investment are systematically subject to adjudicative determination. Being 
substantiated by practices and justified by the common good and consistent with 
the general international rule of recognition, a consensual construction of property 
rights of corporations and corresponding obligations of States in international law 
on foreign investment in the customary framework of determination was found 
the requirement of legitimacy.   
Finally, the criteria of recognition and coherences for the common good 
developed in the thesis were employed to assess the legitimacy in the concept of 
expropriation and its evaluation in view of customary determinations in two major 
instances of hard indeterminacy in this domain. Bona fide regulation of States for 
public and human protection as an instance of hard penumbra in the conduct of 
States arising in the concept of expropriation was assessed in the framework of 
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legitimacy. Discussing lex lata in the background of customary international law, 
it was found that customary international law did not determine the bona fide 
regulation of States affecting foreign investment as expropriation and thereby did 
not require compensation for bona fide regulation interfering with foreign 
investment unless the conduct had an unlawful character determined in customary 
international law such as discrimination. In line with the framework of legitimacy 
of recognition and coherence, therefore, the statements expressing precedents, 
principles and opinions of arbitral tribunals to qualify bona fide regulation as 
expropriation were characterized as practical statements expressing desirability 
and evaluation, i.e. lex ferenda. The sole effect doctrine and proportionality tests 
were discussed as practical views that require subscription by States in cogent 
practice and opinion to represent the statement of the law, i.e. lex lata. It was 
observed that no positive State practice or opinion exists to show the formation of 
a customary determination to deem bona fide regulation as expropriation without 
the unlawfulness of the conduct under customary international law. Moreover, it 
was observed that such practical views have received a negative response by 
States in their recent practice and opinion. In view of this negative response, a 
customary determination to change the position of customary international law to 
characterize bona fide regulation of States on the weight of the sole impact of the 
conduct of States or the proportionality of its burden on foreign investment in 
international law is not only presently absent but also unlikely to form in future.  
In the same line of reasoning, the thesis approached the question of future 
profits as another hard penumbra surrounding the question of compensation and 
legality in the concept of expropriation for unilateral termination of State 
contracts in implementation of nationalizations for economic development reform 
in natural resources. Exploring the position of lex lata, it was observed that no 
customary international law determination existed to consider a unilateral 
termination of an economic development agreement unlawful per se in 
international law to justify future profits for the term of the contract on the ground 
of unlawfulness of the conduct. In addition, it was observed that no customary 
determination existed to require such future profits as part of the standard of 
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compensation.  Consistent with the criteria of recognition and coherence, the 
opinions advocating unlawfulness of the unilateral termination of economic 
development agreements in natural resources or future profits as a requirement of 
compensation standard were found expressions of lex ferenda discordant with 
customary international law.  
In both of these hard indeterminacies of bona fide regulation and future 
profits for economic development reform in natural resource, reliance on 
precedents and principles to transfer their authority to these hard instances and 
project opinions expressing lex ferenda as lex lata fell afoul to the criteria of 
coherence and recognition. In hard penumbra according the private interests of 
corporations the advantage of lex lata on the weight of authority elicited from 
principles and precedents rooted in analogy for what is actually no more than 
expression of lex ferenda subject to fresh determination is an affront to 
legitimacy. Assumption of principles and precedents as the statements of law in 
favor of private corporations branding appropriate opposing demands of justice of 
States as lex ferenda frustrates coherence for the common good.  Such an 
approach disguises latent engagement by arbitrators in a creative function without 
adhering to the criterion of coherence that requires a genuine consideration of all 
demands of justice for the common good. Engagement in an adjudicative creative 
function additionally frustrates the rule of recognition that requires a consensual 
determination of the obligations of States for the conduct and consequence in the 
concept of expropriation of property in international law on foreign investment.       
In the absence of a theoretically sound framework of legitimacy to sift 
practical views from juridical statements in order to legitimate the authority of 
purported rules, interpretation of international obligations of States in investment 
arbitration would be a process to foist the conception of justice of an arbitral panel 
at the best or to instill arbitrators‘ bias at the worst. To rise to the status of 
juridical statements of law, practical views need to obtain subscription by State 
practice and opinion. In the current structure of international law on foreign 
investment, State practice and opinion represent the legitimate unifying actor of 
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the mass of competing and conflicting practical views in the field of foreign 
investment.   
This thesis has espoused a new horizon for legal reasoning in foreign 
investment disputes in international law by offering a framework of legitimacy in 
light of the common good of human beings with structural criteria of coherence 
and recognition for the determinacy of international obligations of States. In this 
horizon, the banal method to extract authority from principles and precedents in 
interpretation of hard penumbra surrounding international obligations of States in 
international law on foreign investment is the most obscure and offensive manner 
of departure from the legitimacy criteria of recognition and coherence for the 
common good. The authority of principles and precedents having a pedigree in 
past legal materials of national or international origin is of no weight for hard 
penumbra as it ceases to exist once in hard indeterminacies posing acute moral 
and political evaluations. In this horizon, limitations upon States may rather figure 
in absolute principles or constitutional construction of rights and concomitant 
adjudicative determination power. The legitimacy framework of coherence and 
recognition offered in this thesis stands steadfast in assimilating such limitations. 
No change in the framework that requires adherence to coherence and recognition 
is necessary in order to limit the conduct of States in international law by virtue of 
absolute principles or constitutional character of rights. A constitutional approach 
of limitations upon the conduct of States rather hinges on the practices and the 
common good justifying reform in the content or even the origin of the 
international rule recognition. There is no rigid stance to project the content and 
origin of the international rule of recognition impervious to change. Yet, this 
requires supporting practices and justification of the common good in the interests 
of human beings.  
The content of the international rule of recognition has already succumbed 
to reform in the field of human rights, validating a constitutional approach to 
rights of human beings and corresponding limitations on States.  If the practice of 
States is somewhat immature to show this reform fully, the common of the good 
of the community heavily justifies it.  The practices and common good 
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justification in the field of foreign investment are in an opposite direction. The 
protection of corporations in foreign investment consists in a consensual pattern 
requiring State practice and opinions in a customary framework of determination 
to determine the substance of obligations of States in hard indeterminacies. To 
assume investment treaties rights as constitutional and investment treaty tribunals 
as supreme courts determining their content departs from practices and the 
common good. A constitutional characterization of substantive rights of 
corporations in national systems or special or regional frameworks of dispute 
settlement within the powers of public courts in national systems is neither 
unprecedented nor unfounded. A constitutional construction of the property rights 
of corporations in international law to lay limitations upon States in hard 
indeterminacies through arbitral creative power faces major tests of practice and 
common good. The practices set in establishing a consensual construction of 
property rights of corporations in hard cases in international law on foreign 
investment are extremely unlikely to reverse.  The common good justifications 
supporting this consensual scheme of rights are even more plausible to last.  
On core matters of policies and principles in interpretation of hard 
indeterminacies in substantive obligations of States under international law, the 
process of dispute settlement in investment arbitration is bound by the legitimacy 
criteria of coherence and recognition within the structure of international law. In 
the long run, this would elevate the standing of investment arbitration building 
confidence for States and their democratic constituents. Customary international 
law should be restored in its fundamental position for the normative structure and 
substance of obligations of States in hard cases of foreign investment. The 
regulatory role of States in the interests of their collective and individual human 
members is ever increasing. To advance a constitutional approach to property 
rights of corporations in international law on foreign investment, shifting justice 
evaluation and policy decisions with far-reaching implications for the powers or 
funds of States from democratic processes to arbitral tribunals, is an ambitious 
agenda for international law. This agenda is remote in prospect and distant from 
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the common good when the flourishing of human beings is the primary value and 
the ultimate end.  
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